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Abstract: This thesis considers the link between changes in the shareholder ownership 
structure and the governance of firms. Making use of extensive interview data it assesses the 
governance activities of asset managers in Germany, the UK and the US. The thesis makes use 
of the varieties of capitalism framework to assess the extent of convergence or divergence 
between the respective national varieties. Since the largest asset managers are US firms, the 
institutionalisation of share ownership could be expected to lead to the Americanisation of 
global corporate governance. However, despite a convergence in form, no corresponding 
convergence in function is observed. Instead a considerable continuity in the heterogeneity of 
national models of capitalism is noted. This is due to national differences in the relative 
resourcing of active and passive asset managers, of proxy advisors and corporates as well as 
the approach followed by the respective governments. In the US, where index funds have a 
comparatively larger market share, the domestic regulatory approach results in a bigger 
potential for conflict between shareholders and corporate managers. In the UK and Germany, 
on the other hand, the relationship between asset managers and corporates is shown to be less 
antagonistic. This is due to the greater relevance of proxy advisors, the smaller market share of 
US index funds, the stewardship approach of domestic asset managers and because of the 
regulatory approach pursued by the governments in the UK and Germany, which seeks to 





Lay Summary: Over the past century the shareholder ownership structure of the typical stock 
market listed company has been turned on its head. Instead of holding shares directly, most 
households today hold shares indirectly via pensions and investment products offered by asset 
management firms. Because of substantial economies of scale, the asset management industry 
is dominated by a relatively small group of very large firms. The voting rights that come with 
these shareholdings give this small number of asset managers substantial say in how companies 
are to be run. It is therefore important to understand how these asset managers cast their votes 
and what the consequences of this are for individual firms and for their respective national 
models of capitalism. To answer these questions a large number of UK, US, and German asset 
managers and stock market listed companies and their advisors were interviewed. The results 
show that differences in attitudes as well as differences in the relative resourcing of actors 
(index funds, active funds, domestic funds, foreign funds, corporates and proxy advisors) mean 
that in each of these countries the relationship between asset managers and companies differs. 
Instead of the growth of the asset management industry leading to an Americanisation of 
national models of capitalism, national models of capitalism therefore continue to exhibit 
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Most people, whether they live in Germany, the UK or the US, will not be aware that through 
their pension funds as well as any household savings invested in mutual funds or Exchange 
Traded Funds (ETFs), they have an indirect say about how some of the biggest companies in 
the world are run. They will also not have heard of proxy advisors such as ISS or Glass Lewis 
that assist the institutional investors, who manage those savings, in voting their shareholdings. 
They will therefore be unaware of the struggle that is unfolding between corporates and 
shareholder interests to different degree in the three countries concerned.  
 
The influence of institutional investors, and consequently the indirect say of private investors 
and pensioners, stems from the voting rights that come with shareholdings. In principle, each 
ordinary share has one voting right.1 The more shares an investor holds, the greater the 
percentage voting rights they represent. The growth of institutional investors documented in 
this thesis has therefore resulted in an increase in the size of asset managers’ average voting 
blocs, which in turn has changed the balance of power between corporate executives and 
institutional investors in Germany, the UK and the US. 
 
 
1 There are exceptions to this: Some companies issue “preference” shares alongside “ordinary” shares that 
typically make up for a lack of voting rights with higher dividends. Other firms, particularly from US tech firms, 
have been criticised for either issuing shares without voting rights, or providing their founders with voting rights 
that are up to 500x higher (“dual class” shares). It is considered “best practice” for companies to only have share 
with equal voting rights. For further information, see: https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/survey-
reports/dual-class-shares-apac-survey-report (Accessed 14 January 2020). 
 2 
Up until 1965 individual shareholders held the vast majority of shares of listed companies, 
representing approximately 84 percent of all outstanding shares in the US (Useem, 1996).2 
During this time, individual shareholders faced a collective action problem in organising their 
interest vis-à-vis company management. In the UK and Germany, the level of individual 
ownership was not as high as in the US, however, the collective action problems were 
comparable. Since a large number of private individual investors each held a very small part 
of the company’s shares, they were thus likely to be rationally apathetic when it comes to 
exercising corporate control (Berle and Means, 1932; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Berle and 
Means therefore concluded that the listed corporation has ‘destroyed the unity that we 
commonly call property’ and split ‘the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control 
and beneficial ownership' (1933: 8). The result of this separation was that control of the firm 
rested with management. The era from the 1930s to the late 1980s therefore became known as 
the era of “managerialism” (Davis, 2009).  
 
Since the time of Berle and Means the ownership structure of publicly listed companies in the 
United States and Europe has been turned on its head. From holding less than thirty percent of 
outstanding shares in 1965, institutional shareholders grew to control 50 percent of the shares 
of US listed companies in 1990 and continued to increase their holdings by approximately one 
percentage point per year, reaching approximately seventy percent of shares outstanding in 
2018 (Useem, 1996; PwC, 2018). In the case of the largest US companies, those contained in 
the S&P 500 index, institutional ownership stands even higher at eighty percent of shares as of 
 
2 Data for the UK and Germany is incomplete. Rydqvist et al. (2010) report that UK households held 65.7 
percent of UK share capital in 1957, and German households held 32.8 percent in 1953, therefore showing that 
UK and German households never held as many shares as their US peers. However, the overall trend of falling 
household share ownership and rising institutional share ownership is.   
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April 2017 (Pensions & Investments, 2017). Furthermore, much of the remaining individual 
ownership today is by employees, especially company founders and top management.3  
 
The development in the UK and Germany largely mirrored that seen in the US. Institutional 
share ownership increased continually from the 1970s to reach 44 percent in the UK and 77 
percent in Germany by 1990 and then continuing to increase further,  to reach approximately 
90 percent in both countries by the middle of this decade (European Commission, 2013; 
Jürgens and Rupp, 2002; UK ONS, 2018).  
 
This re-concentration of corporate ownership has had the effect that corporate managers are 
today faced with shareholders that represent much larger stakes, are better resourced and are 
able to coordinate their actions with greater ease. The biggest of these institutional investors 
are the large asset managers, who manage funds on behalf of private individuals, corporates 
and pension funds as well as other investors such as family offices and sovereign wealth funds. 
Their large stakes have provided asset managers with the means to exert greater influence over 
corporate strategy. While they have these means this does not, however, mean they necessarily 
make use of them.  
 
The way in which asset managers seek to influence companies’ corporate governance is 
through “engagement” or “stewardship” activities. In the process of stewardship, most 
investors follow “escalation policies” or “escalation strategies”. These policies arrange 
different means of engagement along a spectrum of options, typically starting with private 
 
3 Technology companies such as Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet or SAP are examples of companies where the 
founders maintain stock ownership. Furthermore, the National Center for Employee Ownership reports that 
employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) or ESOP-like plans in the United States held assets of $1.4 trillion as 
of 2015. Source: https://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-profile-employee-ownership (Accessed 20 October 
2019) 
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engagements (emails, letter, phone calls, meetings) and ending with the filing of resolutions or 
in rare cases in litigation. Public engagement may include press interviews, investor coalitions, 
or speaking at company’s AGM. Figure 1 provides an example, based on recommendations by 
the NGO ShareAction and the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI).  
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Shareholder Engagement  
 
Source: ShareAction, UN PRI4 
 
At times asset managers have shied away from using their powers, leading to accusations of 
their resembling “absentee landlords” (Investments & Pensions Europe (IPE), 2011). However, 
when they have sought to take on a more active role, they have also come in for criticism from 
corporate interests who have accused them of pursuing political goals when supporting 
shareholder proposals on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues (The New York 
Times, 2018). This two-sided pressure means that asset managers might therefore appear to 
have to tread a tightrope in protecting the financial interest of their investors while facing 
opposition from corporate interests and having to ensure they maintain a social license to 
operate from society as a whole. The consequence is that it is not clear whether this new world 
deserves the nomenclature of “asset manager capitalism” (Braun, 2016). Asset manager 
capitalism for the purpose of this thesis is defined as a governance model in which asset 
managers are the primary supplier of equity funding and where they are able to demand changes 
 
4 For details on the ShareAction policy recommendation, see: https://shareaction.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/InvestorReport-GoodEngagement.pdf For the UN PRI, see: 
https://www.unpri.org/listed-equity/developing-an-active-ownership-policy-/2724.article (Accessed 4 April 
2020). 
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to corporate policies, when they deem it necessary, against the preferences of corporate 
executives. 
 
How, and to what extent, shareholders are able to exercise control over their investee 
companies is determined by a set of “corporate governance” rules and institutions. Corporate 
governance is a complex concept, the definition of which may take on a number of forms (Clark 
and Wójcik, 2007). Shleifer and Vishny (1997), pioneers of the law and finance literature, 
define corporate governance as the set of rules by which suppliers of capital can assure 
themselves of receiving the returns from their investments. Benton (2017) takes a broader 
relational approach to corporate governance, which does not focus exclusively on shareholder 
rights. Instead he considers corporate governance as the set of rules that sets out how power is 
allocated within a company, in particular amongst its board of directors, managers and 
shareholders.5 The different focus on shareholder interests implicit in these two definitions 
mirrors a schism present in the finance literature with respect to the purpose of the firm. On 
the one hand, there is the “shareholder value” literature, commonly attributed to the work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Friedman (1970) and on the other hand there is the 
“stakeholder” literature, typically attributed to Freeman (1984).  
 
Proponents of shareholder value maximisation expect a company’s managers, as the agents of 
the owners, to focus their efforts on maximising the returns for shareholders.6 Furthermore, this 
literature regards shareholders as the “residual claimants” on a company’s assets (Easterbrook 
 
5 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2010) defines corporate governance as follows 
“Corporate governance establishes a system of accountability among shareholders, directors and managers 
through rules and regulations, the corporate charter and bylaws, formal policies, and customs. This process 
helps determine the leadership, organization, and direction of the company”. 
6 A number of legal scholars dispute the interpretation of shareholders as owners, highlighting that share 
ownership does not equate to company ownership and that such rights are not to be found in law (Bainbridge, 
2003; Ireland, 1999; Stout 2012). 
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and Fischel, 1985; Jensen, 2000). Since shareholders will only be paid once all others have 
been paid, they are, it is argued, best placed to be the ones monitoring the performance of the 
managers. 
 
Proponents of stakeholder theory, on the other hand, regard shareholders as just one of several 
groups of stakeholders, each with legitimate claims on the company. Freeman defines 
stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization’s objectives” (1984: 46). Accordingly, it is the duty of company directors to 
operate the firm in the interests of all stakeholders and to act as an impartial referee with only 
the interests of the firm in mind (Aoki, 1984). Doing so will ensure companies operate at an 
optimal rate as individual self-interest is bounded and stakeholders respond to reciprocity 
(Bosse et al., 2009; Phillips, 1997). The concept of reciprocity contends that stakeholders 
respond positively and disproportionately to positive deeds. Raising wages or providing for 
flexible working arrangements, for example, is said to increase employees’ productivity by a 
greater magnitude than the cost incurred by the employer.  
 
Corporate governance is set at two distinct levels: the societal level and the company level. The 
company level is set by its shareholders in the articles of incorporation and often revised at 
companies’ general meetings. With regards to the societal level, corporate governance 
frameworks result from a country’s laws, which in turn are a product of its politics, business 
practices and norms. The World Bank therefore recommends that each country should 
endeavour to devise its own corporate governance code, as “whilst globalization of economies 
has increased, and international corporate guidelines have been adopted, each country has its 
own values, societal norms, way of doing business, and special circumstances” (2005: 1). 
Corporate governance is therefore an intrinsically political undertaking. In this line of thought 
 7 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) explain that corporate governance lies at the heart of comparative 
political economy since it determines the conditions under which funding is provided, thereby 
affecting countries’ economic prospects.  
 
The corporate governance literature can be grouped along the four broad questions that it seeks 
to answer. Firstly, there is the literature that sets out to explain the nature of the modern firm, 
the contractual arrangements that create it and by what means shareholders interest can be 
secured. The basis of this literature is to be found in the “theory of the firm” and principal-
agent relationships (Berle and Means, 1932; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This literature also discusses the extent of shareholders’ ownership rights of 
the firm (Bebchuk, 2005; Friedman, 1970; Stout, 2012; 2016) and considers how shareholders 
may seek to respond to challenges to their rights.  
 
Related to this, the “law and finance literature” (La Porta et al., 1998) links the shareholder 
ownership structure to national variations in shareholder protection and contends that 
shareholders will seek to protect their minority rights by amassing larger stakes, which result 
in higher ownership concentration. Such “blockholders” (Edmans and Holderness, 2016) play 
a special role with the governance of firms since their larger stakes reduce the collective action 
problems faced by smaller stakeholders. An adjacent literature looks at financial intermediaries 
and private governance authorities that help investors overcome information asymmetries in 
the principal-agent relationship. This includes the literature on credit ratings agencies, index 
providers and proxy advisors (Petry et al., 2019; Robertson, 2018; Sinclair, 2005). 
 
Third, there is the literature that seeks to determine how, and in whose interest, companies 
should be managed. This includes the literature on shareholder primacy and shareholder value 
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(Jensen, 2002; Keay, 2010), stakeholder value (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010), as well 
as the literature on corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1999; 1999; Friedman 1970).  
 
The fourth block of literature is concerned with the broader consequences of how companies 
are governed. It is this third block of literature, in particular the literatures on the varieties of 
capitalism (Amable, 2003; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001, Hardie et al., 
2013) and the process of financialisation (Maxfield et al., 2017; van der Zwan, 2014) that this 
thesis will be primarily concerned with. The most comprehensive and prominent contribution 
to the varieties of capitalism has been provided by the eponymous work of Hall and Soskice 
(2001). Hall and Soskice advance a number of propositions such as the fact that individual 
countries’ models of capitalism can be divided into two broad categories: liberal market 
economies (LMEs) such as the United Kingdom and the United States and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) such as Germany. In LMEs, it is argued, companies finance themselves 
primarily via capital markets, while in CMEs close relationship to domestic banks provide 
firms with funding.  
 
The literature also makes a number of other explicit and implicit assumptions about how 
national models are likely to develop. Central to these is the belief that CMEs and LMEs 
represent stable and reinforcing equilibria (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and that CME’s are 
naturally doomed to extinction, leaving only LMEs ultimately to prevail (Goodin, 2003). This 
thesis seeks to assess to what extent the rise of the asset management industries in Germany, 
the UK and the US has affected these propositions. This includes asking questions, such as, 
whether it is still appropriate to consider the US and Germany as representing stable equilibria, 
looking for signs that the German CME model is converging on the US LME model, and 
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assessing whether executives of UK and US firms retain managerial autonomy in their 
decision-making.  
 
In doing so this thesis builds on the literature on pension fund capitalism (Clark, 1998; Hebb, 
2008; Webber, 2018), asset manager capitalism (Braun, 2016; Fichtner et al., 2017; Harmes, 
2001; Useem, 1996;) and fiduciary capitalism (Hawley and Williams, 2000; Richardson, 
2013), which stress the need to differentiate between shareholder types as different institutional 
requirements lead to different allocation and engagement practices. Pension funds, for 
example, have longer investment horizons and generally broader portfolio holdings than, for 
example, active mutual funds or hedge funds, meaning that they can be considered as “patient 
capital” (Deeg and Hardie, 2016) and “universal owners” (Hawley and Williams, 2007).  
 
While the academic literature has long realised the significance of corporate governance, the 
attention it has given it has increased substantially over recent years. Gillan (2006) finds that a 
search on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) for research documents containing the 
term “corporate governance” returned 3,500 results in 2006. While this was already a very 
large body of research, a repeat of this search in May of 2020 returned 15,398 documents. A 
look at the results bears testament not only to the level of academic interest the topic is 
receiving but also the interdisciplinary nature of the concept. 
 
 
Chapter Structure  
With a focus on changes in, and implications of, the shareholder ownership structures in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, this thesis investigates the relationship 
between changes in ownership structure and changes to companies’ corporate governance, and 
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the implications for the varieties of capitalism in the three countries. The next section will set 
out the central research question of this thesis. This is followed by an explanation of why 
institutional investors are the appropriate level of analysis.  
 
Engagement, including shareholder voting, is the primary means by which shareholders 
exercise influence over a company. Throughout, shareholders have the choice between 
employing their voice, exiting their shareholdings in their portfolio companies (“the Wall 
Street walk”), or remaining silent while remaining invested (“loyalty”). The work of 
Hirschman (1970) is therefore introduced next, as it provides an appropriate framework for the 
analysis of shareholders’ choices.  
 
Following on from this, five developments that either result from or contribute to, the 
increasing ownership concentration will be introduced. These five developments are divided 
into two first-order and three second-order developments. The first-order developments are 
those that have caused the increasing levels of ownership concentration, while the second order 
developments are consequences of that rising ownership concentration. Together these five 
developments make up the independent variables of the research question and will each be 
discussed in more depth in dedicated chapters of this thesis. 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will explain the methodological approach of the 
thesis. This will include the reasoning behind the choice of the three countries as well as the 
selection of interviewees, an explanation of the decision to interview and an outline of the 
interview data collected. This chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of the 
remainder of the thesis.  
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The Research Question  
By helping to overcome the collective action problems previously faced by the highly dispersed 
share ownership amongst individual shareholders, the re-concentration of corporate ownership 
that has resulted from the growth of asset managers has provided shareholders with the 
necessary conditions to exercise greater control over corporate management. In many cases, 
shareholders today are able to nominate corporate directors more easily, submit shareholder 
proposals and ensure there is an increased likelihood that they pass through concerted actions, 
which have been eased by regulatory overhaul (see, for example, European Parliament, 2012; 
United States Court of Appeals, 2011).  
 
However, whether institutional investors are assuming this control and what that control, if 
assumed, might mean for national varieties of capitalism, is not yet certain. While there have 
been instances of asset managers using their powers to, for example, force Exxon Mobil Corp 
to report on climate risks,7 there are also reports that investors, particularly the three biggest 
asset managers BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Global Advisors (collectively known as 
the “Big Three”), fail to challenge corporates on issues such as excessive CEO pay (As You 
Sow, 2020). There is also, as will be discussed, evidence of considerable heterogeneity across 
the three countries considered. 
 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) take a top-down macro approach in their investigation of how 
politics shape public policy and how the resulting regulations influence shareholder structure. 
In focussing instead on how changes in ownership structure result in changes in corporate 
 
7 Reuters, 31 May 2017, “Exxon shareholders approve climate impact report in win for activists“, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxonmobil-climate/exxon-shareholders-approve-climate-impact-report-in-
win-for-activists-idUSKBN18R0DC (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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governance frameworks, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature a bottom-up micro 
understanding of changes to corporate governance. My research question is: 
 
What are the consequences of the changes in the shareholder ownership structure 
for the corporate governance of stock market listed firms? 
 
My dependent variable, the corporate governance of stock market listed companies, will follow 
the definition of Hall and Soskice (2001), by differentiating between LME and CME systems. 
Due to networks of cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorships the literature assumes 
that corporate managers in CMEs are less sensitive to current profitability while managers in 
LME are considered to be more exposed. Furthermore, management in CMEs is considered to 
be more by consensus, whereas executives in LMEs are considered to be more independent in 
their decision-making (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). 
 
The following chapters will document that the rise of the asset management industry in all three 
countries has resulted in asset managers on average holding much larger ownership blocs. 
Combined with the fact that a greater proportion of assets is today managed in index strategies, 
this means that the selling of shares has become increasingly difficult. Engagement therefore 
takes on a more important role. Greater investor stewardship may have considerable 
consequences for the governance of firms, and differences in the stewardship approaches of 
asset managers in different countries may impact the trajectory of individual countries’ 
varieties of capitalism. 
 
In looking at consequences for corporate governance, the aim of this thesis is therefore not to 
conduct quantitative tests to ascertain whether shareholder value orientation (SVO) has 
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increased in Germany; this has already been done by others (Bradley and Sundaram, 2004; Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004). Instead the focus is on identifying and understanding how the different 
dynamics that are changing the shareholder ownership structure are influencing the way 
companies are governed by shareholders in Germany, the UK and the US both from a micro 
perspective and from the perspective of the varieties of capitalism.  
 
To this end the independent variable, changes in shareholder ownership structure, is separated 
into two first-order developments. These first-order developments are the institutionalisation 
of shareholder ownership and the growth of index investing. Next, three second-order 
consequences, which result from one or both of these first-order developments are considered.  
These are the internationalisation of share ownership, the advent of proxy advisors, and the 
corporate (lobbying) response to growing shareholder ownership concentration.  
 
All of these developments are related. Institutionalisation created the foundations for index 
investing and the rise of index investing has further super-charged the institutionalisation of 
asset management. Together these two developments lead to a diversification of both domestic 
and international portfolio holdings. For asset managers this has meant that they have to vote 
at a growing number of individual companies, thereby creating the need for proxy advisors. 
Finally, the rise of shareholder ownership concentration that resulted from institutionalisation 
and indexation has created the preconditions necessary to shift the balance of power from 
corporate managers to institutional investors. All of the aforementioned developments 





The appropriate level of analysis  
While previous studies such as Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) and La Porta et al. (1998), have 
employed the degree of ownership concentration as an indicator of corporate governance, 
financial innovations such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have resulted in the creation of 
“blockholders” whose purpose is not primarily the protection of shareholder rights.8 As I will 
show in Chapters 2 and 3, these developments have resulted in the levels of ownership 
concentration in Germany, the UK and US equalising, leading to talk of convergence in 
corporate governance models across countries. However, I will demonstrate that ownership 
concentration by itself is today no longer sufficient to draw conclusions as to the governance 
of firms. I therefore contend that it is necessary to look beyond the mere level of ownership 
concentration before drawing any conclusions with regards to corporate governance and 
shareholder protection.  
 
Different types of investors will face different regulatory and cost pressures, have different 
time horizons and performance pressures and will thus make different uses of their governance 
powers. The causal link between ownership concentration and shareholder protection, as well 
as the motivation behind the creation of blockholdings, historically made by the law and 
finance literature therefore no longer applies. As I will go on to illustrate, the present-day levels 




8 ETFs are forms of passive investing. Passive investments are defined here in line with Braun (2016a) as those 
that aim to track, rather than beat, the performance of a benchmark index. Unlike passive mutual funds, which 
can only be bought and sold once per day (typically a time lag of one or more days), ETFs trade like ordinary 
stock and can be bought and sold continually on stock exchanges during market hours.  
Shareholders with stakes in companies exceeding 5% of the issued share capital are commonly referred to as 
blockholders. This is a very simplistic definition and as Edmans and Holderness (2016) suggest, it may also be 
worth considering stakes below the 5% threshold and to expand the definition to take account of the dollar value 
of a shareholding. 
 15 
These economies of scale result in significant cost pressures in the asset management industry, 
thereby limiting the funding available for governance activities. Yet the rising indexation of 
investment management also means that the proportion of investors for whom it is impossible 
to provide a governance signal by selling shares has been increasing, and therefore the role of 
engagement within corporate governance should be expected to increase. There is thus an 
inherent tension between growing cost pressures and growing governance requirements. These 
pressures are further exacerbated by increasing regulatory demands as well as social pressures 




Davis defines institutional investors as “specialised financial institutions which manage 
savings collectively on behalf of small investors, towards a specific objective in terms of 
acceptable risk, return-maximisation and maturity of claims” (1996: 64). The one qualification 
I would add to this definition, is that institutional investors such as mutual funds, may also 
manage investments for other institutional investors such as corporate pension funds or 
sovereign wealth funds. Institutional investors provide a number of common features, most 
notably risk pooling, fiduciary management and economies of scale (Harmes, 2001). 
 
Asset owners and asset managers sit at the centre of the investment industry. Asset owners are 
typically defined to include endowments, family offices, insurance companies, pension funds 
and sovereign wealth funds (Clark and Monk, 2018). In addition to these institutional asset 
owners, private individuals are a further large ownership group. While these asset owners may 
choose to manage assets themselves, many of them outsource at least some of their assets to 
asset management firms who manage them on their behalf (The Investment Association, 2016). 
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What results is an “investment chain”, which is “the set of intermediaries that ‘sit between’ 
savers and companies or governments” (Arjaliès et al., 2017).  
 
The ownership concentration highlighted in this thesis is primarily a result of the growth in 
pension fund assets and the institutionalisation of private “retail” investments. On a global 
level, Willis Towers Watson (2018a) estimates that institutional investors control $132 trillion 
in savings (across all asset classes) as of the end of 2017. Of these pension funds and mutual 
funds manage $45 trillion each with the remainder managed by insurance companies, sovereign 
wealth funds and endowments and foundations.  
 
The corporate governance literature has traditionally been concerned only with one single 
relationship; the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers of the firm 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Yet, the 
investment chain is significantly more complex than much of the finance and law literature 
would have us believe. Instead Gilson and Gordon (2013) have coined the term “agency costs 
of agency capitalism” to illustrate how the multiple relationships that exist within the 
investment chain have resulted in multiple levels of agency problems, beyond that identified 
by Berle and Means (1932). This chain can be longer or shorter depending on the respective 
institutional set up.  
 
For example, it may start with a retail investor, connect to her asset manager and from there 
connect directly to the corporate executive that runs the firm, at which point it ends. In the case 
of an employee investing in a company pension fund the chain could be substantially longer. 
It may start at the employee, from there connect to the pension trustee, who select the pension 
fund manager, who in turn may invest through an ETF, whose asset management firm then 
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(may) ultimately engage with the corporate manager. However, in some cases the pension fund 
will manage the assets in-house, thereby fulfilling the function of both asset owner and asset 
manager and thus resulting in a shorter chain. Asset owners in the context of this thesis are 
defined here as the ultimate beneficial owners of assets. This definition therefore includes, for 
example, private individuals and insurance companies.  
 
 
The institutional consequences of rising shareholder ownership concentration  
Since increasing ownership concentration has created the conditions to enable increased 
shareholder oversight, this raises the question of how investors are harnessing their new 
influence. By what means are they exercising their control, to what end are they doing so, and 
what are the differences between countries? In this regard, Hirschman (1970) provides a 
compelling framework. He explains that consumers, or in this case shareholders, have three 
choices if they are unhappy with the conduct of a company. They can move on and leave (exit) 
the company, they can raise their voice and seek to change it, or they can remain silent and 
loyal. Hirschman further explains that the “decision on whether to exit will often be taken in 
the light of the prospects for the effective use of voice” (1970: 37). 
 
While providing a remedy for the collective action problem, the growth of asset managers also 
poses a new challenge. Ever-greater shareholdings by a relatively small number of very large 
institutional investors means it is increasingly difficult for these institutions to sell their shares 
in a company without substantial negative price effects. The tracking error constraints that 
come with passive management further limit the ability to sell.9 While asset manager capitalism 
 
9 Tracking error indicates how closely a fund follows its benchmark index. A tracking error constraint is 
sometimes introduced to limit the extent to which a fund manager may diverge from a reference benchmark.  
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has potentially given investors greater influence over company strategy, if this influence does 
not suffice to achieve the desired effect in corporate policies, then investors may find 
themselves in a situation where they have little say and no ability to sell. In Hirschman’s terms, 
the growth of institutional investors has increased the potential of voice but decreased the 
ability to exit (a dynamic discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
 
The question thus arises of which institutional consequences for the varieties of capitalism will 
result from the rise of a shareholder base increasingly incentivised to utilise voice. North (1990) 
defines institutions simply as “the rules of the game”. Jackson and Deeg build on this definition 
to explain that “[i]nstitutions exist in distinct national configurations or types that generate a 
particular systemic logic or economic action and competitive advantages related to 
complementarities among those institutions” (2008: 541). These national configurations are 
what makes up the varieties of capitalism.  
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) explain that these national configurations differ in how actors 
strategically interact with one another and that those institutions that condition the interactions 
of actors will be the most important differentiators. In their firm-centred approach. Hall and 
Soskice (2001) focus on five spheres within which firms must resolve coordination problems 
in order to remain successful: industrial relations, vocational training and education, inter-firm 
relations, their own employees and corporate governance. Each of these spheres is important 
(as stakeholder theory teaches us), but the focus of this thesis lies only on the latter sphere of 
corporate governance and specifically, how institutional investors, their proxy advisors and 
corporates interact.  
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With regards to the complementarities amongst institutions, raised by Jackson and Deeg in the 
above quotation, Amable (2003) explains that complementarities exist, when the presence of 
one institution increases the returns or efficiency of another. Deeg (2010) illustrates 
complementarities with the example of ‘radical innovation’, which is said to be one of the 
competitive advantages of LMEs. He explains that this radical innovation can only be achieved 
because labour markets are flexible enough to allow for a dynamic reallocation of resources to 
new ideas, while the financial markets provide the necessary risk-oriented capital. In LMEs the 
labour and financial markets thus complement each other to achieve comparatively high levels 
of innovation.  
 
In order to fruitfully integrate the concept of complementarity into theories of institutional 
change, “it is necessary to have a political economy definition of complementarity, which 
should not take institutions as some sort of inputs in a production function, but as socio-political 
compromises established in historically-specific conditions” (Amable, 2016: 1). Chapters 3, 5 
and 7 will therefore focus on highlighting the strategic interactions of asset managers, proxy 
advisors and corporates respectively to show how such socio-political compromises are 
reached in the age of asset manager capitalism. Differences in these interactions result in 
different compromises, which in turn may contribute to varieties of capitalism diverging. As 
the following chapters will document, the nature of the relationship between institutional 
investors in the three countries studied differs substantially. Chapter 8 confronts the 
comparative political economy literature with the contemporary insights presented in the 
previous chapters in order to highlight where the present-day shareholder ownership structure 




The financialisation literature 
The varieties of capitalism framework predicts that countries are likely to continue to develop 
in heterogenous ways as national models of capitalism confront challenges by doubling down 
on their respective strengths. The existence of complementarities between different spheres of 
economic coordination dictates a country’s response and creates a degree of path dependency. 
Since complementarities dictate the logic of how countries respond to institutional change, 
there are important insights to be drawn from their analysis.  
 
However, in order to ensure the thesis provides the necessary depth of micro-level analysis of 
market practices, an equivalent analysis of how changes in corporate governance influence the 
functioning of other spheres such as employee relations is largely beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Yet, there are important insights to be gained with regards to the political economy 
discourse by consider how the asset management induced changes to corporate governance are 
influencing society at the macro level, particularly with regards to inequality. To this end, this 
thesis will employ the literature on financialisation alongside the varieties of capitalism. Doing 
so will help situate the findings of the thesis in the broader debate about the relative power of 
financial and nonfinancial actors in the economy.  
 
Financialisation assesses “how an increasingly autonomous realm of global finance has altered 
the underlying logics of the industrial economy and the inner workings of democratic society” 
(van der Zwan, 2014: 100). It is these logics that may otherwise be missed by an exclusive 
focus on complementarities in the varieties of capitalism. Whereas the VoC literature 
represents a firm-focussed approach, the financialisation literature takes a multi-layered 
perspective, considering effects on the household, the firm and the state. Considerations of the 
financialisation of the “everyday life” of individuals (Langley, 2008; 2020a) make it better 
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suited to address social issues. The financialisation literature will therefore be employed when 
discussing issues of inequality resulting from the distributional consequences of asset manager 
capitalism.  
 
Both the varieties of capitalism and the financialisation literature implicitly address the 
convergence/divergence hypothesis. Financialisation is “a process that grants an increasing 
role to financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies” (Maxfield et al., 2017: 1007). It 
therefore describes the shift from industrial to finance capitalism (van der Zwan, 2014) of 
which the growth of the asset management industry is one potential indicator.  
 
Since finance capitalism is generally considered to be most advanced in the US (Davis and 
Kim, 2015), there is an implicit assumption of a ‘financialisation convergence hypothesis’ 
(Maxfield et al., 2017) akin to the convergence of CME to LME countries often assumed in 
the VoC literature. Yet the extent to which financialisation is advancing differs greatly from 
country to country and does not equate to a homogenization of economic models (Karwowski 
et al., 2020; Maxfield et al., 2017).  
 
Karwowski et al. find that “while the behavior of the world's largest globally active financial 
institutions is converging irrespective of home domicile, their activities are not necessarily 
leading to the general global homogenization of financial forms and activities implied by the 
financialization convergence hypothesis” (2020: 957). The financialisation literature thus risks 
sharing the problem of VoC in not looking more closely at finance. Instead this thesis notes a 
convergence in form only, without a corresponding convergence in function. Asset managers 
are not behaving the same in different jurisdictions. While previous research has highlighted 
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the growing role of asset managers within US corporate governance (Fichtner, et al. 2017), this 
thesis contributes a comparative perspective to the literature by focussing on differences in 
asset managers’ conduct across countries.  
 
Chapter 2 will show that the relatively larger asset management industries in the United 
Kingdom and the United States are the result of relatively weak social security and pensions 
provisions that require individuals to ensure greater private provisioning. Financialisation of 
pensions provisions thus provided the nurturing soil for asset manager capitalism to grow, but 
the extent of this support provided differed from country to country. Sticking with the image 
of nurturing soil, the nutritional content differs by country and has contributed to the 
heterogenous development of individual country’s asset management industries. Dixon and 
Sorsa find that the increasing relational proximity between national pensions systems and 
global financial markets “is deeply embedded in existing institutional practices typical of each 
political economy, simultaneously supporting continuity and change” (2009: 347). 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 will show that asset manager capitalism is also contributing towards 
financialisation’s continued expansion. First, the products that asset managers are providing 
are attracting ever more households to the financial markets. They are doing so as a result of 
the growing fund offering, the falling management fees and the implicit reduction in risk that 
results from the diversification inherent in many funds, particularly index funds. Second, the 
policies that many of the largest asset managers are advocating are advancing, or at the very 
least tolerating, an increased focus on short-term returns and on the principles of shareholder 
value. Considered together the reduction in risk is very short term. Longer term damage results 
from not thinking of other stakeholders and therefore in the long-term the diversification looks 
increasingly illusory (systemic environmental and social risks cannot be diversified away). 
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Pagliari and Young (2020) explain that financialisation is a political phenomenon both because 
it has resulted from the political decisions of deregulation and also because it is creating the 
conditions for its own reproduction by influencing politics. This influence, the authors explain, 
is the result of both direct lobbying activities as well as indirect changes in households’ policy 
preferences towards more pro-finance policies as a result of a greater proportion of households 
now having an interest in financial markets. While to date it has arguably been the banking 
sector that has been driving the majority of the deregulation agenda, Chapter 6 will show that 
asset managers too are spending increased financial resources on lobbying and political 
donations.  
 
The financialisation literature can help to bring in the politics of asset manager capitalism more 
explicitly than is possible in a pure VoC framework. Yet both the VoC and the financialisation 
literature suffer from an excessive focus on US developments. This is why this thesis employs 
a comparative approach. The results do note that the growing power which asset managers 
have attained as a result of their increasing assets has tilted the balance of power in favour of 
shareholders and at the cost of other stakeholders, particularly investee companies’ workers. 
However, these consequences of asset manager capitalism differ widely across countries. Full 
recognition of this requires careful consideration of the domestic regulatory context as well as 
acknowledgement that different types of investors behave differently in different countries, and 
that even the same institution will behave differently in different countries. The following 
chapters will, for example, demonstrate just how great the differences between the regulatory 
approaches of the UK and the US are and how these differences condition the investor-
corporate relationship (thus calling into question the appropriateness of referring to an Anglo-
Saxon financial system). 
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Five Developments in relation to the Shareholder Ownership Structure 
As previously mentioned, this thesis identifies a total of five trends, two of which 
(institutionalisation and indexation) I consider to be first-order developments and three that are 
treated as second-order developments resulting from the first-order developments. In the 
following sections I will now introduce each of them in turn. 
 
 
The Institutionalisation of Investment (First-Order Development) 
Much has changed since Hirschman first published his thoughts on exit and voice in 1970. 
While the initial era of globalization from the 1950s onwards was focused on the trade of goods, 
by the 1990s the role of finance independent of trade became increasingly important. Davis 
remarks that while “twentieth-century American society was organized around large 
corporations, particularly manufacturers and their way of doing things. It is now increasingly 
organized around finance” (2009: xi).  
 
Institutional ownership has been growing because individual investors increasingly delegate 
their asset management decisions to institutional investors. They do so for a number of reasons 
including the diversification benefits funds offer, access to specific investment themes, as well 
as the perceived stock selection expertise on offer.10 Around the turn of the century, when 
institutional ownership surpassed 50 percent of all US shares in issuance, Useem (1996), 
Hawley and Williams (2000), and Harmes (2001) drew attention to this phenomenon, referring 
to it as investor capitalism, fiduciary capitalism and mass investment respectively.    
 
10 The prospectus of the first British mutual fund, the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust highlighted the 
benefit of diversification in its prospectus stating that the goal of the fund was to give “the investor of moderate 
means the same advantage as the large capitalist in diminishing the risk of investing … by spreading the 
investment over a number of different stocks”. Quoted in Kahn (2018: 9-10). 
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The initial growth of institutional shareholdings was driven by pension funds, whose assets 
were growing as a result of the rapid growth in private employment and employer pensions in 
the 1950s. This led Drucker (1976) to talk of the advent of “pension fund socialism”. Drucker 
notes that pension funds at the time controlled 25 percent of the shares outstanding in US 
companies and thus voices concern that socialism, which he defines at the ownership of the 
means of production by workers, will take hold as a result. While he showed remarkable 
foresight in predicting the rise of pension fund assets, as I will go on to demonstrate, his fear 
of pension fund socialism has largely failed to materialise.  
 
Clark (1998) documents how UK pension fund assets rose in earnest from £106.6bn in 1980, 
to £528bn in 1990, reaching £1,080.3bn in 1996. Developments in the US were similarly rapid, 
with pension assets rising from $1,176bn in 1980 to $3,788bn in 1990 and $7,003bn in 1996. 
Pension consultants Willis Towers Watson (2018a) estimate that UK pensions assets reached 
£2,393bn ($3,111bn) in 2017, while US pensions assets reached $25,411bn (21.6x the 1980 
level). In Germany, however, where the state pension system is more important, company 
pension assets are today still comparatively small at just $472bn.11  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s mutual funds took over from pension funds as the driver behind the 
continued institutionalisation of savings. This led to the coining of the term “mutual fund 
capitalism” (Hawley and Williams, 1997). While the modern mutual fund industry has its roots 
 
11 While the size of German pension assets is already considerably smaller than those in the UK or US, what 
further reduces their significance in the context of shareholders’ corporate governance practices, is the 
extremely low equity allocation of German pension funds. Willis Towers Watson (2018a) reports equity 
allocations of 50% in the United States and 47% in the United Kingdom. In Germany pension funds as recently 
as 2012 had equity allocations of just 21%, although the low interest environment has forced a reallocation 
towards equities which has seen their allocations increase to 35% by 2015. Source: 
https://www.ipe.com/reports/german-asset-management/pension-assets-measuring-the-pension-
world/10010008.article (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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in 1940, it was not until much later that its growth started to pick up in earnest. Initially US 
assets increased from less than $2bn in 1949 to $50bn in 1977, but then exploded to reach $4trl 
in 1987 (Fink, 2008). The initial growth in mutual fund assets was supported by reforms to 
pensions regulations, most notably the switch from defined benefit (DB) to defined 
contribution (DC) pensions and the creation of “401(k)” individual tax advantaged retirement 
savings plans in the US in 1978. The UK has undergone similar shifts from DB to DC pensions. 
The Independent newspaper, referring to a study by a leading actuarial firm, reports that “in 
1993 “virtually all” FTSE 100 companies offered traditional final salary schemes to new 
employees. By 2018 “not a single one does”.12 Chapter 2 discusses this transformation from 
DB to DC schemes in more detail.  
 
In addition to pensions reforms, financial innovation played a major role in the popularity of 
mutual funds. Birdthistle (2016) ascribes the popularity of mutual funds to a trinity of benefits: 
instant diversification, professional money management and easy redemption. Instant 
diversification refers to the benefit of an improved risk to reward ratio that results from 
constructing a portfolio of different stocks. This understanding is derived from the work of 
Markowitz (1952) on “modern portfolio theory” (MPT).  
 
Furthermore, mutual funds are managed by professional full-time portfolio managers, who at 
least in theory should have an information, analytical and timing advantage over private 
individuals, though this of course comes at the cost of a management fee. The alternative is for 
an individual investor to construct their own portfolios of say 50 different stocks, and to 
continually adjust them as share prices rise and fall and companies’ fortunes change. The third 
 
12 The Independent, 10 August 2018, “Britain’s great pension robbery: How defined benefits schemes became a 
thing of the past”. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/pension-
retirement-defined-benefit-contribution-funds-risky-a8479426.html (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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benefit, easy redemption, is related to the portfolio diversification and professional 
management benefits. With the mutual fund, there is always a buyer for the asset one sells, and 
settlement typically takes just three days, between sending the sell order and receiving the cash. 
This is much easier than having to sell fifty individual shares, for example.13  
 
The main result of this institutionalisation of the pensions and investment landscape is that 
asset managers had grown much larger by the end of the 20th century. However, while many 
observers considered these levels of institutional ownership as sufficient for investors to play 
a much more influential role in the governance of the firm (Harmes, 2001; Hawley and 
Williams, 1997; Useem, 1996), I will show that institutional ownership at the time did not 
suffice for shareholders to take control. One ingredient that was as yet missing was ownership 
concentration. Without it, institutional investors, while better organised than individual 
shareholders, still faced substantial collective action problems. These were diminished with the 
rise of index investing, which due to its focus on economies of scale, resulted in a material 
increase in ownership concentration.   
 
The Indexation of Investment (First-Order Development) 
The second first-order development is the growth of index investments. Their comparatively 
low fee base has made investment management accessible to a much broader population 
thereby providing a substantial contribution to the aforementioned institutionalisation of 
investment management. But not only have they contributed to institutionalisation, because 
 
13 The general point I seek to make is that for ordinary investments in highly liquid indices, mutual funds have 
benefits to constructing and rebalancing individual stock portfolios. However, with regards to liquidity, there are 
exceptions, especially when a fund invests in illiquid assets, or assets too illiquid for the fund size, such as 
happened in the case of the Woodford equity income fund in the UK in 2019. Besides conventional “open-
ended” funds, commonly referred to as mutual funds, there are also “closed-ended” funds. While open-ended 
funds do not have a limit on how many shares they can issue, a closed-ended fund issues shares similar to a 
company in an IPO. The value of these shares then moves with demand and supply, meaning that a closed-
ended fund’s shares can trade at a discount or premium to its net asset value. 
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they are unable to sell shares at will, they have also had a very profound influence on corporate 
governance.  
 
While active funds seek to beat the performance of broad market indices, index funds seek to 
track them as closely as possible. The business model of index funds is based around low fees 
and in order to deliver these investment managers have to ensure they operate with the lowest 
costs possible. Index investments are not a new phenomenon they have been around since 1971. 
The first index fund launch followed closely on the footsteps of Fama’s (1970) assertion that 
markets are efficient because they incorporated all publicly available data and that it was 
therefore impossible for anyone (beyond insiders) to consistently outperform (MacKenzie, 
2006). 
 
The initial growth of index funds was driven by pension funds (Fouse, 1998). These early index 
funds were typically structured as conventional mutual funds but charged just a tenth of the 
management fee of a typical active mutual fund. They thus presented pension fund trustees 
with a cheap means of diversification of investments. The switch to index fund investments by 
pension funds was further supported by observations from industry insiders that noted that the 
multitude of active mandates that many pension funds had invested in effectively left them 
with a portfolio of stock holdings so broad that it resembled a high-cost index fund (United 
States Senate, 1979: 22).   
 
Despite index funds having been around since the early 1970s, it was not until the creation of 
Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”) in 1993 that the general public (“retail investors”) got on 
board. Because ETFs trade on stock exchanges like ordinary stocks, they provide a highly 
liquid means for investors to invest in funds. Investors can buy them through their stock trading 
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accounts and do not require special documentation as may be the case for certain mutual funds. 
ETFs can also be sold in real-time, while orders to buy or sell mutual funds typically take one 
to two days to settle. Because they are index investments, their constituents are known by 
market participants, which means that arbitrage ensures that their prices do not diverge 
substantially from their net asset value.14 If a discount should develop, arbitrageurs could 
otherwise buy the ETF and short the underlying stocks to capture the discount. Finally, ETFs 
have no “sales load” or “front-end load” fees, which mutual funds often charge when fund 
shares are purchased (these fees are then passed on to distribution partners for their sales 
efforts). For funds that charge front-end load fees these typically stand at five percentage  points 
(Heyden and Röder, 2020; Thune, 2019). This means that an order to purchase $1000 of such 
a fund results in the investor receiving only an investment of $950 in the underlying fund.  
 
The boom of ETFs, which began in earnest in 2000, took Birdthistle’s (2016) trinity of benefits 
of institutional asset management to another level. Investors retained the benefit of 
diversification, indeed it increased even further, as for minimum investments of as low as $140 
investors can invest in ETFs that hold shares in more than 3500 companies (in the case of the 
Vanguard U.S. Total Market Shares Index ETF). The professional management of active funds 
is replaced with the diversification offered by index investing, with the added benefit of 
substantially lower management fees. The liquidity too is greatly improved thanks to the on-
exchange trading of ETFs.  
 
To provide some perspective to the growth of index investing, Morningstar (2019a) reported 
in August of 2019, that assets invested in US equity index funds for the first time exceeded 
 
14 There are currently a very limited number of fund managers that are testing active ETFs and ETFs that do not 
disclose their holdings.   
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those managed by US active equity funds. Morningstar further reports that over the previous 
10 years active U.S. equity funds have had $1.3 trillion in outflows and their passive 
counterparts nearly $1.4 trillion in inflows. For Europe, James et al. (2019) report that index 
funds have grown from 15 percent of investment fund assets in 2007 to 30 percent of total fund 
assets in 2017.  
 
While index funds have taken market share from active funds, they have also helped attract 
new investors into the stock market. They are thereby contributing to the overall growth of the 
asset management industry. By the end of 2018, the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2019) 
estimates the assets of investment companies in the US (defined as mutual funds, closed end 
funds, exchange traded funds, and unit investment trusts) at approximately $21.4trl, triple what 
they were at the turn of the century ($7.1trl). Of that three hundred percent increase 
approximately eighty percentage points can be attributed to stock market gains (as proxied by 
the S&P 500 index), meaning that more than two-thirds can be attributed to inflows. 
 
The significance of the rise in the assets under management (AuM) of index mutual funds and 
ETFs for the corporate governance of firms lies in the fact that index funds alter the means of 
control that asset managers have available. Since index construction dictates which shares 
should be in the fund, asset managers are no longer able to discretionarily exit their 
shareholdings. In Hirschman’s (1970) terms they are therefore left with only the options of 
raising their voice or remaining loyal. With exit unavailable, this should necessitate a greater 
focus on the use of voice.  
 
Further complicating matters is the fact that index construction may lead to ETF providers 
inadvertently finding themselves as large holders in, for example, high carbon-emitting 
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companies such as coal producers or in other controversial industries such as arms producers. 
Such holdings in turn will put these asset managers under the spotlight of critical public 
attention, as evidenced by the anti-gun protests that have occurred outside BlackRock’s 
headquarters in New York.15 These protests are neither limited to the US nor are they limited 
to index investors. There have, for example, also been protests by members of Extinction 
Rebellion outside the offices of the UK asset manager Baillie Gifford in Edinburgh.  
 
The rise of ETF assets has therefore increased the capacity of voice (through greater AuM) 
while simultaneously reducing the number of assets that are able to exit. Also, through their 
holdings in ETFs, the general public has become more aware of the role of asset managers 
within corporate governance, demanding greater stewardship as they now feel entitled to have 
a say in how asset managers engage. The growth of the asset management industry has 
therefore provided society with an additional target to register their grievances, as evidenced 
by the aforementioned protests. 
 
How fund managers engage differs greatly from country to country and by investor type and 
size. Stewardship is a concept that has several dimensions. Firstly, there is the stewardship of 
capital, which requires asset managers to manage their customers’ assets in their customers’ 
best interest. The second aspect of stewardship is that regulators, particularly in the UK, expect 
asset managers to guide the executives of the companies they invest in and failure to do so can 
have consequences for asset managers, as stated in the UK Stewardship Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012). The UK’s Financial Reporting Council defines stewardship as “the 
 
15 See, for example, New York Daily News, 23 May 2018, “Anti-gun protesters rally outside BlackRock 
shareholder meeting to condemn its Sturm Ruger investments“ Available at: 
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/anti-gun-protesters-rally-blackrock-shareholder-meeting-article-
1.4005409 (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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responsible allocation, management and oversight of capital to create long-term value for 
clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for the economy, the environment and 
society” (Financial Reporting Council, 2019). 
 
Gilson and Gordon (2013) argue that mainstream asset managers (both active and passive), due 
to their business models that focus on keeping costs to a minimum, will be “rationally reticent”, 
keeping their governance activities to a minimum. Work by Fichtner et al. (2017) in particular 
has drawn attention to the lack of opposition to management proposals in the proxy voting 
behaviour of the largest index investors. This in turn has led to debates regarding the 
desirability of these large asset managers for corporate governance of firms generally (Bebchuk 
and Hirst, 2018; Fisch et al., 2018) and with regards to possible anti-competitive influences 
(Azar et al., 2018; Elhauge, 2016). Braun therefore describes an asset manager capitalism in 
which shareholders are “fully diversified and economically disinterested” (2019: 4). 
 
While Fichnter et al. (2017) show limited opposition to company management in the voting 
behaviour of the biggest asset managers, their respective stewardship reports do show an 
increase in the number of governance meetings held. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the degree 
to which ETF providers engage in voice appears to be a function of their size, with larger asset 
managers engaging to a greater extent. Two reasons are likely responsible for this. Firstly, the 
limited holdings of smaller ETF providers receive less public attention thus necessitating less 
engagement. In other words, the social and regulatory pressure for them to be seen to engage 
in stewardship is less pronounced. Secondly, due to the economies of scale inherent in the asset 
management industry, they are financially more constrained than larger asset managers. 
 
 33 
The sheer size of these asset managers has also had the effect of pushing them into the public 
limelight, with the result that their social licenses to operate are increasingly being challenged 
for lack of perceived corporate governance leadership. In a growing number of countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, there are also real regulatory consequences for failures to engage in 
stewardship. Asset managers have been responding by increasing their corporate governance 
headcounts.  
 
As of March 2020, BlackRock’s governance team is made up of 47 full-time employees, almost 
four times the 13 employees it had in 2008 (IPE, 2019a; Financial Times, 2020b). Furthermore, 
in its 2018 annual stewardship report BlackRock (2018a) announced that it plans to double the 
team size by the end of 2020 (implying a growth from 36 to approximately 72 members). While 
these headcounts are constantly rising, Chapter 3 will illustrate that they remain inadequate 
given the size of the task. To put these numbers into perspective, the 2019 BlackRock 
Investment Stewardship Annual Report states that BlackRock voted on 155,131 proposals at 
16,124 company meetings.  
 
 
The Internationalisation of Investment (Second-Order Development) 
The institutionalisation of investment management brought a greater focus on diversification 
both domestically and internationally. The indexation of investment management in turn 
provided easy access to foreign markets. Investors no longer have to search for qualified 
investment managers for foreign markets, who themselves are oftentimes domiciled abroad in 
the market in question. Instead the availability of index funds gives easy access to stock 
markets as remote as Vietnam. The great economies of scale inherent in the investment 
management industry furthermore mean that it makes strategic sense for fund management 
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companies to engage in international mergers and acquisitions such as the 2009 acquisitions of 
the UK asset manager Barclays Global Investors by the US asset manager BlackRock. The 
internationalisation of asset management is a more recent development than 
institutionalisation. French and Poterba (1991) estimate that in December of 1989 more than 
94 percent of the equity portfolios of US investors and 82 percent of UK investors were held 
domestically.  
 
This thesis identifies two dimensions of internationalisation. The first is reflected in the 
internationalisation of the shareholder register of public companies. This can be observed by 
the fact that the average foreign ownership of companies in both the UK and Germany is above 
fifty percent. In the US it has also grown but remains substantially lower at approximately 14 
percent.16 The second dimension of internationalisation has occurred at the level of the asset 
management firms themselves through international expansion as well as through the 
aforementioned international mergers and acquisitions. This second dimension is not usually 
part of the discourse of internationalisation. However, looking only at the foreign ownership 
levels of companies misses an important aspect for corporate governance.  
 
This thesis finds that the growth of multinational asset managers has nevertheless left domestic 
asset managers with a special role to fulfil with regards to corporate governance. My findings 
concur with Dimson et al. (2018) who report that an investor is more likely to lead the dialogue 
 
16 For US data see: See https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shlprelim.html and 
https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shlptab1.html  
For UK data see: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2016  
and for German data see: Handelsblatt, 17 December 2007, 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/dax-30-konzerne-gehoeren-mehrheitlich-auslaendern-
deutsche-firmen-in-fremder-hand/2906102.html and Handelsblatt, 25 April 2018, 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/boerse-inside/aktionaersstruktur-so-stark-dominieren-
auslaendische-investoren-die-dax-konzerne/21211152.html?ticket=ST-681442-PgEroIZc1inAPGQPQhLf-ap1 
(Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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when the company is domestic, and that coordinated shareholder engagement are more likely 
to be successful if they are led by domestic shareholders. Similarly, my asset management 
interviewees reported themselves to be more likely to engage with domestic firms due to the 
more material size of their shareholdings in those firms and because those engagements are 
more likely to result in public attention. While German and UK asset managers are typically 
much smaller than their US peers, interviews showed that they focus their more limited 
governance resources on the domestic market, ensuring that they have sufficient impact to 
make it worthwhile (fulfilling regulatory requirements and gaining public attention from it).  
 
 
The Significance of Proxy Advisors (Second-Order Development) 
The institutionalisation and indexation of investment management has resulted in both the 
number of individual company shareholdings as well as the number of foreign jurisdictions in 
which shares are held growing significantly. This highly diversified and heterogenous holding 
base has brought with it a number of challenges for investors’ corporate governance activities. 
Firstly, there is the sheer number of agenda items, for some asset managers as many as 100,000 
ballot items per year (Bew and Fields, 2012), that has to be processed annually by asset 
managers. Secondly, with each foreign country come separate regulatory requirements as well 
as national corporate governance standards. This poses a major challenge to an asset 
management industry exposed to significant cost pressures. Together with changes in 
regulation this has created the business case for proxy advisors, as unlike individual 
shareholders, institutional shareholders in the UK and the US are today required to submit 
proxy votes and report on their voting decisions.17  
 
17 At the time of writing the SEC is reviewing the wording of its proxy voting requirements. Voting all proxy 




Proxy advisors are consultants that analyse corporate elections and advise shareholders on how 
to vote (Choi et al., 2010). Their services range from recommendations of how to vote, to 
providing the infrastructure to submit the vote, and the reporting structure to publish voting 
records and reasoning. The proxy advisory industry has received limited academic attention to 
date. However, the fact that the industry is dominated by two companies, ISS and Glass Lewis, 
has led to increasing regulatory interest. Together the two companies are said to control 97 
percent of the market for proxy advisory services (ESMA, 2012). This high level of 
concentration has led to accusations of outsized influence (Allaire, 2013; Larcker and Tayan, 
2011). Not only has their influence been questioned, so too has the quality of their work with 
accusations of them following a “box-ticking” and “one-size-fits-all” approach coming from 
both academics and companies (Glassman and Verret, 2013; Rose, 2011).  
 
Further adding to the controversy surrounding proxy advisors is the fact that one of the two 
proxy advisors (ISS) advises both corporates and shareholders, while the other large proxy 
advisor (Glass Lewis) is co-owned by the Ontario Teachers’ pension fund, leading to 
accusations of conflicts of interest (Copland et al., 2018). These concerns were confirmed by 
a number of the corporations I interviewed, with one describing as “bullshit” the scenario 
where ISS pitched for consulting business after contributing to the company losing the vote on 
its executive pay package at its AGM. He described the aftermath of the failed vote as follows: 
“it was kind of annoying that after ISS recommended against, we got 12 emails over the past 4 
months as well as several calls asking whether we wanted to buy their services”.18 
 
 
German institutional investors have no legal requirement to vote, though the largest asset managers tend to 
similarly vote all domestic proxies.  
18 Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview, 16 January 2018.  
 37 
Following the corporate accounting scandals of 2001/2002 (WorldCom, Enron etc.) and the 
bankruptcies that followed the Global Financial Crisis, governments have been looking for 
ways to ensure greater investor oversight of corporate conduct. The degree to which investors 
are required to engage, however, differs greatly from country to country. In the United States, 
the SEC (2003) introduced legislation in 2003 to require mutual funds with AuM exceeding 
$100m to disclose both how they voted in shareholder proxy votes as well as to disclose the 
policies and procedures followed in order to make those voting decisions. While, this 
regulation does not require asset managers to vote their shares, only to consider it, the largest 
asset managers do still seek to vote all shares.19  
 
The UK went further with the introduction of the Stewardship Code in 2012 (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012). It considers responsibility for a company’s operations to be shared 
between the management board and shareholders, advocates voting of all shares, and states that 
investors should be willing to act collectively when needed.20 The importance that the British 
system assigns to the joint responsibility for stewardship was evident in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the building services company Carillion PLC, when UK members of parliament 
summoned representatives of its major shareholders to examine whether they complied with 
the Stewardship Code.21  
 
 
19 See keynote remarks by SEC Commissioner Elad L. Roisman to the ICI Mutual Funds and Investment 
Management Conference, 18 March 2019, transcript available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-
roisman-031819 (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
20 Principle 6 of the UK Stewardship Code states “Institutional investors should seek to vote all shares held”. 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-
(September-2012).pdf (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
21 CityWire, 1 February 2018, “MPs grill fund groups over Carillion’s collapse”. Available at: 
https://citywire.co.uk/funds-insider/news/mps-grill-fund-groups-over-carillions-collapse/a1088523 (Accessed 
20 October 2019) 
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In Germany, regulatory demands are less explicit to date. The result of this is that the biggest 
asset managers appear to be voting a very high percentage of their shares while smaller asset 
managers for the most part refrain from voting. One portfolio manager at a medium-sized 
German asset manager explained that he had recently been put in charge of governance and 
proxy voting matters and was surprised to find out that voting was not required. 22 The code of 
good conduct of the German fund association (BVI Wohlverhaltensregeln) does not require the 
voting of shares and, unlike the UK or the US, there has to date been no regulatory intervention 
in this regard. Nevertheless, the big asset managers in Germany, like the UK and US, seek to 
vote the vast majority, if not all, of their shares.23 
 
Estimates of the impact of proxy advisor recommendations vary from 13.6 percent (Bethel and 
Gillan, 2002) to 29.7 percent (Cotter et al., 2010). Choi et al. (2010) contend that many studies 
substantially overestimate the influence of proxy advisors due to the difficulty of separating 
correlation from causality. Proxy advisors see their role as data aggregators, seeking to create 
policies that match the preferences of their clients (Bew and Fields, 2012; Calluzzo and Dudley, 
2015; Thomas et al., 2012). If there were no correlation between their recommendations and 
the way clients vote, then they would not be doing their job well. However, even if we assume 
the low estimates of 6-10 percent, their influence is substantial, nevertheless.  
 
The debate surrounding proxy advisors is in fact a proxy battle in itself.24 Proxy advisors are 
the pawn in a struggle between shareholders and corporate interests. Corporates are attacking 
the services of proxy advisors and calling for their regulation as a means to rein in the powers 
 
22 Portfolio Manager, German asset manager, telephone interview, 21 March 2018.  
23 The UN PRI signatory database provides summary data (in the “Transparency Reports”) of voting practices. 
For 2018 these reports (under section LEA 21.1) show that Allianz Global Investors (AGI) cast 99% of all of its 
votes, for Deka Investment the result is 90%, for Union Investment 85% and for DWS Group it is 68%.  
24 See also Cappucci (2019). Cappucci is Senior Vice President, Harvard Management Company and from the 
perspective of an investment manager describes “a proxy war against proxy advisors” (2019: 1). 
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of shareholders. Proxy advisors are a valuable tool for shareholders without whose support they 
would struggle to process all of their proxy ballots. They are enabling institutional investors to 
meet regulatory requirements resulting from the indexation and internationalisation of 
investment management. In targeting proxy advisors, corporates are able to avoid openly 
calling for curtailment of shareholder oversight, which would likely be politically more 
troubling. Multiple corporate interviewees admitted that proxy advisors did indeed fulfil an 
important role and did not have too much power per se, but that instead it was asset managers 
that were not doing their work that were bestowing proxy advisors with power. 
 
 
The Corporate Response to Institutionalisation (Second-Order Development) 
The debate about the role of proxy advisors is just one example of potential conflict between 
companies and their shareholders. The institutionalisation of asset management and the 
economies of scale that have driven its concentration have created asset managers, that in 
theory, have significantly more influence over corporate executives than shareholders have had 
in the past. Furthermore, the indexation of asset management, with its associated limits on exit, 
require shareholders to get involved when things turn against them. The alternative of quietly 
selling out of shareholdings and walking away are no longer available for index funds. Proxy 
advisors have further reduced the collective action problems of the past, giving shareholder 
voice greater leverage by helping to construct a consensus of best-practice on corporate 
governance. Together these developments have resulted in a more unified shareholder base that 
more frequently challenges corporate opinion, which in turn has triggered a corporate response. 
The intensity of this response differs from country to country, but in the case of the US has led 
to a very elaborate campaign against shareholder interests.  
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US corporates, for example, employed a lobbying group disguised as representing the interests 
of small “Main Street” investors, thereby “astroturfing” their campaign to hide its corporate 
roots. This group lobbied the SEC and succeeded in having it review the proxy voting process. 
Bloomberg (2019) later reported that in justifying the changes to its policies, the SEC cited 
letters of support from “ordinary Americans”. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton commented that 
"some of the letters that struck me the most came from long-term Main Street investors, 
including an Army veteran and a Marine veteran, a police officer, a retired teacher, a public 
servant, a single mom, a couple of retirees who saved for retirement" (SEC, 2019). However, 
as Bloomberg reported the letters were written by the lobbyists themselves and “they are the 
product of a misleading — and laughably clumsy — public relations campaign by corporate 
interests”.25 
 
This corporate behaviour contradicts the prevalent view in the traditional CPE literature that 
portrays corporates as mere passive actors adapting to whatever institutional framework they 
are confronted with. Instead, as the US examples show, corporates are active agents seeking to 
influence the design of the framework within which they operate. This is therefore supportive 
of the decision to follow the varieties of capitalism approach set out by Hall and Soskice in this 
thesis (rather than comparative political economy approaches taking a more macro approach).  
Although the approach of Hall and Soskice (2001) is firm-centred, they consider it “unrealistic” 
that firms construct or control the overarching institutional structures of the political economy. 
Importantly, they conclude that there will be national differences in the strategies chosen by 
companies to overcome their coordination problems, but that these will be determined by the 
respective institutional structures and political economy they operate in. Therefore, while Hall 
 
25 Bloomberg, 19 November 2019. “SEC Chairman Cites Fishy Letters in Support of Policy Change”. Available 
at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-19/sec-chairman-cites-fishy-letters-in-support-of-policy-
change Accessed 23 December 2019. 
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and Soskice do approach the varieties of capitalism from a firm-centred approach, they too take 
the institutional structures as given.  
 
Furthermore, a core argument that I will set out in this thesis is that differences in the ways in 
which companies have chosen to engage regulators and shareholders are influencing the 
direction that the varieties of capitalism are taking. That is, the orthodox interpretation of 
laissez-faire free-market capitalism that is being imposed by corporate interests in the US is 
contributing to a widening of the differences between the US LME form of capitalism and the 
forms of capitalism seen in the UK and Germany. In contrast, the UK regulator’s approach of 
taking a more inclusive approach to stakeholder concerns and the decision to enlist institutional 
shareholders in order to assist in the policing of corporate conduct is having the effect that in 







The Decision to Interview 
The decision to interview was made because many of the critical issues concerning the growth 
of asset management firms struggle with differentiating between correlation and causation. The 
aforementioned issue of attempting to calculate the influence of proxy advisors is just one such 
example.26 Secondly, any study of corporate governance faces the difficulty that much of the 
engagement today happens behind closed doors.  
 
 
26 See Maxwell (2004) for a detailed reasoning of why a qualitative research approach such as interviewing can 
provide insights with regards to causality. 
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Many of the largest asset managers do not provide lists of which companies they have engaged 
with on what topic, thereby precluding any attempts to evaluate the success of shareholder 
engagement.27 There therefore is no quantitative data to answer the question of whether 
engagement is happening and whether or not it is successful. The only quantitatively 
observable variable is whether asset managers voted and how they voted. Without interview 
data this always leaves the possibility that what is not observable in the voting data has been 
addressed in private meetings.  
 
Questions regarding the extent to which asset managers seek to influence corporate governance 
and the extent to which they have been successful therefore cannot be answered quantitatively. 
Also, insights into the nature of interactions, such as between activist hedge funds and index 
funds, cannot be observed quantitatively. Instead this thesis makes use of interviews to 
compare public policy statements with interviewee responses. In order to penetrate through 
prepared responses, interviewees were at times confronted with anonymised responses from 
other investors or corporates as to their firm’s engagement practices.  
 
This thesis draws primarily on information collected in interviews with 82 individuals at 61 
different institutions. In total interviews were conducted with 18 institutional investors, 33 
stock market-listed companies (“corporate issuers”), 4 proxy advisors (including three 
founders and former CEOs), 3 proxy solicitation companies (these help firms reach out to their 
shareholders and provide insights into shareholders’ governance policies) as well as 3 NGOs 
to arrive at a multi-dimensional understanding of how engagement is conducted in practice. 
 
27 State Street is one noticeable exception to this. The company recently started publishing quarterly and annual 
engagement reports that include the names of the companies they engage with. See, for example: 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/03/stewardship-activity-report-
q4-2018.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2019). BlackRock announced on 14 January 2020 that it would in the future 
also provide a list of companies engage and the issues discussed. 
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The semi-structured interviews were mostly conducted in the spring and summer of 2018 and 
interviewees were selected from the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, with 
the aim of having approximately one third from each jurisdiction. Prior to this, a small number 
of exploratory interviews were held in 2014 and 2015 to ensure the practical relevance of the 
research question and approach.  
 
In sum the investors interviewed managed total assets of $14.3 trillion as of October 2019 with 
the smallest asset manager managing assets of $4bn and the largest asset manager managing 
assets of several trillion dollars. The companies interviewed for this paper had a combined 
market capitalization of approximately $2.5 trillion, with individual market capitalizations 
ranging from $4bn to $400bn. Balancing both assets under management and market 
capitalizations is important as these are proxies for the financial means companies have at their 
disposal. Interviewing both asset managers and corporates provided the opportunity to confront 
each side with the experience of the other and enabled a degree of cross-checking of the claims 
that were made about the degree and nature of engagement.  
 
All the interviews with corporates were conducted via telephone due to the number of 
interviews and the broad geographic spread of corporations. As the asset management industry 
is geographically more focussed, I was able to do in-person interviews in London, Edinburgh, 
Frankfurt and New York and to compliment these with telephone interviews. With regard to 
the mix of in-person and telephone interviews, Novick (2008) notes that despite telephone 
interviews being a principal survey method and the most widely used survey modality in 
industrialized nations (Bernard, 2002; Shuy, 2003), an apparent bias against telephone 
interviews exists in qualitative research. Yet studies that have sought to investigate differences 
in interview modalities have found that quality of data obtained by telephone interviews is 
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comparable to in-person interviews (Carr and Worth, 2001; Lyu et al. 1998, Minnick and 
Young, 1999; Rogers, 1976).  
 
The main shortcoming of telephone interviews is said to be a lack of visual cues (Aquilino, 
1994; Groves, 1990; Novick, 2008). Yet much of the research that compares in-person and 
telephone interviews is based on nursing and mental health case studies in which such non-
verbal cues are of greater importance. Shuy (2003) explains that choosing the appropriate 
interview mode involves a trade-off between persuading individuals to participate and the 
elicitation of information. The decision to use telephone interviews alongside in-person 
interviews in this thesis has been a conscious decision based on belief that the loss of visual 
cues is a small price to pay to ensure greater accessibility of interviewees.  
 
The interviews were mostly not recorded, as it became apparent in the exploratory interviews 
that contacts felt unease about being recorded and that the value of the interviews would be 
negatively impacted if I sought to push for their recording. Researchers have noted different 
experiences with regards to whether interviewees object to being recorded. Hardie (2007) 
reports that interviewees rarely withheld permission. However, my experience matched that of 
Sobel (1994) who found that almost all interviews preferred not to be recorded. Unease at being 
recorded is one of three interview challenges identified by Esterberg (2002) and it is also 
acknowledged by Saunders et al. (1997), Hayes and Mattimoe (2004) and Allen (2017). Several 
times, it was made clear to me that interviews were the result of individual personal favours 
and that the interviewees could not publicly speak for their employers. These comments 
reaffirmed my decision not to record the interviews and confirmed the findings of Byron (1993) 
and Harvey (2011) that opting to not record interviews provides the potential for more detailed 
off-the-record information. 
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The likely reason for the differences in reaction is the fact that in my case the interviewee’s 
conduct is the subject of the questions and not some third-party conduct. Furthermore, some of 
my questions requested their opinion of the corporate governance practices of other 
institutions, a potentially awkward question to ask of a member of this small group of experts. 
With regards to the quality of data, Hayes and Mattimoe report the results of two studies, one 
with and one without taping, and suggest that there is no “one-best-way”. Instead they suggest 
that when the research topic is “more structured and the researcher is reasonably clear about 
what is to be asked during the interview”, it is easier to use the manual method of recording 
data (2004: 6). 
 
The selection of companies was a random sample from each of the countries, with the aim of 
ensuring a balance across sectors and market capitalizations. Companies in the United States 
and Germany were very open to talking, while engaging with corporates in the United 
Kingdom was complicated by the fact that engagement on matters of corporate governance is 
split across several functions including investor relations, the corporate secretary, and human 
resources. This necessitated a higher number of outreaches in the United Kingdom versus the 
other countries.  
 
My requests for corporate interviews were targeted at companies’ investor relations (IR) 
departments, typically at the head of investor relations. This is because IR department act as 
the gatekeepers to corporate management and are typically involved in all investor dialogue. It 
became apparent that a number of corporates, particularly in the US, were keen to air their 
frustration with the quality of investor engagement. While an interview with an IR 
representative was the goal, in the case of a handful of corporations, I had human resources, 
company secretaries, and in one case even the chief financial officer on the call.  
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Interviews with asset managers were set up with the help of a “snowballing” approach, which 
started with existing contacts of mine in Germany and the UK. Once initial interviews were 
secured, interviewees were asked whether they would be prepared to provide further 
introductions. While this snowballing approach risks the selection of interviewees becoming 
non-random, the fact that I had a pre-set list of quadrants (size, type and location of investors), 
meant that in practice I mostly suggested investors I wanted to speak to and either received an 
introduction or not.  
 
The social context within the corporate governance community is important, as it is made up 
of a very small number of individuals who regularly meet at industry conferences and 
workshops. While portfolio managers already represent an exclusive subset of employees of 
asset managers, corporate governance teams are typically much smaller still. While some 
institutions such as Hermes EOS or BlackRock have teams consisting of twenty to thirty 
professionals,28 the typical team size is only around five headcounts per firm (Bew and Fields, 
2012). Referrals were thus very fruitful. What became apparent throughout these interviews is 
how close-knit the corporate governance community is. Not only do many governance experts 
know one another from industry conferences but the CVs of interviewees showed that many 
had moved between firms. 
 
Asking investors for introductions to other investors also provided insights into investor 
networks and highlighted who was and who was not actively engaged in the governance debate. 
Combining this knowledge with the feedback from corporate issuers was insightful, as part of 
the interview consisted of me reading out names of investors and asking the corporates how 
 
28 For BlackRock numbers, see: https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a For 
Hermes EOS staffing numbers, see: https://www.hermes-investment.com/uki/stewardship/eos-team/ (Accessed 
23 February 2020). 
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much interaction they had had with these investors on governance issues. The resulting picture 
was consistent with both corporates and investors singling out the same institutions, both in 
regard to a lack of engagement and in regard to best-practice engagement. To round off the 
picture, I conducted a number of interviews with both proxy advisors and proxy solicitation 
firms, who advise investors and corporates respectively. These meetings proved very 
informative and helped to fill out the overall picture of governance activities. 
 
The interviews were given on the basis of anonymity. Anonymity was important for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, most firms have policies preventing employees from talking to press and 
academics without prior approval. In the case of one asset manager, who had initially agreed, 
simply asking whether I could list the name of her institution as having participated, led to her 
having to check with compliance, with the result being that she ultimately withdrew the consent 
for the interview. In another example, I was only able to interview a governance staffer outside 
of their building and the entire interview had a very “hush-hush” feel to it.  
 
Interviewees highlighted that many companies in the asset management industry use company 
specific job titles and ranks and have therefore requested that I only reference their job titles in 
generic terms. I therefore use terms such as “corporate governance analyst” instead of 
“Director, ESG and Engagement Team” in order to obscure the organisations of the respective 
interviewee. However, wherever relevant and possible, I provide further descriptive 
information about the interviewees in the text. The mantra followed with regards to information 
is “as little as necessary to ensure confidentiality, as much as possible to provide context”. 
 
The interviews followed a semi-structured approach, with each interview starting with a couple 
of open-ended questions in order to allow the interviewee to raise the issues they considered 
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important (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). These were then followed up with a number of closed 
questions, such as “Do you believe proxy advisors have too much power?” Interviews were 
scheduled for 30 minutes but typically ran for approximately one hour, as is typical for semi-
structured interviews. In the case of one proxy advisor, the interview ran for a full three hours.  
 
The questions asked of asset management interviewees were divided into three blocks. The 
first asked about how engagement had changed over time and how engagement differed from 
country to country. In particular, whether the volume of engagement had increased and whether 
the issues of concern had shifted over time. The second block focussed on how investors 
arrived by their proxy voting decisions and, in particular, how they employed the services of 
proxy advisors. The third block asked about the extent to which investors coordinated their 
activities with other investors and any changes that have arisen, or are anticipated, as a result 
of the rise of index investing. 
 
Engaging with investors proved more challenging than engaging with corporates. Due to the 
high level of interest that academics have shown for issues of sustainability (which typically 
are also handled by the corporate governance teams), investors reported being inundated with 
requests for access to data and interviews. One corporate governance analyst at a European 
asset manager, whom I have known for several years, explained to me that she declined all 
requests for assistance from all students simply due to the sheer number of requests. What 
likely also played a role was the increasing public attention given to asset managers’ corporate 
governance activities, which at least initially lead to requests for further background 
information before committing to interviews.  
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The interview response rate differed considerably by interviewee type and by interviewee 
domicile. It became apparent early on, that both asset management firms and proxy advisors 
were oftentimes hesitant to provide interviews due to both the number of interview requests 
they have received from academics and due to the multiple regulatory reviews ongoing. 
Making use of personal networks I was nevertheless able to attain interviews with most of my 
desired targets. These networks are the result of my personal professional background as a 
portfolio manager and research analyst at one of Germany’s four largest asset managers.  
 
With regards to the asset management interviewees in Germany, the small number of firms and 
correspondingly small number of corporate governance and portfolio management employees 
meant that I had at least one contact at each of the firms to reach out to. These personal contacts 
often helped provide access to the relevant interviewees. More generally though, it is likely 
that interviewees at fund managers and proxy advisors were prepared to support my research 
because of an implicit assumption by some, that my research was likely to either be less critical 
or more understanding of the many resource-constrained challenges faced by practitioners. To 
be clear, I made no such promises, made it clear in all communication that I was approaching 
the industry from an academically critically perspective.  
 
Nevertheless, securing asset management interviewees particularly in the UK initially proved 
challenging. While overall prospective asset management interviewees were responsive to 
unsolicited emails in the US and Germany, for the most part I failed to gain a response from 
such emails in the UK. Instead I was reliant on introductions, and one very well-regarded 
interviewee proved to be particularly supportive (an example of successful snowballing). She 
asked what asset managers I had yet to have a response from and then proceeded to list names 
of people at each of the firms, offering to provide her name as a reference. From that point on, 
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I was able to access many of the firms I had previously failed to engage with. Overall the 
response rate amongst German fund management firms was 88 percent (6 of 8 firms), amongst 
UK asset managers it was 40 percent (6 of 15) and amongst US asset managers it was 38 
percent (6 of 16).29 Specifically, with regards to the Big Three, I was able to secure interviews 
with two of them, with the third responding on multiple occasions throughout the six-year 
research period that they were unavailable due to resource constraints.  
 
The highest response rate was achieved from corporate interviewees. In Germany there was 
only one company that declined to participate, in the UK there was one decline and one non-
response, while in the US there was one decline and four non-responses (all from “big tech” 
Silicon Valley companies). The overall interview response rate from corporates was therefore 
very high at 80% (33 of 41).30  
 
There are three factors which likely explain this high response rate. First, unlike the asset 
management and proxy advisory firms, corporate issuers have to date not become overrun with 
interview requests from academics. Second, there was big interest from corporates to tell their 
side of the story. As will become apparent throughout this thesis, but particularly in Chapter 7, 
many corporates felt that the investors’ resource demands with regards to information on 
sustainability issues were becoming too great and with regards to proxy voting that investors 
were not doing their jobs but simply blindly following proxy advisors, who in turn have gained 
too much power in their eyes.  
 
 
29 Note this is the number of asset management firms at which interviews were secured. The total number of 
individual interviewees was higher at 29, as at several asset managers I was able to speak to multiple employees.  
30 Note this is the number of corporates at which interviews were secured. The total number of individual 
interviewees was higher at 39, as at several firms I was able to speak to multiple employees. 
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Third, and particularly with regards to corporate interviewees in Germany and, to a lesser 
extent the interviewees at UK corporates, my day job as a portfolio manager at a leading 
German asset manager undoubtedly played a role in gaining access. While all interviews were 
arranged from my University of Edinburgh email account and it was made clear that these 
interviews were unrelated to my day-job, for full disclosure potential interviewees were 
nevertheless made aware of my role as a portfolio manager. With regards to the information 
collected during the interviews, I do not, however, believe that the answers were influenced by 
the fact that I also work as a portfolio manager. Interviewees were remarkably frank and even 
gave critical feedback as to the corporate governance activities of my employer. As some of 
the interview quotations contained in this thesis will show, interviewees in full knowledge of 
anonymity spoke openly, oftentimes making use of swear words to stress their discontent with 
the status quo of investor engagement. In fact, a number of corporate interviewees appeared to 
enjoy the opportunity to provide straightforward feedback to a member of the investment 
community.   
 
 
The Choice of Countries 
This thesis investigates the relationship between investors and companies in Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States to allow comparative insights to be drawn. The three 
countries were chosen primarily for two reasons. First, as previously stated, corporate 
governance is the subject of several disciplines, most notably law, finance and politics. The 
law and finance literature (La Porta et al., 1998) employs legal origin and the level of investor 
protection as the most common country-level factors used as independent variables in cross-
country governance research (Schiehll and Martins, 2016; Schnyder et al., 2018). Since 
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Germany is a civil law country, while the United States and the United Kingdom are common 
law countries, both legal traditions are included.  
 
Secondly, taking a comparative political economy approach should allow for insights to be 
drawn with respect to the “varieties of capitalism” literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008). This literature seeks to explain how differences in institutional characteristics 
of national economies lead to differences in national competitive advantages in production 
(Witt and Jackson, 2016) and typically divides economies into LMEs and CMEs, as previously 
mentioned. The United States and the United Kingdom are often presented as typical LMEs 
while Germany is considered to be a quintessential example of a CME (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Vitols, 2001). In fact, Crouch (2009) counts the number of times the analysis in Hall and 
Soskice (2001) refers to each country and concludes that their study, rather than being a 
comparison of systems, is really a comparison of the UK/US with Germany. Accordingly, 
much of the subsequent literature on the varieties of capitalism has been about the degree to 
which Germany is, or is not, converging with the UK/US (O'Sullivan, 2003; Schmidt, 2002; 
Streeck, 2010; Vitols, 2001). 
 
What unites the law and finance literature with the comparative political economy literature, is 
the significance they ascribe to blockholders. While the law and finance literature primarily 
consider the ownership structure to be a necessary compensation for shortcomings in 
shareholder protection vis-à-vis company management, the political economy literature 
considers blockholders part of the institutional framework of “Rhenish Capitalism,” which 
provides a competitive advantage through the provision of “patient capital” (Fichtner, 2015). 
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In the Opening Keynote of the 2019 Global Research Alliance for Sustainable Finance and 
Investment (GRASFI) conference, Professor John Kay similarly compared “The Concept of 
the Twenty-First Century Corporation” by looking at Germany, the UK and the US. He 
explained that in Germany, the duty of directors is to operate in the best interest of the company, 
in the UK the situation is less clear as the Companies Act reflects a deliberate compromise 
between competing groups which “appears to give a particular role to shareholders but does 
not give priority”. In the US it is not actually the government but individual states that set the 
laws. Since management decides where to incorporate, states have competed to attract 
registrations by allowing governance policies that serve to insulate management from capital 
market pressures. The result is that “US law is not so much shareholder friendly as management 
friendly”.31  
 
For all of these reasons, the UK, the US and Germany represent an appropriate mixture of 
political economy models, of legal origin, and of institutional investor types. The fact that there 
is a rich academic literature on all three countries, also enables selective temporal comparisons 
across countries.   
 
 
Summary of Findings 
This thesis investigates the process of change in the varieties of capitalism that results from the 
growth of the asset management industry. This growth has caused a transformation in the 
identity of the shareholder: from individual shareholders to institutional investors, and from 
majority active to increasingly indexed shareholdings, concentrated in a small number of fund 
 
31 For conference details, see: https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/events/GRASFI-
Conference-Programme-2019.pdf (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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management companies. Institutional shareholders today represent different preferences to the 
individual shareholder of the past. Index funds and large active funds today provide capital on 
more patient terms than in the past, but also have the potential to take a greater influence over 
company strategy. 
 
This thesis concludes that the growth of the asset management industry, and the 
homogenisation of the shareholder ownership structure that it has brought about in the UK, the 
US and Germany, to date represents a convergence of corporate governance only in form but 
not in function. Instead, and despite the widespread internationalisation documented in this 
thesis, significant differences in the institutional logic of individual countries remain. The 
prime reason for this is that different actors have different resources as well as different 
preference in each of the respective countries. These differences are exacerbated by the 
heterogeneity of government approaches. As a result, asset manager capitalism reflects some 
of the idiosyncrasies present in the national varieties of capitalism.  
 
The interview and proxy voting data presented clearly show the differences between different 
types of investors. Index funds are likely to vote differently to active funds, domestic funds 
often engage differently to foreign funds, and the engagement approach of the Big Three asset 
managers is altogether different from that of other US and European asset managers. There are 
therefore three dimensions along which asset managers differ: their size, their domicile and 
whether they are predominantly active of passive. This therefore results in a possible nine types 
of asset managers. However, this thesis will show that in practice one dimension suffices to 
analyse the behaviour of asset managers: there are the Big Three asset managers, and then there 
are all the other asset managers (all of which are smaller and offer mostly active investment 
strategies).  
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Corporates, proxy advisors and the respective governments are presented as three further 
central types of actors. The institutional framework presented in the final chapter of this thesis 
therefore consists of five primary actors. The way asset manager capitalism unfolds is 
furthermore shown to be the result of seven factors influencing the nature of change in 
corporate governance, which determine the way in which the above five groups of actors 
interact.  
 
First, there is the approach of the government in setting out the ground rules of corporate 
governance and investor stewardship. This dictates how the remaining six dimensions interact 
with one another. Second there is the approach followed by corporates, the level of 
confrontation being in large part determined by the extent to which the national regulatory 
context allows for this. Third, there is the relative influence of proxy advisors in each of the 
three countries. Their recommendations are shown to frequently diverge from those of their 
asset management clients, particularly the Big Three. The aforementioned three dimensions 
are confronted with four asset manager specific dimensions. These are: asset managers’ intent 
to bring about change, the nature of the change they seek to bring (greater focus on shareholder 
value versus stakeholder interests), their physical resources (stewardship headcounts), and the 
size of their respective voting blocs.  
 
The following chapters will show that the functioning of the varieties of capitalism in the three 
respective countries continues to exhibit a number of significant domestic features. Domestic 
asset managers continue to play an important governance role despite their comparatively 
smaller size, proxy advisors’ recommendations do not represent the orthodox shareholder value 
maximisation policies that we would expect, and the influence of the three biggest US asset 
managers differs from country to country.  
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Instead of asset manager capitalism causing the Americanisation of the global corporate 
governance regime, significant differences therefore continue to persist. Indeed, there are signs 
that rather than converging on one global model of capitalism the rise of the asset management 
industry is contributing towards moderate divergence, particularly between the models seen in 
the UK and the US. In the UK, where the government has enlisted asset managers as stewards 
of their portfolio companies, and where the Big Three asset managers have a comparatively 
smaller market share, asset managers are increasingly considering the concerns of other 
stakeholders alongside their own. A similar situation can be observed in Germany. In the US, 
on the other hand, where the government has not been a supporter of greater asset manager 
stewardship, and regulators are generally more sceptical of environmental and social affairs, 
asset manager capitalism to date has failed to bring about substantial change to the domestic 
governance model.  
 
The Big Three US index investors continue to follow what can best be described as an orthodox 
interpretation of fiduciary duty, one that is focussed primarily on short-term financial returns. 
This stands in stark contrast to the approach of many UK and (to a lesser extent) German 
investors, who are increasingly reconceptualising their role as that of “universal owners” 
(Hawley and Williams, 2007). The theory of universal ownership argues that the shareholdings 
of many institutional investors are today so widely dispersed that they effectively own a slice 
of the entire economy. The increasing share of indexed investments has contributed to this. 
Furthermore, their ultimate beneficiary base, the clients of the asset managers, represent an 
increasing portion of the population that is saving for retirement. Because of this asset 
managers should care about externalities such as pollution or even social unrest as it risks 
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negatively affecting the performance of the widely diversified portfolio as well as affecting the 
physical environment that their beneficial owners will encounter in retirement.  
 
The policy consequence of this is that asset managers that conceive of themselves as universal 
owners will show greater regard to the concerns of other stakeholders besides themselves. This 
manifests itself by asset managers demonstrating greater support for shareholder proposals 
concerning environmental, social and political issues. Chapter 4 will show that the evidence 
shows that asset managers in the UK and Germany indeed back a large and growing percentage 
of such shareholder proposals, whereas the Big Three US asset managers, who we would 
expect to be the most likely to see themselves as universal owners, vote with management and 
against the vast majority of such proposals. The Big Three thereby provide corporate managers 
with insulation from some of the changing policies of other investors.  
 
The extent to which the Big Three US asset managers’ understanding of their fiduciary duty 
changes in the future will therefore be of critical importance for how the varieties of capitalism 
are influenced by institutionalisation going forward. Such change may occur as a result of 
updated regulations, because of an increased acknowledgment of the financial materiality of 
sustainability concerns, or because increased public scrutiny by activists leads to increased 
social pressure to change. Should the result be that the Big Three US asset managers adjust 
their understanding of fiduciary duty to align it with the understanding favoured by European 
asset managers, then the rise of the asset manager capitalism has the potential to cause a 
convergence in the varieties of capitalism that goes beyond a mere convergence in form to one 






Limits of the Analysis 
This thesis considers only one of the five spheres identified by Hall and Soskice (2001) in 
which firms have to maintain relationships to be successful. In general, the varieties of 
capitalism deals with a broad range of issues including workers representation and innovation, 
but financing and corporate governance are central to most of the discussions. A further point 
to note is that the focus of this study lies only on the listed equity market as a source of funds. 
Countries differ in the extent to which their firms use private equity or venture capital (Black 
and Gilson, 1998), bank funding (Hardie and Howarth, 2013; Hardie et al., 2013), or finance 
expenditure out of retained earnings (Braun and Deeg, 2019). Furthermore, there are also 
differences between countries in the proportion of the companies that are listed on the stock 
market, with Germany and its Mittelstand in particular being largely in private ownership and 
thus funded initially by paid-in owners’ equity, borrowing and retained earnings (Perry and 
Nölke, 2006).  
 
The following chapters repeatedly straddle the law and economics and the varieties of 
capitalism literatures. Corporate governance is central to both, but the questions that the 
respective literatures ask are very different. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) description of an ideal-
type LME model, for example, refers to managers’ focus on share price, on short-term 
developments and on shareholder value. Though they do talk about bank blockholders having 
monitoring advantages within CMEs, agency problems between corporates and shareholders 
are not the focus of their analysis. Instead the focus is on comparative institutional advantage 
achieved through complementarities between institutions. The law and economics and 
corporate governance literature on the other hand is focussed on the degree of managerial 
autonomy as it seeks to limit agency problems but for the most part does not question how 
different shareholders’ preferences may differ. Managerial autonomy by itself, however, tells 
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us little about where a country sits on the continuum between the two ideal-type poles of LME 
and CME models. 
 
Bridging the conceptual gap between the corporate governance literature and the varieties of 
capitalism literature analysis requires a focus on the type of shareholder policies that replace 
managerial autonomy. If managerial autonomy is reduced in favour of greater shareholder 
control, this represents a reduction in agency problems but by itself does not imply a change in 
corporate strategy. Should shareholder policies merely seek to advocate for the same policies 
previously already pursue by management, then nothing will change (as is the case at many US 
companies today). If, on the other hand, managerial autonomy is replaced by shareholder 
policies seeking to give greater consideration to the interests of other stakeholders (the 
following chapters will show that this is the case in the UK and Germany), then this is of 
relevance for the varieties of capitalism as it would represent a change from an LME towards 
a CME model of capitalism, requiring managers to adopt greater coordination and longer time 
horizons.  
 
There is one further point that has to be addressed in order to ensure the conceptual integrity 
of the above link between the law and economics and varieties of capitalism literatures and that 
is that the influence of shareholders on corporate executives has historically been exaggerated 
in the literature (exceptions being Knafo and Dutta, 2019; Pistor; 2019; Roe, 1994). Rather 
than acting as the impartial referees of stakeholders’ concerns as Aoki (1984) and others have 
envisaged, managers have run companies mainly for their own benefit (particularly in the US), 
taking account of shareholder demands only where necessary. Even though large remuneration 
packages ensured that shareholder returns were given substantial attention, when it came to 
corporate strategy, shareholders have generally had limited influence.  
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Pistor (2019) highlights the irony in the fact that the Business Roundtable, an association of 
the largest firms in America, in August of 2019 announced that it “redefines the purpose of a 
corporation to promote ‘an economy that serves all Americans’”.32 The statement made clear 
that Americas largest firms would no longer seek to maximise shareholder value but instead 
follow a stakeholder approach. The statement effectively sought to pass the blame for past 
social failings on to shareholders; managers as agents where only doing what their principals 
were telling them. Yet if managers were truly lacking autonomy in their decision making, then 
they could not simply choose a new master (stakeholders) and abandon their old (shareholders).  
 
Instead managerial autonomy in LME countries such as the US has historically always been 
substantial, and the control of shareholder has been exaggerated. In CME countries such as 
Germany, managerial autonomy has historically been limited by dual board structures and 
employee representation (see also Goyer, 2011). For managers of companies in CME countries 
the greater attention that asset manager capitalism gives to stakeholder concerns simply 
represents a moderate rebalancing of the relative power of stakeholders without material 
changes to managerial autonomy. For executives in LME countries such as the US, however, 
the rise of asset manager capitalism can represent a decrease in managerial autonomy as it 
requires managers to give greater consideration for other stakeholders’ concerns and thus 






32 Full statement available at: https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-
of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans (Accessed 1 May 2020).  
 61 
The Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis identifies five distinct developments influencing the corporate governance of 
companies in Germany, the UK and the US. Two first-order phenomena, rising institutional 
ownership and the rise of index investment and three second-order developments: the 
internationalisation of fund management, the need for proxy advisors, and the corporate 
response. In the chapters that follow, each of these phenomena will be addressed in a dedicated 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 documents the historical roots of the institutionalisation of the asset management 
industry with particular attention given to the role played by national social security and 
pensions systems. Chapter 3 looks at the significance of the growth of “passive” index 
investing on the corporate governance activities of asset managers. Chapter 4 assesses the 
internationalisation of share ownership, both in terms of the internationalisation of the 
corporate share register as well as the increased internationalisation of asset management firms 
themselves. Chapter 5 illustrates how this has given rise to the services of proxy advisors and 
investigates their role in the struggle between shareholder and corporate interests. Chapter 6 
discussed the role of the asset management sector within the overall process of financialisation 
and specifically with regards to the repercussions for workers and the relationship to growing 
economic inequality. Chapter 7 considers the role of the firm within this changing shareholder 
ownership structure and documents how corporates, particularly in the United States, are 
engaging in lobbying in order to challenge shareholders’ increased governance assertion. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a consideration of what these governance changes entail for our 
understanding of the comparative political economy literature.  
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Chapter 2  
The Institutionalisation of Share Ownership  
 
Introduction  
In 1904, John Moody, the founder of the synonymous bond rating agency, published a book in 
which he outlined his expectations that in the future the US would have delegated all of its 
corporations to the control of a single group around the Rockefeller family (Moody, 1904). 
Instead, blockholding families such as the Rockefellers soon lost their control over US 
corporations, spurred on by antitrust policy and the ability of bankers like J. P. Morgan to 
successfully sell large blocks of stock to a wide public (Becht and DeLong, 2005). The result 
was that by the end of 1929 only eleven percent of the 200 largest corporations in the US were 
still controlled by large blockholders (Becht and DeLong, 2005). This then was the background 
which led Berle and Means (1932) to observe that the atom of ownership had been separated 
into its components of beneficial ownership and control. 
 
The dispersed ownership noted by Berle and Means (1932) was, however, only to be a 
temporary phenomenon. Figure 2 illustrates the extent to which institutional share ownership 
has increased in the US over the past century. From less than 7 percent in 1945 US institutional 
ownership has grown to approximately 70 percent in 2018, with some estimates putting it as 
high 80 percent (SEC, 2019). While this “great re-concentration” (Braun, 2019) represents one 
continual transfer of shareholdings from individuals to institutional investors, this chapter will 
show that below the surface of this consistent development there have been multiple waves of 




Figure 2: Percentage of US Corporate Equities Held by Institutional Investors (1945-2018) 
 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, The Federal Reserve, grey bars represent 
interpolated levels. 
 
Institutionalisation in the context of this thesis refers to the transfer of shares from individual 
investors to institutional investors. Institutional investors are asset managers (including mutual 
fund and Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) companies), pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign 
wealth funds and corporations (including banks and insurance companies). The primary focus 
in the context of this thesis are those cases where these institutional investors act as 
intermediaries in the investment chain, where they represent a new link in that chain, managing 
the assets of individuals that would have previously been directly held by individuals. This 
therefore eliminates sovereign wealth funds, and corporates from the analysis, putting the focus 
of this chapter on insurance companies, pension funds and especially on asset managers.  
 
Harmes (2001) explains that all institutional investors have three common characteristics that 
differentiate them from individual investors: First, they provide individual investors with a 
means of risk pooling, enabling them to diversify their investments even for small sums of 
money. Second, they are able to spread the costs of investment management across a large asset 
base, thereby taking advantage of economies of scale and lowering the costs of investment 
 64 
management. Third, while regulatory requirements differ from country to country, there are 
generally requirements for institutional investors to act in the interest of their ultimate 
investors. 
 
The institutionalisation of share ownership is far from an exclusively US phenomenon. Figure 
3 shows how UK individual (household) share ownership declined from approximately 40 
percent in 1975 to approximately 11 percent by 2012. The most recent data from the UK Office 
for National Statistics puts UK individual share ownership at 13.5 percent of UK quoted shares 
at the end of 2018.33 The overall trend in the UK thus mirrors the developments observable in 
the US, with individual shareholdings declining and institutional holdings increasing.  
 
Figure 3: Ownership structure of UK quoted shares 
 




Accessed 25 December 2019.  
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Figure 4 shows a comparable trend in Germany with household ownership declining from 
approximately 30 percent in 1970 to approximately 9 percent in 2012. As the European 
Commission (2013) notes, the data for assets in investment funds is distorted by the fact that 
many German funds are listed in Luxembourg and Ireland for regulatory and tax reasons and 
thus do not appear in this graph. If one were to include these figures, the percentage of quoted 
shares held by German investment funds would be slightly higher, and the share or Foreign 
investors slightly lower.  
 
Figure 4: Ownership structure of German quoted shares 
 
Source: European Commission (2013) 
 
A number of authors have already covered different aspects of institutionalisation in detail, 
including pension funds (Clark, 1998; Hawley and Williams; 2000; van der Zwan, 2017), 
mutual funds (Davis, 2009; Useem, 1996;) and ETFs (Braun, 2016; Fichtner, et al. 2017). The 
aim of this chapter is to bring these different aspects together, to show how they form part of a 
bigger process of institutionalisation. Furthermore, despite national differences in the 
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respective importance of pension funds versus mutual funds and versus ETFs, the end result is 
that the percentage of shares held by institutional investors in Germany, the UK and the US 
today is approximately equal. While this has created the preconditions necessary for 
shareholders to take on a greater governance role, this chapter will show that it still left them 
short of the ownership concentration necessary to assume meaningful control over corporate 
governance. Both Figure 3 and Figure 4, for the UK and Germany respectively, also show a 
substantial increase in foreign ownership during the period. This development of increasing 




This chapter will set out the following five arguments. First, the twentieth century witnessed a 
massive shift of shareholdings from private individuals to institutional shareholdings in all 
three countries, though to slightly differing degrees. Second, the relative lack of support 
provided by the social security and unemployment systems in the UK and US provided the 
foundations for the dominance of the asset management industry by Anglo-Saxon asset 
management firms. Third, the replacement of defined-benefit pension plans with defined-
contributions pension schemes resulted in a transfer of assets from pension funds to asset 
managers and further boosted the relative size of UK and US asset managers versus German 
investment managers.  
 
Fourth, with a small number of exceptions, institutional investors in Germany, the UK and the 
US only had limited influence over corporate governance during the twentieth century. 
Ownership concentration increased as shares passed from individuals into the hands of asset 
managers. But overall concentration within the asset management sector at the end of the 
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twentieth century, did not suffice for asset managers stewardship efforts to provide broad 
oversight. Finally, with regards to the varieties of capitalism this means that while many of the 
preconditions for Anglo-Saxon asset managers to play a greater role in corporate governance 
were set in the twentieth century, the limited influence they had at the time was focussed on 
their domestic markets. The chapters that follow will show that this largely continues to be the 
case today. 
 
The next section will explain the significance of the process of institutionalisation for the 
corporate governance of firms. This is followed by a section which shows that the dominance 
of Anglo-Saxon asset managers has its roots in the foundations of the pensions systems in the 
late 19th century and early 20th century. Next the retrenchment of the welfare state that occurred 
in all three countries from the late 1970s onwards and the corresponding transition of corporate 
pension plans from a defined benefit to a defined contribution structure, particularly in the UK 
and the US is analysed. This is then followed by an investigation of the factors that contributed 
to the rise of mutual funds in each of the three countries from the late 1980s.  
 
Also discussed are a number of offsetting factors that occurred concurrently. First, in Germany 
there was the special case of the Deutschland AG ownership network, the dissolution of which 
offset some of the growing ownership concentration that resulted from institutionalisation in 
Germany. Second, the decline in UK insurers’ equity holdings similarly offset some of the 
growing ownership concentration. This chapter closes with a consideration of the consequences 
that the shifting shareholder structures have had for the governance of firms, concluding that 
the ownership structure in place at the end of the 20th century did not suffice to give 
shareholders a notable say over corporate matters.  
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The significance of institutionalisation 
“It’s amazing how all those tiny nest eggs can add up when you put them together 
and let a handful of people decide how to invest them”. Harmes (2001: 9) 
 
As the above quote from Harmes (2001) suggests, the transfer of millions of individual savings 
and pension accounts into the hands of a small number of very large financial institutions can 
have significant consequences for the governance of firms. There are a number of ways in 
which institutionalisation changes shareholder behaviour, all of which explain why 
institutionalisation is considered a first-order development in this thesis. Firstly, from a purely 
arithmetic perspective, institutionalisation leads to larger average ownership stakes. Ownership 
concentration is not proof of institutionalisation, it may also occur as a result of highly 
concentrated private holdings, but it is a strong symptom of it.34  
 
Institutionalisation brings about ownership concentration in two ways. Firstly, there is the 
transfer of a large number of comparatively small individual investments to a smaller number 
of larger institutional investors. This has the result of reducing the collective action problems 
amongst shareholders, thereby in principle increasing their influence. Secondly, because of the 
extensive economies of scale inherent in the asset management industry, there is a tendency 
for the industry to consolidate, with a very small number of very large asset managers capturing 
the majority of assets (Fichtner et al., 2017). This inevitability of a winner-takes-all market 
structure has only been exacerbated with the trend towards index investment and 
internationalisation, covered in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively.  
 
34 There may be countervailing developments, such as the aforementioned divestments by the early US 
industrialist families at the beginning of the 20th century as well as the break-up of the Deutschland AG 
network. Both of these events had the effect of at temporarily offsetting the growing ownership concentration 
resulting from institutionalisation. 
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Besides the arithmetically higher stakes there are two further ways in which institutionalisation 
may influence the governance of firms. Firstly, institutional investors are able to spread the 
cost of governance activities across a larger asset base, thereby lowering the cost of 
engagement. An example of how the resources of institutional investors differ from those of 
individual investors can be seen in the way they have sought to reduce the free-rider problem 
inherent in governance activity. To do so institutional investors have established investor 
networks to consolidate and amplify their collective voice while reducing the individual 
institution’s costs of engagement.  
 
Today, institutional investors regularly meet both in general forums, such as the United Nations 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), as well as at designated networks, such as the 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) or the Ceres Investor Network on 
Climate Risk and Sustainability (CERES).35 The degree of coordination that can occur at such 
events is still subject to collusion regulations and thus discussions are limited to the design of 
general best-practice principles of corporate governance as opposed to company-specific 
discussions. But despite these limits, these networks nevertheless do contribute to coordination 
amongst investors.  
 
Secondly, institutional investors are subject to regulations that do not affect individual 
investors (Harmes, 2001). Institutional investors may, for example, be required to vote all of 
their proxies as well as to engage in further stewardship measures. In the US, for example, 
legislation in the 1970s formalised the role of fiduciary duty.36 Asset managers are fiduciaries, 
they manage money on behalf of asset owners, also referred to as beneficial owners. The 
 
35 The Ceres Investor Network on Climate Risk and Sustainability comprises more than 150 institutional 
investors, collectively managing more than $24 trillion in assets. 
36 1974 ERISA legislation, 1979 US Department of Labor regulations.  
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resulting ownership structure has therefore been referred to as both “fiduciary capitalism” 
(Hawley and Williams, 2000) and “agency capitalism” (Gilson and Gordon, 2013). 
 
The reason concepts such as fiduciary duty matter is because they formalise requirements for 
institutional investors. In the US the SEC, for example, requires “an investment adviser who 
exercises voting authority with respect to client securities to adopt and implement written 
policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the investment adviser votes 
proxies in the best interest of its clients” (SEC, 2019a). The determination of a client’s best 
interest is a highly controversial issue. To date institutional investors’ interpretation of SEC 
guidance had been that it requires them to vote all shares, though this is an issue the SEC is 
seeking to address in update regulation in 2020. There is also disagreement of how fiduciary 
duty should be interpreted in regard to environmental and social concerns.  
 
Each country has different rules, but each sets out a framework according to which institutional 
investors have to operate. In the UK there is less focus on the concept of fiduciary duty, but 
more emphasis on a general requirement for institutional investors to engage in “stewardship” 
of their investee companies (Financial Reporting Council, 2012; 2019). In Germany legal 
requirements to date are still being formulated, though most asset managers adhere to the 
German Investment Association (BVI) “Wohlverhaltensregeln” (translates as rules of good 
conduct). These best-practice rules of good conduct state that proxy ballots only have to be 
voted when it is in the interest of the beneficiary. In practice this means that most large asset 
managers in Germany seek to vote the vast majority of their shares. Interviewees at large 
German asset managers explained that they sought to vote all German shares and an increasing 
proportion of foreign shares. However, since German law does not compel asset managers to 
vote, one smaller asset manager explained that they almost never voted. The reason for this 
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was a shortage of resources. Besides being one of the portfolio managers, he was also recently 
selected as the person responsible for any corporate governance matters that might arise.37   
 
To summarise, the institutionalisation of share ownership is of particular significance as it 
reduces collective action problems amongst investors, lowers the relative cost of engagement 
and puts shares in the hands of institutions who are for the most part compelled to vote. The 
result is that in principle this has created the conditions for institutional investors to play a 
greater role within corporate governance. The extent to which this has actually occurred to 
date, and differences between the three case study countries, will be investigated throughout 
the chapters of this thesis. 
 
 
Phase 1: 1840s to 1980s – the rise of pension funds 
The roots of Anglo-Saxon dominance of the asset management industry are to be found in the 
decisions made during the design of the social security systems in the late 19th century. From 
the outset, the design of the UK pensions system, and especially that of the US, was such that 
there would only be minimal support and that people would therefore be incentivized to care 
for themselves. 
 
Pensions in the UK and the US were primarily the result of economic realities. The early 
railway pensions were set up as employers were concerned by increased unionisation (Hannah, 
1986). The same is true for the period after WW2 in which unemployment in the UK did not 
exceed 2 percent for two decades. Employers sought to retain skilled workers through pension 
promises. In Germany on the other hand, Bismarck’s challenge was of a broader political nature 
 
37 Portfolio manager, German asset manager, telephone interview, 21 March 2018. 
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in that he sought to stop the rise of socialism with the help of his “Anti-Socialist Law” of 1878. 
Bismarck’s “political project” (Bonoli, 2000) was therefore about appeasing the “increasingly 
restless German working class” (Hill, 2007), rather than ensuring the loyalty of a given group 
of employees.  
 
This required a more wide-ranging and inclusive approach to pensions coverage. From the 
outset the German pension system was (and still is) compulsory, employees and employers 
contributed equally, with the government also contributing. Initially it was partially funded but 
reforms saw partial funding replaced with a PAYG system based on an intergenerational 
contract. In this intergenerational PAYG system the current workforce pays for the current 
generation of pensioners, the system therefore requires no additional funding. However, it does 
rely on a balanced and stable demographic pyramid. Chancellor Adenauer famously quipped 
that "Germans will always have children”.38 
 
In the UK the popularity of life insurance and private pension policies was by design. Life 
insurance policies received tax relief from as early as 1853 and pensions from 1921 onwards. 
Both Hannah (1986) and Davis (1995) consider taxation as the most important incentive for 
pension fund savings in the UK and credit it with the substantial growth of pension assets. Not 
only were corporate pensions encouraged through tax policies, state pensions were also capped 
at minimalist levels. “The consequence of this approach was that the exclusion of the better off 
from non-contributory pensions and social insurance meant that they had strong incentives to 
develop private pensions” (Hill, 2007: 24-25). This steering of workers and corporations 
 
38 https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany-s-baby-bust-why-aren-t-germans-having-babies-a-336760.html 
(Accessed 26 May 2019) 
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towards private pension solutions has been a continuous hallmark of the UK approach to 
pensions and social security.  
 
The publication of the Beveridge report in 1942 laid the groundwork for the introduction of a 
national social security system in the UK, though it was the post-war Labour government that 
brought it in. The system was applicable to all people in employment and funded by a flat-rate 
contribution by all workers. Beveridge’s recommendations were almost implemented in their 
entirety, except for the fact that the timetable was expedited. Rather than following Beveridge’s 
recommendation of adopting a “National Insurance” system in a gradual process over a twenty-
year period, the government sought to introduce the system in ten years or less. The increased 
financial burden that came with a quicker implementation, Hill (2007) notes, probably had the 
consequence of reducing the level at which the support operated, putting it closer to the 
subsistence level. Thereby the faster implementation of the national insurance system, once 
more ensured that individuals were steered towards private pensions. 
 
Similar to the UK, the first US private pensions were provided by the railway companies. These 
were joined by military pensions, which commenced in 1890. But extensive occupational 
pensions were slow to develop (Sass, 1997). It was the New Deal, which was introduced 
following Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, that led to a step change in public and private 
pensions. However, similarly to the developments in the UK, there were disagreements about 
how the system was to be phased in. While the legislation initially passed Congress unscathed, 
the bill met with substantial resistance in the Senate as lobbyists took their last stand 
(Berkowitz, 1991). Berkowitz quotes a lawyer for Edison Electric Illuminating Company who 
spoke of how “paternal government aid sapped the ‘virtues of self-reliance and frugality’ and 
bred ‘a race of weaklings’” (1991: 43).  
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The result of the curtailment of state support in the US and the UK and the tax support provided 
to private pensions was that by the end of the 1970s, pension funds were the largest institutional 
investors in the UK and the US. Their governance activity during this period was, however, 
limited. This was in part because of the absolute size of their ownership stakes. While pension 
funds represented the largest institutional investor in the US with approximately 22 percent of 
assets, approximately 70 percent of assets remained in the hands of individual investors 
(Jackson, 2010), meaning corporate executives faced little serious resistance from a dispersed 
shareholder base in this time of “managerialism” (Davis, 2009). With regards to the US, 
Bebchuk (2004) and Black (1990) also highlight the restrictive role of legislation, which 
prohibited (and to a large extent still does) investors from forming coalitions.  
 
Besides the absolute size of their holdings there were other factors contributing to subdued 
pension fund activism during this time, chief of which were conflicts of interest (Hawley and 
Williams, 2000; Black, 1990). Corporates, cognizant of the fact that any activism by their 
pension funds at other corporate elections could result in retaliatory behaviour at their own 
annual general meetings, on the whole sought to tone down involvement. US legislation 
furthermore ensured that trade unions were constrained in their ability to influence investment 
decisions at corporate pension funds (McCarthy, 2014). This left public pension funds as the 
most active advocates for better corporate governance (Hawley and Williams, 2000).  
 
The situation in the UK and Germany at the time was quite different from that in the US. While 
levels of institutionalisation today are approximately equal in all three countries, the degree of 
institutionalisation in 1980 differed substantially across countries: The UK was actually ahead 
of the US, with levels of institutional ownership of approximately 70 percent as early as the 
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1980s, at a time when the US stood at 32 percent and Germany had reached only approximately 
10 percent (European Commission, 2013). The reason for this divergence is two-fold.  
 
With regards to the UK, the reason for the higher levels of institutional ownership was 
primarily to be found in the large equity holdings of UK insurers and pension funds. Black and 
Coffee (1994) explain that US insurance regulation forbade American insurers from holding 
large equity stakes and that British insurers were also permitted to manage mutual funds, a 
business denied to American insurers by law. The result of this is that the largest US 
institutional investor in mid-1991 would not have even made the Top-10 in the UK when 
measured by assets under management (Black and Coffee, 1994).  
 
Further documenting the UK experience with institutional stewardship, Black and Coffee 
(1994) report on interviews with Prudential Portfolio Managers (PPM), at the time the largest 
UK institutional investor. PPM estimated that it held stakes of 5 percent or greater in 
approximately 200 UK companies, and in some instances held stakes as high as 14 percent. 
This example shows both the role of regulatory differences in facilitating or hindering the 
process of institutionalisation and the fact that the present-day UK stewardship initiative can 
look back on a long history of institutional oversight. The comparatively low level of German 
institutionalisation, on the other hand, can be explained by the continued presence of the 
Deutschland AG network up until the end of the twentieth century (Figure 5). The definition 
of institutionalisation employed in this chapter focusses on pension funds and asset managers 
and thus excludes the holdings of families, banks and non-financial corporates, all of which 
held substantial stakes in Germany at the time.  
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Known as “Deutschland AG” or Germany Inc, the shareholder ownership structure of large 
German companies was characterised by a tight-knit network of crossholdings between 
industrial firms, banks and insurance companies. This network had its roots in the era of 
industrialisation in the second half of the nineteenth century (Höpner and Krempel, 2004). 
From the founding of both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank in 1870, these banks were 
closely intertwined with German industrial companies. Georg von Siemens of Siemens AG, 
for example, was the first spokesman of the board of management of Deutsche Bank.  
 
Figure 5: Deutschland AG in 1996 
 
Source: Höpner and Krempel (2005)39 
 
39 Höpner and Krempel explain that the “size of the point represents the degree of involvement in the network 
rather than company size. […] Financial companies are plotted as white points and non-financial companies as 
dark grey points. Finally, three different kinds of links between firms are distinguished: white arrows show 
connections among financial companies; dark grey arrows represent connections between industrial 
companies;3and light grey lines indicate industrial shares held by financial companies, as well as the rare case 
of financial companies held by industrial firms” (2004: 341). 
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Höpner and Krempel (2004) report that the creation of Deutschland AG was at least partially 
unintentional. Banks often retained stakes in companies that they listed on stock markets, and 
when demand was particularly low, they would hold the balance that they were unable to sell.  
But the authors also explain that cooperation between banks and industrial companies was 
encouraged by the state. State promotion of cartels was preferred, and inter-firm relationships 
were preferred to outright competition. Since the prevailing view amongst politicians and 
companies at the time was that cartels were to be preferred to pure competition, the Stock 
Cooperation Act of 1884 awarded the supervision of the executive board to the supervisory 
board and not to shareholders (Höpner and Krempel, 2004; Jackson, 2001). The idea being that 
interlocking directors would ensure better cooperation than purely return-oriented 
shareholders.  
 
A central feature of the cross-shareholdings was that managers would sit on each other’s boards 
thereby creating networks of directors. Since it is the board’s responsibility to decide on any 
potential takeover proposal and the future of the CEO, this cross-shareholding provided a 
quasi-mutual insurance system amongst participating companies, partially insulating them 
from pressure from minority shareholders (Streeck, 2010). Besides the absence of a funded 
pensions system, this shareholder network thus further explains the relative insignificance of 
institutional investors within German corporate governance during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Overall it can be said that while institutionalisation started to accelerate in all three countries 
in the 1960s and 1970s, it largely failed to result in greater corporate governance activity from 
institutional investors. Cheffin notes that “[w]hile corporate governance concerns might be 
endemic to the corporate form, the now ubiquitous term ‘corporate governance’ was largely 
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The 1980s and 1990s – The retrenchment of the welfare state and the rise of mutual funds 
If pension funds were the winners in terms of asset growth in the decades leading up to the 
1980s, it has been asset managers that have been dominating ever since. There are three main 
factors responsible for the ascendancy of mutual funds. These are the increasing substitution 
of defined benefit pension plans with defined contributions plans, the dawn of “mass 
investment” and the understanding gained from finance theory, notably from modern portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1952). I will now consider each of these factors, starting with the 
transformation of pensions provision in this section.  
 
While the period from the 1940s to the 1970s saw a gradual expansion of social security and 
pension systems in the UK and the US, the period from the mid 1970s onwards saw a 
retrenchment. In the UK there was a brief effort by the Conservative and later the Labour 
governments in the early 1970s to introduce a limited additional pension scheme known as 
State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS). However, with the arrival of the Thatcher 
government in 1979 the benefits guaranteed under SERPS were cut.  
 
In Germany the expansion of the pensions system initially continued under Chancellor Schmidt 
in 1972 with more flexible retirement options, which contributed to the retirement costs for the 
state doubling between 1970 and 1975 (Willis Towers Watson, 2018b). However, in the mid 
1970s Germany faced the same economic and demographic challenges as the UK and the US 
and the government started looking for ways to secure the continued affordability of the 
pensions system. One policy was the creation of corporate pensions, the legal conditions for 
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which were only created with the 1974 ‘Law for the Improvement of Company Pensions’ 
(Willis Towers Watson, 2018b). The law provided for insolvency protection and mandatory 
indexation to inflation. From thereon, the German pensions system consisted of three pillars, 
though the state pension continues to dominate to this day. According to Willis Towers Watson 
(2018b) the breakdown between the three pillars in 2018 was as follows: 80 percent of the 
workforce were covered by the state pension plan and 10 percent each by occupational pension 
plans and by private provision. 
 
With the US similarly facing economic hardship with the onset of the 1973 oil crisis, critics of 
state intervention intensified their attacks on the New Deal and the post-war Keynesian 
policies. The bankruptcy of the Studebaker motor company in 1963 led to the creation of wide-
reaching pensions regulations, known as Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
a decade later in 1974. ERISA codified the legal status of defined-benefit corporate pension 
plans and imposed strict minimum-funding requirements (Davis, 1995).  
 
From this followed the most fundamental change to the US pensions system with the 
introduction of tax-advantaged individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in 1974 as part of 
ERISA. IRAs were followed in 1978 by an even more tax-advantaged product, the 401(k) 
individual tax advantaged retirement savings accounts, which were actively promoted by the 
Reagan administration (Hyde and Dixon, 2008). In contrast to the early days of the pension 
industry, Harmes (2001) notes that since labour was more readily available in these more 
uncertain economic times, employers no longer needed to ensure workers’ loyalty by offering 
them pension promises.  
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While DB schemes guarantee employees a certain level of pensions income from the time of 
retirement, typically a percentage of an employee’s final salary (‘final salary schemes’), DC 
schemes provide no guaranteed level of benefit but instead only specify what level of 
contribution the employer will make every year throughout employment. The important 
difference is that in DB schemes the employer bears the risk of longevity of the employee as 
well as the underlying financial return risk that portfolio returns may not suffice to cover the 
pensions guarantee. With DC pensions the employee carries the risk that the sum of the 
received pension contributions will not suffice to cover necessary pension income in 
retirement. 
 
Besides contributing to the level of aggregate pension savings, the creation of 401(k) plans in 
the mid 1970s therefore also created the vehicle that facilitated the switch from DB to DC plans 
in the US. The reason why companies everywhere, not just the US, started shutting down their 
DB schemes can be found in a combination of rising longevity risk as well as structurally 
declining interest rates. As employees lived longer, pension promises became increasingly 
expensive for companies to uphold. Pension promises are liabilities on companies’ balance 
sheets. In order to match assets with these future liabilities, pension funds historically invested 
in longer dated bonds.  
 
However, longer-dated interest rates started to decline substantially from the early 1980s. From 
a high of 16 percent under the Thatcher government in 1981, the yield on 10-year UK 
government bonds declined to 10 percent by 1990 and to almost 4 percent in 1999. Similar 
developments occurred in the US, where the yield on 10-year treasury bonds declined from a 
high of almost 16 percent in 1981 to 8 percent by the early 1990s and 5 percent by the turn of 
the century. In Germany the Bundesbank kept yields in a tighter corridor but 10-year 
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government bond yields nevertheless fell from a high of above 10 percent in the early 1980s to 
a low of 4 percent in 1999. However, for Germany rates were less important as the majority of 
pensions savings were, and still are, in the state PAYG system, which is mostly unfunded.  
 
Since pension guarantees represent liabilities to a company’s balance sheet and the declining 
interest rate represents a lower discount rate on those liabilities, pension liabilities started to 
balloon relative to corporate earnings, thereby substantially increasing the pressure on 
corporates to close DB schemes to new joiners and convert existing DB plans to DC plans. 
Figure 6, below, illustrates the rapid decline in DB pensions in the US from 1975 onwards. 
From 74 percent of all participants in DB pension schemes in 1975, their proportion quickly 
declined, falling to 50 percent by 1990 and just 26 percent by 2016.  
 
Figure 6: Percentage of participants in US pension plans by type of plan, 1975-2016 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor 
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The switching of DB to DC pensions, which started in the US in the 1970s did not reach the 
UK until approximately 1990, a point at which half of all US DB plans had already been moved 
to DC plans. While the UK transformation started considerably later, the pace at which the 
transition happened was much faster and the end result more extreme. Willis Towers Watson 
(2018b) reports that by 2015 ninety-six percent of FTSE 100 companies offered DC-only 
pension plans. This compares to 71 percent of Fortune 100 companies (Americas 100 largest 
corporations by revenues) offering DC-only pensions. The result of this development is that 
both the US and the UK today have comparatively large private household pension savings.  
 
For Germany, the issue of DB/DC switching to date has been largely irrelevant as the majority 
of employees are covered by the PAYG state pensions system and only a handful of companies 
offer DB pensions. However, because the various pension and social reforms of the Schröder 
government failed to plug the pensions gaps, in 2017 further reforms were announced. These 
seek to enlist company pensions to fill the gap. The law envisions DC plans by collective 
agreement. Employers will not have to provide a minimum benefit or interest guarantees. There 
can be no lump-sum payments, only annuities, and the DC plans are not guaranteed through 
the pensions’ protection fund. The critical point here is that they can only be introduced with 
union approval and the underlying fund needs to be jointly operated by unions and employees 
(Willis Towers Watson, 2018b).  
 
Despite the fact that the 2017 German pensions law came into force on the 1st of January 2019 
(one year later than originally planned), to date no occupational DC pensions have been set 
up.40 While labour unions, such as the IG Metal (the steel workers’ union with more than 2 
 
40 https://www.ipe.com/countries/germany/germany-unlikely-to-see-new-dc-plans-before-2020/10027937.article 
(Accessed 2 May 2020) 
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million members) supported the original law, they appear lukewarm on its actual introduction. 
For now, unions are demanding that employers fund the new DC plans with some initial capital 
in order to provide a safety net (as the DC plans are not insured). 
 
Unlike the creation of pension funds, which launched the process of institutionalisation, the 
shift from DB to DC in itself does not influence the degree of institutionalisation.41 Pension 
assets, whether DB or DC were already managed by institutional investors. Instead the shift 
from DB to DC changed the structure of the investment chain and correspondingly the nature 
of engagement. While many of the DB pensions had been managed by in-house corporate 
pension funds, when it comes to DC plans, individuals select asset managers to run their 
pension plans. With regards to the shareholder ownership structure, the result of this pension 
switching is an increase in the overall level of ownership concentration amongst institutional 
investors as the same asset managers that administer people’s individual investment accounts 
now also manage those individuals’ DC retirement accounts. 
 
More importantly still, pension funds are generally considered to take a more active, and 
oftentimes more socially conscious, approach to corporate governance oversight than mutual 
funds (Chen et al., 2007; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). One interviewee at a US pension 
fund explained that what made pension funds so powerful was their “monolithic beneficiary 
base”, which enabled them to take a more active stance on certain social issues that mutual 
funds would shy away from.42 Such monolithic beneficiary bases have, for example, allowed 
the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) to divest from tobacco stocks in 
 
41 For a detail analysis of pension fund capitalism, see Dixon (2008) and McCarthy et al. (2016).  
42 Governance analyst, US pension fund, telephone interview, 24th of July 2019. 
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the year 2000 and more than half of all UK university pension funds to divest from fossil fuel 
investments in recent years.43  
 
As a result of the transfer of pension savings from DB to DC plans, the associated proxy voting 
rights transferred from pension funds to mutual funds. Interviewees explained that while 
pension funds themselves have always outsourced some mandates to third-party asset 
managers, in such cases they would typically retain the proxy voting rights for these assets.44 
With the switch from DB to DC therefore, the proxy voting rights related to retirement assets 
that were hitherto exercised by the pension funds transferred to the big asset managers. This 
further increased the size of their voting blocs, further decreased collective action problems, 
and created the condition for greater shareholder influence over corporate strategy. 
 
 
The dawn of mass investment 
While the first UK investment trusts had been set up as early as 1868, it took many more 
decades for modern day mutual funds to become established. It was only in 1925 that the 
Foreign and Colonial Government Trust (founded in 1868) changed from investing in bonds 
to equities (Kahn, 2018). In the US the first open-ended fund, the Massachusetts Investment 
Trust, was similarly launched in 1924.45 However, it was not until the Investment Act of 1940 
that mutual funds as we know them today came into existence (Hawley and Williams, 2000). 
In Germany the first investment trusts had also been launched in the early 1920s but closed 
 
43 For further information on CalSTRS’s decision to divest from tobacco stocks, see: 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-apr-05-mn-16182-story.html For UK university divestments of 
fossil fuels, see: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/13/half-of-uk-universities-have-
committed-to-divest-from-fossil-fuel (Accessed24 February 2020). 
44 Governance analyst, US pension fund, telephone interview, 24th of July 2019. 
45 Investment trusts are examples of open-ended funds and are what we today consider to be the common mutual 
fund. Unlike closed-ended funds, open-ended funds are able to issue new fund units whenever new investors 
decide to invest into the fund.  
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shortly afterwards due to high tax burdens. After that it was not until 1949 that the first German 
mutual fund was established and the mid 1950s before banks launched their own funds (Corner 
and Stafford, 1977).  
 
Figure 7: US stock ownership by individuals and mutual funds (1945-2007) 
 
Source: Data from Jackson (2010). 
 
Despite being around for such a long time, mutual funds struggled to gain substantial assets. 
As late as 1985, mutual fund holdings did not represent more than five percent of the 
outstanding shares of US companies (Figure 7). This was even lower than the levels seen in 
Germany and the UK at the time (both at approximately 15 percent; European Commission, 
2013). This all changed in the aftermath of the aforementioned pension plan switching. But 
there was a second reason why mutual funds’ share of total assets grew so rapidly in the later 
part of the 20th century, and that was to be found in the growing popularity of mutual funds for 
individuals’ non-pension investments. Prior to the 1990s more than half of all shares were held 
by private individuals who up until then chose to invest in the stock market primarily via direct 
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investments, picking their own stocks and not relying on professional services from mutual 
funds.  
 
According to Davis (2009), the ensuing shift from individual shareholdings to mutual fund 
holdings was driven primarily by technological innovations that made finance accessible for 
many more people and in so doing dramatically reduced the “cover charge” on mutual fund 
investing. Mutual funds therefore employed their economies of scale and technological 
innovation to provide retail investors with affordable investment solutions that took advantage 
of risk pooling. From under 6 percent in 1980, the number of US households invested in mutual 
funds increased to nearly half by 2005 (Davis, 2009).  
 
These technological advances allowed academic insights into portfolio management to be put 
into practice. In 1952 the Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz published his paper, which would 
lay the foundations for what we know today as Modern Portfolio Theory. In it he explains the 
undesirability of volatility in stock prices and sets out how a diversified portfolio of stocks 
provides a superior solution to putting all of one’s savings into a single stock with the highest 
expected returns. He further notes the importance of taking account of correlations between 
stocks, highlighting that this required a portfolio that is diversified across industries exposed 
to different economic characteristics. Mutual funds provide affordable access to such 
diversified investment portfolios to the individual retail investor. The benefits of diversification 
are provided for a much-reduced capital outlay and costs are lower than if an individual were 
to pay to construct and regularly rebalance their own portfolio.  
 
Harmes (2001) lists two further factors that contributed to the “revolution of mass investment”. 
First, there was a growing perception of a coming crisis in social security in the US during the 
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1990s, which led to households increasingly seeking to find alternative means of ensuring 
retirement income. Second, the global bull market in equities and the media hype it brought 
with it led to big inflows in the US and Europe. This was the age of the Neuer Markt and the 
Dotcom bubble.  
 
While it had taken almost half a century, from the Investment Act of 1940 until 1985, for 
mutual fund assets in the US to exceed five percent of the overall US share capital (blue line 
in Figure 8 below), the subsequent revolution of mass investment and the switching of pension 
plans meant that mutual fund assets grew from five percent to 25 percent in just two decades 
from 1985 to 2005 (Figure 8). Further demonstrating the relative importance of pension assets 
to the growth of mutual funds, Braun (2019) reports that the share of pension assets in total 
mutual fund assets doubled from twenty to forty percent during the 1990s alone (Braun, 2019).  
 
Figure 8: US stock ownership by institutional investor type 
 
Source: Own graph, data from Jackson (2010). 
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Despite the conditions for greater influence by asset managers being increasingly met, asset 
managers showed a strong reluctance to engage. Commenting on the US, Black notes an 
overreliance on the market for corporate control (takeovers), lamenting overall levels of 
“shareholder passivity” and remarks that “[p]erhaps thrice in a thousand cases, unhappy 
shareholders mount a proxy fight. About one fourth of the time, they win” (1990: 521). This 
observation was underlined by a founder of the US proxy advisor ISS who explained that the 
original idea was for them to set up an advisory business, assisting institutional investors to 
become activists in 1983. However, there was no demand, indeed they met with outright 
hostility as US asset managers did not want to become activists and did not even want to know 
of the fact that they had the means to do so. 46  
 
Chapter 5 will explain I detail what has changed since, but the summary is that from 1985 
corporate raiders started targeting companies they considered to be underperforming, corporate 
executives responded with a raft of poison pill proposals to protect themselves, and asset 
managers were regularly coerced into support these proposals or risk losing corporate pension 
mandates. This came to the attention of the US Department of Labor, which responded by 
making the proxy vote part of the fiduciary duty of asset managers, and to many assert 




Institutionalisation and the prospect of greater use of voice 
The previous sections have described how institutionalisation has contributed to establishing 
the preconditions for greater shareholder influence by helping to overcome collective action 
problems, lowering the relative cost of engagement and changing the regulatory framework 
 
46 Former executive, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020.  
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under which shareholders operate. This section will document how the rise of the active fund 
management industry provided the preconditions for greater shareholder influence by changing 
the relative capacity for the use of voice versus exit. This will be followed in Chapter 3 with a 
dedicated analysis of index funds and their rapid rise since the turn of the century.  
 
The revolution of mass investment and the growth of active mutual funds that it represents has 
resulted in the average size of mutual funds growing substantially. The decision by any 
individual retail shareholder to sell is generally an unremarkable event. However, for 
institutional investors liquidity is an important constraint when considering whether to buy or 
sell a stock. “Market liquidity can be broadly defined as the ability to swiftly execute financial 
transactions, notably exit, at low cost with limited price impact” (Rommerskirchen, 2019: 125). 
Active funds seek to outperform the market (also referred to as “capturing alpha”). The 
influence they have on market prices when they buy and sell shares (“market impact”) may at 
times become a significant trading constraint.  
 
Active fund managers will want their positions in any individual stock to be no bigger than 
what can be absorbed by the market within a day or at most a week without substantially 
affecting the stock price. Otherwise they will drive up stock prices when they build the position 
and again drive down stock prices when they seek to exit, thereby reducing the outperformance 
they are able to capture. The individual active fund size is therefore theoretically capped by the 
ability to capture alpha (Chen et al., 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008; Reuter and Zitzewitz, 
2010). 
 
Institutionalisation has therefore changed the relative capacity for the use of voice versus exit. 
Bigger shareholdings mean that asset managers on average represent a greater percentage of 
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proxy votes, giving greater potential for the use of voice. At the same time the growth of assets 
has reduced the relative liquidity, making exit comparatively more difficult. Since the use of 
voice is a function of its likely success (Hirschman, 1970), the growth of mutual fund holdings 
should result in greater use of voice versus exit.  
 
Besides liquidity, the ability to sell shares and exit a stockholding is primarily determined by 
the fund managers’ willingness to take on tracking error risk. Active managers typically have 
a universe from which they may pick stocks and a benchmark against which their performance 
is tracked. If a fund manager decides to sell her holding in a stock that is contained within her 
benchmark this will increase her fund’s “tracking error” (similarly buying a stock that is not 
included in the benchmark will do the same). Even when funds do not have an official 
benchmark they track, the fund manager will often have an internal benchmark according to 
which her performance is measured. In some cases, fund managers may have a formal 
quantitative “tracking error constraint”, which specifies how much tracking risk they may take, 
in other cases it will be down to their own discretion and thus their personal risk appetite. 47  
 
Risk appetite will be a function of the pay structure of the fund management company as well 
as the career risk a fund manager perceives will result from a bad result. A study by McKinsey 
& Company (2015) estimates that ten percent of U.S. assets qualify as “benchmark-hugging”.48 
Benchmark-huggers or “closet indexers” are funds that have a mandate to actively select stocks 
but instead exhibit a portfolio construction that mostly mirrors a benchmark index. From a 
regulatory perspective, the problem this creates is that the consumer is paying the price of an 
 
47 There is a large academic literature on risk aversion and career risk in the asset management industry. See, for 
example: Gibbson and Murphy (1992), Hu et al. (2011) and Klement (2016). 
48 For Europe, ESMA (2016) conducted a study on a sample of 2600 funds for the period 2012-2014. Their 
results presented in 2016 indicate that between 5 and 15% of equity funds “could potentially be closet indexers”. 
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active fund but only getting the performance of a benchmark index, with the portfolios often 
not deviating sufficiently to enable the fund to make up for the higher fee it charges. 
Importantly, the concept of a tracking error constraint will influence even those who are not 
closet indexers. Selling a stock that is a large index component is a high conviction trade for 
any active investor.  
 
Closet indexing and institutionalisation also have an institutional relationship that goes beyond 
the individual portfolio manager. The larger any one individual fund’s assets under 
management, the larger the risk to the asset management firm if that one fund sees outflows. 
To mitigate this risk, firms may seek to ensure that a fund is ranked in the middle of its peer 
group by targeting the performance of a benchmark index, rather than seeking to be at the top 
of its peer group as this also runs the risk of coming bottom. In this regard Pollet and Wilson 
(2008) note that funds diversify their holdings in response to asset growth. As funds gain size, 
the economic considerations therefore change from gaining additional assets to retaining fund 
assets. 
 
Benchmark hugging must not be voluntary though. There are also fund managers who would 
like to be more active but are liquidity-constrained due to the size of their funds. Any 
institutional investor looking to sell out of a stock holding on the open market will have a 
negative impact on that company’s share price when the size of the institutional investors’ stake 
is greater than the available liquidity in the stock. Any such ‘market impact’ resulting from a 
negative impact on the share price contributes to the cost of exit. For a typical mutual fund 
where the fund manager’s performance is evaluated versus that of her peers, at the end of the 
year a few basis points often make the difference between coming say third or fifteenth in a 
league table. The consequence of institutionalisation for corporate governance is therefore to 
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increase the relative propensity for the use of voice over the use of the exit option by decreasing 




While the purpose of this chapter is to document the rise of institutional ownership and explain 
the factors contributing to it, there have also been offsetting factors that require 
acknowledgement. The first of these was the divestments by the early US industrialists such as 
Rockefeller mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. These were brought on by antitrust 
law that sought to weaken the power of financial institutions as shareholders (Black and Coffee, 
1994; Roe, 1991). This process served to dilute the re-concentration of corporate ownership in 
the US that resulted from the initial phase of institutionalisation, namely the rise of pension 
fund assets in the period from 1900 to 1945. The result was that the peak of the widely dispersed 
“Berle-Means corporation” (Roe, 1991) likely occurred after World War II (Cheffins, 2018). 
 
A second countervailing development to the process of institutionalisation occurred in 
Germany around the end of the twentieth century. Up until that point, the shareholder structure 
in Germany was characterised by the aforementioned dense network of crossholdings of shares 
between large non-financial corporations, banks and insurers. Following declining returns from 
blockholdings and increased opportunity costs, Deutschland AG was dissolved largely as a 
result of a change to the German tax code in 2000/1, which enabled corporates and banks to 
sell their crossholdings without incurring capital gains tax (Höpner and Krempel, 2005). 




A large number of scholars have related the demise of Deutschland AG to the rise of 
shareholder value orientation (SVO) at the end of the twentieth century in Germany (Bradley 
and Sundaram, 2004; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Höpner, 2003; Jürgens and Rupp, 2002; Jürgens et 
al., 2000; Schilling, 2002). These authors suggest that it was pressure from Anglo-Saxon 
mutual funds and pension funds that led to the decision to dispose of cross-shareholdings. The 
introduction of stock options compensation plans was one of the principal means by which 
these shareholders sought to achieve their goals.   
 
 
Table 1: 1998 vs 2018: Ownership of 10 largest nonfinancial domestic firms by three largest 
shareholders 
  Germany U.K. U.S. 
Median: LLSV 1998 50% 15% 12% 
Median: own data 2018 19% 16% 19% 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998), Bloomberg, own calculations, as of August 2018 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that a country’s ownership concentration is a reflection of the level 
of shareholder protection it provides. To demonstrate this, they calculate an “Antidirector 
Rights Index” and highlight correlation with shareholder ownership concentration. Table 1, 
above, shows the result of repeating the calculations of La Porta et al. (1998) two decades later. 
The German level of ownership concentration has come down substantially as a result of the 
decline of Deutschland AG, while levels in the UK and US have increased as a result of the 
process of institutionalisation outlined in this chapter.  
 
The academic literature considers ownership concentration to be an important indicator in two 
regards. First, from a comparative perspective, the presence of blockholders is said to be a both 
an indicator of the variety of capitalism in place (Hall and Soskice, 2001) as well as a response 
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to the (lack of) legal protection provided to shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998). Second, from 
a financial theory perspective, the argument is that shareholders accumulate ownership blocks 
in order to address free-rider problems in the context of corporate governance activism 
(Edmans and Holderness, 2016).  
 
However, as Table 1 illustrates, levels of ownership concentration today have homogenized 
across Germany, the UK and the US, with the consequence that any observation of ownership 
concentration by itself today no longer suffices to draw conclusions for corporate governance.  
The nature of the influence of finance on corporate behaviour “can no longer be adequately 
understood through the simple dichotomy of ownership dispersion or concertation” (Jackson, 
2008: 25). This is why the chapters that follow, will go beyond a simple assessment of 
ownership concentration and instead focus on the investor type and the role of individual 
institutions such as index funds and proxy advisors.  
 
As a final note, prior to the reform of the German proxy voting system in 2001, German banks 
were free to vote their customers’ proxy votes as they pleased, so long as they had not received 
instructions, which they mostly never did (Grundlach and Möslein, 2011). This voting 
behaviour served to further reinforce the foothold of Deutschland AG. Since the German 
banking sector was heavily concentrated in the hands of Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and 
Dresdner Bank, these three banks exercised large voting blocs in companies on whose boards 
they often sat, typically in the interest of corporate management, in order to ensure continued 
banking business.  
 
Baums and Fraune (1994) analyse the 1992 AGMs of 24 companies that are within the 100 
largest German firms and have more than 50 percent of their shares widely held. They report 
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that four factors combined to provide banks with a large share of votes cast at the average 
German company: the votes resulting from their own shareholdings (13%), votes from 
dependent asset managers (10%), the votes resulting from their retail clients’ shareholdings 
(61%), and a low overall voting participation (58%). The extraordinary result is that despite 
only directly owning about 7 percent of the average company, the banks controlled 84 percent 
of all cast votes.49  
 
The dominance of banks at the AGMs of German companies came to an end in the late 1990s 
for a number of reasons. First, with the end of Deutschland AG, German banks divested most 
of their holds in German companies. Second, a change to the shareholder law (AktG) in 2001 
capped the percentage of votes that German banks could represent on their customers’ behalf 
without explicit voting instructions at 5 percent (Bruno and Ruggiero, 2011). These two 
developments were accompanied by increasing governance activities at domestic and foreign 
asset management firms. Domestic asset management firms brought voting in-house, while 
foreign asset management firms started voting their German shares, with the result that overall 
voting participation increased from the 58 percent observed by Baums and Fraune (1995) in 
1992 to 70 percent in 2017 (D. F. King, 2017). 
 
 
The declining importance of UK and German insurance companies 
In the second half of the twentieth century insurance companies in the UK and Germany 
represented substantial blockholders. In Germany this was primarily due to Deutschland AG. 
Besides the domestic banks, the insurers Allianz and Munich Re made up the core of the 
 
49 For the year 1975 Yamazaki (2013) reports similarly high numbers, showing that German banks cast between 
79% and 89% of German companies’ votes. Franks and Mayer (2001) present an example where Deutsche Bank 
effectively prevented the takeover of a German company in 1988 by casting 55% of all votes, despite its direct 
holdings amounting to only 8 percent of outstanding shares.   
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network, with Munich Re holding 26 percent of the shares of Allianz and Allianz holding 25 
percent of the shares of Munich Re (Jürgens and Rupp, 2002). The second reason why German 
insurance companies held relatively large equity holdings was due to their investment 
portfolios. These portfolios were in place to invest the received premium income from life, 
health and property insurance policies.  
 
The most important of these products were life insurance policies, which in the year 2000 
represented 70 percent of the total premium volume in Germany (Maurer, 2003). Life insurance 
policies in Germany serve a dual purpose. They include an insurance protection component 
that provides benefits on death and an investment component that pays out a cash value at the 
contract’s expiry, on average after about 28 years (Maurer, 2003). To hedge these long-dated 
liabilities, German insurance companies invest in equities and longer-dated bonds. Life 
insurance products have been extremely popular in Germany, representing approximately 30 
percent of household assets in 2000 (Bundesbank, 2015), and typically guaranteed a minimum 
return of approximately 4 percent. However, due to the previously described decline in longer-
dated bond yields, the liabilities (guarantees) of life insurance companies started to balloon in 
terms of their net-present-value while the returns on their assets started to fall.  
 
The effect of this was two-fold. First, German insurance companies had to reduce the 
guaranteed rates of return on new life insurance policies, and secondly, the risk that they were 
able to take with their investment portfolios declined. The greater the excess savings that they 
held in their reserves (Deckungsrückstellung), the greater the risk that insurance companies 
can take on their investments. However, as rates declined, and the value of assets relative to 
liabilities fell, German insurance companies had to sell equities to buy bonds. The International 
Monetary Fund (2003) reports that the equity holdings of German insurance companies 
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dropped from a peak of more than 20 percent in 2000 to about 10 percent at the beginning of 
2003.  
 
The equity assets of UK insurers suffered a similar fate to those of German insurance 
companies. Davies (2015) documents that UK insurers’ holdings of UK listed companies 
increased from 10 percent in 1963 to a high of 23.6 percent in 1997. He explains that the reason 
for their advance was primarily due to high domestic inflation rates, which reached a high of 
25 percent in 1975 and stayed above 10 percent for most of the 1970s. A number of reasons 
have contributed to a decline in UK insurers’ domestic equity holdings since. Between 1997 
and 2010 the percentage of the UK stock market held by British insurers dropped from 23.6 
percent to 8.8 percent (and to just 4 percent by the end of 2018).50  
 
Prior to the removal of capital controls in 1979, UK insurers had held artificially high 
allocations of domestic stock. Their removal started a gradual reallocation of equities from 
domestic to international markets (Davies, 2015). With an increasing number of DB pension 
plans nearing their maturity, UK insurers that operated many of these pension plans on behalf 
of UK corporates started shifting out of equities and into bonds (Cheffins, 2008, Davies, 2015). 
Finally, the decline in inflation in an analogous development to Germany, led UK insurers to 
reallocate assets from equities to bonds (Cheffins, 2008).  
 
Black and Coffee (1994), in their study of ownership structures in the UK and the US note a 
tight-knit UK insurance industry controlling large stakes of UK public companies and conclude 
that “major British institutions intervene to change management, but only a handful of times 
 
50 2010 number from Davies (2015). 2018 number from ONS: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2018 
(Accessed 25 February 2020). 
 98 
per year. Absent a crisis, the institutions generally stay on the sidelines” (1994: 2003). They 
further highlight the relevance of regulation by noting that British institutions are significantly 
more active because unlike US institutional investors they do not face such tough regulation 
on acting jointly. 
 
Irrespective of regulation that complicated the coordination of US institutional investors, the 
US insurance industry has generally played a relatively minor role in the US stock market, 
when compared to the British and German insurance industries in their respective domestic 
markets. As Black and Coffee (1994) explain, the prime reason for this is that they were 
prohibited by law from offering investment products. As a result of this the average holding of 
US life insurers represented just one to two percent of the total US stock market capitalisation, 
with the exception of a short period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, as shown on Figure 
9 below. 
 
Figure 9: US and UK insurers’ holdings of their respective domestic stock market capitalisation 
(1963-2018) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, ONS, Davies (2015). 
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To conclude, the insurance sectors in Germany, the UK and the US play a relatively small role 
in corporate governance today. However, with regards to the UK, the almost half a century in 
which UK insurers held more than 10 percent of the domestic market, has left UK insurers and 
their trade association, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), with a “track record of 
showing interest in championing good corporate governance in investee companies” (Barker 
and Chiu, 2017: 15). 
 
 
Conclusion - Corporate governance at the turn of the century 
The levels of institutionalisation increased continually over the second half of the 20th century. 
Nevertheless, with a number of noteworthy exceptions such as from US state pension funds 
such as CalSTRS and CalPERS as well as British insurance companies, the overall influence 
of institutional investors over corporate governance remained limited, suggesting the influence 
of shareholders in the twentieth century has been overestimated in the literature.  
 
This chapter has shown that institutionalisation has been a continual development since the 
start of the nineteenth century. During this time the baton of corporate governance has been 
passed initially from individual dispersed shareholders to pension funds and insurance 
companies and subsequently to mutual funds. With each of these phases the nature of 
shareholder governance changed. This chapter listed a number of factors contributing to these 
shifts, including changes to pensions regulations, the insights from MPT and the rise of mass 
investments. As institutionalisation has grown, collective action problems have decreased, and 
managerial autonomy has been somewhat reduced as a result of greater shareholder influence.  
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The relevance of these corporate governance developments for the varieties of capitalism is 
complex. At first glance, it appears that institutionalisation contribute to shareholder value 
thinking and will thus facilitate an Americanisation of the UK and German models of 
capitalism. Yet, as the following chapters will show, the fact that governments in both countries 
have also advocated for institutional investors to show greater consideration of stakeholder 
concerns (traditionally considered CME attributes) as part of their stewardship responsibilities 
goes some way to mediate this LME pressure.  
 
The reason this chapter ends in the year 2000 and separates out subsequent developments to 
the following chapters is three-fold. First, we know from the work of Hall and Soskice (2001) 
and La Porta et al. (1998) that the corporate governance framework at the turn of the century 
still very much resembled the ideal-type LME/CME models. Second, and relatedly, it was the 
German tax reform of 2000/2001 that gave the biggest impetus to the unravelling of the 
Deutschland AG network, with the result that only 35 of Germany’s one hundred largest 
companies remained part of the crossholding network in 2004, down from 60 in 1996 (Höpner 
and Krempel, 2005). Finally, as the following chapter will discuss, the rise of index fund 
management (the second first-order development in the shareholder ownership structure) 
began in earnest from the year 2000.  
 
The corporate finance literature highlights the special governance role of blockholders, who 
due to their large stakes, do not face the free-rider problem to the same extent as smaller 
investors (Bolton et al., 2002; Edmans and Manso, 2011). The literature commonly delineates 
blockholders as investors that hold stakes in companies exceeding five percent of the issued 
share capital (Edmans and Holderness, 2016). Taking this simplistic hurdle rate, it was only in 
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the UK that a group of institutional investors had reached such stakes by the turn of the century 
so that they could individually or collectively exercise increased oversight.51  
 
At the turn of the century, the institutionalisation of investment management was in full swing 
in all three countries. In the US institutional investors controlled in excess of half of all shares, 
but the asset management industry structure was still relatively unconcentrated. As a result of 
this, the largest US investor in 2000, the pension fund TIAA-CREF with $290 billion in assets 
(Ryan and Schneider, 2002), was only approximately the same size as the largest UK investor, 
the insurer Prudential with $267 billion in assets (Myners, 2001; Prudential, 2001). This is 
despite the US stock market capitalisation at the time being approximately six times as big as 
that of the UK at the end of 1999. Furthermore, if we compare the TIAA-CREF of 2000 with 
the largest US institutional investor today, BlackRock with US$7.43 trillion as of year-end 
2019, the ratio is almost 28 times, despite the market cap having only approximately doubled 
over the timeframe. This shows that, even though the size of US institutional investors 
increased considerably between 1990 and 2000, they remained comparatively small when 
compared to UK institutions until after this time.  
 
Instead of the size of any particular institutional investor, changes in the ownership structure 
in the US and Germany at the end of the twentieth century were therefore more about changes 
in aggregate institutional ownerships levels. In the US, for example, institutional ownership 
jumped from 16 percent in 1960 to 57 percent in 2000 (Ryan and Schneider, 2002). In 
Germany, with Deutschland AG still in operation, the change was more moderate in absolute 
 
51 The exception to this was the US fund manager Fidelity who due to their active approach held concentrated 
positions and held large blocks in select companies therefore as early as the 1980s and 1990s (Davis, 2015). 
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terms but also represented almost a doubling of institutional shareholding from approximately 
20 percent to 35 percent (European Commission, 2013). 
 
These trends were “duly chronicled in detailed explorations of the role of institutional investors 
in the modern corporation” (Ryan and Schneider, 2002: 554) with book  titles such as “Investor 
Capitalism – how money managers are changing the face of corporate America” (Useem, 
1996), “Unseen Power – How mutual funds threaten the political and economic wealth of 
nations” (Harmes, 2001) and “Pension Fund Capitalism” (Clark, 1998) leaving the casual 
observer with the impression that corporations and thus society, are now “Managed by the 
Markets” (Davis, 2009). A closer consideration of these monographs, however, shows that 
these authors are in fact introducing a much more nuanced assessment of capital market 
developments, one supported by the findings of this chapter.  
 
While Useem (1996) does see institutional investors play a “catalytic role” in advancing 
shareholder value, he explains that “investor capitalism” is not meant to imply that mutual 
funds are now in charge of corporate governance and thus corporate executives. Instead he 
explains that “[r]ather than one overseeing the other’s overseeing of the firm, they oversee the 
enterprise together. Though the rubric of investor capitalism might seem to imply the owners 
are back on top, it is meant to connote that a new kind of engaged owner is back in the picture 
and working closely with – though also sometimes against – company management” (1996: 7). 
He thus presents investor capitalism as a sort of half-way house between managerialism and 
what might be termed a future asset manager capitalism. 
 
Similarly, Clark considers pension fund capitalism to be a “further stage in the evolution of 
capitalism, rather than a profound break with the past” (1998: 43). My point is that instead of 
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marking the pinnacle of investor capitalism at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
institutionalisation had merely reached levels that justified using such terminology to mark the 
start of a new era in which it was expected that shareholder influence would continue to 
increase.  
 
The impotence of shareholders to engage in decisive oversight was reflected in the corporate 
scandals of the early 21st century at Enron and WorldCom. The main issue shareholders at the 
time focussed on was to tie executive compensation to share price performance in an attempt 
to overcome the perceived agency problem. Kaen (2003) reports how the stock related 
compensation for the average director at the average US company increased from 28 percent 
in 1995 to 60 percent in 2000 and how, for example, TIAA-CREF at the time considered it 
appropriate to have at least half of the compensation package linked to share price performance.  
 
Knafo and Dutta (2019) make the case that the academic literature on the shareholder 
revolution of the 1980s and 1990s largely overstates the influence of shareholders. Blaming 
shareholders has served to “deresponsibilize” corporate managers even though it is clear that 
they have largely been in charge.  Knafo und Dutta (2019) further point out that even Michael 
Jensen (Jensen et al., 2005), the architect of shareholder value and agency theory, was forced 
to admit that stock options had failed to align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
 
This perception of limited shareholder influence at the time is confirmed by analysis of US 
shareholder voting data (unfortunately comparable data on the UK and Germany is not 
available), which shows that in 60 percent of the shareholder proposals that received majority 
support in 2003, the concerned companies had not followed up with “concrete, responsive 
action” (Conger, 2004). Along similar lines Ertimur et al. (2010) note that in 1997 only 16.1 
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percent of governance-related non-binding shareholder proposals at US companies were 
implemented. Bebchuk (2004), considers the “basic allocation of power between management 
and shareholders in publicly traded companies” and notes a “considerable weakness” of US 
shareholders due to a combination of dispersed ownership and US corporate law. The result of 
this is that US shareholders are precluded from “directly intervening in any major corporate 
decisions” (2004: 1) at the turn of the century. Bebchuk (2005) also investigates the ability of 
shareholders to replace the board of directors in US companies during the period of 1996-2005 
concluding that this ability was “largely a myth” as there was on average less than one case per 
year in which a slate of director candidates submitted by shareholders beat the management’s 
own candidates. 
 
In this regard, the example of mandating annual director elections shows the different role that 
regulators play in each of the three countries. In the UK there is a clear mandate for annual 
director elections, in Germany the trend is moving in that directions, while in the US the 
decision on whether or not to hold annual elections is left to the individual company to decide. 
Shareholders have therefore filed a large number of related proposals in each of the years from 
2003 to 2010, with the result that approximately 88 percent of the companies in the S&P 500 
today hold annual director elections (Nohel, 2012). The end result of this is that while US 
investors for the most part now have annual director elections, the route by which they got 
there was through the laborious task of filing individual shareholder proposals, while in the 
UK and Germany the regulators have taken on such tasks.  
 
There are thus a number of reasons that can explain why, despite their increased aggregate 
ownership, institutional investors failed to gain the upper hand over corporate management by 
the end of the twentieth century. These factors include insufficient ownership concentration, 
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restrictive legislation, too great a reliance on compensation policies and the market for 
corporate control (due to focus on agency theory), as well as a lack of resources such as proxy 
advisors to help manage their diffuse shareholdings.52  
 
In Germany there are two primary reasons why shareholders continued to play only a minor 
role in corporate governance. Firstly, the dismantling of Deutschland AG had only begun, and 
some crossholdings and interlocking directorships were still in place. Together with the 
aforementioned proxy voting by banks these factors had the result that hostile takeovers in 
Germany were rare (Köke, 2000) and thus Germany neither had shareholder control nor a 
functioning market for corporate control. Further complicating matters, particularly for foreign 
shareholders, were a multitude of restrictive proxy voting bylaws, for example blocking shares 
for one or more days around a company’s AGM (Baums, 2000). 
 
In the UK and the US corporate governance activities by mutual fund companies for the most 
part was limited as well. However, both markets had alternative actors that took up some of 
the governance slack. In the US this was the state pension funds such as CalSTRS and 
CalPERS, the California State Teachers' Retirement System and the California Public 
Employees' Retirement System respectively, that launched a number of activism campaigns 
starting in the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s (Crutchley et al., 1998). In the UK this 
role of governance police, looking out for the worst offenders, was fulfilled by the domestic 
insurance companies.  
 
 
52 A handful of proxy advisors had launched at the time, but investors’ use of their services was still in its 
infancy.  
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The takeaway with regards to the varieties of capitalism, therefore, is that the period up to 2000 
helped to set the stage for the domination (in terms of AuM) of the asset management industry 
by Anglo-Saxon investors. The roots of this go back to the beginning of the twentieth century 
and the initial design of the unemployment and social security systems. Changes made during 
the 1970s and 1980s further ensured that individuals increasingly took retirement care into their 
own hands. As pensions were switched from DB to DC plans, corporate pension funds 
increasingly became less relevant while asset managers grew in clout. The little investor 
stewardship that there was during this time was primarily focused on the domestic markets, so 
that the influence of the growth of the asset management sector on the varieties of capitalism 
during this time was limited.  
 
What becomes apparent from this chapter is that at the time of Useem (1996) the economies of 
scale within the asset management industry had not been fully exploited yet. The primary 
reason for this is to be found in the continued dominance of active fund management at the 




The Rise of Index Investing53  
Introduction  
The previous chapter closed with an assessment that at the turn of the 21st century institutional 
investors were not yet in a position to exercise meaningful influence over corporate 
management teams. This chapter will document the rise of index funds, who represent the new 
blockholders, and discuss the extent to which their popularity has since contributed to changing 
the balance of power between shareholders and companies.54 While the roots of index investing 
were laid in the 1970s with the publication of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) by Fama 
(1970), it was not until after the year 2000 that index strategies entered the mainstream due 
mainly to the launch of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) which brought index investing to the 
retail market.  
 
Index investing represent the second first-order development that has occurred in the 
shareholder ownership structure during the past century. The popularity of index investing has 
both qualitative and quantitative consequences for the nature of governance. First, from a 
quantitative perspective index funds have turbo-charged the growth of institutional investment. 
Index funds are able to charge lower fees as they do not need to hire teams of fundamental 
research analysts or star portfolio managers to pick stocks. Because of this, index funds on 
average provide substantially cheaper investment solutions for investors. ICI (2019) reports 
that on average expense ratios for index equity funds stood at only 0.08 percent. Compared to 
 
53 This chapter draws on information previously published as “Ownership concentration and institutional 
investors’ governance through voice and exit” (Jahnke, 2019a) in Business and Politics, 1-24. 
doi:10.1017/bap.2019.2  
54 The analysis of this chapter will focus primarily on the Big Three due to their commanding market share. 
Chapter 7 will also discuss the governance role (or lack thereof) of smaller index fund companies,  
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this actively managed equity mutual funds, at average expense ratios of 0.76 percent, are nearly 
10 times more expensive.  
 
This has led to them being praised for “democratising finance”.55 They have earned this 
reputation because their low fees and minimum investments have put professional investment 
management in reach of many households. The fees charged stand in stark contrast to the 
famous “2 plus 20” fees charged by hedge funds (referring to 2 percent management fee, plus 
a further 20 percent performance fee on any return above a certain hurdle). Furthermore, since 
the minimum investment in ETFs is a single ETF share, minimum investments can often be as 
low as $100, compared to the $100,000 minimum investment that wealth management firms 
and hedge funds typically require from the wealthy. Finally, by removing the risk of 
underperformance implicit in active funds, index funds have brought institutional investment 
to more risk-averse investors. By attracting new investors who would have otherwise shunned 
investment management, index investing has therefore contributed to the overall level of 
institutionalisation increasing. 
 
Second, since the stock selection is predetermined by the companies that construct the indices 
(“index providers” such as MSCI or FTSE), the key differentiator is the level of fees charged. 
Economies of scale have therefore taken on an even more important role, resulting in a 
substantial increase in the level of ownership concentration within the asset management 
industry. Greater ownership concentration further reduces both collective action problems 
while also enabling investors to spread their engagement costs across a larger asset base thus 
 
55 See, for example, The Financial Times, “Democratising finance: How passive funds changed investing” (30 
January 2015) and The Wall Street Journal, “How Index Funds Democratize Investing” (8 January 2017). 
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lowering engagement costs even further. The rise of index investment has therefore established 
the theoretical preconditions for greater shareholder influence.  
 
The Financial Times (2020d) notes that the largest 1 percent of asset managers manage 61 
percent of total industry assets. This means that the largest 1 percent manage assets equating 
to 243 times the assets of the bottom 50 percent, which is up from a factor of 105 times in 2010. 
Figure 10 illustrates this growing ownership concentration, showing that the largest asset 
managers globally have grown the most (due to both inflows and mergers and acquisitions), 
while an asset manager ranked 100th in 2006 has approximately the same assets as in 2017.  
 
Figure 10: AuM of 100 Largest Asset Managers Globally, 2006 & 2017 (US$ bn) 
 
Data source: Watson Wyatt (2006) and Willis Towers Watson (2018c). 
 
With the theoretical conditions for greater governance oversight having been met with the rise 
of index funds, the question that follows is whether index funds are also increasing their 
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influence in practice. Here the evidence is mixed at best. From a qualitative perspective, index 
investing changes the nature and relative importance of engagement. As briefly outlined in the 
introduction, index funds seek to match not beat the performance of benchmark indices by 
replicating the indices’ holdings. They can therefore only sell out of an individual stock holding 
when that stock is excluded from the index, which typically happens only when its market 
capitalisation has fallen below a certain level.56 Unable to exit, this leaves index funds only 
with the voice option, which following Hirschman’s (1970) logic we would expect to see 
greater use of.  
 
Index funds’ use of voice is, however, a point of great debate. Since index funds primarily 
compete on fees, the case has also been made that index funds will underinvest in governance 
oversight to save costs (Bebchuk and Hirst, 2018; Lund, 2017). Contributing to this impression, 
others have studied index funds’ voting behaviour and noted that they vote with corporate 
management the vast majority of times (Bubb and Catan, 2018; Fichtner et al., 2017; Heath et 




56 Legally they are not required to do so and may, for example, choose to exclude the smallest stocks in an 
index, though the decision to do so will increase the tracking error. Also “synthetic” ETFs will enter into “index 
swap agreements” with banks in order to track the performance of indices rather than buying a basket of 
individual stocks.  
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Figure 11: Average development of stewardship headcounts, headcounts per $100bn in assets 
 
Source: Willis Towers Watson (2019) 
 
Figure 11 above, shows an analysis by Willis Towers Watson (2019) of the average 
stewardship headcounts of six large firms that emphasise index tracking and collectively 
manage assets in excess of $17trl.57 The data shows that average stewardship headcounts 
amongst this group have increased from 7 in 2014 to 18 in 2018 (blue line, LHS). Compared 
to this the average stewardship headcount when put in context of assets under management has 
remained relatively stable, moving up only in the past year, rising from 0.5 headcounts per 
$100 billion in AuM to 0.7 headcounts in the past year (orange line, RHS). While the average 
headcount has increased by 157 percent, the stewardship headcount per $100 billion in AuM 
increased by only 40 percent, illustrating how index funds seek to take advantage of their 
economies of scale.  
 
 
57 The six firms are: BlackRock, Legal & General Investment Management, Northern Trust Asset Management, 
State Street, UBS Asset Management and Vanguard. 
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Chapter Structure 
The following four main points will be made in this chapter. First, index funds in the US have 
reached a scale at which they have the potential to exert considerable influence over the 
corporate governance of US firms. Second, to date index funds have, however, for the most 
part refrained from exercising substantial influence at US, UK and German portfolio 
companies. Instead, their wholesale backing of corporate managers has insulated firms from 
the demands of other shareholders. Third, index funds, both domestic and foreign, play a 
smaller role in the UK and Germany than in the US. They therefore insulate corporates in the 
US to a greater extent than companies in the UK or Germany. The institutionalisation of asset 
management together with the indexation of investment management, has necessitated the 
creation of dedicated stewardship teams within asset managers and resulted in the 
professionalisation of the corporate governance function. The resulting separation of corporate 
governance from the portfolio management function is akin to a new separation of ownership 
from control. 
 
The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. The first explains the theoretical 
foundations of index investing and charts the global rise of the index fund industry. The second 
section explains how this resulted in the creation of an oligopolistic industry structure in the 
US. The third section contrasts the situation in the US with that in the UK and Germany where 
index funds are shown to play a comparatively smaller role. The fourth section documents the 
policy preferences of index funds and shows how for the most part they have to date sided with 
management. The fifth section concludes with a consideration of what the comparative 
differences in the size of the index fund industries in the US, the UK and Germany entail for 
the domestic corporate governance context.  
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Throughout this chapter I will seek to make use of interview data wherever possible. I do have 
to acknowledge though that the index fund interviewees tended to stick to a script that did not 
acknowledge any issues with their approach. They claimed to have highly involved 
engagement teams, not to rely on proxy advisors and said they were neither too powerful nor 
lacking critical engagement. This perspective differs substantially from the impressions 
provided by corporates and NGOs interviewees, who for the most part presented index funds 
as uninvolved in corporate governance. Chapter 7 will provide a detailed discussion of 
corporate interviewees’ perception of index funds’ engagement efforts. 
 
 
The rise of index investors  
While it was the work of Markowitz (1952) that set out the benefits of broadly diversified 
portfolios, thus laying the ground for institutional asset management, it was Fama’s (1970) 
work on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) that prepared the ground for index investing. 
Fama (1970) considers the role of the stock market in the efficient allocation of capital in 
society and expects market prices to provide accurate resource allocation signals. In an ideal 
market prices would always “fully reflect” all (publicly) available information. The general 
question Fama seeks to answer is whether mutual fund managers have any special insights 
which allows them to outperform the market. After considering several types of information 
regimes he concludes that his efficient market model stands up well to reality. The implication 
is that investment managers cannot generate outperformance, as stock prices at all times 




In a first-person report of the early days of index investing, Fouse (1998), a former executive 
of Wells Fargo, explains that one of the family members behind the Samsonite company 
returned home in 1970, having completed a diploma at the University of Chicago where Fama 
was teaching. He asked his father: "Do you realize we have our pension fund invested in mutual 
funds? That's wrong”. Having been put in touch with Samsonite, Wells Fargo proceeded to set 
up the first inde fund in 1971 (Fouse, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006).  
 
Index funds come in two main forms: traditional index mutual funds and exchange traded funds 
(ETFs). The benefit of ETFs is that they provide greater liquidity and ease of trading. They can 
be bought and sold throughout the trading day and there is no delayed investment, such as is 
usually the case with mutual funds where subscribers typically get the closing price of the 
following day. According to analysis by Morningstar, approximately 80 percent of US equity 
index investments at the end of 2016 were in the form of ETFs and only 20 percent in 
conventional index mutual funds.58 In Europe, where ETFs continue to be dominated by 
institutional investors and retail investors have yet to fully embrace them, the split between 
ETFs and index mutual funds stands at 50:50 (Morningstar, 2017). 
  
The initial uptake of index investments was slow, by 2000 index investments were still 
primarily a vehicle used by institutional investors. For the UK the Bank of England noted at 
that time that “although about 22 percent of pension equity holdings are indexed, the proportion 
is much smaller for other categories of investor, so that the total estimated investment in 
indexed funds amounts to 8.6 percent of the capitalisation of UK-traded equities” (2000: 61). 
The ECB (2001) similarly reported at the time that index investments amongst institutional 
 
58 For further details, see: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/index-funds-now-are-part-of-an-investors-
biggest-problem-2017-12-06 (Accessed 14 January 2020). 
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investors based in the Euro area represented approximately 15 percent of equity holdings, and 
notes that this was significantly behind the levels of 30 percent of institutional equity holdings 
seen in the US.  
 
The popularity of index funds changed markedly with the launch of the first ETFs. The first 
ETF to be launched in the US was the SPDR ETF on the S&P 500, launched by State Street on 
the 29th of January 1993.59 Vanguard, however, did not launch its first ETF until the year 2000. 
The first ETF to be launched in the UK was also not until the 29th of April 2000 by iShares, 
followed by the first German listing on the 23rd of October 2000 by Indexchange.  
 
Figure 12: Total global assets under management in ETFs and index mutual funds ($bn) 
 
Source: Data courtesy of the Financial Times 
 
Figure 12, above, shows the total AuM of ETFs (shaded) and index mutual funds (solid) 
globally since 1990. It shows that index funds only appeared on the scene in any meaningful 
way in the late 1990s and that it was not until the early 2000s that ETFs contributed in earnest. 
Focussing just on the US, Fender (2003) reports that assets in US ETFs in 2002 made up just 
 
59 All references to State Street in this thesis are meant to refer to State Street Global Advisors (SSGA), the asset 
management arm of State Street Corp. 
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6 percent of the total index asset base, compared to Morningstar’s estimate of approximately 
80 percent in 2016. The result of this rapid rise in ETFs has seen them take substantial market 
share from active equity funds to the point where Bloomberg (2019b) in September 2019 
announced “the end of an era” as “Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active in Epic Shift” in the 
United States. Figure 12 also shows that the assets under management of ETFs exploded after 
2008, suggesting that the fallibility of active managers was further exposed by the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
 
Regulators in Germany, the UK and the US have provided a further factor contributing to the 
growth of index investments by increasing their focus on fees levied within the asset 
management industry and the financial advisor network (Mallow, 2019). The increased focus 
on the fiduciary duty of independent financial advisors (IFAs), particularly in the US, therefore 
changed the model by which they are being paid for their services. This decreases the 
disadvantages of index funds versus active funds. In Europe and the US, both independent 
financial advisors as well as online brokerages and retail banks often received “kick-back” 
payments in return for their sales efforts. As these payments are typically a percentage of the 
fee earned by the asset manager, active managers are able to pay higher rewards (due to their 
higher management fees) than index funds. Changing the pricing model for IFAs therefore 
removes or at least reduces this disadvantage faced by index funds (Sethi et al., 2018). 
 
In the US the crackdown on fees in the financial system started with the Dodd Frank legislation 
in 2010. Similar changes have occurred in Europe in response to the introduction of the revised 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID2) of the European Union in January 2018, 
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which similarly requires fees paid to intermediaries to be disclosed to ultimate investors.60 The 
regulatory changes occurring in Europe have a two-fold implication for its shareholder 
ownership structure. First, it suggests that index investments as a percentage of assets under 
management are likely to continue to increase in future years, possibly at a faster rate than in 
the past. This will have consequences for the nature of engagement, as discussed in the next 
section. Second, with index funds no longer at such a distributional disadvantage, the likelihood 
increases that US ETF providers succeed in gaining market share in Europe. This conclusion 
is supported by the comments of Vanguard (2018), who note that “Although still growing, the 
U.S. ETF market is in a more mature state than in Europe […] As a result, U.S. sponsors such 
as Vanguard, J.P. Morgan and Invesco are ramping up teams in Europe, through organic growth 
and acquisitions, to capture growth in this market”. 
 
 
The creation of a US oligopoly 
Index investing takes the economies of scale present in the asset management industry to 
another level, effectively turning it into a winner-takes-all industry. Scale has been employed 
by the larger asset managers to decrease fees with the aim of taking market share from the 
smaller asset managers who typically have a higher cost base (Bloomberg, 2017a). For 
institutional investors, facing both tremendous performance pressures as well as fiduciary 
considerations, choosing the fund with the lowest fees is a major criterion in product selection 
(Madhaven, 2016). The following quote from Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, highlights 
the importance he attributes to scale: “When I am able to increase margins and increase market 
share through price cuts, I am going to do that. The key element is scale” (Bloomberg, 2017a).  
 
60 For further information on MIFID2, see the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA): 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps17-14-mifid-ii-implementation (Accessed 15 January 
2020). 
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As explained in the previous chapter, index funds are not constrained by the liquidity 
considerations that implicitly cap the size that active funds can grow to. Index funds merely 
seek to track indices, and any market impact from inflows will push up the index and thus not 
materialise as relative underperformance. When a stock exits the index, the reverse will happen. 
Most indices include quarterly reweights at which point the index weights of individual stocks 
are recalculated.  
 
A further factor contributing to the oligopolistic structure of the index fund market is the first-
mover advantage within the industry. Like the indices they track, the benefit of being the first 
to market with an ETF are substantial. Investors congregate to the ETFs that have the biggest 
AuM and the best liquidity (Broman and Shum, 2018). The value of launching alternative “me-
too” products on the same indices that already have liquid products on them is therefore very 
small (Petry et al., 2017). In the case of most indices, only one or two ETFs therefore capture 
the vast majority of assets on any one index. Bogle, the late founder of Vanguard states that 
being first mover “has played a major role in our dominance” (2018b: 182). 
 
Together these factors have led to an oligopolistic industry structure in which just three fund 
managers, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street (“the Big Three”) have captured ninety 
percent of the US index fund market (Fichtner et al., 2017) and approximately 80 percent of 







Figure 13: US market share of major ETF brands, 1998-2019  
 
Source: Morningstar (2019b), used with permission. 
 
Figure 13, above, documents the market share of the largest ETF providers in the US. iShares, 
marked in orange, is the main ETF brand of BlackRock. The blue area shows the dominance 
of State Street in the late 1990s when it claimed an ETF market share of 90 percent in 1998 
(Morningstar, 2019b). The grey area shows the initial launches of alternative providers many 
of whom soon either folded under the pricing pressure or were acquired by the Big Three.  
 
 
The European ETF Landscape 
The Financial Times (2020a) reported in January 2020 that European index funds had 
surpassed $1 trillion in assets as of year-end 2019. This is from a base of just $51 billion in 
2005 (Vanguard, 2019a). Describing how the high fees and lacklustre performance of active 
fund managers contributed to this result, the FT notes that “The sector has doubled in size in 
just four years in Europe, turbocharged by a brutal price war on fees, the patchy performance 
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of active managers and another year of robust returns for many of the big stock markets that 
passive vehicles replicate” (Financial Times, 2020a).  
 
This $1 trillion in index assets only represents approximately 10 percent of the global index 
fund market, this is despite Europe representing approximately 26 percent of global assets 
under management (Financial Times, 2020a; PWC, 2017). “ETF usage by retail investors in 
Europe still lags far behind the US but it has started to catch up from a very low base” (Financial 
Times, 2020a).61 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that BlackRock with its iShares ETF brand is the only one of the Big 
Three to appear in the European Top-5. The reason for this is iShares’ European heritage (IPE, 
2017). iShares, as part of Barclays Global Investors, was the first to launch a broad suite of 
European ETFs. The other ETF providers in the Top-5 are all subsidiaries of European banks 
(as iShares once was when it belonged to Barclays). Xtrackers is the Deutsche Bank brand 
(Germany), Lyxor is the Société Générale brand (France), UBS is self-branded (Switzerland), 
and Amundi is the asset manager of Crédit Agricole (France).  
 
Table 2: European ETF provider Market Share (equities and bonds): 
 AuM (€bn) Market Share (%) 
iShares 409.2 44.3 
Xtrackers 98.4 10.7 
Lyxor 76.2 8.3 
UBS 62.0 6.7 
Amundi 56.8 6.2 
Vanguard 47.1 5.1 
Invesco 41.0 4.4 
State Street 38.7 4.2 
Source: Morningstar, data as of 31 December 2019 
 
61 Deborah Furr co-founder of the ETFGI consultancy and a former ETF strategist at iShares in an interview 
with the Financial Times (2020a).  
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In Europe iShares has a market share of 44.3 percent compared to its 39.3 percent in the US. 
However, Vanguard and State Street have significantly lower market shares in Europe, 
meaning that the Big Three together hold just 53.6 percent of the market compared to 81 
percent in the US. The European market is generally less concentrated than the US market, 
with the three largest ETF providers representing 63.3 percent of the market compared to 81 
percent for the US.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no country-level data for individual ETF providers’ market share in the 
UK and Germany. However, the fact that four of the 15 largest ETF providers in a Morningstar 
(2019c) league table of European ETF providers are German (Xtrackers of Deutsche Bank, 
Comstage of Commerzank, Deka ETFs of the Landesbanken, and the German stock exchange 
Deutsche Börse) combined with the captive distribution channel in Germany, does suggest that 
German ETF providers hold a large percentage of the domestic ETF market.  
 
The UK on the other hand appears to be dominated by the Big Three, in particular by 
BlackRock. This interpretation is supported by the comparatively large UK holdings of 
BlackRock presented in Table 3 and can be explained by BlackRock’s UK heritage. The only 
two UK firms amongst Morningstar’s (2019c) Top-20 list of European ETF issuers by assets 
are HSBC at number 14 and Legal and General Investment Management at number 16. They 
are listed with combined assets of €9.3 billion, which works out as 1.2 percent of the total 
€759.7 billion European ETF market. The four German ETF providers have combined assets 






Table 3: Average ownership of 10 largest companies  
  Germany UK US 
Blackrock 6.05% 6.63% 6.51% 
Vanguard 3.00% 4.61% 7.53% 
State Street 0.48% 1.17% 4.22% 
Total 9.53% 12.42% 18.26% 
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations as of 31 March 2020 
 
Table 3 above shows the relative importance of the Big Three across the three countries studied. 
The combined stakes of the Big Three in the US are approximately double the size of their 
stakes in German companies and approximately 50 percent larger than their stakes in UK 
companies. To provide some perspective of how these stakes compare in size to other domestic 
investors, Table 4, illustrates that BlackRock is the largest blockholder in Germany, with 40 
holdings of greater than 3 percent and 31 of those being above 5 percent. DIW (2017) further 
reports that BlackRock’s assets invested in German equities have grown from €17 billion in 
2007 to €77.3 billion in 2015, making it by far the largest investor. That gives BlackRock 
twice as many blockholdings of greater than 5 percent than the asset managers of either Allianz 
or Deutsche Bank. 
 
Table 4: Top blockholders in German publicly listed companies in 2015 
 Number of blockholdings 
>3% 
Number of blockholdings 
>5% 
BlackRock 40 31 
Allianz Group 32 15 
Deutsche Asset Management 24 15 
Fidelity Investments 18 4 
Berenberg Bank 15 4 
NBIM (Norges) 15 2 
Source: DIW (2017) 
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For the UK, Table 5 shows that BlackRock has a holding representing more than 5 percent in 
each of the seven UK insurance companies and that the Big Three on average hold 11.27 
percent of the UK insurance sector. BlackRock’s average stake of 7.54 percent is more than 
three times the size of Legal and General’s 2.05 percent average holding, the largest UK 
investor in the insurance sector. BlackRock’s stakes in the UK are even larger than their stakes 
in the US and Germany. However, while larger than in Germany, the average stakes of 
Vanguard and State Street are substantially smaller than they are in the US.  
 
Table 5: Percentage Holding in the UK Insurance Sector (%) 






Prudential RSA Average 
BlackRock 5.79 6.89 11.26 7.39 5.74 7.52 8.17 7.54 
NBIM 2.72 4.57 3.81 2.53 3.00 3.99 3.66 3.47 
Vanguard 1.71 2.76 2.72 2.70 2.62 2.59 2.77 2.55 
Legal & General 1.86 2.76 2.54 1.54 2.45 2.70 2.50 2.05 
State Street  1.28 1.53 1.00 1.49 1.15 1.79 1.18 
Schroders  2.37 0.84 2.80 0.68   1.01 
Total Big Three 7.50 10.93 15.51 11.09 9.85 11.26 12.73 11.27 
Source: OECD (2017) 
 
The fact that German fund managers have been able to retain their market shares to date is 
primarily due to three reasons. First, it is illustrative of the continued hold that German banks 
have over their retail distribution channels. Online retail brokerages such as Charles Schwab, 
TD Ameritrade, E-Trade or Interactive Brokers, which are popular in the US, are less well 
known in Europe, particularly in Germany where relational banking is still strong in the retail 
landscape.  
 
This captive distribution ensures that a larger percentage of equity assets remain in 
comparatively higher priced active funds, meaning that index funds play a smaller role in 
Europe. Sushko and Turner (2018) report that index funds’ share of investment fund assets in 
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2017 stood at 30 percent in Europe, compared to approximately 45 percent in the US. 
Furthermore, while this represents a doubling of index funds’ market share in Europe since 
2007, the recent trend highlights the continued captivation of the European distribution model. 
McKinsey (2019) reports fund flow data for the period from 2013 to 2018 which shows that 
while the US saw $1.24 billion of outflows from active equity funds and $1.71 billion of inflow 
into passive equity funds, the trend in Europe actually saw greater inflows into active equity 
funds ($265 billion) than passive equity index funds ($180 billion), meaning that index funds 
actually lost market share to active funds in Europe.  
 
Second, European ETF providers, particularly from Germany (DB Xtrackers) and France 
(Lyxor), have been able to compete on fees. They have been able to undercut foreign 
competitors by lowering the explicit fees charged while making up for the lost income with 
financing income from “swap-based” or “synthetic” ETFs (Foucher and Gray, 2014). In these 
cases, the ETF does not purchase the shares that replicate the benchmark index but instead 
enters into a swap-agreement with its parent/sponsor bank, which promises to pay out the 
performance of the relevant benchmark index. In return the ETF provider deposits the 
underlying cash assets of the fund with the counterparty bank to the swap. The bank in turn 
secures this cash by depositing collateral with the ETF provider (Johnson et al., 2012).  
 
The net effect of these trades is that the ETF provides cash funding to the bank while receiving 
collateral from the bank’s balance sheet. The bank therefore makes a profit from its relationship 
with the ETF. It is able to deposit collateral with the ETF that it would have limited use for 
otherwise and get highly valued cash with which it can reduce its regulatory leverage. Foucher 
and Gray (2014) report that synthetic ETFs account for an estimated 33 percent of the European 
ETF market but only four per cent of the U.S. ETF market. Table 6 below shows that this level 
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decreased to approximately 21 percent by the end of 2016, partly as a result of BlackRock 
continuing to take market share with its physical offering. 
 
Such trades have historically enabled banks to fund themselves more cheaply than on the open 
market and were particularly supportive during the Global Financial Crisis. The 2009 
announcement by Xtrackers that they would cut the fees on their DJ Euro Stoxx 50 ETF to zero 
illustrates the significance of this income.62 Besides the funding advantage, swap-based ETFs 
are also chosen when the underlying indices are complicated to replicate. iShares initially only 
offered physically replicated ETFs but responded to the European banks’ swap-based challenge 
with their own synthetic ETFs in 2010.63 However, as illustrated by Table 6, iShares synthetic 
offering does not appear to have taken off. 
 
Table 6: Five Largest Providers of UCITS ETFs 












% AuM in 
Synthetic 
ETFs 
Amundi 8 91 3.7 21.9 85.5% 
Db X-trackers 92 95 32.3 21.7 40.2% 
iShares 288 1 252.1 0.8 0.3% 
Lyxor 40 173 20.6 31.2 60.2% 
Source 12 54 6 11.1 64.9% 
Total 440 414 314.7 86.7 21.6% 
Source: Morningstar (2017), data as of 31 December 2016. 
 
The relevance of synthetic ETFs for corporate governance is, that because these ETF do not 
hold the underlying shares but instead only hold a swap agreement with a bank, the ETF holds 
no voting rights. The voting rights instead sit with whomever has provided the hedge against 
 
62 Financial Times, “Big ETF providers fight for investors”. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1c615a40-
1a03-11e2-a179-00144feabdc0 (Accessed 14 January 2020). 
63 Financial Times, “iShares launches swap-based ETFs” 19 September 2010, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/0be1160c-c27f-11df-956e-00144feab49a (Accessed 14 January 2020). 
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the swap, typically an investment bank or a trading house. If these voting rights are exercised, 
this will be done according to the banks’ proxy voting policies, not those of the asset manager. 
The effect of this is that it diminishes the voting rights of European index funds by 
approximately one fifth, while not affecting the voting rights of the Big Thee within Europe. 
The overall percentage of voting rights this represents is, however, comparatively small at 1.7 
percent.64  
 
However, as Morningstar (2017) reports “synthetic” became a loaded word following fears 
about the creditworthiness of these models during the European debt crisis in 2011, leading to 
a decline of the overall share of synthetic ETFs in Europe from approximately 45 percent in 
2009 to 20 percent at the end of Q1/2019 (Morningstar, 2019c). Creditworthiness concerns 
enter into synthetic ETFs because the swaps and their collateral are provided by European 
banks, some of which ran into trouble during the European debt crisis. In practice these swaps 
were “over-collateralised” meaning that there was an additional safety buffer, but some 
concerns were raised, nevertheless. While the overall market share of synthetic ETFs has 
declined, Table 6 shows how some of the biggest European providers remain heavily reliant 
on this business model. BlackRock stands out for lack of synthetic offerings.  
 
A final reason for European index fund providers to be able to compete with the much bigger 
US providers is the aforementioned first mover advantage. The initial focus of US ETF 
providers on their domestic markets, provided European asset managers with the opportunity 
to capture the domestic market. The head start that these European providers gained, due to 
 
64 The Financial Times (2020a) estimates European ETF AuM at approximately $1 trillion, which equates to 
approximately 8 percent of the European equity market (Gleisner and Thomadakis, 2018). 21.6% x 8% = 1.7%. 
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being the first to issue products and due to their captive distribution networks, has been a 
competitive moat ever since.  
 
However, stricter regulation of commission payments for distributions in Germany under 
MIFID2 and in the UK as a result of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) means that this 
moat is being increasingly tested.65 Further weakening European defences is the falling appetite 
for synthetic ETFs. Finally, while European ETF providers do have a degree of first-mover 
advantage over US peers, this is weakened by the large number of domestic banking networks 
and stock exchanges competing against one another. The result is that there are today 12 
separate providers offering ETFs that track the Euro Stoxx 50 index (Morningstar, 2017), 
compared to the two products that you would typically see in the US market. This explains the 
2012 decision by Vanguard to enter the European market, the 2017 decision by Invesco to 
acquire the European ETF provider Source, and more recently the 2019 decision by Goldman 
Sachs to enter despite the captive distribution networks.66 This therefore suggests that we will 
yet see consolidation in the European ETF market, though this may take some time as 
consolidation within is initially offset by new entrants from the US. 
 
This section has highlighted that index funds have a smaller market share of the UK and 
German equity market. Furthermore, within this smaller index fund market, the Big Three have 
a smaller share than they do in the US. BlackRock is the only one of the Big Three to have a 
similarly commanding leadership in the UK and Germany as in the US. While Vanguard and 
State Street are also large shareholders with approximately 2.5 percent and 1.0 percent 
 
65 The UK RDR banned the payment of commission to independent financial advisers for selling products, was 
implemented in 2013. Source: https://www.ipe.com/the-market-understanding-the-etf-landscape-and-flows-in-
europe/10026998.article (Accessed 17 January 2020). 
66 For further information, see: https://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/8378-vanguard-enters-
european-etf-market and https://www.ft.com/content/58481371-83ad-35f8-8bad-f02e80167415 (Accessed 17 
January 2020). 
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respectively of the capital of the average UK and German company, this is substantially less 
than the approximately 4-6 percent they each hold in the average US company. Since the total 
holdings of the Big Three are smaller in Europe, and since the index assets of European asset 
managers are nested within much larger active assets, the potential influence of index investing 
is thus substantially lower in Europe than in the US.  
 
 
Index funds – power without direction 
While the previous sections have laid out how the growth of index funds is creating the 
preconditions for shareholders to play a greater role in corporate governance, it does not follow 
that index funds take up this role. This has resulted in a growing controversy, which has moved 
from academia into the press and into regulatory circles. The result is that index funds are 
coming under attack from two almost diametrically opposing sides. Barbara Novick, Vice 
Chairman of BlackRock, refers to this as the “Goldilocks Dilemma”.  
 
“The increased focus on stewardship has led to more transparency and, in turn, has 
spawned new research asking critical question: Do asset managers do enough? Do 
they do too much? Or, are they doing just the right amount? Let’s call this the 
Goldilocks Dilemma” (BlackRock, 2019c). 
 
As pointed out by Novick, the criticism can be broadly divided into two camps, those that 
believe index funds have (or will soon have) too much influence, and those who believe index 
funds are not engaging enough, thereby creating an unaccountability vacuum for business 
leaders. What unites the two groups of scholars is that both are concerned by the significant 
size of the Big Three. Coates, for example, is alarmed by the growing ownership concentration 
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resulting from index investing and thus warns of indexing leading to a “significant shift towards 
more shareholder power” (2018: 2). Those that raise concern over the lack of corporate 
oversight from index funds fear that it may result in either corporate self-dealing or provide the 
environment for other groups such as financial or social activists to take charge (Bebchuk and 
Hirst, 2019a; Lund; 2018; Strine, 2018).  
 
Concerns that the Big Three may create a governance vacuum have been furthered by studies 
showing that the Big Three vote the majority of time with management and against shareholder 
proposals (Bubb and Catan, 2018; Fichtner et al., 2017). Bebchuk and Hirst (2019a) show that 
the Big Three can on average cast 25 percent of the votes at S&P 500 companies.67 Fichtner et 
al. (2017) find that the Big Three side with management more than 90 percent of the time. 
While Mallow (2019), a Vice Chairman of BlackRock, explains this is because proxy voting 
data includes a high proportion of routine proposals re-electing directors, Griffin (2020a) notes 
a similarly one-dimensional voting behaviour amongst the Big Three with regards only to 
social and environmental (S&E) proposals. Griffin shows that Vanguard’s largest funds 
supported just 7.5 percent of S&E proposals, BlackRock 7.1 percent and State Street 22.7 
percent, concluding that “it is a convenient myth that index fund stewardship teams are even 
marginally constrained by the “best interests” standard when voting on E&S proposals, and 
likely other proposals as well. The truth is that these index funds, possessing the power to 
decide the fate of most E&S proposals, can do as they wish with that power” (2020a: 2). 
 
 
67 To get to their estimate of 25%, Bebchuk and Hirst (2019a) consider the fact that many of the shares 
remaining in the hands of retail investors are not voted, whereas the Big Three vote virtually all of their shares, 
with the result that the proportion of their votes exceeds their economic value. Fichtner et al (2017) report a 
mean holding of 17.6% for companies in the S&P 500.  
 130 
The results of Griffin’s (2020a) study concur with a study conducted by the climate advocacy 
NGO Ceres, which noted that in 2018 BlackRock and Vanguard only backed 10 percent and 
12 percent of climate-related shareholder proposals respectively, further noting that “The 
investors who should be the leaders have so far been the laggards”.68 Further illustrating the 
consequence of the voting behaviour by the Big Three a report by campaign group Majority 
Action finds that “BlackRock and Vanguard voted overwhelmingly against the climate-critical 
resolutions […], with BlackRock supporting just five of the 41, and Vanguard only four. At 
least 16 of these critical climate votes would have received majority support of voting 
shareholders if these two largest asset managers had voted in favor of them” (2019: 4).  
 
What the above debate shows is that index funds can have influence both by action and 
deliberate inaction. Therefore, despite the fact that The Big Three may for now be a long way 
from controlling the majority of voting rights, they have amassed voting stakes sufficient to 
decide the outcome of approximately a quarter of the shareholder proposals put to the vote at 
US companies and approximately half of all environmental and social proposals (Griffin, 
2020b). The fact that the combined ownership stakes of the Big Three in the UK and Germany 
are approximately half of the size means that their impact in Europe is less extreme, though it 
may also be substantial (unfortunately Europe lacks the same granularity of voting data 
provided for in the US by the requirement to file the form “NP-X”).  
 
With regards to the varieties of capitalism, the consequences of the growth of the asset 
management sector is thus that it reduces the managerial autonomy of corporate executives in 
the UK and Germany, whereas only moderately impacting managers of US companies. On the 
 
68 Source: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/biggest-us-index-funds-oppose-most-climate-proposals-in-
shareholder-votes.html (Accessed 15 January 2020). 
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one hand there is an increase of shareholder control, a typical LME attribute, on the other hand 
European asset managers’ greater concern for social and environmental considerations 
increases the extent to which UK and German corporate executives have to consider the 
interests of other stakeholders, a typical CME feature. Goyer (2007; 2011) shows the extent to 
which American investors traditionally prefer a strong CEO, an attribute that is increasingly 
being challenged by shareholder proposals on ESG issues. 
 
A final point to note is that it has also been suggested that BlackRock has attained 
“infrastructural power” as a result of the significant manpower, systems and specific 
knowledge the firm has amassed (Braun, 2018; 2020b). This has, for example, resulted in 
BlackRock assisting the US Federal Reserve in its quantitative easing mandate, as well as 
supporting the European Central Bank (ECB) in its stress testing of banks’ balance sheets as 
well as in launching its asset-backed security (ABS) mandate.69 The Financial Times therefore 
compares the power of BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink to that of JP Morgan in the 1907 financial 
crisis (2020e). The article explains that BlackRock yields this power through a small 
consultancy division called Financial Markets Advisory that produces less than one per cent of 
its revenues.  
 
In another article the Financial Times (2020c) compares BlackRock to the “Vampire Squid”, a 
name previously coined by Rolling Stone magazine to describe the investment bank Goldman 
Sachs as being “wrapped around the face of humanity”. While a discussion of this aspect of 
power is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is noteworthy that there are signs of greater public 
 
69 For BlackRock’s role in supporting the Federal Reserve’s bond buying programme, see: 
https://www.ft.com/content/f9c7e4de-6e25-11ea-89df-41bea055720b For information on BlackRock’s role in 
helping the ECB stress tests, see: https://de.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-tests/blackrock-helps-ecb-in-bank-
stress-test-idUSKCN0Y215S For information on BlackRock’s role in the ECB’s ABS programme, see:  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-007933_EN.html?redirect (All accessed 1 May 
2020). 
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scrutiny of such mandates. In April 2020, a group of 92 NGOs signed a letter addressed to the 
head of the European Commission urging the Commission to cancel a recently concluded 
agreement with BlackRock that will see it provide assistance in the integration of ESG issues 
into banking stress tests.70 Chapter 6 will explore in detail this political dimension of asset 
managers’ influence, the role they play in advancing the process of financialisation and the 
ways in which they contribute to growing economic inequality.   
 
 
The resource challenges 
A possible explanation for why index funds’ involvement with portfolio companies appears to 
be limited results from the sheer number of individual portfolio holdings the average asset 
manager today holds. This therefore is an important qualification to the thesis that 
institutionalisation and indexation allow for more engagement between asset managers and 
corporate issuers. For approximately half of the asset managers interviewed by Bew and Fields 
(2012) annual meeting volume was between 4,500 and 10,000 and the most common staffing 
level was 3-5 full-time governance staff. BlackRock’s 2019 Annual Stewardship Report shows 
that the fund manager voted at 16,124 meetings in the 2019 proxy voting season (BlackRock, 
2019a). 
 
Further complicating the staffing issue significantly is the fact that the majority of AGMs occur 
in a period of just three to four months each year. This period is known as the “proxy season” 
and the reason for the temporal concentration of AGMs in the period from March to June is 
that most companies have a financial year end that coincides with the calendar year end on the 
 
70 For a copy of the letter, see: https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/BlackRock-Open-
Letter-EU.pdf (Accessed 1 May 2020). 
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31st of December. The proxy season results from the fact that most countries require companies 
to hold their AGMs within 4-6 months of the financial year end. It is thus impossible to stretch 
out the proxy season without moving the financial reporting calendars of companies. 
 
Figure 14 below shows the distribution of the 6,524 annual general meetings (AGMs) globally 
which the British proxy advisor Minerva covered in 2018. Of these, 64 percent occurred in the 
period between April and June and 76 percent between March and July. While not applying to 
any of the three focus countries, it is worth noting that in some countries, companies have been 
accused of deliberately scheduling their AGMs on the same day to make it difficult for 
shareholders to attend.71 The Financial Times explains that the Japanese scheduling of AGMs 
is a response to a “phenomenon of the 1980s and 1990s: racketeers known as sokaiya. In the 
sokaiya scam, gangsters threaten to disrupt the AGM by shouting accusations at the board 
unless they are paid off”.72 Scheduling difficulties have also been reported for other Asian 
countries such as Singapore. Such intentionally scheduling is, however, not observable in 




71 For Japan, see: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/in-japan-hundreds-of-shareholder-meetings-on-
same-day/ For Singapore, see: https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/why-do-companies-make-attending-
agms-so-tough-amended (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
72 See: “Corporate Japan guards AGM sanctity”. 29 June 2009. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/e9b26b66-64cf-11de-a13f-00144feabdc0 (Accessed 2 February 2020). 
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Figure 14: Weekly distribution of AGMs globally covered by Minerva Analytics in 2018 
 
Source: Author’s chart, data courtesy of Minerva Analytics 
 
Processing proxy voting items, even with the assistance of proxy advisors, discussed in the 
next chapter, may therefore take up a significant amount of time.    
 
“One must also take into account that an analysis takes about 4 to 8 hours, 
depending on the market. And that only, if one is familiar with the topic at 
hand and if one understands the information (language) and is in possession 
of all relevant data (such as the evaluation of the previous year). In the case 
of complications (shareholder proposals, M&A etc.), it may take days to 
inspect all relevant documents”.73 
 
 
73 Governance analyst, German asset manager, emailed statement, 9 August 2018. 
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An example of what an absolute minimum staffing level would look like, can be estimated as 
follows: If one looks at the large number of meetings some institutional investors vote at, say 
the lower bound of 4,500 given by Bew and Fields (2012), and allocates an average timeframe 
of six hours to prepare for each meeting as suggested by the interviewee quoted above, then 
this would equate to 27,000 man-hours to complete. Accounting for the 76 percent of proposals 
that fall into the proxy season from March to June, and thus dividing the 20,500 hours(76 
percent of 27,000 hours) by 16 weeks for the 4 months of the proxy season, and then by 45 
hours to represent an average workweek, would result in 28.5 staff needed. Add in managers 
and this generic asset manager would need to employ a staff of approximately 30 to take care 
of their voting responsibilities. For a larger asset manager, such as BlackRock with its 16,124 
meetings in 2019, the staffing needs would be approximately 110 employees  
 
The above example of four to eight hours of processing time is what it takes with the assistance 
of proxy advisors, without their support a multiple of the staffing numbers would be required. 
The governance headcounts of the Big Three compare to the above staffing estimate as follows: 
BlackRock 47, Vanguard 35 and State Street 12.74 The impression that these very diverse 
portfolio holdings do not allow for substantial engagement between asset managers and 
corporates is supported by BlackRock’s (2019a) Investment Stewardship Annual Report, 
which states that the asset manager engaged with 1,458 companies during the 2019 proxy 
season.  
 
Even though BlackRock reports that it engaged with 50.4 percent of the equity assets, the 
percentage of companies it engaged with is much lower due to the fact that a disproportionate 
 
74 Financial Times, 8 March 2020, “Jobs bonanza in stewardship and sustainable investing teams”. 
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percentage of engagement is focussed on the largest companies. If we assume each portfolio 
holds one annual general meeting, this suggests that BlackRock engaged with only 
approximately 10 percent (1,458) of its 16,124 portfolio holdings.75 BlackRock’s engagement 
team of 47 professionals is the largest in the industry, yet with approximately 16,124 portfolio 
holdings, this means that each governance individual is responsible for approximately 343 
companies.  
 
Figure 15: Evolution of Vanguard’s engagement, 2014-2019  
 
Source: Vanguard (2019b). 
 
For its part Vanguard (2019b) reports that it has engaged with 59 percent of its assets under 
management, yet this was done by engaging with just 868 companies (Figure 15). The reported 
59 percent rate thus obscures the fact that the asset manager engaged with just 6.7 percent of 
its 13,000 portfolio companies. At those 13,000 portfolio companies Vanguard’s stewardship 
team of 34 people has handled 170,000 individual matters in the 12 months to 30th of June of 
 
75 In reality, the number of company holdings will be marginally lower, as the meetings that BlackRock has 
voted on will also include a small number of extraordinary general meetings (EGMs).  
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2019.76 That’s 382 companies per stewardship team member. Finally, State Street (2019) 
reports that it engaged with 1,533 companies accounting for about 70 percent of their total 
AuM, but with holdings in more than 12,000 listed equities this also equates to just 13 percent 
of companies. More so, of these 1,533 meetings, just 686 were “comprehensive engagements” 
including in-person meetings and telephone calls. 847 engagements were through letter 
writing. Looked at this way, State Street therefore spoke to only 5.2 percent of their portfolio 
companies. Furthermore, of the 686 comprehensive engagements, 600 were with unique 
companies, suggesting a maximum of 86 companies (0.67%) could have been spoken to more 
than once during that year. BlackRock similarly reports that of the 1,458 companies it engaged 
with in 2019, 25 percent were engaged with multiple times, implying that just 2.2 percent of 
portfolio companies (364 of the 16,124) were engaged more than once. 
 
A proxy solicitor explained that the Big Three operate on a principle of “Bringschuld”, which 
translates as “obligation to deliver”. He explained that the Big Three expected companies to 
reach out to them and that they would rarely reach out themselves.77 He explained that the 
reasoning behind this is that companies would know best when there is a need to talk.78 This 
does, however, raise the question how they can provide oversight when in many cases they rely 
on corporates drawing attention on themselves.  
 
Voicing her frustration with the engagement approach of the Big Three, the investor relations 
director of one German corporate noted that they sometimes ask for meetings with the 
 
76 Number of voting items: https://www.institutional.vanguard.co.uk/documents/2019-investment-stewardship-
annual-report.pdf (Accessed 26 February 2020). Source of staff numbers: 
https://www.ft.com/content/9414052a-3142-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de (Accessed 26 February 2020). 
77 Proxy solicitors are consultancies that help companies interact with their shareholders.  
    Proxy solicitor, in-person interview, 14 April 2018. 
78 He explained that this was explained to him by the head of governance of one of the Big Three, when they 
came to visit the proxy solicitor’s offices. 
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supervisory board chairman but when these are not available at the time, and her company 
makes an alternative suggestion, there is no further response from investors. She therefore said 
that she “sometimes get[s] the feeling that for these investors, they feel that they’ve done what 
is required of them, the mere attempt to arrange a meeting counts as engagement”.79  
 
I will leave a full discussion of how corporates perceive index funds to Chapter 7 and will only 
provide one more example here, which supports the conclusion of the above data showing that 
the Big Three primarily focus their engagement on a small number of very large companies. 
The investor relations contact of one medium-sized US company explained that “at Vanguard 
and State street, god help you if you’re trying to get a contact. Even at Blackrock who pride 
themselves on engagement, it is not easy to figure out who to reach out to. They have a separate 
section on their homepage, but there are no contact details”.80 
 
Besides their voting and engagement pattern, the Big Three have also been hesitant to join 
investor coalitions. One such example is provided by the global Climate Action 100+ coalition. 
Launched in December 2017 Climate Action 100+ is an investor initiative by more than 370 
global investors with more than $35 trillion of assets under management. Notably absent, until 
January 2020, were all three of the Big Three.81 This is despite the fact that being a signatory 
does not require divestment of any assets but instead a focus on engagement with corporates 
engaged in carbon-intensive industries.   
 
 
79 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 5 January 2018.  
80 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018.  
81 For details on Climate Action 100+, see: http://www.climateaction100.org/ (Accessed 2 January 2019). 
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One of the Big Three explained that the reason they had not signed up to the initiative was 
because US regulations on coordinated engagements prevented them from doing so.82 
However, this does not explain why other US investors, including Northern Trust Asset 
Management, the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and the 
California State Teachers' Retirement System  (CalSTRS) were able to sign up. It also does not 
explain why BlackRock in January 2020 announced that it would sign up as the first of the Big 
Three after all.83  
 
One campaigner explained that BlackRock preferred to set up its own campaigns that typically 
involved a coalition with corporate representatives where it could control the dialogue.84 
Campaigners therefore suspect that the real reason that the Big Three are avoiding taking sides 
on controversial issues is for fear of being hit with increased regulation from corporate interest 
groups seeking to limit their influence. 
 
In further evidence that NGOs are losing patience with the approach of the Big Three, the 
representative of one NGO explained in the summer of 2019 that they were preparing to sue 
BlackRock if they voted against future shareholder proposals requesting companies report 
information according to the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) standards.85 Because BlackRock was a 
signatory/member to both standards, the NGO felt that they should not oppose shareholder 
proposals seeking to support those standards. 
 
 
82 Corporate governance analyst, Big Three asset manager, telephone interview, 24 June 2019. 
83 Shareholder campaigner, NGO, in person interview, 27 June 2019.  
84 Shareholder campaigner, NGO, in person interview, 26 July 2019. 
85 Shareholder campaigner, NGO, in person interview, 27 June 2019. 
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Further reasons for index funds’ lack of critical engagement 
Why else might the Big Three show near unanimous support of corporate managers and 
opposition to the majority of environmental and social shareholder proposals? When asked this 
question, one of the Big Three explained that they did not believe that they had a wider 
responsibility to society and that their only responsibility was to the financial wellbeing of their 
investors.86 Indeed, the issue of fiduciary responsibility appears to be one reason for the Big 
Three’s hesitancy to support environmental and social proposals. When asked why BlackRock 
voted against 91 percent of climate change resolutions in 2017, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, 
explained that “In the United States, we can’t put environmental things in front. That’s against 
the fiduciary standard rule of the United States” (BlackRock, 2018b). 
 
Conflicts of interest provide a further explanation for a lack of engagement (Bebchuck and 
Hirst, 2019a; Braun 2019). Bebchuk and Hirst (2019a) argue from an agency-costs theory 
approach that index funds have a strong incentive to underinvest in stewardship as the costs of 
stewardship fall on the fund management company, while the benefits accrue to the fund. 
Furthermore, any benefits of such stewardship will benefit all shareholders not just the funds 
that engage in it and that any outperformance of the stocks will not be captured by index funds 
as it will be reflected in the overall level of the index. 
 
A second conflict of interest results from the fact that asset managers compete for corporate 
pensions and treasury mandates (Davis and Kim, 2007). In the case where an asset manages is 
owned by a banking corporation, their parent bank may also compete for financing business 
(Braun, 2019). Asset managers may therefore be reluctant to engage with portfolio companies 
for fear of retribution. This second type of conflict of interest may also take on another form: 
 
86 Corporate governance expert, Big Three index fund, in-person interview, 17 August 2018.  
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Asset managers may also seek not to appear too environmentally and/or socially conscious for 
fear of alienating a portion of their existing or potential client base. The same logic may also 
work the other way meaning that asset managers may not want to appear too uninvolved for 
fear of putting off the opposite side of the customer spectrum. How politically charged such 
issues become is made apparent by the following comment, which followed BlackRock’s 
January 2020 announcement to divest of some of their coal assets from their active funds: 
 
“Montana Senate Majority Leader Fred Thomas, a Republican and legislative 
liaison with the Montana Board of Investments, for which BlackRock manages 
assets, said he supports the use of many fuel sources including coal and that 
BlackRock should be wary of calls to move away from fossil fuels. ‘Any effort in 
my opinion to try to placate this environmental agenda just to get along and go 
along is a bad decision for any business,’ Thomas said”.87 
 
The fact that many asset managers, including two of the Big Three, are themselves stock market 
listed corporations furthermore creates the possibility that asset management executives 
become conceptually captured by their interests as stock market listed corporations. They are 
tasked with defending the interest of their customers, the ultimate investors, while 
simultaneously themselves fulfilling the role of company managers. Their boards consist of 
many past and present executives of both financial and non-financial stock market listed 
corporations. The managing board of BlackRock, for example, includes the CEOs of Cisco, 
Estée Lauder and PNC Financial Services, as well as past and present executives from 
 
87 Reuters Business News, 14 January 2020, “BlackRock vows tougher stance on climate after activist heat”. 
Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-blackrock-fink/blackrock-vows-tougher-stance-on-climate-after-
activist-heat-idUKKBN1ZD150 (Accessed 27 February 2020) 
 142 
Microsoft, General Electric, Verizon Communications, Swiss Re, Aviva and EQT Corporation 
(a gas pipeline operator).88 
 
Asset managers thus have a number of reasons not to critically engage with their portfolio 
companies. Any shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues has the potential to 
force asset managers to take sides. This may therefore explain why none of the Big Three 
opposed the SEC’s proposals to make it more difficult for shareholders to submit proposals at 
US companies. While a very long list of active fund managers submitted forceful letters of 
objection to the SEC’s proposed new set of rules on proxy voting, Reuters noted that 
BlackRock “declined to back or reject a regulatory proposal to reform the shareholder 
resolution process”.89 The proposed rules seek to increase the minimum dollar value of stock 
an investor has to hold before being able to submit a shareholder proposal.  
 
Since many of the proposals are submitted by small shareholders, such a rule change has the 
potential to drastically reduce the number of proposals submitted. Yet, State Street’s head of 
stewardship commented that “I don't feel like I need to have a position on an issue that's not 
impacting us”.90 The increased dollar hurdle would not impact any of the institutional investors, 
but the way the investment ecosystem works, it is often smaller investors that submit the 
proposals. Yet as one interviewee explained, such rule changes would have a big impact on the 
voting ecosystem, as it is irrelevant who submits the proposals, as long as somebody does, what 
matters is that everyone votes on them.91 If these smaller investors did not submit proposals, 
corporates would face considerably less shareholder pressure.  
 
88 Source: https://ir.blackrock.com/governance/board-of-directors/default.aspx (Accessed 10 April 2020). 
89 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackrock-investors/on-shareholder-vote-reforms-blackrock-sits-on-the-
fence-idUSKBN2002ED (Accessed 27 February 2020). 
90 https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/top-u.s.-fund-firms-split-over-new-limits-on-shareholder-votes-2020-01-31 
(Accessed 27 February 2020). 
91 Former executive, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
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Vanguard’s (2019c) policy documents explicitly state that Vanguard does not file shareholder 
proposals, and the Financial Times reports that BlackRock said it had never submitted a 
shareholder proposal either.92 This is significant because if one thinks about the spectrum of 
engagement options, the two most powerful are submitting a shareholder proposal and publicly 
threatening to divest from a stock (Figure 1, Page 4). Since index investors’ shareholdings 
follow from equity indices, by ruling out shareholder proposals index funds are unable to make 
use of two of their most compelling tools as means for disciplining portfolio companies. 
 
In October 2020, billionaire hedge fund manager Sir Christopher Hohn called out the big asset 
managers accusing them of “total greenwash” and remarking that “asset managers are sheep” 
and that “a lot of them will say ‘we will vote for someone’s else’s resolution’, but why aren’t 
they filing their own resolutions?”93 
 
Index funds are therefore “systematically staying on the side lines on those decisions and 
generally avoiding expressing any position or preference with respect to the SEC proposals 
and Judicial decisions” (Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019a: 79). The result of this approach is that the 
Big Three are helping to insulate US corporations from pressures brought on by other, 
potentially more socially concerned, investors. The fact that the Big Three have a smaller 
market share in Europe than in the US means that this insulating effect is particularly evident 
in the US, where their average voting bloc of approximately 25 percent of the votes cast has 
enabled them to scupper a number of shareholder proposals, as documented by the NGO 
Majority Action (2019).  
 
 
92 https://www.ft.com/content/44110919-84d9-30d5-a346-e9ac30eef204 (Accessed 27 February 2020). 
93 https://www.ft.com/content/2ea426f2-b338-4921-882b-7c99076489fe (Accessed 10 November 2020). 
 144 
A recent report on CEO pay by the NGO As you Sow (2020) furthermore noted how the voting 
behaviour of the Big Three contrasted with the voting behaviour of European asset managers. 
The report noted that while BNP Paribas Asset Management opposed pay packages termed 
excessive 91 percent of the time in 2019, and Allianz Global Investors opposed 93 percent of 
these packages, BlackRock opposed just 8 percent and Vanguard 10 percent of such excessive 
pay packages.  
 
The inaction by the Big Three has added to frustration amongst activists, to the point where 
some are now engaging in what can best be described as “corporate governance squared”. 
Rather than filing shareholder proposals at a large number of individual firms, activists have 
now resorted to filing shareholder proposals also at the level of the asset management firm at 
BlackRock Inc and Vanguard (Bloomberg, 2019). These proposals seek changes to asset 
managers’ proxy voting policies at their respective portfolio companies.94  
 
 
A new separation of ownership and control and the fear of instrumentalization 
The institutionalisation and indexation of investment management has resulted in the 
professionalisation of the corporate governance function within asset managers. This has 
created a new separation of ownership and control within asset managers just as a “great re-
concentration (Braun, 2019) is occurring amongst shareholders.  
 
 
94 While Vanguard is a private company, it does hold irregular general meetings, whenever required. The last 
meetings were held in 2002, 2009 and 2017. At these meetings Vanguard has faced calls “to institute transparent 
procedures to avoid holding investments in companies that, in management’s judgement, substantially 
contribute to genocide or crimes against humanity, the most egregious violations of human rights”. Vanguard’s 
management has recommended voting against these proposals (as they consider them covered by other policies) 
and have succeeded in defeating these proxy campaigns repeatedly. Source: 
https://www.sustainableinvest.com/vanguard-proxy-vote/ (Accessed 3 April 2020). 
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Historically, asset managers’ corporate governance function was comprised by a very small 
team of either admin staff or lawyers, “back office lackeys”,95 who would primarily be 
responsible for completing voting ballots, while engagement was conducted by the portfolio 
managers and research analysts sat in the “front office”. This has changed over the past two 
decades, primarily due to two reasons. First, voice has taken on a more important role as 
investors have gained rights to vote on a greater number of corporate items, larger stakes have 
made selling out of stock holdings increasingly more challenging, and regulatory pressures for 
stewardship have increased. Second, the growth of index funds, who are unable to sell, means 
there is today a large group of investors for whom voice represents the only option for 
influence. 
 
Asset managers have responded to this changed environment by adding substantial, though 
often still insufficient, resources. As the following chapters will show, large investors’ 
stewardship teams have reached average headcounts of 18 people and the largest team (at 
BlackRock) consists of 47 team members. “Within the asset management firms the amount of 
resources has changed, stewardship teams have grown. Twelve years ago, corporate 
governance was a one to two-person team, usually consisting of a compliance officer”.96 The 
new separation of ownership and control results from the fact that these teams have acquired 
specialist knowledge on issues such as the design of executive remuneration policies, that differ 
between countries, that it is near impossible for front office staff to keep abreast of this as well 
as “ordinary” corporate developments.  
 
 
95 Investor relations, UK company, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018.  
96 Former employee, large US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020.  
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Ownership continues to sit with the portfolio managers and fundamental research analysts, 
while corporate governance control sits with the stewardship teams.97 This separation has been 
formalised at most asset managers by the fact that the stewardship teams typically report into 
the Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Financial Officer or directly into the Chief Executive 
Officer. At most firms there is no reporting line into the fund management team. The Global 
Head of BlackRock’s Investment Stewardship Team, for example, reports into the Vice 
Chairman and co-founder of the firm.  
 
Stewardship teams organises dedicated governance meetings with company management, in 
addition to those organised by the portfolio management team. While the portfolio managers 
will meet with the executive team of CEO, CFO and/or investor relations to assess the 
financials, the stewardship teams meet with the chairman and the non-executive directors, 
especially those heading committees (remuneration, audit etc).98 Specialist stewardship 
resources, such as proxy advisors (discussed in Chapter 5), contribute to this separation of 
ownership and control, as their reports are typically only provided to the stewardship teams.  
 
Corporates fear losing control over their relationships as a result of this new separation within 
asset managers. With active managers they have the option of lobbying the portfolio managers, 
whereas with index funds there was no means of recourse should they disagree with the 
stewardship team’s interpretation of a situation. Companies have to “learn how to manage them 
[stewardship teams], investor relations need to evolve their contacts to beyond the PM 
[portfolio manager] and analysts that they are used to speak to”.99 Since the topics of discussion 
 
97 There are a small number of exceptions, where fund managers retain the vote such as, for example, at the US 
asset manager Invesco. For details on Invesco’s approach to proxy voting, see: 
https://www.unpri.org/Uploads/z/i/a/Invescos-differentiated-Proxy-Voting-Approach.pdf (Accessed 5 May 
2020).  
98 Stewardship team member, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 16 April 2015.  
99 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 3 April 2018.  
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are often times very technical,100 investor relations people have reported not being able to have 
an “intelligent conversation” with stewardship teams, instead requiring company lawyers to be 
present as investor relations cannot “talk the language”.101 
 
The result is that corporates described asset managers’ approaches to corporate governance and 
fundamental equity analysis as “disjointed” and representing a “ticking the box exercise instead 
of conviction”.102 Instead of separating corporate governance from portfolio management, 
corporates suggested that “non-financial KPIs and sustainability should all be integrated  […] 
if taken to the natural conclusion, all these topics are so interwoven, and part of the same 
narrative strategy”.103  
 
The separation of the stewardship teams has led to fear amongst many of the interviewed 
corporates that the Big Three and the proxy advisory firms may become instrumentalization by 
activists (Chapter 7 discusses the corporate reaction in detail). Feeding this fear is a general 
lack of contact with these stewardship teams, particularly amongst smaller capitalisation 
companies.104 The reasoning is that, without regular contact governance risks becoming a “tick 
the box” exercise as stewardship teams will lack company-specific insights.105  
 
Corporates therefore have the challenge of needing to build new relationships with these 
governance teams, but “can’t build a rapport if we do not have regular issues to discuss”.106 
Many stewardship teams will only take calls from companies outside of the main proxy voting 
 
100 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 5 June 2018. 
101 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 20 June 2018. 
102 Investor relations, UK company, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018.  
103   Ibid.  
104 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 20 June 2018.  
     Governance expert, US company, in-person interview, 26 June 2018.  
105 Deputy company secretary, UK company, telephone interview, 11 June 2018. 
106 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018.  
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season and only when there are issues to discuss.107 “A governance group will have oversight 
and they will never care as much as that one active fund manager”.108 Portfolio managers by 
contrast will take calls most of the time even if there are no urgent issues, as there is always 
something to be gained, be it about the company itself or its competitors.  
 
The separation of ownership and control is perceived to be particularly relevant within index 
fund managers, where corporates have no alternative contact points. “The more indexed houses 
become, the more important the corporate governance person becomes. And it is a challenge 
to get to know them”.109 Corporates noted that the rise of passive investors represents both a 
chance and a risk. A chance that they may not participate, thereby not voting against 
management, but also a risk if they lend out their voting rights to activist investors, “then you 
have a problem”.110 
 
Several corporates suggested that challenges resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control are greater with US investors than with European investors.111 “There is still a gap, a 
separate world. In some firms you go through the PM [portfolio manager] or analyst to get to 
corp gov meetings. This is weird. In the US a buy-side analyst will actually warn you this does 
not concern him; you have entered the corporate governance realm and he will pass you on to 
colleagues. It’s unclear to me how they can separate an investment decision from a governance 




107 Governance expert, proxy solicitor, telephone interview, 26 February 2018.  
     Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
108 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018. 
109 Investor relations, UK company, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018. 
110 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 18 January 2018. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Corporate Secretary, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has documented that index funds have contributed to an increase in the levels of 
shareholder concentration and to the degree of overall institutionalisation. The larger voting 
blocs have provided the conditions necessary for shareholders to exercise meaningful control 
over corporate governance. However, rather than resulting in greater shareholder influence 
over corporate strategy, the rise of the Big Three asset managers has provided corporations, 
particularly in the US, with a degree of insulation from other shareholders’ policy advances. 
The resulting corporate governance vacuum is evidenced by the failed shareholder proposals 
on climate change at US oil companies. US corporate managers thus retain greater managerial 
autonomy than UK and German executives, with the result that they have comparatively less 
need to coordinate their policies with stakeholders.  
 
The indexation of investment management is therefore affecting the three countries to a 
different extent. The two-pronged regulatory approach in the UK and Germany is balancing 
greater shareholder rights with the requirement for shareholders to take greater account of other 
stakeholders’ concerns. The consequence of this is that the ostensibly LME attribute of greater 
shareholder power is directed not at a further maximisation of shareholder value but instead 
directed at supporting other stakeholders’ interests, therefore requiring corporate executives to 
engage in greater coordination of company strategy (a classical CME attribute).  
 
What the outcomes of the climate change proposals  have also shown, is that the Big Three as 
a group have now amassed sufficient holdings to cast the deciding vote on a growing number 
of shareholder proposals in the US (up to two-thirds of US shareholder proposals have been 
decided by a margin of thirty percent or less). Bebchuk and Hirst (2019b) raise the spectre of 
a “Giant Three”, suggesting that if the Big Three continue to grow at their current rate they will 
 150 
likely reach 34 percent voting blocs in the S&P 500 within one decade and 41 percent within 
two decades.  
 
Coates (2018) similarly draws attention to what he calls the “Problem of Twelve”, the 
“likelihood that in the near future roughly twelve individuals will have practical power over 
the majority of U.S. public companies” (2018: 1). Coates explains that the number 12 is an 
imprecise number, he uses it as a proxy for the typical size of a corporate board. His argument 
is that index investing is leading to a winner-takes-all result in which just one management 
board, that of the largest asset managers, will control all of corporate America. The 
management team of Vanguard, the fastest growing of the Big Three asset managers, consists 
of 12 executives.113  
 
For now, Europe appears to be approximately 10 years behind the US in the adoption of ETFs. 
Index funds are growing at a similar pace but from a lower base. BlackRock is larger in the 
UK than in the US and Germany, but the combined holdings of the Big Three are still 
considerably smaller in the UK than in the US, and much smaller still in Germany. In the UK 
and Germany, the governance agenda is therefore still set primarily by domestic investors and 
the Big three are not yet in a position to provide the level of governance vacuum seen in the 
US and are thus unable to scupper domestic investors’ policy initiatives.  
 
Regulatory changes outlined in this chapter suggest that the Big Three are likely to gain greater 
market share in Germany and the UK going forward. This raises the question of what the 
consequence of greater market share will entail for the corporate governance models in the UK 
and Germany. Since the Big Three serve to insulate corporate managers, rather than themselves 
 
113 For further details, see: https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/our-leaders/ (Accessed 4 April 2020). 
 151 
advocating for any particular model of capitalism, the likely outcome is that greater index fund 
market share in Europe may halt but not reverse changes to the German and UK models. As a 
secondary consequence, there is, however, the potential that greater US index fund market 
share in Europe will lead to declining revenue income for European asset managers, thereby 





The Internationalisation of Share Ownership  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter documented how the growth of the Big Three, all of which are US 
headquartered, has provided asset managers with the scale and ownership concentration 
necessary to play a meaningful role in corporate governance going forward. It has also shown, 
however, that to date this new influence of the Big Three primarily serves to insulate US 
corporate managers from the stewardship efforts of other shareholders. This chapter will detail 
the internationalisation of the asset management industry, which represents the first of the three 
second-order developments to be discussed. While institutionalisation and indexation have 
created the necessary preconditions for shareholder control, internationalisation creates the 
precondition necessary for the growth of the asset management industry to influence the 
individual national varieties of capitalism on other countries outside the United States. 
Internationalisation is the means by which the governance activities of any one investor can 
reach beyond the national context.  
 
Whereas the institutionalisation of investment management has led to a focus on diversification 
of portfolio holdings for both asset managers and individuals, the indexation of investment 
management provided an affordable means for delivering this diversification, both nationally 
and internationally. In questioning the value of active fund management, the rise of index 
investing has furthermore called into question the value of foreign asset managers as necessary 
experts for international investment allocations. Indexation has thus enabled domestic financial 
institutions to offer a credible investment product for foreign investments. Investors now have 
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the option to pick a global, regional or country-specific index fund to capture returns from any 
part of the world they choose. 
 
As of the end of the 2018, foreigners held $7.9 trillion in US equities, equating to approximately 
14 percent of outstanding shares (US Treasury, 2019). Compared to this, the foreign ownership 
of UK and German stocks stand considerably higher. In the UK, foreign ownership reached an 
all-time high of 54.9 percent of the value of the UK stock market (£2.04 trillion) at the end of 
2018. In Germany, foreign ownership almost equalled the UK level, standing at 53.7 percent 
in 2018.114 The high levels of foreign ownership of German equities is partly explained by high 
cross-border ownership amongst European investors. The European Commission (2013) notes 
that approximately half of the foreign ownership of German equities comes from within the 
European Union. 
 
The causal relationship between institutionalisation, indexation and internationalisation is 
shown in Figure 16. Institutionalisation is proxied by the percentage of assets invested in US 
mutual funds and closed-end funds (blue line, LHS), indexation is depicted by the percentage 
of US equities held in ETFs (orange line. LHS), and internationalisation is represented by the 
percentage of total US assets invested in foreign equities (green line, RHS). Figure 16 shows 
that internationalisation received two boosts, first from institutionalisation starting 
approximately in 1980 (US institutional investors allocating funds abroad), and then again from 




114 For UK data see: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2018   
and for German data: https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/dax-30-konzerne-gehoeren-
mehrheitlich-auslaendern-deutsche-firmen-in-fremder-hand/2906102.html and 
https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/maerkte/boerse-inside/aktionaersstruktur-so-stark-dominieren-
auslaendische-investoren-die-dax-konzerne/21211152.html  (Accessed 9 February 2020). 
 154 
Figure 16: Institutionalisation, Indexation and Internationalisation from the US perspective 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve.  
 
The developments in the UK and Germany have been similar to those in the US, with the 
exception that internationalisation started later. Whereas the internationalisation of US equities 
has been a steady development from approximately 1965 onwards, internationalisation in the 
UK only started in earnest in approximately 1980 and even later, in approximately 1997, in 
Germany (the developments in both countries will be discussed in detail below).  
 
This chapter demonstrates that internationalisation has occurred in two dimensions. First, there 
is the generally acknowledged increase in the level of foreign shareholdings reported by 
companies. Second, internationalisation is occurring also at the level of the asset management 
firms themselves. Due to the economies of scale present in the asset management industry, 
mergers are highly accretive to corporate earnings. Mergers also provide a solution to entering 
markets with domestically captive distribution channels, such as in the case of Germany, 
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described in the previous chapter. What results are asset managers with offices and stewardship 
teams in multiple countries.  
 
The first dimension of internationalisation in principle provides investors from different 
countries with the means to influence companies domiciled in other countries. The second 
dimension has contributed to the scale of individual asset managers and to the creation of global 
giants such as the Big Three. Together they have therefore provided the theoretical means for 
asset managers to influence the varieties of capitalism.  
 
In the 2009 annual report of BlackRock, published around the time that ETFs entered the global 
spotlight, CEO Fink addresses both of the aforementioned dimensions of internationalisation. 
Firstly, he acknowledges the importance of scale and thus the need for consolidation amongst 
asset managers and secondly, he highlights that clients will increasingly look more widely 
across the globe for investment opportunities.  
 
“Scale has never been more important, and may well be the catalyst that 
drives consolidation in our highly fragmented industry. […] I believe that 
clients will increasingly cast a wider net for attractive investments, and that 
global economic growth will depend on the growth of the global capital 
markets and on trade policies that facilitate the free flow of capital across 
borders. In short, I believe that globalization is our collective destiny” 
(BlackRock, 2009: 6-7).  
  
What then are the consequences of the rise of internationalisation for the corporate governance 
of firms in the UK, the US and Germany? The common inference in the literature is that 
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internationalisation leads to financialisation, neoliberalism and thus an Americanisation of the 
financial system (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Harmes, 1998; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
Useem, 1996). Harmes, for example argues that “institutional investors possess specific 
characteristics which are serving to reproduce neoliberal restructuring in both coercive and 
consensual ways” (1998: 92), while Useem notes that the “days of divergent governance 
systems are numbered” as “US investors insert their money into other national economies” 
(1996: 266).  
 
Instead this chapter shows that the influence of institutional investors on national models of 
corporate governance is highly complex. Investors engage with companies in foreign countries 
to differing degrees and investors from different countries also follow substantially different 
policies. A diverse international policy discourse therefore persists, and this chapter documents 
that institutional investors from both the UK and Germany are successfully pursuing policies 
with divergent aims to those of US investors. 
 
The result of this is that instead of the US functioning as the model for corporate governance 
and the object of possible convergence, the UK is increasingly being considered to represent 
the best-in-class model of corporate governance.115 In many ways the UK model today 
represents a compromise between the shareholder value and stakeholder value understanding 
of corporate governance. Since the US and UK models of governance are increasingly at odds 
with one another, it also suggests that referring to an “Anglo-Saxon” model of corporate 




115 ESG portfolio manager, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15 April 2015. 
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4.2 Chapter Structure 
This chapter will show that internationalisation does not equate to Americanisation of the asset 
management industry. This is because asset managers’ influence differs between countries. 
Since the Big Three hold comparatively smaller voting stakes in the UK and Germany than in 
the US, the degree of insulation they provide to corporates in Germany and the UK is not able 
to provide the same governance vacuum as it does in the US. In Germany and the UK, domestic 
investors therefore play a comparatively larger role in corporate governance.  
 
There is an emergent international governance discourse amongst which a governance 
compromise, one that focusses on shareholder value but also considers stakeholder concerns, 
is being conceived. The UK is considered by many to be the best-practice model of this 
governance compromise.116 “Disclosure is better in the UK. […] However, US companies still 
have an attitude, ‘who are you, why are you talking to us, leave us alone’. […] Germany is not 
high on the list for corporate governance problems”.117 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next two sections document the internationalisation 
of the shareholder ownership structure and of the asset management firms themselves, 
respectively. This is followed by a section outlining the degree to which the Big Three are 
involved in the governance discourse in Germany and the UK. This is then contrasted with the 
governance approaches of German and UK asset managers, before moving on to a section 
presenting the UK model of corporate governance as a compromise between the shareholder 
value and stakeholder value-oriented models of capitalism.   
 
116 Governance expert, European proxy advisor, in-person interview, 5 October 2018. 
     Governance expert, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 April 2018. 
     Two governance expert, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 25 September 2018. 
117 ESG portfolio manager, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15 April 2015.  
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4.3 Country-Level Data  
There are two perspectives from which to consider internationalisation. The first is from the 
country level. That is to look at the extent to which shareholdings in any one country or region 
have come to be made up of investors from another country or region. While one may expect 
such equity investments to be dominated by US investments abroad, this is not in fact the case. 
Figure 17 below shows equity holdings by domestic US investors in orange, and European 
shareholdings of US domestic companies in blue. It shows that these investments have been 
approximately equal, with European investments in the US in fact slightly exceeding US 
investments in Europe throughout 2019. 
 
 
Figure 17: US holdings of European equities, European holdings of US equities.  
Jan-12 to Aug-19 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
 
The picture looks less balanced on an individual country basis. While shareholdings between 
the UK and the US are similarly balanced at approximately $1.04 trillion each, the US holdings 
of German equities at approximately $340 billion are substantially larger than the $190 billion 
German holdings of US equities (bond investments are of greater importance for German 
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investors on the whole). The reason that the holdings between European and US countries 
balance out overall, is in part due to the Swiss National Bank’s holding of approximately $100 
billion in US equities.118 More remarkable, the US holdings of UK equities dwarf the US 
holdings of German equities at a ratio of approximately three to one. This shows that the Anglo-
Saxon relationship is reflected in substantial reciprocal shareholdings. Similarly, the UK 
holdings of US stocks are almost five and a half times the size of German holdings of US stocks 
(Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18: UK and German holdings of domestic US company shares 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
These large reciprocal shareholdings are in part a reflection of the relative size of the domestic 
equity markets. The UK equity market capitalisation at $4 trillion (£2.36trl) is approximately 
2.4x the size of the German market capitalisation of $1.7 trillion (€1.53trl).119 But this alone 
 
118 Source: https://www.swfinstitute.org/news/76039/swiss-national-bank-almost-owns-100-billion-worth-of-u-
s-stocks (Accessed 1 May 2020). 
119 ECB data as of year-end 2018. Source: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=181.SEE.A.GB.LSE0.MKP.W.N (Accessed 22 January 
2020). 
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does not explain the difference, as the resulting US stock holdings as a percentage of the UK 
and German markets are quite different. US holdings of UK equities equate to approximately 
28% of the domestic market capitalisation, while US holdings of German equities equate to 
just 14% (US Treasury, 2019). Indeed, the Federal Reserve (2019) data shows that US holdings 
of other countries’ domestic market capitalisation on average represents just 16%, substantially 
less than the 28% holding it has in the UK stock market. In emerging market economies, it is 
even lower at just 6% on average. While this data supports the notion of some form of Anglo-
Saxon relationship, it questions the idea of an Americanisation of the world’s equity markets.  
 
The previous chapter highlighted the convergence of ownership concentration levels in the UK, 
the US and Germany that has resulted from the dismantling of Deutschland AG and the rise of 
asset managers. The above data shows that merely looking at ownership concentration levels 
on its own is not enough. Additionally, looking at the domicile of investors adds a further level 
of understanding.  
 
Figure 19 shows the chronological development of foreign ownership in the UK and Germany, 
compared to the US. It shows that while growth in the UK (orange line) started earlier (in the 
1980s), Germany (grey line) saw a subsequent surge in foreign ownership to bring it back into 
line with the UK. In Germany foreign ownership only started in earnest in 1997. From a base 
of ten percent in 1997 it grew to 30 percent in 2002 and to 53 percent by 2007.120 In the UK, 
for comparison, foreign ownership in 1997 already stood at 28 percent, growing to 35.9 percent 
 
120 See: https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/dax-30-konzerne-gehoeren-mehrheitlich-
auslaendern-deutsche-firmen-in-fremder-hand/2906102.html  (Accessed 19 October) 
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in 2002 and to 41.5 percent in 2008.121 Foreign ownership in Germany therefore caught up with 
the UK in the period between 1997 and 2007.  
 
Figure 19: Foreign ownership levels of equities in Germany, the UK and the US 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, ONS, Bundesbank, Morck (2005). 
 
Part of the explanation for why Germany saw greater foreign ownership growth between 1997 
and 2007 is that this timeframe includes the introduction of the Euro in 1999. While not 
covering the introduction of the Euro, European Commission (2013) data shows that between 
2001 and 2006 European investors added approximately 10 percentage points to the foreign 
holdings of German equities, including 5 percentage points which came from European 




(Accessed 19 October) 
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during the period from 1997 to 2007 is the aforementioned acquisition of the German index 
fund manager Indexchange by then still UK domiciled asset manager Barclays Global 
Investors, as well as the dismantling of Deutschland AG and finally the dotcom-induced craze 
that was the Neuer Markt (the former technology segment of the Deutsche Börse, since 
defunct). In the years since, these high levels of foreign ownership on a national basis have 
even been surpassed on an individual company basis. The Handelsblatt reported in 2017 that 
at several blue-chip companies, including Bayer, Deutsche Börse and Adidas, foreign 




4.4 Investor-Level Data 
A second dimension of internationalisation has occurred at the level of the asset management 
firms themselves. Since many of the economies of scale that apply to the asset management 
industry domestically can also be captured internationally, the asset managers themselves 
expanded internationally, in part through merger and acquisitions and in part through organic 
growth. Despite the rapid growth of financial assets in India and China over the past decade, 
the share of global assets managed by US firms therefore further increased from 41.5 percent 
in 2007 to 53 percent in 2017 (Braun, 2019).  
 
Economies of scale led initially to the creation of national leaders and subsequently to the 
creation of global giants, led by the Big Three. As already reported, BlackRock grew through 
a number of significant acquisitions. Consider the following two chains of mergers: In 2006 
BlackRock acquired Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, which itself had previously acquired 
 
122 Source: https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/finance/corporate-globalization-the-daxs-foreign-
invasion/23572594.html?ticket=ST-44220293-QDjAW0xitptXkrdf7YeP-ap1 Accessed 16 October 2019.  
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the UK asset manager Mercury Asset Management. Then in 2009 it acquired Barclays Global 
Investors (BGI, with approximately $1 trillion in assets under management [AuM]), which 
included the iShares ETF brand. Ishares, a UK asset manager, had in turn acquired the German 
ETF provider Indexchange from HypoVereinsbank in 2006.123  
 
A list of the twenty-five largest fund managers globally compiled by IPE (2018) shows the 
dominance of both British and American asset managers. Of the top twenty global asset 
managers that make up the league table produced by IPE (2018), three are French, one is 
German and 16 are either UK or US based. The one German entry, DWS / Deutsche Asset 
Management, ranks as twentieth, while Allianz Global Investors (AGI) with €505bn in AuM 
comes in at rank 30. This is despite Germany having the fourth biggest economy in the world 
and the 19th highest GDP per capita.124  
 
A second set of data looking at 2006 and 2017, illustrates that while the domiciles of the largest 
asset managers show only minor changes, the share of assets amongst those asset managers has 
changed dramatically (Watson Wyatt, 2006; Willis Towers Watson, 2018c). In 2006, asset 
managers domiciled in either the UK or US accounted for 53 percent of the AuM of the 25 
largest asset managers globally (41% US, 12% UK). But by 2017, this proportion has increased 
to 75.8 percent of AuM (70.8% US, 5% UK). The assets of German asset managers within the 
Top 25 remained stable at approximately 8 percent. The fact that the UK has fallen behind 
Germany suggests that internationalisation has equated to Americanisation of institutions 
within the Anglo-Saxon construct, but not beyond it. 
 
123 For a history of BlackRock, see: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/blackrock-history For 
details of Ishares’ acquisition of Indexchange, see: https://www.ipe.com/analysis/analysis/bgis-ishares-buys-
indexchange-in-germany-market-build-up/20231.article (Accessed 19 October) 
124 See World Economic Forum as of 2018: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-
economies-in-2018/ and World Bank as of 2017: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd?year_high_desc=true (Accessed 26 May 2019) 
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Figure 10 in Chapter 3 showed how the fortunes of the 100 largest asset managers has changed, 
highlighting that the majority of all assets had been captured by the largest asset managers. 
Figure 20 below further provides context to the relative size of the ten largest asset managers 
in each of the three countries; green bubbles representing US asset managers, orange UK asset 
managers and blue German asset managers. The y-axis shows the AuM in million dollars (as 
does the size of the bubble), the x-axis the domestic rank of the respective asset managers.  
 
Figure 20: Ten largest asset managers by total AuM in Germany, the UK and the US.125 
 
Source: data from IPE (2019b).  
 
While the above data support the standard view that internationalisation means 
Americanisation, in the remainder of this chapter I will outline a number of factors that serve 
to moderate convergent pressures on the VoC and help explain why governance changes to 




125 The second largest UK asset manager in the above list is Insight Investment. Insight is, however, a subsidiary 
of the US Bank of New York Mellon, and could therefore be instead listed as a US firm.  
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Asset managers’ five dimensions of stewardship 
The extent to which asset managers influence corporate governance depends on a number of 
overlapping factors that can be divided into five dimensions of stewardship. The first 
dimension is the extent to which regulators encourage institutional investors to engage in 
stewardship of their portfolio companies. The second is asset managers’ intent to bring about 
change. The third is the direction of change, which can be observed by the extent to which 
asset managers’ policy preferences seek to advance LME (shareholder) or CME (stakeholder) 
aspects of governance respectively. The fourth dimension is asset managers’ available 
resources to engage with corporates. The final dimension is the size of asset managers’ 
ownership stakes and the voting power that results from their holdings.  
 
The interaction between these five dimensions will ultimately determine whether or not asset 
managers have influence and whether internationalisation can be considered to equate to 
Americanisation or not. Each of these dimensions will now be discussed in a dedicated section. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, respectively, will introduce proxy advisors and corporates as two 




The regulatory dimension 
The regulatory framework represents the first dimension that impacts the degree to which asset 
managers are able to influence corporate governance. Government regulations impact the 
effectiveness of the other four dimensions, as they set out the ground rules on which corporates 
and their shareholders are to engage. One such example was provided in the previous chapter, 
which highlighted that regulators in the UK and Germany set the frequency with which 
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company directors are to be put up for re-election, whereas in the US investors have had to 
fight for such rights by submitting shareholder proposals at the individual company level.  
 
This shows that in the UK and Germany a substantial part of governance change is regulatorily 
driven and thus not the result of pressure by US shareholders to Americanize the domestic 
governance model. In the UK the government through the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
sets the rules that make up both the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK Stewardship 
code.126 These list the obligations of corporates and investors respectively. While there is a 
consultation process and there are advisory groups, it is the government and its civil servants 
that ultimately set the rules.  
 
In Germany the Kodex is drafted by the Kodex commission, which consists of “managing and 
supervisory board representatives of German listed companies and their stakeholders, i.e. 
institutional and retail investors, academics (economics, jurisprudence), auditors and a trade 
union federation. The members of the Commission are appointed by the German Federal 
Minister of Justice and for Consumer Protection”.127 The Kodex thus represents a compromise 
between corporates and shareholders as well as other civil society representatives and 
resembles the classic CME model of coordination.  
 
In the US, the corporate governance rules are set by the SEC, the five members of which are 
appointed by the US President.128 Since there are always two members each from the 
Republican and the Democratic parties, the SEC and its rulemaking has a narrow political 
 
126 For further details, see: https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship (Accessed 8 
February 2020). 
127 Source: https://www.dcgk.de/en/commission.html (Accessed 27 January 2020).  
128 For further details, see: https://www.sec.gov/Article/about-commissioners.html (Accessed 8 February 2020). 
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dimension not seen in the UK or Germany, which instead have civil servants arrange and 
companies and investors lead the process.  
 
The result of this is that the policies of the UK and German regulators have moved in 
substantially different, almost perfectly opposing directions, from the US in recent years. For 
the UK, the FRC has increased demands on both institutional investors and corporates alike, 
with the result that shareholder rights have been increased further while considerations for 
social and environmental concerns have also increased substantially (FRC, 2019). In Germany, 
where corporate representatives are part of the Kodex commission, the changes have been less 
far-reaching, but developments have been in the same conceptual direction as in the UK 
(increasing the areas of corporate governance in which shareholders have a say and therefore 
potentially moving away from the CME model). In the US on the other hand, the SEC is 
currently (in May 2020), considering whether to make it more difficult for shareholders to 
submit proposals and whether to severely restrict the work of proxy advisors.129 The following 
two statements illustrate the gulf that has developed between the approaches seen in the UK 
and the US.  
 
For the UK, the FRC notes that companies are falling short of investors’ expectations for 
clearer reporting on climate-related issues, with its CEO thus commenting that “[a]s societal 
and investor expectations evolve, alongside the regulatory environment, it is clear companies 
need to rapidly increase their transparency and improve their reporting to meet this demand. 
[…] The FRC itself recognises the need to play a more active role in this space and this report 
 
129 Reuters has identified more than two dozen measures the SEC has taken under the Trump administration 
alone that “make life easier” for US corporates. Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-
publiccompanies/how-the-sec-is-making-life-easier-for-corporate-america-idUSKBN1XH2V7 (Accessed 7 
March 2020). 
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is an important step in recognising climate change as a priority and building on the FRC’s 
activities” (FRC, 2019: 1). 
 
Compare this to the extraordinary language of SEC commissioner Hester Peirce who criticised 
proxy advisors, investment banks and ESG ratings agencies for “labelling based on incomplete 
information, public shaming, and shunning wrapped in moral rhetoric preached with cold-
hearted, self-righteous oblivion to the consequences, which ultimately fall on real people. […] 
there is a group of people who take the lead in instigating their fellow citizens into a frenzy of 
moral rectitude. Once worked up, however, the crowd takes matters into its own brutish hands 
and finds many ways to exact penalties from the identified wrongdoers” (Peirce, 2019). 
 
European governments’ actions, particularly those of the UK government, are therefore two-
pronged: on the one hand shareholder rights are being improved, which is very LME, but on 
the other hand, there is an expectation that shareholders are to be longer-term stewards of the 
wider economy, which is very CME. This is why the influence of asset manager capitalism on 
the varieties of capitalism is complex. Implicitly the assumption in the comparative political 
economy literature is that an increase in shareholder power represents a move towards the LME 
model. However, due to a mixture of government legislation and public pressure, European 
asset managers are shown to use their increased power in part to give a greater voice to other 
stakeholders. The fact that shareholders in Germany or the UK have gained additional levers 
of control, such as say-on-pay votes, should therefore not be interpreted to confirm an 
Americanisation of the UK and German varieties of capitalism. 
 
Interviewees explained that the result of the US regulator’s approach is that “most of the US 
resolutions are asking for the sort of governance reforms that have been established in Europe 
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through other means such as the Governance Code”.130 This is why “the higher level of 
rejection [of management proposals] in the US is a sign of the [worse] quality of corporate 
governance there”.131 Interviewees also highlighted the importance of better board access as it 
enables investors to take a less prescriptive approach on other governance issues. “In the UK 
access to the board enables a subtler approach to engagement”.132 The result of this is that 
“corporates in the UK do not take personal offence when you vote against them, this used to 
be the case”.133  
 
In Germany, on the other hand, interviewees noted that both sides were still learning how to 
adapt to the new expectations for joint-stewardship and that resources were still in the process 
of being allocated.134 “The challenge is that German managers will turn up with lawyers, their 
general counsel, to a governance meeting. But many governance discussions are not well suited 
for formal discussions. […] Issues are often not black or white but grey”.135 There is therefore 
“much more to do outside the UK. Engagement in the UK is mature, far more investors do it, 
there are more opportunities to engage, there is good board access in the UK, down to the 
individual board members”.136 
 
“The UK code often has a ripple effect across the market […] What shows up in the UK today 
will often be in other markets in the next five years”.137 For example, “lots of items can be 
voted on in the UK” already today, “in Europe this will likely also change with the introduction 
 
130 Executive, proxy advisor, email exchange, 1st of April 2014. 
131 Corporate Governance Analyst, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 of April 2018.   
132 Ibid. 
133 Corporate governance analyst, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15th of April 2015. 
134 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 16 February 2018. 
     Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 8 June 2018.  
135 Corporate Governance Analyst, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 of April 2018.   
136 Two corporate governance experts, UK Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 25th of September 2018.  
137 Rakhi Kumar, head of State Street Global Advisor’s asset stewardship team, quoted in the Financial Times,  
     “State Street tells boards to focus on corporate culture”. 15 January 2019. 
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of the SRD II”.138 The Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD) of the European Union, initially 
introduced in 2007 (SRD I), seeks to improve shareholder rights. This was followed in 2017 
by the SRD II, which “aims at encouraging long-term engagement of EU listed companies’ 
shareholders” (Deloitte, 2019: 1) in a similar way to the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
the UK Stewardship Code. It targets companies, proxy advisors and institutional investors and 
seeks to improve the general voting process, particularly with regards to directors’ 
remuneration. This therefore is evidence that both the UK and the European Union are pursuing 
the aforementioned two-pronged approach to governance reform, increasing both shareholder 
power, while simultaneously instructing how that additional power is to be employed. 
 
As Chapter 7 will show, the approach that governments take on regulation is of considerable 
relevance for how corporates react to shareholder pressures. In the US companies will often 
turn to the SEC to have shareholder proposals thrown out before they can even be put to a 
shareholder vote.139 In Germany and the UK on the other hand, governments have made it clear 
to varying degrees that they expect shareholders and managers to jointly steward the firm. As 
regards internationalisation, regulation can therefore both advance and inhibit the influence it 
has over corporate governance in any one country.  
 
 
The intent to bring about change 
In general, the interviews showed that rather than seeking to enforce their vision of governance 
on the world, asset managers sought to take a measured and balanced approach, recognising 
 
138 Two corporate governance experts, UK Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 25th of September 2018.  
139 Rule 14a-8(i)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the “ordinary business” exception, permits a company 
to exclude a proposal that “deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations”. For further 
details see: https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/staff-legal-bulletin-14k-shareholder-proposals (Accessed 10 March 
2020). 
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both local practices as well as their own policy preferences. In fact, there was only one asset 
management firm (based in Germany) who claimed to follow a single global best-practice 
approach to corporate governance.140 None of the big US firms did so. Even that German firm 
qualified this statement by remarking that their policy is “more or less global”, but that it takes 
into account local differentiation if there are legal differences or if ownership and control 
structures are different, such as in Asia.141  
 
Nevertheless, there was still a noted difference in UK, German and US investors’ approach to 
stewardship. Starting with US investors, the previous chapter already discussed the fact that 
the Big Three do not file shareholder proposals. Vanguard further underlines its hands-off 
approach to governance in its policy documents by stating that “We don’t: Chase trendy fads 
or name and shame companies in the media” and “We don’t: Offer opinions on company 
strategy, seek to influence it” (2019c: 9) as well as “We don’t: Nominate directors or seek 
board seats, submit shareholder proposals” (2019c: 11). Comparing these statements to the 
policy options available to institutional investors (Figure 1, Page 4), suggests that Vanguard is 
ruling out engaging in all but the gentlest forms of stewardship.  
 
 
Table 7: Percentage of proposals voted with management 
 
Source: BlackRock, Vanguard, annual stewardship reports 
 
 
140 Corporate Governance Analyst, German Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 20th of March 2018.   
141 Corporate Governance Analyst, German Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 9th of April 2018.  
     Different governance expert at same asset manager as in footnote 13. 
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The results of this approach are illustrated in Table 7, which shows the voting decisions for 
BlackRock and Vanguard by region (State Street does not report region-level data). What 
becomes apparent from the above data is that BlackRock and Vanguard provide similarly very 
high levels of support to management in Europe (92.1 percent) as in the US (93.1 percent). 
This data is for all shareholder proposals, so includes routine proposals on director elections. 
But even if we break this data down and look only at proposals submitted by shareholders, 
regional differences are hard to make out. Vanguard, for example, supported an average of 4.6 
percent of shareholder proposals on environmental and social issues submitted at US 
companies in the three years from 2017-2019, compared to 1.4 percent at European companies.  
 
The stewardship activities of the Big Three in Europe therefore do not notably differ from their 
US stewardship activities discussed in the previous chapter. As in the US, there is no observable 
intent to bring about change, and the proxy voting and stewardship activities of the Big Three 
therefore provide European corporates with a degree of insulation against the policies advanced 
by other shareholders. The level of overall insulation is, however, diminished by the fact that 
the Big Three on average hold smaller voting blocs in European companies. The 
internationalisation of the asset management industry from this perspective therefore does not 
result in an Americanisation of the corporate governance models of the UK and Germany. 
 
Amongst the US active investor base, particularly from pension funds, there was a noticeably 
more engaged approach to stewardship (than from the Big Three). Whereas the European 
approach tends to focus on individual companies, two state pension funds described how they 
sought to select thematic priorities, such as better access to company boards, and to work with 
asset managers to target a large number of corporates simultaneously (with one coordinated 
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campaign).142 One such example is provided by the New York state pension funds, which under 
the “Boardroom Accountability Project”, of which there have now been three iterations, has 
sought to tackle a number of issues.143 In the “Project 1.0” the funds submitted shareholder 
proposals at 75 companies at once in the fall of 2014 in order to demand “proxy access” bylaws. 
These bylaws provide shareholders with the right to nominate a limited number of company 
directors.  
 
Launched in September 2017, “Project 2.0” targeted 151 companies simultaneously, this time 
focussing on board diversity and climate competence. In the third campaign, launched in 
October 2019, 56 letters were sent to US companies demanding further board diversity 
improvements. However, all companies targeted in the three projects were US companies, 
meaning that their relevance for internationalisation and Americanisation of European 
corporate governance is limited. Instead these US investors’ relevance is in the US corporate 
governance context, where their policy preferences often align with those of European 
investors and proxy advisors.  
 
Moving to Europe, one major difference between German and UK index funds and their US 
peers is that in Europe the majority of index funds are provided by asset managers that operate 
much larger active platforms. Their active funds should ensure that the European asset 
managers are incentivised to engage with their portfolio companies as they retain the ability to 
generate active outperformance with such engagement. The more frequent contacts that come 
with being an active asset manager, from management roadshows, conference visits and analyst 
 
142 Governance expert, US pension fund, in-person interview, 24 April 2015. 
     Governance expert, US pension fund, telephone interview, 24 July 2019. 
143 For a history of the three Boardroom Accountability Projects to date, see: 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/services/financial-matters/boardroom-accountability-project/overview/ (Accessed 10 
March 2020). 
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days, should also ensure that these institutions as a whole have a greater awareness of their 
portfolio companies’ activities.  
 
In the UK the largest asset manager, Legal & General Investment Management (LGIM) has 
£1.1 trillion in AuM, of which £390 billion (35 percent) are managed in index strategies.144 
Many of these index assets, however, are from pension schemes that are coming to an end, 
leading to outflows from LGIM’s index business. Legal and General (2019) explains that “[f]or  
the  past  several  years  we have  had  consistent net outflows  from  our  UK  DB  index  funds  
and  we expect this  trend  to continue as many clients transition into LDI strategies where we 
are well positioned to retain the assets’.145 As regard new retail index funds, LGIM only entered 
the ETF market with the acquisition of ETF Securities’ platform in November 2017, and only 
launched a list of core products one year later in November 2018.146 As of 30 June 2019, 
LGIM’s ETF platform managed a mere £2.4 billion in AuM, equating to just 0.2 percent of its 
overall AuM.  
 
DWS (Deutsche Bank’s asset manager, and the owner of the Xtracker ETF brand) is both 
Germany’s largest asset manager and ETF provider and the second largest ETF provider in 
Europe after BlackRock’s iShares.147 But even for the biggest European domiciled provider of 
index funds, the index equity assets (at 13 percent) are only equal to those of active equity 
assets (at 12 percent). Those figures look only at pure equity mandates and exclude a further 
17 percent of AuM that DWS manages in active multi-asset mandates (the balance of DWS’ 
assets is in fixed income funds). The second largest asset managers in the UK and Germany, 
 
144 https://www.lgim.com/uk/ad/capabilities/index/ (Accessed 1 March 2020). 
145 LDI refers to a liability-driven approach to investment, in which such pension plans are likely to allocate a 
higher proportion of assets to bonds as they approach maturity. 
146 https://www.ft.com/content/7ad4db3e-e610-3a23-91ea-a4ced6c5b84a (Accessed 1 March 2020). 
147 https://www.statista.com/statistics/274218/leading-players-on-the-etf-market-in-europe/ (Accessed 1 March 
2020). 
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Insight and AGI respectively, do not have any ETF offerings of their own. AGI’s entire 
branding is centred around the slogan “Active is: Allianz Global Investors”, and the company 
reports 0 percent passive equity assets in the UN PRI database.148 Active equity assets therefore 
continue to dominate the European landscape.   
 
Unlike the Big Three, many UK and German index investors (who mostly are the same as 
active investors) are seeking to bring change by adopting a measured approach to engagement 
in order to achieve results, meaning that any pressure to convergence will be moderate and 
only show up over the long term: “Governance is very local; it is rooted in culture and has a 
historical context. In order to be relevant, you need to understand this. It is a question of how 
you bring effective change. If you are highly principled and have preconceptions of how things 
should be done, you might not be able to bring change”.149  
 
A macro analysis of the global proxy voting behaviour of the three largest US, UK and German 
asset managers reveals that the largest German investors on average voted 73.3 percent of all 
proposals in favour of management, compared to UK investors on 86.4 percent, and US 
investors on 90.0 percent.150 This already shows that the three largest German and UK investors 
are on average more critical than the Big Three. The next section will zoom in on this macro 
analysis to show that the contrast between the voting behaviour of UK and German investors 
compared to US investors is much more distinctive when considering only environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) proposals submitted by shareholders. 
 
148 https://uk.allianzgi.com/en-gb/adviser/our-firm (Accessed 1 March 2020). 
For the UN PRI reports, see: https://reporting.unpri.org/surveys/PRI-reporting-framework-2019/F2924091-
B95F-4DD6-8812-15B224A98117/6c78c45b1e874fbaa7011f6a3bae511e/html/2/?lang=en&a=1 (Accessed 1 
March 2020). 
149 Corporate Governance Analyst, UK fund management company, telephone interview, 25 September 2018.  
150 Data from 2019 UN PRI Transparency Reports. Available at: 
https://www.unpri.org/signatories/transparency-reports-2019/4506.article (Accessed 6 March 2020). 
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Finally, an issue that is becoming of increasing relevance and may soon change the behaviour 
of the Big Three is the concept of social license to operate. Asset managers, like all companies, 
are required to maintain a social license to operate (Morrison, 2014; Gjølberg, 2009; Porter and 
Kramer, 2006; Gunningham et al., 2006; Post et al., 2002). In a democratic capitalist society, 
failure to do so may result in consumer boycotts, worker strikes and ultimately in calls for 
stricter regulation. In today’s connected world, consumers and activists are better informed 
than ever before. As asset management firms have grown in size, they have become household 
names.  Concurrently society’s understanding of their business model, its profitability, and its 
latent power has expanded.  
 
The end result is that society’s expectations of asset managers continues to grow, increasingly 
seeing their social license to operate challenged. Evidence of this can already be seen with 
activists protesting at the AGM of BlackRock, protesting outside BlackRock’s office, and in 
one instance even occupying and vandalising the Paris office of BlackRock.151 Activists hope 
that this increased pressure on asset managers to back up their words (in the form of CEO 
letters) with actions (in the form of proxy voting) may result in a more critical consideration of 
shareholder proposals in the future. They are seeking to “stop the money pipeline” by which 
the financial sector is “funding, insuring, and investing in the climate crisis”.152 
 
 
The direction of influence 
One of the biggest differences to become apparent between engagement practices of US asset 
managers when compared to UK and German asset managers is the relevance attributed to 
 
151 For further details, see: https://www.ft.com/content/2a27f446-4f15-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5 (Accessed 13 
April 2020). 
152 For further information, see: https://stopthemoneypipeline.com/ (Accessed 9 May 2020). 
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sustainability (often framed as ESG; Environmental, Social and Governance issues) when 
engaging in both the US and Europe. Data presented in this chapter will highlight that the Big 
Three provide little support for shareholder proposals and instead mostly support corporate 
management, whereas European investors support a far greater proportion of such shareholder 
proposals. Interviews showed that the reason for this is that European investors take a 
substantially more “integrated” approach to ESG issues.  
 
My interview questions did not specifically target sustainability issues. Instead they focussed 
on the nature of investor engagement with corporates, how this differed across countries, and 
how it had changed over the years. Yet repeatedly the discussions with both investors and 
corporates turned towards sustainability. In this regard, both investors and corporates noted 
that sustainability plays a much greater role in Europe.153 The data presented in this chapter is 
of relevance for the varieties of capitalism discussion because it suggests that European 
investors are the agents of change within asset manager capitalism and that, therefore, the rise 
of the asset management sector cannot be equated to an Americanisation of international 
governance models.  
 
This section will document significant differences in the voting behaviour of the biggest 
German and UK domiciled investors when compared to the largest US investor. The large UK 
and German asset managers are far more likely to support shareholder proposals concerning 
environmental and social issues than their US peers. The argument that will be made is that 
because such issues have been traditionally considered to be stakeholder concerns, they are 
 
153 Chief Financial Officer, Head of Human Resources and Head of Investor Relations, US company, telephone  
    interview, 23rd of April 2018. 
    Corporate governance expert, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 12th of June 2018. 
    Investor relations, US Company, telephone interview, 3rd of July 2018. 
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advancing aspect of corporate governance more commonly associated with the CME model 
than LME models. However, it does have to be noted that traditional conceptions of CME 
models do not engage with environmental issues. The environment is traditionally not 
considered to be a stakeholder (Phillips and Reichart, 2000) and it is therefore necessary to 
illustrate the relevance of ESG shareholder proposals for the varieties of capitalism.  
 
Environmental as well as social shareholder proposals are relevant indicators for the varieties 
of capitalism as they provide insights into the extent to which corporations, as well as their 
shareholders, pursue a strategy focussed on shareholder value maximisation versus one that 
takes a broader account that also incorporates negative externalities such as pollution. As 
regards corporate managers, a greater consideration of environmental considerations implies a 
management style that comprises a greater degree of cooperation. Also, taking account of the 
environment typically entails giving greater weight to the concerns of employees and the local 
community. From the perspective of the shareholder, the fact that many environmental issues, 
particularly global warming, have material financial consequences mostly in the long-term, 
suggests that asset managers’ support for such proposals provides an indication for the extent 
of their investment horizons. Longer investment horizons and greater patience typically being 
associated with CME models.  
 
Patience by itself must not, however, always be positive. If it merely serves to isolate corporate 
managers, as many of the Big Three voting decisions to date have done, corporate investment 
horizons will not necessarily be extended. Therefore, for index investors’ implicitly infinite 
investment horizon to translate into longer investee company investment horizons, 
governments must assist in creating the necessary institutions. The most fundamental of these 
is fostering an interpretation of fiduciary duty that challenges asset managers to conceive of 
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their role as one of universal owners and “stewards of the commons” (Serafeim, 2018). Doing 
this will prompt asset managers to ensure that their more patient provision of funds is matched 
by corresponding changes to business strategy. Regarded from the perspective of the varieties 
of capitalism, this adjustment to fiduciary duty supports the continued functioning of 
complementarities between corporate governance and other spheres such as employee relations 
continue to exist.  
 
A report by the shareholder activism NGO As You Sow questions whether fund managers are 
“asleep at the wheel” and notes that “[t]he largest fund managers – particularly BlackRock […] 
opt to vote against only a very few of the CEO pay packages, and their votes are hard to 
understand” (2020: 4). The end of the report lists asset managers by the level of opposition to 
the Top-100 most overpaid CEOs and shows that Aberdeen Standard Life opposed 81 percent 
of these, LGIM 65 percent, DWS 34 percent and AGI 93 percent. Compared to the largest UK 
and German investors, the Big Three have strikingly lower levels of opposition, of just 8 
percent from BlackRock, 10 percent from Vanguard and 15 percent from State Street. 
 
Table 8: Largest Asset Managers and their voting behaviour on shareholder proposals 
 
Source: Majority Action (2019). 
 
A second report shows that UK and German investors’ opposition to corporate interests extends 
beyond CEO pay to include environmental concerns. Table 8 above documents the striking 
difference between the three largest asset managers in the UK and Germany (average support 
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of 82 percent of climate-critical resolutions) and the three largest US asset managers (backing 
on average just 16.3 percent). The report on climate action by the non-profit Majority Action 
(2019) notes that “across all 41 resolutions [at US companies], PIMCO, BNP Paribas, DWS 
Group, and Legal & General most consistently voted in favor of these resolutions, voting in 
support more than 95% of the time. By contrast, Vanguard, BlackRock, J.P. Morgan and 
Prudential154 demonstrated the lowest level of support for these resolutions, voting for them 
less than 15% of the time” (2019: 17). The four institutions with the greatest support for climate 
proposals are all European-owned, while the bottom four are all US owned.155  
 
A third, and final, example underscoring the different approaches of US and European 
investors is provided by the March 2020 study conducted by the NGO ShareAction. The report 
(ShareAction, 2020) assesses the responsible investment approaches of the world’s 75 largest 
asset managers and analyses their performance on stewardship, transparency and governance. 
The ratings scale ranges from AAA (which no asset manager achieved) to E.156 State Street and 
BlackRock were each rated D with Vanguard receiving an E rating. Only five asset managers 
achieved an A rating, all were from Europe. Dividing the 75 asset managers by region, shows 
that European asset managers on average received a rating of CCC compared to US investors 
three notches lower on D. On an asset-weighted basis the difference is even larger, with 
European asset managers receive an average B rating, while US investors receive an average 
rating four notches lower at D. 
 
 
154 Prudential Financial Inc. is a US financial services firm, which is not related to the British insurer Prudential 
PLC.  
155 I use the term owned rather than domiciled due to the inclusion of Pimco in this list. Pimco is majority US 
based but owned by the German insurer Allianz. 
156 The ratings scale is as follows: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D, E. 
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As the above examples on environmental shareholder proposals (Majority Action, 2019), 
executive pay (As You Sow, 2020) and overall ESG stewardship (ShareAction, 2020) 
demonstrate, European investors are substantially more supportive of social and environmental 
shareholder proposals and more critical of management pay than the Big Three. Because some 
of the issues supported by UK and German investors have been traditionally considered to be 
stakeholder concerns, they are advancing aspect of corporate governance more commonly 
associated with the CME model. Since UK and German investors represent comparatively 
larger voting blocs in their respective domestic markets, their stewardship activities are 
ensuring that the rise of the asset management sector has to date not resulted in an 
Americanisation of corporate governance.  
 
Corporates repeatedly noted the distinction between the attitudes of European and US investors 
towards issues of sustainability, remarking that it was a “European thing” and that it was 
“harder to sell” certain governance components such as a combined role for the CEO and 
Chairman to European investors.157 A large US corporate noted a new focus in recent years on 
diversity, the environment and expense disclosure, “here it’s definitively more the European 
investors, especially on environmental issues”.158 A UK asset manager explained “we try to 
keep on the pressure, not just on emissions, but broader on sustainable business models more 
generally”.159 
 
Asset managers could therefore exhibit some of the same national variations as reported 
between banks in the varieties of capitalism framework. One US corporate summed up the 
 
157 Investor relations, US Company, telephone interview, 3rd of July 2018. 
158 Chief Financial Officer, Head of Human Resources and Head of Investor Relations, US company, telephone 
interview, 23rd of April 2018.  
159 Corporate governance analyst, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 25 September 2018.  
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difference between investors as follows: “In New York you get asked about the prospects for 
the next 90 minutes, maybe the next 90 days. In London its perhaps the next year, in continental 
Europe it’s the next 5 years”.160 
 
 
The resource levels and the focus on domestic stewardship 
Chapter 3 highlighted the enormous resource and time constraints associated with voting and 
engaging with the large modern-day portfolios of most asset managers. Asset managers have 
recently started responding to this challenge by expanding their stewardship teams. As a result, 
the average headcount of index funds’ stewardship teams increased from just 7 in 2014 to 18 
in 2018 (Willis Towers Watson, 2019). Unfortunately, there is no data on the historical regional 
split of headcounts, but Vanguard only established its European stewardship team in London 
in 2018 and State Street only created the role of Head of EMEA for Asset Stewardship in 
2017.161 To put this into perspective, this means that much of the European governance 
infrastructure of the Big Three has only been established after I began this PhD. 
 
BlackRock, the only one of the Big Three that reports on London-based headcount, explains 
that “all companies listed in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, are voted by the team in 
London, regardless of where the portfolio manager is based or the client funds originated” 
(2019g: 12). As of 2019, BlackRock’s London stewardship team consists of 11 people, up from 
10 in 2018. That team of 11 therefore voted on 46,598 proposals at 3,347 company meetings 
and held approximately 550 engagement meetings during 2019 (BlackRock, 2019a). An online 
 
160 Corporate secretary, head of investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22nd of February 2018. 
161 See https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/vanguard-opens-london-office-20081110 and 
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/news/3026880/vanguard-hires-european-investment-
stewardship-head and https://newsroom.statestreet.com/press-release/corporate/state-street-global-advisors-
grows-esg-and-corporate-governance-team-globall (Accessed 10 March 2020) 
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presentation by State Street from 2018 lists a team of 10 governance staff globally, of which 
just 2 appear to be based in London.162 Investor relations at a large German corporate “cannot 
remember at all to ever have received any queries from the US”. She did, however, qualify this 
statement by adding that BlackRock and Vanguard have teams in London and other US 
investors have representatives in Frankfurt and Paris.163 
 
To handle the workload with this relatively small team, State Street’s employs a proprietary 
model to alert it to companies that are falling behind. This approach focusses on identifying 
companies that fail to comply with regional codes of best practice. This thus gives regional 
best-practice standards, developed with input from domestic as well as international investors, 
an important role in deciding which companies State Street engages with. “In order to monitor 
compliance with these various governance codes, we have developed principles-based 
compliance screens for our key markets in the US, UK, Australia and Europe. These screens 
enable us to proactively monitor compliance with the appropriate market governance codes 
and to address any concerns with governance practices” (State Street, 2019: 59). The reference 
to regional governance codes thus contributes to mitigating the potential for index funds such 
as State Street to advance the Americanisation of international corporate governance regimes.  
 
The geographical distribution of asset managers’ assets plays a significant role in determining 
the degree to which asset managers will engage. While BlackRock has a similarly commanding 
market share in Europe and the US, the previous chapter has shown that both Vanguard and 
State Street have considerably smaller holdings in Europe than in the US. The result of this is, 
for example, that Vanguard reported that 86 percent of its engagements were with US based 
 
162 Source: https://19of32x2yl33s8o4xza0gf14-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019-02-13-RM-
ELECTRONIC-FOLDER-1.pdf (Accessed 28 February 2020). 
163 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 20th of June 2018. 
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companies, despite “only” 76 percent of their assets being invested there (Vanguard, 2018). On 
an asset-weighted basis Vanguard engaged with 67 percent of their assets in the US but only 
with 47 percent of their assets in Europe (Vanguard, 2019b). State Street (2019) reports that in 
2018 US domiciled companies represented 65 percent of their engagement efforts, while UK 
companies represented 8 percent, and Europe (ex. UK) a further 13 percent. 
 
Despite British and German investors’ greater desire to bring about change and their greater 
degree of policy divergence, they too are faced with resource constraints. Due to their relatively 
smaller size, these investors have lower absolute budgets, though the relatively greater 
importance of active assets (with its higher fees) does help to offset some of the cost pressure. 
Table 9 below shows the average headcount at some of the largest asset managers in each 
category. This table shows the relative size of the largest stewardship teams in the US (24 
people) and UK (19) when compared to those at German asset managers (10). Size here 
definitively plays a role, with the largest German asset manager DWS being approximately 
half the size as the largest UK asset manager LGIM (in terms of AuM).  
 
Table 9: Stewardship headcounts by investor type and location 
 
Source: Interviews, company websites, Financial Times.164 
 
164 The UK investment manager Hermes is a special case. Hermes, which has its roots in the Post Office and 
British Telecom pension schemes, has become both an asset manager for third-party assets as well as a stewardship 
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These staffing levels suggest, for example, that while DWS’ proxy voting decisions are 
challenging US corporates, they are likely to be unable to support these with substantial behind 
the scenes engagement in the US. This impression is confirmed by an examination of DWS 
(2019) engagement report, which shows that DWS attend the AGMs of 16 investee companies 
to make speeches, of these 14 were at German companies (and one each in the Netherlands and 
Italy). Speeches are one of the most intense engagement levels, and one particularly favoured 
by German asset managers. Union Investment made 15 such AGM speeches at German 
companies and explained that they prefer such open engagements to “backroom conversations” 
which are “not very transparent”.165 
 
DWS (2019) furthermore reports that it engaged with only 35 companies (representing 26 
percent of total engagements) in the US compared to 61 (46 percent) in Germany and 7 in the 
UK. Similar engagement biases are also visible at other US, German and UK asset managers. 
The German asset manager AGI (2019) reported that 17% of its engagements were with 
German companies, 24 percent with UK (the team is primarily located in London), and only 
17 percent with US companies. LGIM (2019) similarly reports that 48% of the companies they 
met with were based in the UK.  
 
Asked whether it is a fair assumption to say that the further away from home a holding is the 
less likely they are to engage, a German asset manager replied that “the holdings in Germany 
 
advisor for external mandates through its Hermes Equity Ownership Services (EOS). In the case of Hermes EOS, 
the assets sit with other asset managers but investors, particularly pension funds, have given the mandate to engage 
to Hermes EOS. Hermes (2019) reports £33.5 billion in AuM and £389.5 billion in assets under stewardship, 
meaning that its stewardship services represent more than ten times as many assets as its asset manager. This 
makes Hermes unique, because it is managing the voice of a large number (637) of clients from 28 countries, 
collectively representing 29 million current and future pensioners and savers (Hermes, 2019). This is why Hermes 
is listed in this table as “UK Advisory” 
165 Interview with Ingo Speich, former head of corporate governance at Union Investment. Available at: 
https://www.ecoreporter.de/artikel/aktives-engagement-bei-union-investment-hinterzimmer-gespraeche-sind-
wenig-transparent-18-09-2017/ (Accessed 1 March 2020). 
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are more significant when considered as a percentage of the companies in question. Besides 
this the level of engagement is determined by where our people sit. The ESG team 
predominantly sits in Europe. Also, the fundamental active PMs [portfolio managers] sit 
mainly in Europe, so that is why they will engage more there”.166 
 
Investors’ domestic focus helps to explain why a German company that has had substantial 
environmental and governance issues in recent years reported that it had no interactions with 
foreign investors on corporate governance issues, only with domestic investors and 
associations of retail investors.167 With resource capacities and allocation considerations 
limiting many asset managers’ foreign stewardship activities, there was some evidence that 
asset managers sought to learn from one another across markets, with one asset manager 
reporting that they would reach out to US investors to get their insights on new US policy 
proposals, French investors on French policy changes, etc.168 
 
Overall, my interviews supported the above engagement data, showing that engagement 
beyond proxy voting is to date primarily (but not exclusively) a domestic exercise, focused on 
the largest companies in each country. This is because domestic companies typically represent 
investors’ largest holdings, both in terms of the percentage of the funds’ assets and in 
percentage of the companies’ outstanding shares. These engagement considerations are driven 
in part by a resource constraint on behalf of the asset manager as well as financial 
considerations (costs to the fund versus benefit of voting). Investors therefore reported 
introducing minimum voting thresholds, such as 0.3 percent of the shares outstanding of any 
 
166 Corporate Governance Analyst, German Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 9th of April 2018.  
167 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 20th of June 2018.  
168 Corporate Governance Analyst, German Asset Manager, Telephone Interview, 9th of April 2018.  
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company, that had to be met before exercising their voting rights.169 Such thresholds mean that 
in many cases German and UK investors will not even vote at US companies.170 The point to 
come out of this is that investors are generally targeting their engagement where they think 
they can have an impact, rather than necessarily where they have the greatest financial interest. 
 
As will be further elaborated on in Chapter 7, corporates reported engagement primarily from 
their domestic investors and only rarely from international shareholders. Confrontations 
between investors and their domestic corporations are most likely to gain the attention of the 
investors’ domestic press and thus their local customer base.171 Furthermore, in countries such 
as the UK, where the government has enlisted asset managers to steward their portfolio 
companies, there may be litigation risk if asset managers fail to give their portfolio companies 
sufficient attention. Since the UK government will be primarily concerned with the conduct of 




The Voting Power 
The final dimension of asset managers’ stewardship efforts is the size of their voting blocs in 
their respective portfolio companies. Voting blocs in turn are, of course, a function of the size 
of an asset manager’s shareholdings, which are also a crucial determinant of an asset manager’s 
 
169 Senior portfolio manager, German asset manager, telephone interview, 21 March 2018. 
170 Ibid. 
171 This finding is in line with Dimson et al. (2018) who note that investors are more likely to lead coordinated 
engagement when the firms are domestic and that the success rates are also elevated when the lead investor is 
domestic. 
172 See the following link for a summary of the UK Parliament’s questioning of the shareholders of Carillion, 
following the UK service company’s collapse: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/work-and-pensions-committee/news-parliament-2017/carillion-letters-17-19/ (Accessed 19 
October) 
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engagement budget and thus the size of its stewardship team. Table 10 below presents 
approximations of the voting power (percentage of shares held) of different types of investors 
in the US, the UK and Germany. The table shows how domestic investors in each of the three 
countries continue to represent the largest voting bloc. The purpose of this section is to 
highlight the degree to which proxy voting by foreign investors may enable them to play a role 
in other countries’ domestic governance discourses as well as to estimate the degree of 
insulation that certain groups of investors may be able to provide to domestic companies. 
 
Table 10: Approximation of institutional investors’ voting power by country  
 
Source: Federal Reserve, ONS, Bundesbank, Bloomberg. 
 
Starting with the US, the largest block of shares is held by US institutional investors. If we dig 
down into this data, then of that 51.9 percent, approximately 41 percentage points of this are 
held by investment funds, with approximately half in active and half in passive funds (Federal 
Reserve, 2019; Bloomberg 2019b). There is therefore a block of approximately 20 percent of 
shares, representing approximately 25 percent of the votes cast (taking account of 70-80 
percent voter participation), at the average US company that is cast by US index funds (see 
also Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019a; Fichtner et al., 2017).  
 
Table 10 further illustrates that with approximately 30 percent of the shares outstanding, US 
households continue to have sizeable shareholdings in US companies. Brav et al. (2019) show 
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that voter participation for this group is low, with just 32 percent of votes cast on average. 
Furthermore, they find that retail shareholders back management at a very high rate, for 
example, voting with management in 88.5 percent of all say-on-pay votes in 2017. US 
households may therefore be counted alongside index funds as shareholders likely to provide 
insulation to corporate managers.  
 
Chapter 3 showed that the Big Three hold approximately 12 percent of the outstanding shares 
of the average UK listed company, accounting for approximately 15 percent of all votes cast. 
Assuming UK households adhere to similar voting patterns to households in the US, this has 
the potential to increase the proportion of shares likely to vote with management by a further 
5 percent, for a total of approximately 20 percent. Corporates in the UK therefore enjoy a far 
lower level of insulation from active (and activist) shareholders than corporates in the US. 
Instead they are exposed to UK domestic institutional investors holding 29 percent of shares 
(equating to approximately 40 percent of cast votes) in addition to a further approximately 20 
percent of shares held by foreign, non-US, institutional investors. 
 
The relationship between differences in managerial autonomy, as those highlighted above, and 
the varieties of capitalism is that in principle active, and especially activist, investors could use 
this lower autonomy to push LME type changes. Indeed, the previous sections have shown that 
European investors are pushing for change, but instead of the LME type (shareholder value 
maximisation) it is of a more CME related nature. The agents of change are therefore the 
domestic active investors, not the Big Three, and they are not advancing an Americanisation 
of national models of capitalism.   
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For Germany Chapter 3 showed that the Big Three hold approximately 9.5 percent of the 
average shares in a German company, representing approximately 13.5 percent of all votes 
cast. Again, adding to this the shares held by German households (11.8 percent at a 
participation rate of 30 percent), increases the block of shares likely to vote with management 
to approximately 17 percent. Germany has a peculiarity in that even after the dismantling of 
Deutschland AG, considerable bloc holdings by founding families and their trusts remain. With 
18.3 percent of the average shares outstanding German non-financial investors therefore 
continue to play an important role. This 18.3 percent adjusted for the average voter turnout of 
70% equates to approximately 26 percent of the votes cast.  
 
However, employing averages in these cases is misleading as many companies will have no 
insider holdings while others, such as BMW (50 percent family holding), will have much 
higher insider ownership. If one were to add the 26 percent of non-financial investors to the 17 
percent of US index investors and German households, the resulting level of shareholders likely 
to vote with corporate management is approximately 43 percent. The more appropriate take 
away from all this is, however, that for many German companies the percentage of shareholders 
likely to vote with managers on the vast majority of all votes equates to approximately 17 
percent is even lower than the 20 percent in the UK. However, those companies with large 
insider holders will enjoy substantially higher levels of insulation from domestic and foreign 
shareholders.  
 
From an internationalisation perspective the consequences are two-fold. First, despite 
internationalisation, domestic investors in all three countries continue to play an important 
governance role. Second, US companies benefit from a comparatively large block of 
shareholders that are likely to vote the vast majority of all shares with them, thereby providing 
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a governance vacuum. Companies in the UK and Germany on the other hand are comparatively 
more exposed to shareholders seeking change to their corporate governance models. Yet since 
many of the policies being advocated by shareholders in the UK and the US are or relevance 
also to the interests of other stakeholders, the direction of the resulting impulse is in the 




This chapter started out by mapping the internationalisation of share ownership. The picture 
presented was one of growing foreign ownership levels in all three countries. Germany and the 
UK, each with just over half of all shares held by foreigners appeared particularly susceptible 
to foreign influence. An analysis of the structure of the asset management industry further 
confirmed that US asset managers dominated industry league tables by AuM and that the size 
of the Big Three in particular dwarfed UK and German asset managers. Despite all of this 
suggesting that internationalisation will result in an Americanisation of corporate governance, 
this chapter has documented a very different reality. This is because this convergence in form, 
has not been matched by a convergence in function.  Despite an apparent homogenisation of 
the shareholder ownership structure in the US, the UK and Germany, governance in the latter 
two countries continues to operate substantially different. This is because asset managers 
continue to behave differently in different countries.  
 
Instead of being dominated by US investors, the governance dialogue in the UK and Germany 
is being led by domestic asset managers. These domestic asset managers are focussing their 
limited resources on where they have their biggest assets and where they expect to have the 
greatest impact, which for the most part is their domestic market. A second factor explaining a 
lack of Americanisation is the behaviour of the Big Three. Their voting records document the 
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same corporate-aligned voting behaviour as seen in the US. However, due to their relatively 
smaller voting blocs, they are unable to provide the same level of insulation that they provide 
for US companies. Furthermore, even though the Big Three have built out their stewardship 
teams, engagement in Europe remains underrepresented.  
 
As regards UK and German investors having influence in the US, the evidence is similarly 
scarce. With many focusing their more limited stewardship resources on their domestic 
markets, engagement beyond proxy voting in the US is limited. Proxy voting by both German 
and British investors does show a significantly more confrontational approach than for the big 
US asset managers, in particular the Big Three. However, the insulation that the Big Three 
provide to management, together with the minority of retail investors that do cast their votes, 
means that US corporates remain well insulated from the pressures of foreign shareholders.  
 
For the varieties of capitalism this means that the US remains relatively steady for now, though 
this appears to be a result of inertia rather than a stable self-reinforcing equilibrium. For the 
most part the signs are also that the German model of corporate governance remains largely 
unchanged as a result of internationalisation. There are minor signs that shareholders are having 
a greater say on certain issues, such as executive pay, but on the whole the way in which 
shareholders are increasingly using their voice is to amplify ESG concerns. Such ESG concerns 
are more consistent with traditional CME models than LME models as they are oftentimes 
aligned with the interests of other stakeholders. In the meanwhile, the governance model in the 
UK continues to evolve moderately, with some signs that the UK’s LME model is giving 
greater weight to stakeholder concerns previously associated with CME models such as seen 
in Germany, thereby causing a moderate divergence between the UK and US models of 
corporate governance.  
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Chapter 5  
Proxy Advisors  
Introduction 
The growing internationalisation and indexation of investment management have left most 
asset managers with stock holdings in a very large number of companies, spread across many 
countries. The institutionalisation of shareholder ownership has furthermore ensured that these 
assets are managed by institutions that are subject to rules that oblige them to consider the use 
of the voting rights attached to their shareholdings. Together the trends presented in the 
preceding four chapters have therefore created the need for a voting solution that enables 
institutional investors to handle their voting responsibilities.  
 
Besides growing their in-house governance teams, most investors have hired advisors to help 
with the processing of their proxy voting items. Such ‘proxy advisors’ are “private firms that 
analyse corporate elections and advise investor clients on how to vote their shares” (Choi et 
al., 2010: 870). In practical terms, proxy advisors help asset managers keep track of all their 
shareholder meetings as well as the agenda points to be voted on, highlighting controversial 
issues and suggesting how to vote. Some proxy advisors also provide the electronic voting 
infrastructure to submit the votes as well as confirmations of voting records. The $1.2 trillion 
US asset manager T. Rowe Price explains:  
 
“We retain the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) to 
provide proxy advisory and voting services. These services include voting 
recommendations that are customized to conform with T. Rowe Price voting 
guidelines, as well as vote execution and regulatory reporting across the many 
markets globally where we invest. Last year, T. Rowe Price’s global proxy voting 
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activity included voting on 56,532 proposals – 55,561 management proposals and 
971 shareholder proposals – at 6,444 shareholder meetings. We cast votes at more 
than 5,000 portfolio companies in 79 countries. To perform these voting 
obligations, we rely on ISS to provide advisory and voting administration services 
that are accurate, timely, and objective” (T. Rowe Price, 2020).  
 
This indicates the scale of the challenge faced by large asset managers today. This chapter will 
explain the size of corporate governance teams this necessitates, even with the help of proxy 
advisors. Proxy advisors have come in for regulatory scrutiny in both Europe and the US, 
though the accompanying criticism from corporate interests has been much more ferocious in 
the US. Many corporates believe: “the majority of large [asset] managers are defaulting to these 
folks”.173 Yet proxy advisors disagree: “the mission is to empower clients to express their own 
views”.174Another proxy advisor stated “we are not the activist, we are here to enable the 
activist”.175 
  
This perception that it is proxy advisors and not shareholders that are making the proxy voting 
decision is what feeds the narrative of proxy advisors’ outsized influence. Since the two 
dominant proxy advisor firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, are both American firms and provide 
services in most countries, it could therefore also be tempting to see proxy advisors as 
supporting convergence by furthering Americanisation.176 This chapter will show, however, 
why this is not the case.  
 
173 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018.  
174 Former governance analyst, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020.  
175 Governance analyst, European proxy advisor, in-person meeting, 9 January 2020.  
176 On 17 November 2020, the German stock exchange Deutsche Börse announced the acquisition of an 80 
percent ownership in ISS from Genstar Capital for $1.8bn. It remains to be seen whether being majority owned 
by a European institution will impact ISS’s policy approach or the way in which it is perceived by corporates 
and investors. Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iss-m-a-deutsche-boerse/deutsche-boerse-to-buy-80-
of-iss-for-18-billion-idUSKBN27X2MJ (Accessed 18.11.2020).  
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The significance of proxy advisors for the corporate governance of firms results from the fact 
that they help investors overcome information and coordination problems. Proxy advisors are 
a solution to a resource constraint that affects smaller asset managers disproportionately. The 
influence of proxy advisors’ recommendations will therefore differ amongst asset managers 
within a country but also between countries, depending on the structure of the respective 
domestic asset management industries.  
 
Since asset management fees are much lower in index funds than active funds, the percentage 
of a country’s equity market held by index investors is a further point of relevance for proxy 
advisors’ influence (with the smaller index funds using proxy advisor services instead of 
expanding in-house corporate governance teams). Finally, since interviewees also 
acknowledged deferring to the advice of proxy advisors to a greater extent in foreign markets, 
the degree of foreign share ownership is also likely to be a factor in proxy advisors’ influence.177 
This finding is in-line with Schouten (2012) who finds that fund managers are approximately 
three times as likely to deviate from the recommendations of proxy advisors for domestic 
portfolio companies as they are for foreign holdings.  
 
In order to determine proxy advisors’ influence on corporate governance, it is therefore 
necessary to consider the degree of institutionalisation, the structure of the domestic asset 
management industry, as well as the degree of indexation and internationalisation of a given 
market. The fact that these issues were all addressed in relation to the asset management 
industry in the preceding chapters is telling about the central role that proxy advisors play: 1) 
 
177 ESG portfolio manager, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15 April 2015. 
     Governance expert, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 16 April 2015. 
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they focus investors’ voice and 2) their influence is entirely relational, deriving from the advice 




The aim of this chapter is first to ascertain the scope of proxy advisor influence, and second to 
investigate the nature of their influence. It is impossible to discuss proxy advisors without at 
least touching on the criticism levelled at them from corporate quarters. This chapter will 
therefore help set the scene for the following chapter, which discusses how corporates are 
responding to the rise of the asset management industry.  
 
Based on the interview data collected, the following arguments will be made in this chapter: 
First, proxy advisors help investors, particularly resourced-constrained smaller asset managers, 
overcome coordination problems. They therefore represent a second governance authority 
alongside the Big Three index funds. Second, the authority of proxy advisors is entirely 
relational, stemming from their relationship as advisors to institutional investors. Third, the 
governance policies of proxy advisors and the voting decisions made by the Big Three show 
considerable differences, especially with regards to social, environmental and political 
shareholder proposals.  
 
 
The creation of the Proxy Advisor Industry 
In total I spoke to three founders of proxy advisor agencies. One described how the original 
plan for ISS was to be a consultant to institutional investors, helping them to file shareholder 
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proposals and become activists.178 This idea, however, was a dead end, as asset managers had 
no interest in becoming activists. Instead investors explained that they required help with the 
handling of their proxy voting workload. Furthermore, the founders decided that the business 
model of a proxy advisor was far more attractive than running a consultancy for two reasons: 
First, one could sell the same piece of research to multiple clients, and second, unlike with 
investment research, clients would want other clients to read the same research for only if the 
majority voted the same way could they have success. 
 
Up until 1984 all the votes were relatively standard, concerning the re-election of directors and 
auditors. Then from 1985 onwards three factors came together to create the demand for proxy 
advisor services.179 First, corporate raiders such as Michael Milken put fear into entrenched 
corporate management teams who responded by proposing a raft of poison pill proposals to 
prevent hostile takeovers of their companies.180 What then became apparent is that asset 
managers were voting with corporate executives virtually all the time and that this was the 
result of serious conflicts of interest. Corporates were threatening to pull pension fund 
mandates if asset managers did not vote their shareholdings in support of corporate 
management. In a 1985 report by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) quoted 
in a 1986 report by the U.S. Department of Labor, it was noted that 
  
“several individuals have reported […] that their institutions have moderated their 
opposition to anti-takeover charter amendments after they received pressure from 
 
178 Former executive, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020.  
179 Ibid.  
180 In response to a wave of takeovers in the 1980s, corporate executives sought to introduce various 
amendments to their corporate charter that would make it more difficult for their firms to be taken over without 
their consent (Davis, 1991). Such “poison pills” included, for example, “staggered boards” in which the terms 
that directors serve overlap with each other, so that there is no one year in which all directors were up for 
election and could be replaced by hostile shareholders.   
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clients. One insurance company reportedly changed its policy from voting against 
anti-takeover proposals to voting in favor of almost all. Another insurance company 
stopped reviewing proposals independently and instead switched to a policy of 
uncritical support. A third institution, a major bank, changed its policy from 
opposition to support of fair price proposals” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1986: 56). 
 
These findings were followed up in 1988 by the U.S. Department of Labor ruling that the proxy 
vote was as much part of the fiduciary responsibility as looking after the shareholdings from 
which they resulted. The rule never explicitly stated that it was compulsory for US investors to 
vote all of their shares, only to consider whether it was in the best interest of their fiduciaries, 
but it was nevertheless interpreted that way. With harmful poison pill proposals increasing, 
rules ensuring that investors voted, and awareness of the potential for conflicts of interest in 
proxy voting, institutional investors were eager to receive impartial voting advice.181  
 
A former executive of a European proxy advisor believes that the US ruling effectively 
compelled US investors over night to vote all of their shares. The downside to this is that they 
“never really developed a love affair with voting” and that this is why US corporate governance 
is struggling to mature to this day. In the UK on the other hand, the speed of regulatory 
development was more moderate, focussing initially on voting in the UK only. 182  
 
 
The Industry Structure 
Proxy advisors enjoy huge economies of scale. Rather than have hundreds of asset managers 
each individually employing a big staff, proxy advisors each have one large governance team 
 
181 Former executive, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
182 Former executive, European proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
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and can charge asset managers a fraction of the cost of processing all these voting items than 
if investors did all the work themselves. The structure of the proxy advisor industry is a likely 
outcome of the huge economies of scale, with pricing pressure from the fund management 
industry further compounding these. The fee pressure in the proxy advisor industry has led to 
criticism that the proxy voting industry produces the lowest product quality that fulfils 
investors’ regulatory requirements (Larcker et al., 2013).  
 
The proxy advisor industry is effectively a duopoly. Estimates of the combined market share 
of ISS and Glass Lewis range from 90 (Calluzzo and Dudley, 2015) to 97 percent (ESMA, 
2015). ISS is larger, with a 50 to 61 percent share. This highly concentrated market share has 
brought parallels with the influence of credit ratings agencies (Belinfanti, 2009). For one 
corporate: “ISS and Glass Lewis are the King and Queen of governance”.183 
 
ISS was founded in 1985 and covers about 44,000 meetings in 115 countries annually, it 
executes a total of 10.2 million ballots annually, representing 4.2 trillion shares for about 2,000 
clients, it does so with nearly 2,000 staff.184 Since ISS reported a staff of 700 in a 2014 press 
release this implies that ISS increased its staff by almost 200 percent in the past six years. Glass 
Lewis was founded in 2003 and according to its company website has more than 360 employees 
(still a small number considering the size of the task) and more than 1,300 clients representing 
assets under management in excess of $35 trillion.185 Glass Lewis has been an active 
consolidator in the industry; acquiring Sydney-based Corporate Governance (CGI) in 2006, 
Washington Analysis in 2008, and the German proxy advisor IVOX in 2015.  
 
 
183 Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018.  
184 ISS company website: https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss/ (Accessed 8 February 2020) 
185 Source: https://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/ (Accessed 15 November 2020) 
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The sheer number of institutional investors and corporates, each seeking to interact with one 
another, has created an industry of advisors (Figure 21). On the one side are investors who 
work with the aforementioned proxy advisors and on the other side are corporates, many of 
which reported employing the services of “proxy solicitors”. Proxy solicitors help companies 
to keep abreast of changes at the investor level, and one such proxy solicitor, IPREO, has 
developed a proxy advisor tracking score (PATS) to estimate the extent to which a given 
investor is likely to vote with the big proxy advisors (IPREO, 2017).    
 
Figure 21: The Proxy Landscape 
 
Source: author’s image.  
 
In Europe the market share of the two big proxy advisors is similarly dominant, though at a 
somewhat lower absolute level (approximately 10 percent less).186 “US based proxy advisors 
tend to have a more global presence and are also active in Europe, whereas European firms 
 
186 Former executive, European proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
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have a more national or regional focus” (ESMA 2012: 10). Examples of European proxy 
advisor firms are Minerva Analytics, PIRC and IVIS in the UK, Proxinvest in France and until 
2015 IVOX in Germany.187 IVIS and IVOX are examples of federations of institutional 
investors setting up their own, or working in close cooperation with, proxy advisors (the 
Association of British Insurers and the German asset management association BVI 
respectively). Using Germany as a setting, Heinen et al. (2018) suggest that the 
recommendations of local proxy advisors diverge further from those of ISS and GL than do the 
recommendations between ISS and GL.  
 
As is the case with index funds, a first-mover advantage operated in the industry (Tountopoulos 
and Veil, 2019). With the US capital market being the biggest in the world, this gave ISS a 
significant scale advantage versus European peers that were either launched later such as IVOX 
(launched in Germany in 2005) and/or were launched in smaller domestic markets such as 
PIRC (launched in 1986 in the UK). An interviewee felt that following its international 
expansion, ISS has been aggressively chasing global market share in order to attain critical 
mass. The problem for European proxy advisors is that this does not only mean that they 
struggle to get any share in the US, the US proxy advisors have also “destroyed” pricing in the 
European market. The result of this is that ISS was said to offer company reports for $7 to $8 
a piece when an appropriate price to cover costs should have been $30 to $40.188  
 
 
The Proxy Policy Formulation Process  
Proxy advisors typically provide two types of analysis services. The first is the provision of 
“benchmark policies”. These are proxy voting policies designed by the proxy advisors 
 
187 IVOX was acquired by Glass Lewis in June 2015. 
188 Former executive, European proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
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themselves on the basis of their respective policy formulation frameworks. In these policies the 
proxy advisors set out their views on what is and what is not good practice. The second type 
of proxy voting policy are “custom policies” which proxy advisors implement on the basis of 
policy documents provided by their clients. Here the voting decisions are based not directly off 
proxy advisors’ recommendations but on investors’ own in-house governance principles.  
 
ISS and Glass Lewis both report that at least 80 percent of the ballots they process follow 
custom policies. ISS furthermore reports that they have approximately 2,000 clients and more 
than 400 custom policies (20 percent), implying that the majority of large clients use custom 
policies while smaller clients mostly follow the benchmark policy (as 80 percent of ballots are 
processed with custom policies).189 A UK investor explained that having a “custom policy 
overlay is an essential part of what is means [for an investor] to have good governance”.190 
 
Each proxy advisor employs a proprietary policy formulation process for their benchmark 
policies. In this section I will outline the process followed by ISS, both because ISS is by far 
the largest proxy advisor and because they have responded to criticism regarding a lack of 
disclosure with a very detailed, publicly available, benchmark policy formulation framework. 
ISS reviews and updates its proxy voting guidelines annually. ISS divides its research into three 
regions: the Americas, EMEA (Europe/Middle East/Africa), and Asia-Pacific. Each region has 
its own proxy voting policies, which will be discussed below. The challenge for proxy advisors 
is to translate feedback into a proxy rule that a voting system can process. A graphical 
representation of ISS’ policy formulation process is given in Figure 22 below.191  
  
 
189 Sources: ISS company website as of 4 March 2020. ISS (2018) letter to US SEC. Glass Lewis CEO in 
testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process, minutes available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-
round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
190 Corporate governance expert, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 30 August 2018. 
191 https://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/policy-formulation-application/ (Accessed 4 March 2020). 
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Figure 22: ISS Policy Formulation & Application 
 
Source: ISS  
 
The policy review process starts with an “internal review of emerging and notable trends across 
global markets” which is based on data collected from investors and corporates throughout the 
year (ISS, 2019). Next, ISS sets up “policy committees” by governance topics and by region. 
These policy committees then compile the questions that are to be asked of investors and 
corporates as part of the annual survey and the roundtable discussions that make up the “policy 
outreach cycle”. While the policy survey is one global survey for everyone in all regions to 
participate, it does ask region-specific questions. The roundtables are also region-specific. 
 
“We also host a number of roundtables and what we call ‘fall briefings,’ where we 
literally go to various cities, not only in the United States but around the world, and 
have frank and open conversations with the institutional shareholders that 
essentially represent the vast majority of the equity holdings around the world. And 
 204 
we listen to what the issues are that they are facing, what matters to them, what has 
changed this year versus in the prior year. And we incorporate all that into our 
policy development process”.192  
 
Because of all the investor outreach that take place, ISS’ and Glass Lewis’ policy formulation 
frameworks function as consensus-building processes.193 “We bring institutions in together to 
talk about policy”.194 One of the two big proxy advisors explained that “everyone has input, but 
clearly BlackRock is more important than some random Swiss pension fund. Its logical that a 
large, world-wide present fund would carry more weight”.195 
 
Once the draft policy has been composed with the help of these resources, the draft policy is 
published online and investors, corporates and other stakeholders are given a two-week period 
to provide comments. Following this comment period, ISS’ analysts compile the final policy 
update in November. These policy frameworks, one for each region (plus many more for 
individual countries), will then be effective for shareholder meetings held after the 1st of 
February of the following year.  
 
 
How Asset Managers employ Proxy Advisors’ Services 
Besides the policy survey and the roundtables, proxy advisors further reduce coordination 
difficulties through the pre-season and post-season voting reports they produce. With these 
 
192 ISS CEO in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process, minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
193 Multiple asset management interviewees reported having participated in ISS’ consultations, examples 
include: Corporate governance expert, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 12 July 2018, and corporate 
governance expert, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 April 2018.  
194 Glass Lewis CEO in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process, minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
195 Senior employee from one of the two big proxy advisors, telephone interview, 20 September 2018. 
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reports proxy advisors keep investors abreast of new trends in corporate governance. Investors 
report using these post-season summaries to plan policy changes for the subsequent year.196 
These post-season summaries aggregate proxy voting trends (new issues receiving increased 
shareholder support) and help to set the agenda for the following proxy season by highlighting 
where best practice is changing. By channelling investors’ attitudes in this way, they formalise 
standards, for example by specifying how much additional equity companies can raise without 
requiring a shareholder vote or by specifying on how many companies’ boards a director can 
sit on simultaneously before being considered to be “overboarded” (sitting on too many boards 
and thus not having enough time to dedicate to each). 
 
For investors that make use of custom policies, proxy advisors code investors’ own in-house 
governance policies into their proxy voting system. They agree with their customers what the 
default recommendation for different policy items should be and then suggest how to vote 
shares accordingly.  
 
“When the institutional investor becomes a client, it's not like they just sign a 
contract and say, oh, yeah, we've taken a cursory look at your policy and that 
seems to make sense So go ahead and do the voting and then send us the 
reporting at the end of the year.  I mean, there's a lot of work that goes into 
reviewing and adopting the policies that we put in front of them for them for 
them to review”.197 
 
 
196 Governance expert, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 April 2018. 
197 Glass Lewis CEO in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process, minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
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Some proxy advisors also provide the ability for straight through processing, whereby proxy 
votes will be automatically submitted according to the customer’s policy framework. Most, if 
not all, investors specify a list of proxy items to “flag” up. In cases where proxy items are 
flagged, the asset manager’s governance team takes a closer look at the issue and may engage 
with the corporate before deciding how to vote. These are typically all those cases where the 
proxy advisor recommends a vote against management, where the proxy item is a proposal 
submitted by shareholders, or where the customer’s policy framework cannot automatically be 
applied due to the difficulty of categorizing the issue. Describing this process, a UK investor 
explained that they look at shareholder proposals (as opposed to management proposals) on a 
“case by case basis. Every one of them is flagged up. The devil is often in the detail”.198 One 
of the Big Three asset managers explained that as a result of such flagging they typically look 
at the ballots of approximately 30 percent of their companies manually in-house.199  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted the significant resource challenge posed by the extensively 
diversified portfolios that most large asset managers have today. There are only limited 
workarounds that an asset manager can implement, such as bringing in temporary staff from 
other departments, as a US asset owner explained they did.200 The challenge here are 
competitive pressures that the asset management industry is facing. In practice it is therefore 
very difficult, if not impossible, for most asset managers to handle their large proxy voting 
workload without a degree of automation and external support. Investors confirmed that they 
used proxy advisors as data aggregators and structurers, saying that they are “highly necessary 
 
198 Corporate Governance Analyst, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 30 August 2018. 
199 Corporate Governance Analyst, Big Three asset manager, telephone interview, 24 June 2019. 
200 Corporate Governance Analyst, US pension fund, in-person interview, 16 April 2015. 
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(…) There is no way of having effective voice without proxy advisors’ help. They provide 
structured information”.201 
 
The smaller an investor’s asset base, the bigger the challenge they face, as they will have fewer 
assets from which to recover the associated costs. This will either put downward pressure on 
their profitability or upward pressure on the fees they will have to charge their clients, thereby 
worsening their competitive situation. Corporates commented on this, explaining that “for large 
investment houses they have the resources, and there is much less frustration. […] I think it’s 
a function of size, the smaller the house the less wiggle room there is to diverge” (from proxy 
advisor recommendations).202  
 
Besides the fact that most of the AGMs fall within a period of just three to four months there 
is a second time constraint. As outlined in Figure 23, the typical timeline between a company 
publishing the agenda and voting points for its AGM and the convening of the AGM is just 28 
days. In order to ensure that all the votes are transmitted to the various jurisdictions and reach 
the companies on time, the voting systems typically close after 26 days. To allow time for their 
own operations Broadridge, which handles the vast majority of the proxy “plumbing”, closes 
its systems on day 24. This therefore leaves a period of just 24 days for proxy advisors to 
compose their reports, for corporates to review the data used, and for investors to make their 








201 Corporate governance Analyst, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 25 September 2018.  
202 Director, Investor Relations, US Company, telephone interview, 5 June 2018. 
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Figure 23: Typical Voting Timeline  
 
Source: Sydorowitz (2015) 
 
Proxy advisors typically issue their reports 14-16 days after the companies publish their voting 
agenda. This leaves investors with 8-10 days to make their voting decisions. According to 
IPREO (2017) there are a total of 7 analysts at ISS responsible for the 500 German companies 
under coverage. Based on these numbers each analyst has on average 71 companies to look at. 
Assuming all of these meetings fall within a period of 12 weeks, this would equate to 1.2 
companies per day (500 companies / 7 analysts / 60 days).  
 
This indicates the number of additional corporate governance staff an asset manager would 
require if they were to do all analysis without employing the services of proxy advisors. To 
have a similar staff as ISS in Germany, with 7 Analysts for 500 companies, would require an 
additional staff of between 9 and 32 for a company with global shareholdings in 4,500 to 16,000 
companies, in addition to the estimated 30-110 staff estimated in Chapter 3. For BlackRock 
with its approximately 16,000 individual shareholdings this would imply a required governance 
headcount of 143 made up of the 110 stewardship staff listed in Chapter 3 plus an additional 
32 staff to compensate for the theoretical scenario where they were to do without the support 
of proxy advisors. BlackRock (2018a) reports that it plans to double its stewardship team size 
by 2020, from 36 in 2018, thus implying a team size of 72 (though in May 2020 the latest 
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available data suggest the team has only grown to 47). Thus, in practice, not even the largest 
asset managers have governance teams sufficiently staffed to cope without the support of proxy 
advisors.  
 
The above time constraints have the effect of increasing the potential influence that proxy 
advisors may have, as the shorter the time, the larger the team size needed to tackle all issues 
in-house. In order to tackle the seasonality of proxy voting, proxy advisors (like some 
investors) make substantial use of seasonal hires. Oftentimes these are interns or recent 
graduates, the best of which will receive job offers to return the following year as a permanent 
employee.203 A former employee of one the two big proxy advisors described that for every 
full-time employee there would typically be five to ten seasonal staffers.204 One interviewee 
criticised the industry for its reliance on a workforce comprised of many part-time students as 




Controversies surrounding the industry 
Before turning to the controversies surrounding proxy advisors, it is necessary to highlight the 
role played by grey literature. Grey literature composed by “free market” think tanks and 
corporate lobbying groups makes up a substantial part of all the documents that have been 
published on proxy advisors. Examples include a paper by Doyle (2018b) entitled “The 
conflicted role of proxy advisors” (Doyle is Vice President of Policy and General Counsel of 
 
203 Former executive, European proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
204 Former employee, one of the two big proxy advisors, in-person interview, 5th of June 2018.  
205 Former executive, European proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
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the American Council for Capital Formation, ACCF).206 The debate has become heated, with 
accusations of conflicts of interest. One interviewee at a proxy advisor suggested that the Rock 
Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University is playing a central role in issuing 
critical reports.207 
 
Both ISS and Glass Lewis have been accused of conflicts of interest (Clark and Van Buren, 
2013; Doyle, 2018a; Glassman and Peirce, 2014). In the case of Glass Lewis, the accusations 
stem from the fact that it is owned by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, described by the 
Financial Times (2007) as “one of the world’s largest and most aggressive pension funds”, and 
by the Alberta Investment Management Corp. Glass Lewis’ response to these accusations is 
that they try to disclose all potential conflicts.208 
 
In the case of ISS, the accusations stem from the fact that it also advises companies. ISS is the 
only proxy advisor to advise both asset managers and corporates. ISS acknowledges this 
potential conflict in their Regulatory Code of Ethics (ISS, 2017) and has registered in the US 
as an investment advisor. In this regard a US corporate complained that ISS are “aggressively 
trying to sell their products” to his company.209 Another US corporate described how after his 
company lost a say-on-pay vote, in part because ISS recommended against them, they 
subsequently were targeted by ICS’ sales team. He said it was “kind of annoying that after ISS 
 
206 The American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF) is a think tank that prides itself on "economic growth 
through sound tax, regulatory, and environmental policies" and seeks to expose “the politization of corporate 
governance”. They have issued a number of reports criticising socially responsible investment, for example, 
arguing that CalPERS’ pension fund liabilities have risen as a result of the pension funds’ decision to consider 
social and environmental issues. Records show they have been funded by the likes of ExxonMobil Corp. For 
further information, see: http://accf.org/about/ and 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/American_Council_for_Capital_Formation as well as the following for 
information on their funding: https://exxonsecrets.org/html/orgfactsheet.php?id=77 (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
207 Proxy Advisor, in-person interview, 5 October 2018. 
208 CEO of Glass Lewis in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process, minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
209 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 3 April 2018.  
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recommended against, we got 12 emails over the past 4 months as well as several calls asking 
whether we wanted to buy their services”.210 
 
Other proxy advisor companies also commented that they considered the ISS set-up 
troublesome:  
 
“I cannot defend the indefensible. What I mean by that is that there are conflicts that 
arise from consulting when you're also in the proxy advisory business. If you're getting 
paid to give corporations early indications on voting and then turn around and vote, 
most people consider that to be problematic, and we're probably in that camp. We don't 
get involved in consulting, either directly or indirectly”.211  
 
ISS acknowledges the potential for conflicts but claim that firewalls and transparency are 
sufficient to prevent them.212 While corporates are concerned about conflicts of interest at 
ISS,213 asset managers, who are the paying clients of their proxy advisory services, did not see 
a problem: “[w]e have seen no evidence that there has been any impact from conflicts of 
interest on the services provided to us, and we feel comfortable with the level of disclosure that 
we get”.214 Other proxy advisors suggest ISS did not divest of its ICS consulting arm because 
they  relied on it for income as the profitability of proxy advice was too low.215  
 
210 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 16 January 2018. 
211 CEO of Egan-Jones, third largest US proxy advisor in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy 
Process. Minutes available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf  
212 CEO of ISS in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
213 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018.  
     Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 17 January 2018.  
     CFO, Head of Human Resource, Head of Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview,  
     23 April 2018. 
214 Jonathan Bailey, Managing Director and Head of ESG Investing, Neuberger Berman, LLC, in testimony  
to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-
table-transcript-111518.pdf 
215 Governance expert, European proxy advisor, in-person interview, 5 October 2018. 
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A central tenant of the criticism of proxy advisors is that they have outsized influence because 
asset managers blindly follow their recommendations. For this the grey literature has created 
terms such as “robo-voting” (Doyle, 2018; Placenti, 2018) to give the impression that proxy 
analysis has been automated. ISS’ CEO suggests that “robo-voting, the term itself, is used in a 
way that seems to be pejorative in some fashion. […] If you're talking about one vote or one 
recommendation and it is then executed by every client that ISS has, that could not be further 
from the truth”.216 
 
A US private wealth manager agrees: “the idea that automation of input that we give the proxy 
advisory firm is -- you know, robo-voting -- misrepresents the level of diligence that goes into 
the review of the benchmarks to begin with. If you've ever actually reviewed the benchmarks, 
whether it's ISS or anybody else, they're very extensive and much more detailed than small 
firm like ours could ever develop with our own independent research”.217 This comment also 
highlights the expertise that ISS has accumulated and that even their basic “benchmark” 




The nature of their Influence 
Comparing proxy advisors with credit ratings agencies is revealing. Ratings agencies have been 
described as “private authorities” that act as “gatekeepers” and “invisible switchmen” based 
 
216 CEO of ISS in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
217 Scot Draeger, Vice President, Director of Wealth Management, General Counsel and Chief Compliance 
Officer, R.M. Davis Private Wealth Management, testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. 
Minutes available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
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on the “monopoly of expertise” that they have created (Kerwer, 2001; Sinclair, 2005). First, 
the influence of ratings agencies is of a much broader range of both investors and therefore 
borrowers (including governments). Second, ratings agencies influence the flow of funds, 
whereas proxy advisors with few exceptions do not.218 Proxy advisors for the most part have 
not created a monopoly of expertise, the closest they get is a near monopoly on resources, but 
even that is partially challenged by the largest asset managers.  
 
Proxy advisors are “pretty influential but not too powerful”, unlike credit ratings agencies, who 
are “much more powerful” as they determined the price of financing.219 Instead the interviewee 
compared their services to the research reports published by investment banks, explaining that 
investors have the option of deciding whether to follow proxy advisors recommendations or 
not. Finally, and significantly, because proxy advisors are paid by investors (and not the 
corporates they rate), the same conflicts of interest as for credit ratings agencies do not apply.220 
Arguably this reduced the influence that corporates are able to have over their ratings and at 
least in part explains corporates’ mostly hostile attitude to proxy advisors. 
 
Sinclair (2005) explains that ratings are not strictly rules-based decisions that are black and 
white but instead always include a degree of judgement. This concurs with how proxy advisors 
regard corporate governance: “speaking for Glass Lewis, that our approach is that we take a 
case-by-case approach and we apply bounded judgment”.221 Both proxy advisors and credit 
ratings agencies therefore do make judgements, but whereas the judgements of credit ratings 
 
218 In those cases where companies put the right to raise additional equity capital to a shareholder vote, proxy 
advisors to have influence over the potential flow of funds, but this is a very small sub proportion of overall 
votes. 
219 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018. 
220 Proxy Advisor, in-person interview, 5 October 2018. 
221 CEO of Glass Lewis in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
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agencies are primarily based on internal models, those of proxy advisors involve interpretations 
of investors’ consensus opinions. Proxy advisors’ judgements are thus a second-order 
judgement, “we're incorporating whatever we think is appropriate in our policy formulation”.222 
 
Corporates acknowledged the relational nature of proxy advisors’ influence “it’s because 
investors give them the power, as investors just look and follow”223 and “they have the ability 
to influence corporate policy because investors follow with their votes”.224 Despite these 
comments, corporates and their proxy solicitors both saw value in the services provided by 
proxy advisors. While there were misgivings about their processes and potential conflicts of 
interest, the “channelling” of investors’ opinions that results from proxy advisors’ activities 
was seen as simplifying also the work of corporates. 
 
“It is helpful to get a tendency for what direction a vote will go. They 
highlight trends for the upcoming proxy season in a timely manner. We then 
have an idea of what to expect. Proxy advisors have a reputation to consider 
and they have credibility that is at stake. It gives us a better impression what 






222 CEO of ISS in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
223 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018. 
224 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 31 January 2018.  
225 Investor relations, three team members on call, German company, telephone interview, 18 January 2018.  
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Estimates of Proxy Advisors’ Influence – what proportion of investors are influenced? 
A number of academic studies have set out to quantify the impact of proxy advisors’ 
recommendations on the voting outcomes of corporate elections (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cai 
et al., 2009; Iliev and Lowry, 2014). The results show a relatively wide distribution, ranging 
from 13.6 percent to 29.7 percent of votes impacted.226 The difference depends to a large extent 
on what is being measured. Are the studies evaluating say-on-pay (Larcker et al., 2013; 
Malenko and Shen, 2016) or director nominations (Cai et al., 2009), and do the studies look at 
the combined impact of both proxy advisors recommending in the same direction or at the 
recommendations of individual proxy advisors?  
 
Overall, while the market share of ISS and GL is commonly given as 97 percent (ESMA, 2012), 
there is no reliable data on the percentage of equity assets covered by proxy advisors. There is 
also no data available on the European market structure, even the ESMA regulatory 
investigation of the proxy industry did not ascertain such information. An approximation of 
proxy advisors’ market share for both the US and Europe can be made with the following 
equation: 70% (market share of institutional investors) x 63% (ISS market share) = 44% 
maximum ISS market share, assuming all institutional investors employ a proxy advisor. An 
alternative calculation is taking data from ESMA (2012) which reports that ISS advises assets 
totalling $26 trillion (and GL $15 trillion).227 At the time the global market capitalisation of all 
 
226 Choi et al. (2010) estimate a 20-30% impact, although this drops to just 6-10% after taking into account firm-
specific criteria. Bethel and Gillan (2002) estimate 13.6-20.6%, Cai et al. (2009) show 19%, Cotter et al. (2010) 
show 29.7%, Iliev and Lowry (2014) show a greater than 25% impact, Larcker et al. (2013) estimate a 20% 
impact on say-on-pay voting behaviour, and Malenko and Shen (2016) show a 25% impact on say-on-pay votes. 
227 These market shares have changed since. While ISS does not provide an update on its website, the website of 
GL now states that they advise investors with AuM exceeding $35trl. Source: 
https://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/ (Accessed 6 July 2019) 
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stock exchanges approximated to $51.1 trillion, implying that ISS advised approximately 51 
percent of all equity assets globally ($26 trillion / $51.1 trillion).228  
 
If one combines these estimates with the statement of the CEO of ISS to the SEC that 87 percent 
of ballots voted in 2017 were processed based on custom policies, this suggests that 
approximately six to seven percent of all shares are voted in accordance with ISS benchmark 
policy ((100 percent minus 87 percent) x 51 percent). While this estimate is significantly lower 
than the typically quoted range of 13.6 to 29.7 percent (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cotter et al., 
2010) those estimates are for the entire proxy advisor industry. This estimate of six to seven 
percent is also close to the estimate given by an employee of one of the two big proxy advisors, 
who suggested that it was only “a small single digit percentage of investors” that blindly 
followed ISS’ recommendations.229 
 
The estimate of six to seven percent is furthermore in-line with Choi et al. who estimate that 
ISS recommendations shift only six to ten percent of shareholder votes and conclude that 
“popular accounts substantially overstate the influence of ISS” (2010: 869) and that ISS’ 
impact is reduced greatly once further factors are taken into account. This is still a substantial 
impact however one measures it and would make shareholders voting according to ISS’ 
benchmark policy one of the biggest shareholders in most companies.  
 
The challenge in studying proxy advisor influence is separating correlation from causation. Is 
the “impact” that is being measured merely the percentage of investors following proxy 
advisors’ advice or are any voting decisions actually changed as a result of the advice? If proxy 
 
228 For the source of global market capitalisation, see: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/cm.mkt.lcap.cd 
(Accessed 16 June 2019) 
229 Governance expert, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 20 September 2018. 
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advisors do a good job as data aggregators and consensus-builders, we would expect their 
recommendations to reflect the preferences of the majority of investors. The fact that so many 
agenda items that are voted on concern routine items contributes to high levels of correlation; 
“high correlation exists but is normal” (ESMA, 2013: 12). In this regard Choi et al. (2010) 
identify four reasons why correlation may exist (a) investor and proxy advisor come to same 
conclusion, (b) proxy advisors may gather information that investors use to make their 
decision, (c) investors may select proxy advisors based on ex-ante agreement with their 
benchmark policies, and (d) investors may view the recommendation alone as the basis for 
making a decision. The authors note that only the last of these reasons can be truly characterised 
as causality.  
 
Throughout the interviews, investors were eager to emphasize that it was them making the 
voting decisions and that proxy advisors’ reports were only providing input. One UK investor 
stressed that they only “supplement” their approach with the ISS functionality (meaning that 
they used their systems to help process the voting data), while another explained that they use 
ISS to “provide context on where companies sit relative to peers”.230 All of this points to (b) in 
the list of reasons given by Choi et al. (2010) above. However, such responses from investors 
are to be expected “causality is difficult to establish since investors are not likely to admit 
blindly relying on proxy advisors” (ESMA, 2013: 12).  
 
Many corporate interviewees, however, were adamant that proxy advisors have power. “I think 
they have a lot of power, yes I think they have too much power”.231 Another said: “If they 
 
230 Corporate Governance Analyst, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 30 August 2018, and  
   Corporate Governance Analyst, (different) UK asset manager, telephone interview, 12 July 2018, respectively. 
231 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 7 February 2018.  
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recommend against, you see their influence”.232 Twenty percent was the estimate of proxy 
advisors’ impact given by a US corporate who noted that “the day the ISS report is released, 
within 24 hours we see a meaningful, a significant vote come through and these votes are spot-
on the ISS recommendations”.233 This suggests that there is a section of investors that do vote 
systematically with proxy advisors. These are the “box tickers”, “blind followers” and “robo-
voters” that the critics complain about. Most interviewees suggested that these were primarily 
the smaller institutions that cannot afford large corporate governance teams.   
 
ISS and GL thus represent significant voting blocs alongside those of the Big Three in all three 
countries. Any such influence that proxy advisors may have is entirely relational, resulting 
from customers following their advice. Corporates are cognizant of this, as one US corporate 
explained that “they are actually filling a vacuum for lazy investors. I find it criminal that 
[investors] have not done what’s right”.234 Some investors concurred with this interpretation: 
“the only reason they have this [influence] is because too many investors don’t do proper proxy 
voting […] Proxy advisors are mandated by investors, but it’s not their fault, its investors’ 
fault”.235 
 
Furthermore, while in-house governance teams moderate proxy advisors’ influence, even large 
in-house teams are influenced by proxy advisors’ recommendations: “if both proxy advisors 
recommend against the company, then the hurdle to convince investors in dialogue is very 
high”.236 A UK corporate similarly reported a discussion they had had with a US active investor, 
who told them that “[i]f we have to vote against proxy advisors then we need to put together a 
 
232 Group general counsel and corporate secretary, UK company, telephone interview, 12 June 2018. 
233 Corporate Secretary, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018.  
234 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 20 June 2018. 
235 Governance expert, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 April 2018. 
236 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 8 June 2018.  
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very strong case”.237 “This is because the decision makers at the investors will then need to 
argue in front of a committee why they differ from the recommendation of a proxy advisor. 
Such cases need to be documented in case the auditor seeks an explanation [at the annual fund 
audit]”.238 An asset management interviewee confirmed that they needed to note down a 
justification in cases where they diverged from proxy advisors’ recommendations in case 
auditors were to look into it as part of their annual fund audit.239  
 
Therefore, while a very small number of global asset managers, those with the largest in-house 
governance teams (the Big Three, Hermes, LGIM and Norges), might be able to regularly 
diverge from the recommendations of their proxy advisors, for most of the other investors this 
will not be the case. This highlights that proxy advisors’ influence is more complex than the 
simple differentiation between investors that use custom and benchmark policies. It thus 
extends beyond those investors that “blindly” follow proxy advisors to those that have their 
own governance teams. 
 
The exact number of votes whose actual direction is changed by proxy advisors is impossible 
to ascertain due to the interaction between the four factors identified by Choi et al. (2010). It 
is clear that they do have some influence, but the extent of this influence is likely to be much 
smaller than the duopolistic industry structure would suggest. As with the Big Three in the 
previous chapter, voting impact is most visible when one focusses only on a subset of voting 
results. Since the launch of non-binding executive compensations votes in the US in 2011, 
Glass Lewis has recommended voting against 14 to 18 percent of these on average, yet GL 
highlights that on average just two percent of these fail to pass each year, with average 
 
237 Investor relations, UK company, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018. 
238 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 8 June 2018. 
239 Senior executive, German asset manager, telephone interview, 21 March 2018. 
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shareholder support for say-on-pay proposals exceeding 90 percent on average.240 This suggests 
that the block of shareholders that follows corporate managers is larger than the block that 
follows proxy advisors. Proxy advisors may therefore be influential, but as the next section will 
further illustrate, their influence is bounded by the fact that their recommendations reflect 




Estimates of Proxy Advisors’ Influence – what is the influence regarding 
The studies listed in the previous section that estimated proxy advisors’ influence to be in the 
region of 13.6 to 29.7 percent concerned proxy voting on ‘traditional’ corporate governance 
metrics such as director elections and say-on-pay. Focussing instead on ESG proposals gives a 
very different impression (Ceres, 2019; ShareAction, 2020; Strine, 2018). Rather than 
suggesting an overreliance by asset managers on the recommendations of proxy advisors, a 
study of ESG proposals shows that “asset managers routinely ignore the recommendations of 
their proxy advisor to vote down action on these important issues” (ShareAction, 2020: 10). 
 
The ShareAction (2020) report shows that asset managers voted for such proposals only 35 
percent of the time as often or more than their proxy advisors recommended, and 65 percent of 
asset managers voted in support less often than recommended by their proxy advisors.241 
Furthermore, the results of the ShareAction (2020) study show the same investor-level pattern 
indicated in the previous chapter, namely that UK and German asset managers are more likely 
to back ESG proposals than US asset managers. Vanguard, BlackRock, JP Morgan Asset 
 
240 Katherine Rabin, CEO of Glass Lewis, in testimony to the SEC Roundtable on the Proxy Process. Minutes 
available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf 
241 The study involved UK and US asset managers at the 2019 AGMs of UK and US portfolio companies. 
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Management and State Street indicated support for just 8 percent of these resolutions, 
compared to 79 percent by ISS (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24: Asset managers’ votes “For” shareholder resolutions, compared to ISS’ 
recommendations to vote “For” resolutions. 
 
Source: ShareAction (2020). 
 
The data from ShareAction (2020) is supported by a report from the law firm Sullivan & 
Cromwell (2018a), which notes that in 2018 ISS supported 74 percent of all shareholder 
proposals on environmental, social or political matters. The report notes that despite this almost 
uniform recommendation by ISS, these proposals received an average support of just 26 
percent and even more striking just six percent of those proposals (8 out of 128) actually passed 
(Sullivan & Cromwell, 2018b). This data thus further serves to question the claims that proxy 
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advisors have outsized influence over their clients. Instead, “[c]orporate lobby groups have 
managed to paint proxy advisers with a bad brush”.242 
 
The most dramatic difference between the voting behaviour of asset managers and ISS’ 
recommendations according to ShareAction (2020) can be seen on shareholder proposals 
calling for greater transparency on political lobbying activities. Whereas the majority of asset 
managers voted in support of these proposals 80 percent of the time, ShareAction found that 
BlackRock, Vanguard and JP Morgan voted against the recommendations of their proxy 
advisors 93 percent of the time (when proxy advisors recommended voting in support).  
 
Strine (2018) reports similar data, showing that Vanguard and Fidelity supported no such 
proposals in 2018, while BlackRock supported just 4.1%. The previous chapters explained that 
BlackRock and Vanguard have formal investment policies that defer to management on 
political issues. Strine (2018) labels this as the “fiduciary blind spot” of the Big Four (he 
includes the active manager Fidelity alongside BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street), 
remarking that “they let corporate management spend the Worker Investors’ entrusted capital 
for political purposes without constraint” (2019: IV). This substantially more critical proxy 
voting approach of ISS and GL, when compared to the Big Three, likely explains why they 






242 Isobel Mitchell, co-author of the ShareAction report, quoted in the Financial Times, “Big investors ignore 
proxy advisers on controversial votes”, 8 February 2020. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/fd275eff-
39b9-438d-bf15-31bb242a1924 (Accessed 15 March 2020).  
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Estimates of Proxy Advisors’ Influence – US vs. international influence  
Previous chapters have shown that the UK and Germany have substantially higher foreign 
ownership levels than the US. The UK and Germany both also have on average smaller asset 
managers than US investors. Both these factors would indicate that proxy advisors should play 
a bigger role in the British and German equity markets.  
 
With regards to indexation, however, the previous chapter showed that most of the index funds 
in Germany and the UK have been issued by asset managers that have much larger active 
assets. Since standalone index funds are more likely to rely on proxy advisors, this would 
suggest that proxy advisors will be of greater relevance in the US market. One such example 
was reported by a US basic resources company, which had not even been able to contact one 
of their ten largest shareholders, a US sector ETF launched by a small US index provider.243 
However, since 81 percent of the US ETF market is controlled by the Big Three with their 
comparatively higher absolute stewardship staffing levels, this is likely to mostly offset the 
greater relevance of index funds in the US context.  
 
The differences in the dependency on, and thus the susceptibility to influence from, proxy 
advisors are therefore likely to be largely similar across countries. Instead, as with the Big 
Three in the previous chapter, there are a number of factors that explain why the policies of 
ISS and GL are not advancing a US-centric understanding of corporate governance. First, 
proxy advisors have acknowledged attaching increased significance to the opinions of domestic 
investors. Having asked a representative of one large proxy advisor what role domestic 
 
243 Investor relations, US company, telephone-interview, 16 January 2018. 
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investors play in setting governance practices, he explained that a “home advantage is always 
there. They are not more important but have greater expertise”.244 
 
Secondly, US proxy advisors, like the Big Three operate European offices. In Europe GL is 
headquartered in Limerick in Ireland but following the acquisition of IVOX also maintains a 
large German office. On its website ISS lists offices in Paris, Zurich, Brussels, Berlin, 
Stockholm, Munich and London. A former employee of one of the big proxy advisors 
commented on the significance of this “For the most part, analyses for European companies 
are written in the rather autonomous European bureaus, if only because of the required 
language skills. The accusation that Americans would dictate to European companies what 
they have to do or should not do therefore falters a bit”.245 
 
Third, in these regional offices, regional policy documents different from those for the United 
States are drafted. ISS divides its voting policies into three regions (Asia-Pacific, Europe the 
Middle East and Africa, and the Americas). The Asia-Pacific region, for example, lists ten 
separate voting policies for China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Australia, New Zealand as well as a “Asia-Pacific Regional Proxy Voting Summary”, which 
covers markets not listed separately.246 Whereas an inspection of the regional proxy voting 
guidelines of the Big Three reveals almost no differences between regions, the guidelines of 
ISS show substantial regional variations.  Proxy advisors’ regional policies therefore serve to 
limit the Americanisation that might otherwise arise from their services.  
 
 
244 Specialist, Proxy Advisor, Telephone Interview, 20th of September 2018.  
245 Emailed comment, former proxy advisor employee. 6 June 2018. 
246 For further details, see: https://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/voting-policies/ (Accessed 20 
October 2019) 
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ISS’ UK policy (ISS, 2019a) starts out by explaining that prior to 2015 they used the voting 
guidelines of the UK Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association and that today it remains 
broadly consistent with that. Since the UK follows a “comply or explain” approach the ISS 
policy takes account of this and “[w]hen assessing the quality of a company's explanation, ISS 
follows the guidance provided by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (the Code)” (ISS, 2019a: 4). Throughout the UK policy references are 
repeatedly made to UK regulation serving as a guide. For gender diversity reference is made 
to the UK Corporate Governance Code and for renumeration “[t]he ISS approach is aligned 
with the five remuneration principles for building and reinforcing long-term business success 
developed by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association in conjunction with a number of 
leading UK institutional investors, originally published in 2013” (ISS, 2019a: 14).  
 
Germany does not have its own policy but forms part of ISS’ Continental European proxy 
voting policy. With some exceptions, the European policies do not refer to specific country-
level laws but instead “boards should adhere to domestic legal requirements or local best 
market practices or, in the absence thereof, be in line with European established practice” (ISS, 
2020: 12). Whereas the UK policy has an explicit mission statement in favour of shareholder 
value, which is balanced by a dedicated section on ESG, the European policy has neither. ISS 
explains that it’s European “approach is not “one-size-fits-all” and takes relevant market-
specific factors into account in our research and recommendations” (ISS, 2020: 4).  
 
ISS’ US proxy voting policies at 70 pages is almost twice as long as the policies for the UK 
and Continental Europe. This is due to the fact that the US lacks a national, government-
enforced corporate governance code and ISS policy thus has to describe each policy item in 
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detail without the ability of referring to national legislation.247 “What market participants in the 
United Kingdom regard as uncontroversial or settled in their best practice governance codes is 
still a source of dispute for their U.S. counterparts” (Tuch, 2019: 1462). ISS’ US policy 
therefore appears to walk a tight rope between focussing on shareholder value and allowing for 
the integration of ESG. One section on mergers states “Stakeholder Provisions: General 
Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder 
constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business 
combination” (ISS, 2019b: 28). In the absence of national legislation, ISS is forced to spell out 
how it considers certain ESG policies and the following examples show why as a result of these 
policies their recommendations diverge to such a large extent from the voting practices of the 
Big Three.  
 
On “Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions” the policy recommends to 
“[g]enerally vote for resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the 
financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change on its operations and 
investments or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks” (ISS, 2019b: 
58). The Big Three on the other hand have to date considered most such cases to be issues of 
“ordinary business” and thus best left to management’s discretion. The policy document 
contains pages with individual ESG policy items, but in general can be summarised as 
supporting proposals that seek further information from companies. Another example is 
provided by shareholder proposals calling for greater transparency of political contributions, 
which the Big Three generally reject, whereas ISS recommends to “[g]enerally vote for 
 
247 Instead corporate governance matters are provided in state and federal laws, regulations and listing rules. For 
further detail, see: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-011-
8693?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true (Accessed 15 November 2020).  
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proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company's political contributions and trade 
association spending policies and activities” (ISS, 2019b: 64). 
 
Besides these country and regional voting policies, ISS also offers Climate, Faith-Based, Public 
Fund, Sustainability, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and Taft-Hartley proxy voting 
guidelines.248 ISS policy approach is therefore best described as a menu approach: they offer 
investors a large selection of benchmark policies to choose from, their website lists 32 
benchmark policies as of 15 March 2020, with investors deciding which one of these 
benchmark policies to choose or to have their own custom policy designed.  
 
A former employee of one of the big US proxy advisor firms explained that “while there are 
overarching principles, such as the rule of law, policies always have to be tailored to the 
markets. Taking into account the legal system, the ownership structure, the position of the 
economy, whether it is emerging or developed, and cultural factors”. He would therefore “not 
advocate to use the same policies across the world, but principles are helpful. I think markets 
learn from each other. The UK clearly led the way with say on pay. They all learn from each 
other”.249 This “learning” implies a degree of conversion on individual policies, but not that 




This chapter documented that the scale and time pressure of the proxy voting process has left 
asset managers dependent on the services of proxy advisors. However, this dependence on their 
resources does not equate to a widespread overreliance on their recommendations. While there 
 
248 Source: https://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/voting-policies/ (Accessed 15 March 2020). 
249 Former governance analyst, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020.  
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is evidence that a group of investors blindly follows proxy advisors, asset managers for the 
most part explained that they were using proxy advisors merely as data aggregators and 
decisions were being made based on investors’ own custom policies. This impression is 
confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of all proxy items are approved with high levels of 
support, despite proxy advisors’ frequent recommendations to the contrary.  
 
What the services of proxy advisors have achieved is to coordinate the views of the smaller 
asset managers. In effect proxy advisors have helped to coordinate the voice of smaller asset 
managers the way that economies of scale and thus asset growth has done for the larger asset 
managers. They have created a secondary voting bloc alongside, and often in opposition to, the 
voting blocs of the Big Three. Proxy advisors have thereby added to the potential for 
shareholders’ use of voice. 
 
Proxy advisors are less constrained than asset managers when it comes to confronting corporate 
conduct since they are not subject to the same conflicts of interest as detailed for asset managers 
in the previous chapter.250 Because the policy recommendations of proxy advisors, particularly 
as regards environmental, social and political issues, have been shown to be more critical of 
corporate managers, than the voting policies pursued by the Big Three, the coordination they 
provide may therefore enable other asset managers to break the governance vacuum provided 
for by the Big Three. They thus represent a further agent of change alongside US pension funds, 
UK and German asset managers.  
 
250 While ISS does seek corporate mandates, the resulting conflicts of interests is different to that which arises 
from asset managers competing for corporate pension mandates. Corporate interviewees’ accusations of 
conflicts of interest at ISS have focussed on the fact that they intentionally increase the demands on corporate 
governance standards each year “they would have to change something every year”. This suggests that conflicts 
of interests would result in ISS issuing a greater number of critical reports (not a smaller number) in order to 
ensure continued demand for their consulting services from corporate issuers. 
References: Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018.  
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If one compares the 13.6 to 29.7 percent influence attributed to proxy advisors by the academic 
literature (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cotter et al., 2010) to the 25 percent of votes cast by the 
Big Three at the average S&P 500 company (Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019s), this suggests that 
within the US corporate governance landscape the influence of the Big Three likely exceeds 
that of the proxy advisors. This conclusion is supported by the proxy voting data presented in 
this chapter. The fact that the shareholdings of the Big Three are substantially smaller in the 
UK and Germany than in the US, at approximately one third less and fifty percent less, 
respectively, suggests that proxy advisors are relatively more influential in Germany and the 
UK than they are in the US.  
 
Since proxy advisors’ recommendations have been shown to be more supportive of shareholder 
proposals on environmental and social issues, the greater influence of proxy advisors relative 
to the Big Three in the UK and Germany may provide a partial explanation for why those 
countries’ understanding of corporate governance is changing to a greater extent than that of 
the US (the regulatory environment also playing a role). Rather than being a tool that promotes 
an Americanisation of corporate governance, proxy advisors therefore appear to advance the 




Chapter 6  
Asset Management, Financialisation and Inequality  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have focussed on the relationship between shareholders and the 
corporate and though social issues have been touched on throughout, this approach 
nevertheless runs the risk of falling into the trap of agency theory by removing workers from 
the analysis. The research question seeks to identify changes to corporate governance as a result 
of changes in the shareholder ownership structure. As such I have shown that there is an 
increasing demand from institutional investors for greater integration of social considerations 
into corporate policies. However, the Big Three asset managers have frustrated many of these 
efforts to differing degrees across countries.  
 
To ensure the social consequences of asset manager capitalism receive the attention they 
deserve, this chapter will make use of the financialisation literature. The introduction defined  
financialisation as a process that grants a greater role for financial motives, financial markets 
and financial institutions in the economy (Maxfield et al., 2017). Through this growing role 
financialisation is changing the logics of the industrial economy (van der Zwan; 2014). Davis 
and Kim (2015) surmise that how finance is intermediated in an economy shapes social 
institutions in fundamental ways. It is thus the aim of this chapter to draw on the insights of the 
previous chapters to highlight the role that the asset management sector has played in changing 
the intermediation of finance and the consequences of this for the three countries in question, 
with a particular focus on economic inequality. 
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The bundling of assets and their ensuing securitisation has turned debts into marketable 
securities, enabling the “assetization” (Langley, 2020b) of ever more objects and relationships. 
Davis and Kim (2015) thus consider securitisation to be “[o]ne of the most critical yet under-
appreciated enablers of financialization”. Derivatives more generally have enabled a 
transformation of the relationship between borrowers and lenders. The consequence of this is 
that the relational aspect between lenders and borrowers is significantly diluted.  
 
Since the VoC literature places considerable importance on the form of financial 
intermediation, differentiating between bank-based and market-based forms of financing in 
CME and LME economies respectively, the increase in financialisation has decreased the 
significance of this differentiator (Erturk et al., 2008) and instead raising the significance of 
the differences in the institutional structures of the investment chain, presented in this thesis. 
With capital markets increasing in relevance in almost all economies, it has therefore become 
more important to identify differences in financial institutions’ conduct across countries. 
 
Figure 25 plots the proportion of shares held by the Big Three asset managers against national 
levels of inequality. Merely charting inequality (measured by Gini coefficients) as is done in 




Figure 25: Gini coefficient versus Big 3 shareholdings by country 
 
Source: Bloomberg, World Bank 
 
The relationship is particularly distorted by the inclusion of emerging market countries Brazil, 
Russia and China as well as the special case of the Netherlands. If we limit the analysis to 
developed markets as much of the VoC literature does (see Hall and Gingerich, 2009), the 
relationship becomes much stronger. The Netherlands represents a special case as some of its 
largest companies (in particular Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever) have dual listings on the UK 
and Dutch stock markets with corresponding weights in both countries’ blue-chip benchmark 
indices (the FTSE 100 and AEX respectively). The result of this is that these companies are 
included in ETFs of both countries with the result that the Big 3 have greater shareholdings. 
With these adjustments made, the correlation increases to 0.69 with an r-squared 0.45 as 




Figure 26: Gini coefficient versus Big 3 shareholdings in selected developed market economies 
 
 Source: Bloomberg, World Bank 
 
The difference between Figure 25 and Figure 26 confirms the obvious, that there are factors 
other than the ownership by the Big 3 asset managers that play a more important role in 
determining levels of inequality across developed and emerging economies. Yet focussing the 
analysis on developed markets also provides support for the relationship between asset 
manager capitalism, financialisation and inequality discussed in this chapter. Of course, 
causality could also be the reverse of course: in unequal societies the rich have money and 
spend less and save more. All of this confirms that further research on the link between the 
asset management sector and inequality is needed.251  
 
 
251 A typical approach in the financialisation literature would be to look at the market capitalisation of the 
domestic stock market versus levels of inequality, or the asset base of the fund management sector as a 
percentage as a percentage of GDP in relation to inequality. Instead Figures 9 and 10 consider only the holdings 
of a select group of actors, the Big Three, and consider how these differ across countries.  
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The financialisation literature has highlighted the importance of securitization in expanding 
financial markets into an ever-increasing assortment of assets, ranging from bank loans, 
mortgages, life insurance policies to commodities (Aalbers, 2008; Davis and Kim, 2015). 
Private equity and hedge funds are commonly presented as the primary drivers of 
financialisation (Appelbaum and Batt, 2014; Fichtner, 2013). Yet, while hedge funds and 
private equity capture much of the popular attention, this focus is misdirected given the size of 
mutual funds an ETFs. As the preceding chapters have highlighted, these actors cannot succeed 
without the support of the large mutual fund and ETF companies.  
 
Despite not being the primary agitators, conventional asset managers have therefore played a 
substantial role in advancing financialisation. For decades they have condoned the actions of 
other more aggressive actors, particularly activist hedge funds and private equity funds, and 
silently and passively benefitted from those actors’ initiatives. These initiatives include, for 
example, the break-up of companies into several smaller companies, mergers and acquisitions, 
and share buybacks as Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted, the Big Three possess the means to 
decide the fate of many of today’s shareholder proposals.  
 
They have thus become the adjudicators of the market for corporate control. The market for 
corporate control would not function the same way without the big asset managers’ support of 
activist investors, as for the most part activists only acquire relatively small holdings in target 
companies, often as little as three to five percent, and then push for change. For activist 
campaigns to be successful they have to be able to convince (or appear to convince) the 
majority of the remaining shareholders that their proposals will add value. These proposals 
from shareholder-value focussed activists are increasingly joined by proposals from social 
activists calling for greater protection of the environment or better protection for employees. 
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Such “ESG” (Environmental, Social and Governance) proposals seek to protect or advance 
stakeholder interests. With some shareholders pushing for shareholder priority and others for 
stakeholder priority, the large asset management firms have become the arbiters of such 




Erturk et al. note that finance matters since the 1970s “because the experience of individual 
subjects and the trajectory of the macro-economy are both increasingly mediated by new 
relations with financial markets” (2008: 3-4). The financialisation literature seeks to understand 
this mediation and, in its efforts, commonly differentiates between three groups of actors: the 
financial sector, nonfinancial corporations, and households. Some such as Pagliari and Young 
(2020) include the state as a fourth actor and Trampusch (2019) assesses the role of government 
debt management offices in financialisation. Scholars have correspondingly conceptualized 
financialisation as a new regime of accumulation, a guiding principle of corporate behaviour 
or a central feature of everyday life (van der Zwan, 2014).  
 
Karwowski et al. (2020) identify seven main hypotheses in the financialisation literature. These 
are: (1) the question of whether financialisation is one uniform process or whether there are 
several distinct and independent processes across sectors and countries, (2) the argument put 
forward by some Marxist authors that a slowdown in investment precedes financialisation 
(Brenner, 2003), (3) that financialisation results from deregulation, (4) financialisation reflects 
a shift to more market based forms of financial intermediation, (5) that financialisation should 
be understood as part of a debt-driven demand regime, (6) that that financialisation is driven 
by foreign financial inflows, and (7) that financialisation is driven by asset price inflation. Of 
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these seven hypotheses, number 1 and 4, are particularly relevant for this thesis as they both 
relate to the issue of convergence.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows. The next section will briefly outline 
how the asset management industry’s high salaries directly contribute towards economic 
inequality. This will be followed by three sections that discuss how asset managers have 
contributed to the financialisation of households, nonfinancial corporations and the state 
respectively. Each of these sections will include an investigation of how asset managers’ role 
within financialisation contributes to the growing problem of income inequality. What will 
become apparent is that financialisation is a heterogenous process, and that both its extent and 
consequences differ substantially from country to country.  
 
This chapter will show that pensions reforms in particular have created a relationship of 
dependence between households and financial markets’ performance. The section on asset 
managers and the state will furthermore show that governments and their institutions have also 
entered a relationship of dependency, one that is based on on the resources, both physical and 
epistemic, that asset managers have accumulated in recent decades. The section on the 
financialisation of the nonfinancial firm will highlight the extent to which asset managers’ 
policy preferences have increasingly shifted corporate executives’ focus from measures 
seeking to secure organic growth towards financial engineering. Yet the national heterogeneity 
also gives hope, as there are signs that asset managers in the UK and Germany are increasingly 





Asset Managers’ direct contribution to income inequality 
The institutionalisation of share ownership documented in the preceding chapters has created 
many new financial firms, adding to employment in the high-income finance industry. In 2017 
the fund management industry employed 178,000 people in the United States, 38,000 in the 
UK and 13,900 in Germany.252 Considered on a national level these absolute numbers are 
relatively small, however, geographic concentration in a small number of cities increases the 
local impact.  
 
Only about 10 percent of these employees work in the “front office” managing investment 
funds. For this small number of people, however, salaries can be high. Data from the website 
Glasdoor.com taken in July of 2020 show that the average salary for a fund manager in New 
York was $103,000, in London it was £73,759 and in Frankfurt it was €96,612 per annum. In 
addition to these salaries, fund managers typically receive bonuses equating to approximately 
fifty to one hundred percent of their base salary.253 Though the total number of individuals 
employed in these new financial intermediaries is small on a national basis, Folkman et al. 
(2007) point out that they outnumber senior giant firm managers many times over, who 
oftentimes are the focus of the press when it comes to income inequality.254 Godechot (2020) 
explains that in this way the finance sector has contributed directly to increased inequality.  
 
Pay may also contribute a class dimension to corporate governance and financialisation. What 
the above numbers hide is that there is a small elite within the fund management industry 
 
252 US numbers from Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/255592/investment-company-industry-
employment/ (Accessed 19 September 2020). UK and German numbers from EFAMA (2019).   
253 While high, these average numbers are substantially lower than what can be earned by members of the 
investment banking, private equity and hedge fund industries. 
254 Folkman et al. (2007) compare the number of executive directors at FTSE 100 companies with the number of 
senior capital intermediaries in London, also including lawyers, consultants and private equity. However, the 
same conclusion holds true when focussing only on mutual fund portfolio managers and analysts.  
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consisting mainly of the owners of asset managers as well as their star fund managers that earn 
pay packages in the many millions. Braun (2016b) highlights that Bill Gross, the co-founder 
of US-based asset manager Pimco (owned by the German insurance company Allianz), in 2013 
earned $300 million, equating to approximately 20 percent of Pimco’s 2013 profit-sharing plan 
of $1.3 billion. The remaining $1 billion was paid out to the other 60 managing directors of the 
firm (an average of just under $17 million per person). 
 
Braun (2020a) therefore suggests that corporate managers and asset management executives 
have formed an amalgamated elite. This is a break from the stakeholder coalition perspective 
(Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005), which has mostly interpreted shareholder primacy as an 
allegiance between shareholders and workers against corporate executives. The preceding 
chapters of this thesis support this conclusion in the case of the US. That is because the Big 
Three asset managers’ voting records evidence a near blanket backing of corporate executives 
and thus insulation from the concerns of other stakeholders. This conclusion that asset manager 
capitalism represents a coalition of executives and big shareholders against workers does not 
translate equally across other countries though, since the regulatory approach and the relatively 
larger stakes of other shareholders moderate the influence of the Big Three in both the UK and 
Germany.  
 
Asset Managers and the Financialisation of Everyday Life  
Chapter 2 reported how pension reforms ignited the growth of the asset management industry. 
In the US, pensions reforms were brought in as a response to the crisis of profitability that beset 
US firms in the 1970s, marking deregulation as one of the key drivers of financialisation 
(Fligstein, 2001; Krippner, 2005). Instead of being able to rely on a defined benefit in 
retirement, most employees in the UK and the US today instead have pensions that are linked 
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to the performance of stock markets. Birdthistle therefore remarks that the US has embarked 
on a “grand experiment” that seeks to determine whether “millions of ordinary, untrained, busy 
citizens can successfully manage trillions of dollars in a financial system dominated by 
wealthy, skilled, and powerful financial institutions, many of which have a record of treating 
individual investors shabbily” (2016: 1). 
 
With private pensions bringing finance into ever more households, financialisation is laying 
the ground for its own reproduction by influencing the policy preferences of individuals 
(Nesser and Davis, 2012; Pagliari et al., 2018). It is doing so by creating a “finance culture” 
(Fligstein and Goldstein, 2015), which is resulting in a “split personality” dilemma (Harmes, 
2001), whereby individuals as shareholders will want higher returns, but reject the resulting 
negative consequences that might result at a personal level, such as global warming, a higher 
workload, lower pay, less diverse work environment or, ultimately, the loss of one’s own job.  
 
Index funds, and the diversification they entail, have helped to lower both the cost and the 
perceived risk of investing to millions of households, thereby advancing the financialisation of 
everyday life.  Van der Zwan (2017) explains how the same logic held true for institutional 
investors, as Dutch and US pension funds increased their exposure to equities in earnest from 
the mid-1970s onwards as they fully embraced the lessons of modern portfolio theory, namely 
that stock-specific risk can be diversified away and that markets are efficient and therefore it 
is futile to try to beat the market.  
 
Whereas the process of financialisation has brought mutual funds and ETFs to many more 
households in the US, the UK and Germany, what is oftentimes neglected is the role that wealth 
distribution plays in this process. Financial market risks, whether resulting from the 
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discretionary investment in mutual funds or the less discretionary investments resulting from 
pension plans, require both financial literacy as well as risk capital, something that many 
households lack. The wealthy will be better able to deal with market vicissitudes (not being 
forced to sell when markets have fallen).   
 
The Federal Reserve (2019) finds that 39 percent of the US adult population would be unable 
to cover a hypothetical expense of $400 using cash, savings, or a credit card paid off at the next 
statement. Lacking a starting block of savings, many households are thus unable to participate 
in the alleged benefits of the democratisation of finance. Accordingly, Froud et al. (2001) and 
Godechot (2020) find that financialisation has no effect on inequality at the bottom of the 
income hierarchy but that it drives inequality at the top.  
 
Erturk et al. (2008) furthermore highlight how this narrative of citizen shareholders and the 
“ownership society” is a political construct. They explain that in the 1920s and 1930s the term 
“rentier” was widely used for the actors known today as shareholders. The terminology is 
inherently critical, implying there is no economic value to shareholding beyond extraction of 
cashflows to the benefit of the individual. Later finance “delivered on its promise of long-term 
security and capital gains” for the masses as a result of the boom in stock markets in the 1950s 
and 1960s, thereby forming the “basis for a new connection between finance and the 
financialized masses” (Erturk et al., 2008: 4). Following this period, the rentier terminology 
was abandoned as neoliberal supporters in the following decades sought to advance the notion 
of the “good” shareholder. The authors explain that this reconception was predicated on the 
fact that whereas the shareholders in the 1920s and 1930s were made up only of the small elite 
rich, in the late 20th century an ever-increasing proportion of households was invested in 
financial markets.  
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Chapter 4 documented that the extraordinary popularity of index funds in recent years has led 
industry insiders (Novick, 2017) and financial commentators (Financial Times, 2015) to 
suggest that they are “democratising” finance. The argument is that mutual funds, and index 
funds in particular, have brought down the risks and costs of investment management with the 
result that a growing proportion of households today owns a (small) piece of the big pie.  
 
However, this fails to acknowledge the income and wealth distribution amongst households. 
In the US, for example, the median household had assets of $213,000 in 2018, yet the median 
assets of households owning mutual funds is four times that level at $856,300, and ETF 
households were even wealthier with median assets of $929,800 (ICI, 2018). In fact, just 6 
percent of US households reported holding ETFs in 2018, and these households were younger, 
wealthier and better educated with 66 percent reporting a college or postgraduate education, 
compared to 34 percent for all households (ICI, 2018). The consequence of this is that the less 
wealthy may have a stake in the stock market, but wealthier have a bigger stake, so rising 
markets increase inequality rather than reducing it.  
 
The situation in Germany is similar though more complex requiring a brief excursion into the 
technicalities of German savings products. First, as outlined in Chapter 2, “life insurance” 
products play a much greater role in private pension provisions than mutual fund or ETF 
investments. These financial products offered by insurance companies and typically distributed 
via retail banking partnerships, offer individuals a guaranteed minimum return 
(“Garantiezins”) for the duration of their life. Individuals then draw down their savings in these 
products as they enter retirement. At approximately 84 million policies (46 percent of 
households), they dwarf the 7.1 million of individuals (13 percent of households) in Germany 
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with mutual fund investments (Bundesbank, 2016; DAI, 2019; Handelsblatt, 2019). However, 
their relevance for equity markets is substantially smaller than this ratio would suggest as these 
products generally have low investments in equities. 
 
Figure 27 below shows the historic asset allocation of German insurance companies. Two clear 
drops in the allocation to equities are visible after 2001 and 2008 respectively. In each case 
financial markets turmoil forced a substantial reduction in insurance companies’ equity 
allocations. The reason for this is to be found in regulatory standards, which prescribe that 
German insurance companies follow an asset liability approach that ensure that insurers are 
able to fulfil the minimum return promises they have made. The two primary drivers of such 
calculations are the reserves that an insurance company has been able to amass over the 
preceding years as well as the returns they are able to model.  
 
With each financial crisis and resultant stock market collapse, these reserves diminished, 
forcing a pro-cyclical sale of equity investments.255 Secondly, as central banks responded to 
the financial turmoil with rate cuts, this only acerbated insurance companies’ troubles as this 
reduced the future returns they were able to assume in their models, and thus further reducing 
their ability to carry equity risk. The end result is that these life insurance policies cannot 
withstand the viscidities of equity markets, in the same way that individuals with low personal 




255 There were occasional, temporary, suspensions of these rules at the height of the crisis.  
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Figure 27: Equities as a percentage of the total allocation of German insurance companies 
(excluding reinsurance companies) and the minimum interest rate guaranteed by German 
insurers  
 
Source: GDV, BMF, Das Investment, Statista 
 
Because of the adverse development of equity markets and central bank interest rates is that 
insurers increasingly find themselves caught in trap, where they need higher equity allocations 
to pay their guarantees but cannot afford the regulatory risk budget this requires. Insurers have 
responded by repeatedly cutting the guaranteed interest rate for new policies, to the point where 
it now sits at just 0.90 percent. As a result, such products have recently fallen out of favour and 
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Allianz reports that more than 90 percent of new life insurance policies are now issued without 
a minimum return guarantee.256  
 
The relevance of all this for the issue of financialisation is that for the most part German private 
pension savings have not been invested in stock markets, thus arguably reducing the influence 
of financialisation (less exposure to stock market volatility). With regards to those households 
invested in mutual funds and ETFs, however, the dynamics are similar to those seen in the UK 
and the US. As with the US, the distribution of mutual fund holdings across households is 
highly unequal (Bundesbank, 2016; DAI, 2019). Both direct share holdings and mutual fund 
holdings are highly correlated to income, with just six percent of households in the bottom two 
quintiles holding any mutual funds, while mutual fund ownership amongst the top two quintiles 
of households is 22 percent and 32 percent respectively (Bundesbank, 2016).257 Since overall 
mutual fund ownership in Germany is smaller than in either the UK or the US, the contribution 
towards increasing inequality has however been lower.  
 
Statistically there is thus little evidence of everyone having an equal stake, and even for those 
with a stake, there are questions as to how they have influence. Van der Zwan is right in noting 
that “the democratization of finance has relegated large segments of the population to the status 
of capital owner, thus upsetting notions of class that regard labour and capital as binary 
opposites” (2014: 120). Yet from a comparative perspective the extent to which this has 
happened differs from country to country.  
 
 
256 Central bank monetary policy has thus affected more individuals negatively in Germany, than in the UK or 
the US. Whereas US and UK private pensions are predominantly in equity markets and have thus benefited from 
the resulting asset price inflation German life insurance policies have suffered from lower equity market returns 
as allocations to equities have been decreased as a result of lower interest rates.   
257 Comparable current data is not available for the UK.  
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Because equity allocations of both public and private pension plans are so much higher in the 
UK and the US, individuals in Germany have even less of a say in German corporate 
governance as their combined pensions savings make up a smaller part of the domestic market 
capitalisation. This is reflected in the comparatively small asset base of German asset managers 
when compared to their UK and US peers. The four largest German asset managers have a 
combined average stake of just 4.5 percent of a typical DAX-30 company.258 As the preceding 
and following chapters show, the relatively small holdings of German asset managers are 
partially made up for by the comparatively high salience that domestic institutional investors’ 
voice has within contemporary asset manager capitalism.  
 
Unfortunately, comparable data for the UK is not available. Instead, only the percentage of 
individuals with direct shareholdings (12 percent) and the percentage of individuals with share 
based “individual savings accounts” (“ISAs”, also 12 percent) is known. Furthermore 20.6 
million individuals had active pensions, of these 8m were in the form of employer defined 
contribution and 1.8 million were private pensions.259 The value of DC pensions stood at 
approximately £600 billion in 2020.260 Besides private pension schemes, the UK also provides 
the option for private individuals to save tax-free for retirement in the aforementioned ISAs. 
 
As of November 2020, individuals are able to invest up to £20,000 tax-free in ISAs annually. 
There are different types of ISAs but the most common can hold both mutual funds/ETFs and 
shares. At the end of 2019 “stocks and shares” ISAs accounted for approximately £315 billion 
in assets (HM Revenue and Customs, 2020). To put this into perspective, ISAs alone have 
 
258 Combined shareholdings of DWS, AGI, Union Investment and Deka Investment in the 10 largest DAX-30 
companies. Data as of 14 April 2020. Data source: Bloomberg. 
259https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/da
tasets/financialwealthwealthingreatbritain (Accessed 7 November 2020).  
260 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51676600 (Accessed 7 November 2020).  
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investments almost equalling all of the assets of German private corporate pensions (£457 
billion).261 With regards to income distribution and inequality the data shows that the amount 
subscribed to an ISA increases with the income of the individual. The highest proportion of 
ISA savers, approximately 44 percent, saved between £1 and £2,499. However, 61 percent of 
those with income of £150,000 or more saved at the maximum allowed rate of £20,000. 
 
The situation in the UK represents a combination of the developments seen in the US and in 
Germany. On the one hand, the value of UK domestic pensions savings invested in stock 
markets is very high (£915 billion just from DC pensions and ISAs). As a result, the assets of 
personal pension funds as a percentage of GDP at approximately 36 percent (£915 billion / 
£2.522 billion) is even higher than the 18.1 percent of GDP seen in the US.262 On the other 
hand, because these pension assets are invested globally across several asset classes, and 
because of the relative size of the UK stock market, the percentage of the UK stock market 
owned by foreigners in 2018 stood at 54.9 percent.263  
 
With the majority of both the UK and Germany stock market held by foreigners, this raises the 
question of whose shareholder democracy it is? One could argue that via their sovereign wealth 
fund the Norwegians have a say in UK and German capital markets, as do Americans through 
their big fund management firms. This is why it has been so important to document the differing 
behaviour of institutional investors across countries and the enduring salience of domestic 
investors in determining the themes for the national corporate governance discourse.  
 
 
261 Willis Towers Watson (2018a), exchange rate of £/$ of 1.32. 
262 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=595# (Accessed 7 November 2020). 
263https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2018 
(Accessed 7 November 2020). 
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Figures 28 and 29 below illustrates that the rapid growth of households investing in mutual 
funds peaked in 2000. Since then the number of households with mutual fund holdings has 
plateaued or even slightly declined. This suggests that household financialisation resulting 
from the fund management sector has reached a limit for now. It is noteworthy that this 
plateauing has occurred at a much lower level (approximately 13 percent of households) in 
Germany than in either the UK or the US, suggesting that the role of the asset management 
sector and financialisation more generally will continue to play a comparatively smaller role 
in Germany. Financialisation is therefore far from an inevitable process. The plateauing of 
households’ mutual fund holdings is also not the result of the growth of ETFs. Data from the 
US shows that in 2019 just eight percent of households held ETFs and of these 92 percent also 
held mutual funds, implying that including ETFs in Figure 29 would add less than one 
percentage point to the result. 
 
Figure 28: German Equity Mutual Fund Holders (million individuals) 
 
Source: Deutsches Aktien Institut (2019)  
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To conclude, the contribution of the asset management sector to the financialisation of 
everyday life appears to have hit a plateau when measured by the percentage of households 
with mutual fund holdings. This also implies that the “democratisation” of finance has stalled. 
The headline-grabbing growth in AuM of the largest asset managers should thus not be 
interpreted as a sign of increasing participation in equity markets, but instead the result of 
market share gains and of fiscal and monetary policy choices that have driven asset price 
bubbles and inequality, both of which have in turn contributed to asset managers’ rising AuM.  
 
The term democratisation implies that households have an increased say in how both 
companies and financial markets are run. It also implies a degree of growing equality; which 
income inequality prevents. Instead the spread of asset management products to ever more 
households reflects a greater dependence amongst individuals on the prospects of financial 
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markets. As the later sections of this chapter will show, this dependency on an individual basis 
is joined by a dependency relationship at the governmental level.  
 
 
Asset Managers, Financialisation and Nonfinancial Corporations 
This section will discuss three ways in which asset managers’ business models and policies are 
contributing to inequality. The first is by supporting, or at the least condoning, high executive 
compensation at portfolio companies. More important than the direct contribution towards 
rising income inequality that this provides, are the indirect consequences that result from how 
compensations sets the course for corporate strategy.  
 
The structure of executive compensation packages is today set in a way that ensures 
shareholder interests are taken into account. This increased executive focus on financial 
engineering with the result that nonfinancial corporations are increasingly financialised. The 
result is corporate downsizing via spin-offs, and the diversion of funds from other avenues that 
could have otherwise potentially reduced the likelihood of corporate insolvency, increased 
organic growth or increased employment and wages. This policy shift represents the second 
means by which asset managers contribute towards increased inequality. The third is via 
increased consumer prices that result from corporate executives’ appreciation of the fact, that 
as common owners of multiple companies in each sector, institutional investors interests are 
best served (portfolio returns maximised) when firms do not compete against one another but 
instead seek to maximise industry profits by raising prices to the consumer.  
 
This section will make clear, that these trends are not uniform, and instead of what the 
financialisation convergence thesis would suggest, the process of financialisation does not 
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appear to be inevitable. This is due to both differing regulatory approaches and because of 
differences in the asset management landscape between countries. One such difference is the 
concept of universal ownership, which represents the other side to the coin that is common 
ownership. Whereas common ownership requires no explicit action from asset managers, that 
is no intention to change corporate policy, universal ownership requires asset owners to 
understand that their highly diversified portfolios means they own a small part of the entire 
economy, and thus acknowledge that they are exposed to systematic risks that cannot be 
diversified away. This in turn requires them to reconceptualise their role towards one focussed 
on limiting negative externalities including social inequality and environmental risks.  
 
What results is an investment management ecosystem made up of the Big Three, hedge funds, 
ESG funds, regular asset managers and universal owners.264 While the financialisation 
literature would suggest that the direction of change is exclusively in the direction of the 
American form of capitalism, this thesis has shown that the reality is substantially more 
complex. For the most part it is activist hedge funds that set the shareholder value agenda, 
while ESG funds (supported by NGOs) and universal owners increasingly put forward the 
stakeholder perspective. In what direction the corporate governance discourse develops 
depends on the relative sizes of these different institutional investors, as well as the respective 
country’s regulatory approach and the attitudes of the corporates in question. As I will go on 
to show, this in turn means that in the UK and Germany there has been some evidence showings 




264 In practice there are many more players including sovereign wealth funds and central banks, but in most 
instances the dynamics of the investment ecosystem can be explained without the need for their explicit 
consideration.  
 251 
Starting with executive pay, I will now turn to the first of the three mechanisms by which asset 
managers are contributing to growing inequality as well as the financialisation of the 
nonfinancial firm. The link between executive firm and financialisation may not seem 
immediately apparent. Yet pay plays a central role as a result of mainstream economic theory 
presenting corporate governance as an agency problem. It is through high pay that shareholders 
have sought to align the interests of management with theirs. “This realignment of corporate 
manager interests to coincide with those of financial markets has been facilitated by the 
destruction of union power. This has removed a countervailing force that previously prevented 
managers from siding excessively with financial interests” (Palley, 2007: 18). 
 
Excessive pay packages are designed to encourage a change in behaviour towards shareholder 
interests. Since pay packages are oftentimes focussed on short-term results, and since 
executives are aware that the duration of their average tenure has shortened substantially over 
recent decades, such pay encourages the consideration of short-term measures. 
 
The support of the Big Three has been particularly strong with regards to US executive 
remuneration, even when pay packages have been shown to be excessive by industry standards. 
Chapter 3 documented the astonishing difference between the voting decisions of the biggest 
UK and German asset managers on the one side and the biggest US asset managers on the other 
side. Whereas the two largest UK asset managers Aberdeen Standard Life and Legal and 
General Investment Management opposed 81 percent and 65 percent of the “most overpaid” 
CEO packages respectively, and the German asset managers DWS and AGI opposed 34 percent 
and 93 percent respectively, BlackRock and Vanguard opposed just eight percent and ten 
percent respectively.  
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As a result of such behaviour by US asset managers (who have themselves seen rising executive 
pay), the pay of US corporate CEOs has increased by 1,167 percent since 1978, compared to 
the typical worker compensation which has increased only 13.7 percent, thereby substantially 
contributing to increased inequality. The pay of US CEOs now stands at 320 times the pay of 
the average employee, up from 21 times in 1965 (EPI, 2020). Executive pay has increased also 
in the UK, where the average CEO earned 201 times the salary of the average worker in 2018 
and in Germany where the ratio stood at 136 times. Despite the substantial increases in all three 
countries, the difference between the rations is still pretty remarkable.  
 
Financialisation convergence theory would suggest that Germany and the UK are going in the 
same direction as the US and will catch up in the future. However, this is a point where the 
regulatory context comes into play. The Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRDII) of the 
European Union, the deadline for compliance to which was the 3rd of September 2020, has the 
aim of reducing short termism and excessive risk taking within companies traded on EU stock 
exchanges. It stipulates that listed companies must publish a remuneration policy and give 
shareholders a vote on the remuneration policy. The UK already had comparable rules before 
the introduction of SRD II, so it is unlikely that the UK’s exit from the EU will lead to an 
abolition of the say-on-pay requirement. Due to this regulatory approach, it is likely that rather 
than decrease, the gap between executive pay in the US and that seen in the UK and Germany 
will increase further in the years to come.  
 
Recently there are modest signs that in Europe asset managers may have started to rein in 
excessive executive compensation. In their study of executive compensation in Germany 
between 2006 and 2018, Beck et al. (2020) note a substantial increase in executive 
compensation over the entire period but note that the increase occurred primarily between 2006 
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and 2013. Between 2013 and 2018, however, CEO median pay has remained largely unchanged 
at 53 times the average workers’ pay in Germany.265 The UK provides stronger evidence yet of 
asset managers’ success in reining in the growth of CEO pay. After increasing from 
approximately £1 million in 1994 to £4 million in 2007, a study by the UK Parliament notes 
that pay of FTSE 100 CEOs has remained largely unchanged since the financial crisis of 
2007/2008.266 
 
Meanwhile in the US, the compensation of the average CEO continues to increase largely 
unabated. Interview data presented in the previous chapter suggests the differential 
development of CEO salaries in the US to the UK and Germany comes as a direct result of the 
divergent approaches being taken by European investors (as well as their proxy advisors) in 
Europe. Several European corporate interviewees complained about the fact that investors were 
too strict on CEO compensation with two in particular making the case that they operated in 
global industries with US peers and thus were in a global battle for talent. 267 Yet investors 
refused to support higher pay packages for their CEOs.  
 
Executive pay matters because it sets incentives for corporate behaviour. Executive 
remuneration plays a central role in what Braun (2020a) refers to as the Berle-Means-Jensen-
Meckling ontology. Agency theory considers the relationship between shareholders and 
company executives as pivotal and pay is regarded as the means to limit perceived agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tosi et al., 1989).  
 
 
265 The authors also show that the percentage of performance-related pay that is tied to longer-term goals has 
been expanded from 4 percent to 12 percent of total compensation.  
266 Source: UK Parliament, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/2018/201805.htm 
(Accessed 25.10.2020). 
267 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 17 January 2018. 
  Investor relations, UK company, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018. 
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Executives are unlikely to be able to achieve short-term results by increasing research and 
development expenditure or by raising capital expenditure to support organic growth. The 
incentive structure has therefore had the effect of shifting the focus of executives towards 
financial engineering and thus the financialisation of the nonfinancial firm. This has been 
reflected in record levels of share buybacks by companies in the US and the UK (though not 
in Germany, as will be discussed below) and the many “spin-offs” in which companies separate 
business units and sell them off to other companies, private equity funds or list them separately 
on the stock market.  
 
Examples of spin-offs are the German chemical companies Covestro and Lanxess, both of 
which were separated from the German pharma/chemical giant Bayer AG, the US chemicals 
companies Dow Chemical and Du Pont that merged only to then separate into three separate 
businesses, and the UK insurer Prudential, which spun off its UK and European insurance and 
asset management business M&G. This represents a clear shift from the traditional “retain-
and-reinvest” model to a “downsize-and-distribute” strategy (Froud and Williams, 2007; 
Lazonick, 2015). The financialisation literature therefore considers the spread of shareholder 
value thinking (high executive pay, share buybacks, etc.) as evidence of the financialisation of 
the nonfinancial corporation (Davis and Kim, 2015). 
 
Although the pressure for such policy changes comes mostly from activist hedge funds, such 
policy changes could not happen without the implicit support of the big mutual fund 
companies. Hedge funds typically only acquire stakes between three and ten percent and use 
these to agitate for change (Fichtner, 2020). As will become clear in relation to the common 
ownership literature discussed below, corporate management may internalise (act according 
to) what they perceive to be their shareholders’ preferences. For activists to be successful they 
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have to appear to represent the preferences of the majority of shareholders for management to 
take action. Fichtner et al. (2017) have shown that the Big Three have supported the vast 
majority of votes calling for share buybacks as well as mergers and acquisitions when these 
have been supported by corporate management teams.  
 
In the absence of asset managers taking a public stance against share buybacks, it is logical for 
executives to assume that shareholders welcome them. Share buybacks are a controversial issue 
with the different literatures giving little regard for the arguments put forward by the other. In 
what follows I will attempt to present both sides of the argument, but to be clear, the case I 
seek to make is that share buybacks should be regarded as a transfer of wealth from other 
stakeholders to shareholders with the associated negative effects for income inequality.  
 
Scholars interested in the social studies of finance mostly regards them as immediate payoffs 
to shareholders (the result of a “cult of debt Finance”, Palley (2007)) that come at the cost to 
other stakeholders, particularly workers. Once the money has been distributed to shareholders 
it cannot be used for research and development or other capital expenditure purposes that could 
grow the firm (Fichtner and Heemskerk, 2020; Lazonick, 2015). Many finance practitioners on 
the other hand denounce what they consider to be unjust criticism of buybacks, referring to a 
“buyback derangement syndrome” (Asness et al., 2018). They argue instead that buybacks are 
appropriate when a company cannot see profitable investment opportunities and wishes to 
ensure its balance sheet is not underleveraged, which could have tax disadvantages and could 
also otherwise make it a takeover target.  
 
To assess the argument that share buybacks further inequality and harm economic growth, one 
needs to consider how they function. Companies use either cash on hand or issue bonds to 
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finance share buybacks. Since interest rates have been historically low over the past decade, 
buybacks have been enjoying increased popularity. Shares are bought from existing 
shareholders, typically via the stock market. Since there are fewer shares, the value of each 
share appreciates to compensate benefitting shareholders and corporate executives that are 
incentivised with shareholdings.268  
 
The significance of share buybacks from the stakeholder perspective is that they remove cash 
from the company. Irrespective of whether this cash could have been used to fund company 
growth, it increases the leverage of the company, making it more vulnerable should the 
economic situation deteriorate in the future. Airlines have been one sector that has made 
substantial use of share buybacks, with the result that their leverage going into the coronavirus 
induced recession was higher than it would otherwise have been.  
 
Figure 30: Annual Net Issuance of Equities by US Non-Financial Corporations 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
268 Technically this issue is highly disputed. Since the company has more debt (or less cash), the valuation of a 
company should not be impacted (“Modigliani and Miller theorem”). Yet depending on the earnings multiple 
employed, the higher debt may (EV/EBITDA) or may not (P/E) be reflected in the multiples. For a discussion of 
how “research laid the intellectual groundwork for a dramatic erosion of corporate creditworthiness”, see: 
https://www.ft.com/content/87efe5a9-4cb6-493b-a31a-f9efd5ddd242 (Accessed 14 November 2020) 
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Figure 30 above shows that US non-financial corporations have been delisting more shares via 
mergers and share buybacks than they have been issuing in every year since 1997. A total of 
$6.18 trillion was removed from US companies in this 23-year period, with the trend 
accelerated in recent years. The result is that the stock market has reversed its function 
“changing from an institution that transports capital from investors to firms that use it for 
investment into a mechanism that channels money out of listed corporations to their owners” 
(Fichtner and Heemskerk, 2020: 14). Arguably the financialisation of everyday life, has 
decreased the opposition to share buybacks amongst a small number of rich households.  
 
In Germany and the UK, the volume of buybacks has also increased in recent years, but at a 
much smaller total (even after adjusting for the relative size of markets). In the UK FTSE 100 
companies have spent £136bn buying back their own shares from 2010 to 2019 (McGachey, 
2020). In Germany buybacks in the DAX and MDAX reached a peak of €16.8 billion in 2007 
before crashing to €0.4 billion in 2008.269 They have since steadily recovered to reach €8.4bn 
in 2018. It is noteworthy that this level is half of the level of annual share buybacks seen at the 
peak in 2008, while the US market in 2018 set a new record of $700 billion.270 As with 
executive remuneration, there are therefore signs that Europe is reconsidering its approach to 
shareholder value maximisation.  
 
The third way in which asset manager capitalism is contributing towards growing inequality is 
via “common ownership”. Common ownership, or horizontal ownership, occurs when a 
shareholder holds simultaneous shareholdings in multiple companies within the same industry. 
 
269 https://www.flossbachvonstorch-researchinstitute.com/en/comments/2018-is-the-year-of-share-buybacks-1/ 
(Accessed 8 November 2020).  
270 http://union-investment.ch/home/Capital-Market/Themen_Record_level_of_share_buybacks.html (Accessed 
8 November 2020). 
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Research has shown that this results in less competition and higher prices in the airlines 
industry (Azar et al., 2018), pharmaceutical industry (Newham et al., 2019) and banking (Azar 
et al., 2019). Such a decrease in competition is in the interest of their common owners, as it 
maximises portfolio returns. If one firm where to seek to aggressively take market share, the 
profits of that firm may increase, but the profits of all other firms would likely decrease, leading 
to lower portfolio returns for the common shareholder.  
 
The social consequence of common ownership is that consumers pays higher prices and 
shareholders are rewarded by higher company profits. The common ownership research does 
not imply explicit collusion between firms or that shareholders are explicitly pushing 
companies to compete less, but that company executives cognizant of their shareholders’ other 
holdings internalize their owners’ preferences and thus compete less, in order to maximise 
industry returns. Common ownership is not limited to index funds, though their large and 
diversified holdings make them prime examples. Other investors such as Berkshire Hathaway 
(airlines) as well as the Japanese firm Softbank and a number of hedge funds are also frequently 
named.  
 
Previous chapters have highlighted the smaller holdings of the Big Three in the UK and 
Germany compared to the US. Yet in both countries we have different common owners, 
national champions (Standard Life Aberdeen Asset Management, DWS) as well as the 
Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, that mostly make up for this in terms of common ownership. 
Yet it is unclear, whether and to what extent, corporate executives from US and European 
companies interpret the policy preferences of European investors differently to those of US 
investors. If corporates perceived different preferences, one could expect common ownership 
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to result in different policy decisions in Europe versus the US, though the necessary research 
has to date not been completed.  
 
Because asset managers’ business model is to maximise the value of their assets under 
management, that being a function of returns those asset generate as well as the size of the 
assembled asset base, it is in asset managers’ interests for firms to maximise prices charged to 
consumers while minimising wages paid to employees Braun (2020a). The reason this holds 
true is because the resulting negative externalities such as growing inequality are borne by 
society.  
 
There is, however, another side to the coin that is common ownership. Common ownership 
feeds of corporate executives’ assumption of what their shareholders preferences are. If 
shareholders were to voice preferences that differed from shareholder value maximisation, the 
outcome of common ownership could be altered. This is where the concept of universal 
ownership comes in. Universal ownership typically refers to asset owners, as opposed to asset 
managers that much of the common ownership attention has focussed on. Institutional asset 
owners such as pension funds care about externalities such as inequality, as they affect the 
long-term returns as well as the real-world wellbeing of their beneficiaries (Mattison, 2011; 
Quigley, 2019).  
 
Urwin explains that “universal owners are asset owners who recognize that through their 
portfolios they own a slice of the whole economy and the market. They adapt their actions to 
enhance the return prospects of their portfolios, and hence the prospects for the whole economy 
and the market as well” (2011: 1). Because of the multigenerational nature of pension funds, 
they also have longer time horizons and care about “intergenerational equity”. 
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Unlike asset managers, asset owners typically do not have a business model predicated on 
maximising assets under management. Their high levels of portfolio diversification and the 
long time horizons mean that their returns are exposed primarily to systematic risks, including 
global warming and social inequality (which asset managers oftentimes treat as externalities). 
This is why universal ownership provides an opportunity to seek to address some of the 
negative consequences of financialisation. The fact that rising inequality leads to greater 
savings and thus larger AuM, arguably makes asset managers blind to the risks posed by 
inequality. This research suggests that the relative shareholdings of the Big Three relative to 
the size of the shareholdings of investors that conceive of themselves as universal owners will 
play an important role in determining the social consequences that asset manager capitalism 
will have in any one country. 
 
I will now turn to how asset manager capitalism, with its growing index investments and when 
conditioned by ESG funds, pension funds and other investors with a sustainability focus, may 
address some of the negative consequences of financialisation. As the previous chapters have 
shown, the extent to which this is reflected in the present-day institutional reality differs 
substantially from country to country, with European investors on the whole generally more 
supportive. In the US pension funds and ESG investors are driving a comparable agenda to that 
seen in Europe, but the outcomes are oftentimes very different due to the lack of support from 
the Big Three.  
 
Godechot (2015) interprets financialisation as marketisation, considering it to be a result of 
increasing social energy devoted to trading financial instruments such as shares on financial 
markets. Since index funds have almost no turnover, adjusting their holdings only in response 
to periodic index reweights, they reduce the volumes of shares that are actively traded on stock 
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exchanges.271 From this perspective the increasing market share that is being gained by index 
funds could be considered to represent a de-financialisation force. Furthermore, the growth of 
individual active mutual funds has meant that many of them are today so big, that they are 
restrained in the extent to which they can actively trade their shareholdings, resulting in 
accusations of closet indexing.  
 
Figure 31: Turnover Rate Experienced by Equity Mutual Fund Investors (asset weighted) 
 
Source: Investment Company Institute 
 
Figure 31 shows how these trends have resulted in the turnover rate by US equity funds 
declining for the past two decades. The turnover rate of below 30 percent that was observed in 
the US in 2019 implies that the average fund now holds the average stock position for more 
than 3 years. From the varieties of capitalism perspective, asset manager capitalism involving 
 
271 Some of this may be offset by market makers seeking to arbitrate price divergences in ETFs from the 
underlying shares.  
 262 
passive funds therefore represents an increase in investor time horizons towards patient capital 
(Deeg et al., 2016; Deeg and Hardie, 2016).  
 
From this changed trading behaviour results the need for a new engagement approach by the 
asset management sector, leading to suggestions that asset managers’ may contribute towards 
the de-financialisation of our capitalist system (Fichtner, 2020). From a reduced ability to exit 
results increased need for voice. At the same time public expectations of asset manager conduct 
are rising, requiring asset managers to take greater care of their social license to operate. This 
creates the previously highlighted tension between asset managers’ fiduciary duty towards their 
investors and societal demands.  
 
According to the orthodox interpretation of fiduciary duty prevalent in the US, this requires a 
focus on shareholder value optimisation, whereas many in society call for greater consideration 
of stakeholder concerns. In the UK and Germany, however, the implementation of fiduciary 
duty is much closer to the understanding put forward by the UN PRI (2019). The UN PRI finds 
that “[i]nvestors that fail to incorporate ESG issues are failing their fiduciary duties and are 
increasingly likely to be subject to legal challenge” (2019: 8). It further notes that globally 
there are over 7.320 hard and soft-law policy revisions that “support, encourage or require 
investors to consider long-term value drivers, including ESG issues.”272 The lack of change 
from many domestic asset managers in the US, makes that market stand out globally.  
 
In the US, the Big Three have mostly been clinging on to their orthodox interpretation of 
fiduciary duty, in part due to the partisan political environment prevailing there, and thus out 
 
272 https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century-final-report/4998.article (Accessed 10 November 
2020).  
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of fear of increased regulation should a change in policies result in upsetting one side of the 
political spectrum.273 In Europe the picture is more mixed and there are signs that asset 
managers are succeeding in slowing down executive pay and perhaps even share buybacks.  
 
Briefly turning to the history of fiduciary standards shows that they were designed with pension 
funds in mind (Lydenberg, 2012). As Ambachtsheer explains, the fiduciary regulations were 
broadly concerned that pension fund assets “would end up being managed not in workers’ 
interests, but in the interests of politicians, corporate executives, labor leaders, and the financial 
services industry” (2011:x). However, somewhat ironically, it is mutual funds who today 
appear to be particularly restricted by them. This should not be the case since it is the ultimate 
investors that are making the asset allocation choices. They decide what funds they wish to 
hold, and while some investors will hold a basket consisting of many different equity ETFs, 
others may hold only a single ETF. 
 
The fiduciary considerations of index funds thus arise not from the investment decision itself, 
but from the voting rights that are associated with these fund holdings. Since voting rights at 
present cannot be separated from the physical stock holdings, and fund companies in most 
cases have no way of polling their investors’ preferences, they have to make the voting 
decisions on their behalf (as well as the engagement decisions more generally). Fichtner et al. 
(2017) have shown that the Big Three asset managers engage in centralised voting, voting 
almost all shares of all funds the same way. Lipton (2017) explains that this “family loyalty”, 
whereby all funds issued by the same fund company vote in unison, raises fiduciary issues. 
How likely is it that the investor investing only in an ETF tracking the performance of oil 
 
273 Shareholder campaigner, NGO, in person interview, 27 June 2019. 
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companies has the same preferences with regards to global warming as an investor investing 
in an environmentally themed fund?  
 
The outcome of this fiduciary tension is to be seen in the Big Three’s lack of support for many 
of the shareholder proposals that seek to undo some of the excesses of financialisation and 
agency theory, such as corporates’ exorbitant executive. Instead of taking decisive action, they 
appear to prefer the deferral of most decisions to corporate management. The Financial Times 
reports that 2020 marked a global record for the number of environmental and social 
shareholder proposals filed, and that 21 of these resolutions received majority backing of 
shareholders, up from 13 in 2019 and 2018 and just five in 2017.274 The trend is thus clear, but 
the small number of such proposals receiving majority backing is also telling. This thus 
suggests that we should not have too high expectations that the big asset management 
companies will contribute meaningfully towards resolving society’s big problem.275 
 
From the perspective of social activists, the aforementioned work on “common ownership” by 
economics and law scholars does still provide some hope, as it shows that asset managers can 
have influence over corporate behaviour even without explicit engagement (Azar et al., 2018; 
Elhauge, 2016; Schmalz, 2018). This potentially provides a way out for asset managers fearful 
of challenges to their social license to operate on the one hand and accusations of breaches of 
fiduciary duty on the other. Recent examples, include calls by the world’s largest asset 
managers, including BlackRock, for drug companies to put aside any qualms about 
 
274 The FT reports data from Proxy Insight showing that a total of 233 social or environmental shareholder 
resolutions went to a vote in 2020 (by October). Just over half of those received at least 20 per cent support. 
https://www.ft.com/content/844783f8-c9c4-4cda-960f-bec2543a5e12 (Accessed 10 November 2020).  
275 The public responses of the big asset management firms to such concerns have repeatedly been that engagement 
and policy changes mostly happen in private discussions and that shareholder proposals are a sign of a failure of 
engagement and thus should only be employed as a last resort. See, for example: 
https://www.ft.com/content/7a80f33b-a0ed-4dea-b2d3-ce56381f4084 (Accessed 14 November 2020) 
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collaborating with rivals (Financial Times, 2020f) as well as the Climate Action 100+ investor 
coalition on climate change that seeks to ensure that corporates “are minimising and disclosing 
the risks and maximising the opportunities presented by climate change”.276 It may also go 
some way to explaining the possible motivation (other than marketing) that BlackRock’s 
annual CEO letters may have.  
 
Asset managers’ reactions to climate change and the Covid pandemic suggest that in instances 
where they perceive systemic risks to their portfolios, they are prepared to act. To date, asset 
managers on the whole have not, however, shown similar concern with regards to economic 
inequality, even though the World Economic Forum and other institutions have identified it as 
a systemic risk for some time (OECD, 2003; WEF, 2014). Inequality is of particular systemic 
importance because of its interconnected nature, connecting social and macroeconomic risks 
as has been the case with both global warming (migration) and Covid (access to healthcare).  
 
If inequality continues to rise unabatedly, it will ultimately harm the demand for the goods and 
services of asset managers’ portfolio companies. In the short-term rising inequality will, 
however, support growing savings and thus AuM growth for asset managers. The fact that 
rising asset prices favour the wealthy is not really something we would expect asset managers 
to do something about, nor is their pay structures. However, we can expect more on ESG, less 
on shareholder prioritisation, and more on executive pay. We can also be concerned about the 
aims of their lobbying. We see from national variation that change to limit inequality and 




276 Source: Climate Action 100+, https://climateaction100.wpcomstaging.com/investors/ (Accessed 25.10.2020) 
 266 
Asset Managers, Financialisation and the State   
Braun (2020a) highlights the fact that the business model of asset managers is often neglected 
in their analysis. Their aim is to maximise the assets under management on which they earn 
returns. Since retirement assets account for the biggest proportion of assets, asset managers 
have a strong vested interest in retirement policy. He furthermore explains that “[w]hereas 
social policy has the power to mobilize more of the base ingredient (savings), macroeconomic 
policy has the power to inflate the pie (asset prices)” (Braun, 2020: 24). Asset managers thus 
have an interest in ensuring lose monetary policies and deregulated pensions markets.  
 
Asset managers’ growing asset bases have provided them with greater resources, which they 
have employed in part to have a say in the national and supra-national political sphere. This 
chapter will focus on the US, because the US has the most granular data and comparable data 
is not available for the UK or Germany. That is not to say that the Big Three do not engage in 
lobbying outside of the US. A platform monitoring the lobbying activity of corporates at the 
European Commission estimates that in 2019 BlackRock had a European lobbying budget of 
approximately €1,5 million and that it held 35 meetings with the European Commission.277  
 
Figure 32 and 33 show how annual lobbying expenditures and political donations of the Big 
Three in recent years. This increased expenditure creates the conditions for financialisation to 





277 https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/bc00bbb0e3cb4fd7a03231d84a00f7a5/blackrock (Accessed 9 November 
2020). 
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Figure 32: US Lobbying Expenditure (USD) of the Big Three 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org) 
Figure 33: US Political Donations by Pacs (USD) of the Big Three 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org) 
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Figure 34: BlackRock Earnings (EBITDA) vs. sum of its US lobbying expenditure and US 
political donations 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org), BlackRock annual reports 
 
Figure 34 shows that the increase in political donations and lobbying expenditure has tracked 
the growth in earnings of BlackRock. This supports the thesis of Pagliari and Young (2020) 
that the financial industry’s growth has broadened the resources that financial firms can deploy 
to lobby policy makers to influence the design of financial regulation. From this perspective, 
the Big Three’s near blanket rejection of shareholder proposals calling for disclosure of 
political contributions by portfolio companies is no surprise (documented in Chapter 5).   
 
Besides direct efforts to influence government policy, asset managers have also gained 
influence as a result of governments’ increased reliance on their services. This “infrastructural 
power” (Braun, 2018; 2020), noted in Chapter 3, arises as a result of governments’ reliance on, 
for example, BlackRock’s experience in risk management, their understanding of the capital 
market ecosystem, as well as their ability to conduct market interventions on governments’ and 
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central banks’ behalf. BlackRock’s epistemic authority has thus created a relationship of 
dependence. 
 
Asset managers’ promises to ministries of finance and central banks that there will be liquidity 
and well-functioning monetary transmission mechanisms, improves their ability to oppose 
policy innovations or tighter regulatory measures (Dafermos et al., 2020; Gabor 2016). This 
infrastructural power is not limited to the US but is also very present in Europe. BlackRock has 
advised the European Central Bank on issues ranging from its asset backed securities (ABS) 
purchasing program,278 banking stress tests,279  and environmental rules for banks.280  
 
Such dependence has recently undergone a step change when in September of 2020 the US 
Federal Reserve mandated BlackRock to intervene in the US fixed income ETF market on its 
behalf.281 The largest high-yield ETFs from BlackRock and StateStreet have assets under 
management of $28.3 billion and $12.6 billion respectively. The fear is that in periods of high 
financial distress, such as the one caused by the Coronavirus pandemic, the arbitrage between 
these bond ETFs and their underlying bonds could break down and lead to “dislocations”, 
which could in turn have knock-on effects for credit markets.   
 
To avoid this happening, the US Federal Reserve provided a mandate to BlackRock that 
included a remit for BlackRock to ensure that the bond ETF market would not become 
dislocated. The US financial newspaper Barron’s (2020) thus concluded that BlackRock is the 
 
278 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-007933_EN.html?redirect (Accessed 9 
November 2020) 
279 https://de.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-tests-idUSKCN0Y215S (Accessed 9 November 2020) 
280 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/12/blackrock-eu-environmental-rules-for-banks  (Accessed 
9 November 2020) 
281 For details, see, The Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2020, “Fed Hires BlackRock to Help Calm Markets. 
It’s ETF business wins big”. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-hires-blackrock-to-help-calm-
markets-its-etf-business-wins-big-11600450267 (Accessed 29 October 2020). 
 270 
biggest beneficiary of Fed corporate bond purchases as almost half of the purchases made by 
BlackRock on the Fed’s behalf were purchases of BlackRock’s own funds. The Wall Street 
Journal similarly declared that the “[t]he central bank’s market intervention helped the largest 
U.S. provider of corporate bond exchange-traded funds get larger” (The Wall Street Journal, 
2020). Not only did BlackRock’s assets grow as a result of the intervention it conducted on 
behalf of the Fed, its business model was also strengthened as the corresponding ETFs were 
stabilised and got through the crisis without a breakdown of market pricing. This is one very 
explicit example of how BlackRock is benefitting from the Federal Reserve’s dependence on 
them.  
 
Financialisation has therefore increased the reliance of the state on the asset management sector 
and the extent to which capital markets and the general economy are intertwined. The 
increasing complexity of financial products and financial markets, that is one of 
financialization’s hallmarks, has meant that during times of crisis policy makers are left 
dependent on the finance industry’s know-how, while simultaneously being vulnerable to 
implicit blackmail to bail out capital markets for fear that failing to do so will bring down the 
wider economy. This dependency relationship further calls into question the appropriateness 
of the concept of the democratisation of finance.  
 
Only a relatively small fraction of the “demos” profits from stock market appreciation, yet all 
of its members have to step in to save it when markets break during a crisis. To date the role 
of asset managers has been considered less consequential than that of banks, with the result 
that none of them has as yet been categorised as a Systemic Important Financial Institution 
(Sifi). Yet, the increasing complexity of wealth management products as well as the growth in 
the assets of exchange traded products (ETPs), all of which are reliant on a functioning 
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arbitrage mechanism, does mean that their relevance from a financial stability perspective has 




This chapter has highlighted the close relationship between financialisation and the growth of 
the asset management sector as well as its contribution to income inequality. The convergence 
hypothesis suggests that the US model will steadily take over the world eroding national 
heterogeneity as shareholder value orientation proliferates amongst nonfinancial firms. 
However, as this and the preceding chapters have shown, there have been considerable 
variations in the way shareholders behave in different countries. Financialisation is therefore 
not a uniform process but differs across countries (Karwowski et al., 2020). Instead of 
witnessing an Americanisation of the international corporate governance landscape, this thesis 
has shown that the national institutional framework continues to matter.  
 
This chapter has furthermore sought to assess the extent to which the narrative of the 
democratisation of equity markets is evidenced by a change in asset managers’ behaviour. 
Differences in attitudes both between different types of institutions and across countries have 
resulted in the varied evolution of corporate governance that has been documented in the 
preceding chapter. Yet overall the evidence suggests that with a small number of exceptions, 
such as the slowdown in growth of executive compensation in the UK and Germany, the 
narrative of the democratisation of investment seems mostly without merit.  
 
Instead of ETFs making investment more accessible for the lowest deciles of the income 
pyramid, evidence presented shows that investors in ETFs are more financially literate and 
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wealthier. Thus, rather than providing a way around high asset management fees for the less 
wealthy, the less wealthy are likely more dependent on advice from financial advisers whose 
incentives will mostly steer them towards more expensive investment solutions, while ETFs 
instead help the more investment savvy to reduce their management fees.   
 
The increase of lobbying spending in recent years should keep front of mind that asset 
managers are themselves corporates focussed on making money for their executives and 
owners. Governments should consider this when deciding what issues to regulate and what to 
leave to capital markets. When considered alongside the potential for conflicts of interests in 
the asset management industry, such as those resulting from the fact that money spent on 
critically engaging with investee companies comes at the expense of asset managers’ profits 
and may threaten corporate pension mandates, the potential for asset manager capitalism to 
reverse the negative consequences of financialisaton therefore appears limited. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have employed an implicit teleological framework that casts 
stewardship as progress and resistance to it as being antiquated. This stems from the normative 
conviction that the status-quo is defective when it comes to social and environmental issues. It 
also stems from the insights gained from the many corporates interviewed for this thesis. These 
interviews showed, particularly in the US, but also to a lesser extent in the UK and Germany, 
that corporates for the most part do not acknowledge that they need to do more.  
 
From this starting point, investor stewardship thus presents an incremental opportunity, 
alongside regulation and consumer pressure, to seek to enact change at the corporate level. Yet 
these interviews, as well as my personal experience within the finance industry, have also 
shown that there is the risk that stewardship is primarily employed as a tool to pre-empt stricter 
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regulation, to open markets for new financial products, or for marketing purposes seeking to 
safeguard an asset manager’s social license to operate.  
 
It is therefore prudent to consider the motivation behind different asset management industry 
initiatives. Gabor warns of a “Wall Street Climate Consensus” that seeks to deliver a low-
carbon transition without radical political or institutional changes.282 Sustainable development 
finance is increasingly market-led instead of regulator-led with private finance writing the rules 
for how to green the financial market. The danger is that these private ESG taxonomies seek 
to maximise business opportunities rather than maximising progress. Viewed from this 
perspective, ESG rather than being a means to unwind some of financialisation’s negative 
consequences, may in fact be a mechanism to drive financialisation further into households, 
nonfinancial corporation, and the state.  
 
Instead, if one looks at the development of executive pay in the asset management industry 
itself, it raises the question of whether we have in fact witnessed the creation of a common elite 
consisting of executives from the asset management industry alongside executives from 
nonfinancial corporations. The Financial Times (2020g) notes that “[t]he chiefs of 31 US and 
European asset management businesses took home combined pay and bonuses that rose 12 per 
cent to $233m last year” and that the CEO if BlackRock once again lead the industry’s pay 
table with an award of $24.3m in 2019 noting that “Mr Fink is also entitled to about $50.8m in 
stock awards that have not yet vested.” This 2019 puts Mr Fink’s pay on a ratio of 182 times 
the pay of the median employee.283 
 
 
282 https://www.taxjustice.net/2020/05/28/the-wall-street-climate-consensus/ (Accessed 10 November 2020). 
283 Source: https://www.execpay.org/executive/laurence-d-fink-285/r-154423 (Accessed 25.10.2020) 
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Useem (1980) notes how in the 1970s US society was run by a corporate elite. In comments 
that could equally be applied to present day developments, he further remarks that  “[e]fforts 
to describe US corporations as having entered a "post-capital­ist" era, or more simply to banish 
"capitalists" altogether from the apex of the class pyramid, are premature” as the “corporate 
elite is united by its primary commitment to capital accumulation” (1980: 68). At the time 
institutional investors controlled only about one third of all shares, compared to the 
approximately 70 percent reported for the UK, the US and Germany in the preceding chapters. 
Yet even with institutions today controlling the majority of shares, the Berle-Means-Jensen-
Meckling ontology endures. 
 
To conclude, the higher levels of both executive pay and share buybacks are negative 
symptoms evidencing financialisaton’s role in increasing inequality. Asset managers 
contribution to this process is two-fold. First, their lobbying activities support an environment 
conducive to the continued marketisation of household finances. Second, their corporate 
governance policies to date largely fail to account for the social consequences that an exclusive 
focus on the shareholder-value entails in the longer-term. The fact that increased inequality in 
the short term leads to rising savings and thus demand for asset managers’ investment products, 
arguably distorts their perception. The next chapter will highlight the role that corporates play 
in ensuring investors’ focus remains on short-term profits. 
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Chapter 7  
The Corporate Response to Asset Manager Capitalism   
 
Introduction  
What we are seeing to different degrees in the three countries is a battle for control of the 
company. The institutionalisation, indexation and internationalisation of investment 
management have resulted in a shareholder base, which, aided by proxy advisors, is better 
coordinated and more incentivised to engage in this battle than has been the case in the past. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that the shareholder ownership structure of the 
typical listed company in Germany, the UK and the US is dominated by two voting blocs: The 
Big Three and the two big proxy advisors. It is therefore not surprising that this chapter notes 
particular concern amongst corporates with regards to these two groups.  
 
This chapter will document the corporate response to the rise of the asset management industry. 
It will show that rather than merely passively adapting to changes in their respective 
governance frameworks, as the VoC literature would suggest, corporates are actively seeking 
to influence the design of their national governance frameworks. The extent to which asset 
managers are therefore able to take on the role of stewards of their portfolio companies depends 
also on company managers’ willingness to cooperate with institutional investors and their 
ability to resist doing so. Alongside the regulatory approach, asset managers’ intent to bring 
about change, asset managers’ policy preferences, their stewardship resources, their voting 
blocs and the support provided by proxy advisors, the corporate response represents the seventh 
and final dimension of asset managers’ stewardship efforts. 
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With regard to the research question, this means that the extent to which the varieties of 
capitalism are changing cannot be assessed without consideration of the role played by 
corporates. This chapter finds that the extent of companies’ resistance to shareholders differs 
substantially across the three countries studied. While the interviews documented tension in all 
three countries, the governance relationship between shareholders and companies is most 
harmonious in the UK and most antagonistic in the US, with Germany falling in between.  
 
Since fear of instrumentalization grows with declining engagement, the greater size of the 
domestic capital markets contributes to the higher tension in the US. There are 1.145 US 
companies with market capitalisations greater than $2 billion, compared to 109 in the UK, 103 
in Germany and 490 in Europe as a whole.284 This means that US investors have on average 
ten times more domestic companies to engage with than investors in the UK and Germany. Yet 
the stewardship resources of US asset managers, while bigger, are not on average ten times 
larger than their European peers. Table 9 (Page 184) shows that the Big Three have an average 
headcount of 31 people, which compares to an average of 19 headcounts at the listed UK asset 
managers and 10 at the German firms. 
 
This chapter will illustrate that the strong corporate opposition in the US has resulted in a high 
degree of inertia within the US model of corporate governance over the past ten to twenty 
years. Having started on its journey of continual corporate governance reform as early as 1992 
(Cadbury Report), the UK successively added to legislation, notably with the Combined Report 
in 1998 and the UK Corporate Governance Code and the UK Stewardship Code in 2010.285 In 
 
284 Definitions differ, but companies with market capitalisations of less than $2 billion are commonly considered 
to be small capitalisation companies. For the US, the universe used was the MSCI US All Cap Index, for 
Germany it was the CDAX index and for the UK the FTSE All Share Index. Data as of 26 March 2020.  
285 For a timeline of UK corporate governance reforms, see: https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-
governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code/25th-anniversary-of-the-uk-corporate-governance-
co (Accessed 18 March 2020). 
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Germany the corporate governance “Kodex” was established in 2002, and the asset 
management industry’s equivalent of a stewardship code (“BVI Wohlverhaltensregeln”) were 
introduced in 2003.  Instead of introducing similar governance and stewardship codes, the US 
merely introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 in the aftermath of the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals. SOX seeks to address governance failures by strengthening auditing and 
some of the roles of directors but does “much less to address issues around shareholder 
engagement or executive compensation” (Jackson, 2010: 38). 
 
While US pension funds and activist hedge funds have challenged company managers for many 
decades, US corporates have to date been largely successful in restricting the governance 
activities of the largest asset managers. Besides the implicit threat of withholding corporate 
pension fund mandates, a central way in which they have done so is by enlisting the SEC to 
ensure that the concept of fiduciary duty is interpreted for the most part in an orthodox 
principal-agent understanding focussed on short-term returns. The consequence of this is that 
as the rest of the world’s understanding of fiduciary duty and social responsibility is developing 
to the point where asset managers are considering their wider role within society and in some 
instances taking on broader stakeholder concerns, the US understanding of corporate 
governance is stuck in time, with some actors even seeking to move it in the opposite direction.  
 
This is evidenced by the fact that the SEC, in the spring of 2020, is considering reducing 
shareholder rights to submit proposals as well as measures to increase regulation on proxy 
advisors, including making them liable to litigation by companies. It is further underlined by 
the SEC’s March 2020 decision to grant requests by Chevron Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp. to 
reject a shareholder proposal calling for reports on how the companies are addressing climate 
 278 
change goals. US laws allow companies to petition the SEC to do so if they can show that such 
proposals would interfere with normal business and resemble micromanaging.286  
 
Chapter Structure 
This chapter starts with three sections detailing the corporate perspective of the overall 
shareholder governance dialogue in each of their three respective countries. This will be 
followed by sections outlining corporates’ concern with the Big Three and proxy advisors 
respectively. Since the US is the country with the greatest corporate resistance to asset 
managers’ governance, two case studies will then illustrate the dimension of US corporate 
opposition to stewardship. The first looks at the role of stock exchanges, particularly Nasdaq, 
in coordinating the corporate response to the rise of the asset management industry. The second 
documents the role of the Main Street Investors Coalition, a lobbying group set up by corporate 
interests with the aim of limiting shareholder influence in corporate governance.   
 
 
The perspective of UK corporates 
In general, the interviews with UK corporates brought up relatively few controversies. The 
approach by the UK regulator to require both corporates and investors to jointly steward the 
company has created a somewhat less conflictual relationship between investors and corporates 
when compared to either the US or Germany. The approach of the UK government is to enlist 
investors as stewards alongside governmental oversight. In the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of Carillion PLC in the United Kingdom, for example, both the Work and Pensions 
Committee and the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2018) wrote letters 
 
286 See: https://www.pionline.com/governance/exxon-chevron-given-ok-dismiss-shareholder-climate-proposal 
(Accessed 25 March 2020). 
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to the company’s top shareholders to examine whether they had complied with the country’s 
Stewardship Code.  
 
The UK government’s approach has created the expectation amongst UK corporates that 
shareholders should engage “our top shareholders should be engaging better. If you hold 2% 
in a UK FTSE 100 company, it is incumbent on you to engage. […] We would be instigating 
the engagement; we want to know if you will vote for us”.287 Another corporate noted that “this 
stewardship thing is ironic. Stewardship has to be a two-way thing. Corporates control 
engagement by the investor. But they can’t control a lack of engagement at the stewardship 
level, from institutional level investors. There hasn’t been stewardship despite all the noise by 
the loudest investors. And we all know who the noisy few are”.288 He continued that “the notes 
of generic IR people will tell you they have never had a serious discussion with investors. Yet 
the notes of the investors will say the IR never brought up corporate governance so it cannot 
be important to them, there cannot be any issues”.289 
 
This shows that even in the country considered by many interviewees to represent the best 
practice of shareholder engagement, tensions between asset managers and corporates remain. 
A qualitative difference between corporate complaints in the UK and the other two countries 
is, that UK companies mainly complained about a lack of engagement and a lack in depth of 
the engagement that there is, whereas the following two sections will show that corporates in 
Germany and the US still struggle with the basic principle of investor stewardship. This section 
only provided a bird’s-eye view of the UK context, individual policy aspects of the UK model 
will be discussed in the later sections of this chapter.    
 
287 Group General Counsel & Company Secretary, UK corporate, telephone interview, 12 June 2018.  
288 Investor Relations, UK company, telephone interview, 14 June 2018. 
289 Ibid. 
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The perspective of German corporates 
On the whole, German corporates expressed unease with greater shareholder involvement, 
noting that they felt much of it was a fad driven by a desire for a more responsible image.  As 
a result, investors were becoming “more populist” and “stricter” in their evaluation of corporate 
conduct. 290 Institutional investors “want to go one step further” due to marketing reasons vis-
à-vis their ultimate investors.291 The quality of engagement with German asset managers was 
worse, it “has a different quality” as it is perceived to be a marketing-led approach.292 The 
interviewee thus described these investors as “the dachshund barking especially loud”. 
Explaining that they have strict policies and will never deviate from them. He contrasted this 
with the UK engagement specialist Hermes, who he said was different “If they agree they 
would be prepared to publicly back a company’s management even on sensitive issues”.293  
 
Several corporate interviewees suggested corporate governance was a box-ticking exercise, not 
just the proxy voting but also the engagement, with investors asking for meetings being enough, 
regardless of whether the meetings actually happened or not.294 Another German corporate 
explained that the German Corporate Governance Kodex from 2017 stated that companies 
should make the supervisory board chairman available for dialogue. They had offered such 
dialogue to a number of their larger shareholders, but investors were unsure how to proceed as 
they had no experience with such dialogue, and interest was thus limited.295  
 
But besides the above list of grievances, concern amongst German corporates was limited. 
They reported how in the past they had spent a lot of their time educating foreign investors on 
 
290 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Investor Relations, German company, telephone interview, 31 January 2018.  
293 Ibid. 
294 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 5 January 2018. 
295 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 8 June 2018. 
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domestic corporate governance statutes, but that the understanding of the German corporate 
governance system had become better. For example, one company explained that the UK 
guidelines encouraged investor interaction with “the board” but that in the case of Germany 
some investors had been confused as to which board was meant.296 “The separation of duties 
between CEO and the Chairman of the supervisory board is not always well understood by 
investors from the UK and US”.297 Today, however, the feeling amongst German corporates is 
that the two-tier system is better understood and that “the guidelines used by investors and 




The perspective of US corporates 
If UK corporates are concerned about a lack of engagement, and German corporates consider 
much of it to be a theatrical performance put on for retail investors, then the response by US 
corporates stands out because of how serious their alarm is. US companies fundamentally 
questioned whether investors are the right people to decide on many of the issues such as say-
on-pay, or political donations, and suggested it would be better to go back to the “old model of 
selling companies whose policies you don’t like”.299  
 
The current approach of giving shareholders a say in an increasing number of issues had led to 
shareholders seeking to micromanage companies, according to one of the big US oil 
companies.300 In his opinion, social activists today have identified 4 routes of action: 1) the 
 
296 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 5 January 2018.  
297 Ibid.  
298 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11th of January 2018.  
299 Corporate secretary, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
300 Governance expert, US company, in-person interview, 26 June 2018. 
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traditional activist route, aiming to change legislation, 2) go the regulatory route, 3) if no 
success then go via the shareholder proxy route, and 4) use lawsuits. “Many activists today go 
for all four routes simultaneously to create a buzz. To create a culture around the issue”.301 It is 
this fear that large asset managers, as well as proxy advisors, may become instrumentalised, 
that appears to be driving the strong opposition of US corporates to investor stewardship.  
 
On the whole US corporates reported that “proactive outreach from investors hasn’t changed 
very much”.302 Instead, it was corporates, and not investors, that are putting in the effort to try 
and set up engagement, and many reported following a process of regularly reaching out to 
their top 20-40 investors.303 However, investors were often times not interested in taking such 
calls, “it’s total bullshit, there is no engagement unless there is a clear activist approach”.304   
 
Corporates see two reasons for this lack of engagement. First, there is a lack of resources and 
experience.  
“There is a gap, people are not sure what to do with it [engagement on 
corporate governance issues], especially the smaller institutions, how to vote 
and how to staff it and how to deal with ESG issues. The system has not quite 
figured out how to make it part of the process. There is frustration on both 
sides as a result. The last couple of years we have been proactively reaching 
out to investors, but investors are not ready to talk”.305 
 
301 Ibid.  
302 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018.  
303 CFO, Head of Human Resources, Head of Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview, 23 April  
    2018. 
    Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 16 January 2018.  
    Company Secretary, Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 15 March 2018.    
    Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018.  
304 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018. 
305 Corporate secretary, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
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Second, US companies, like many German companies, do not feel that investors believe in 
engagement and only go through the motions in order to be able to refer to it in marketing 
campaigns.  
“I was IR manager from 2009 until 2012 and when I came back into the IR 
function in early 2016, I found that there is a much bigger marketing element 
to governance. Shareholder letters are an interesting dynamic. They are full 
of platitudes that probably everyone can agree to, but the recommendations 
are not necessarily actionable. These letters come particularly from passive 
CEOs and we receive three to five letters regularly. The fact that they are also 
released to the press tells you a lot about their purpose [marketing]”.306 
 
 
Corporates and the Big Three 
Despite reporting difficulties engaging with index funds, UK and German corporates were less 
alarmed by the growth of the Big Three than their US peers. Engagement from the Big Three 
was said to be limited, though BlackRock was said to be more involved than Vanguard or State 
Street in the UK and Germany.307 “Per definition the passive investors have far fewer contact 
people. At Vanguard there’s nobody there, even the brokers have no contacts”.308 To the extent 
that there has been engagement, this was said to be limited to a small number of “special 
occasions”309 such as controversial say-on-pay votes.310 “Do we have good engagement? We 
do have good engagement when there is remuneration to discuss”.311  
 
306 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018.  
307 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018.  
     Three team members, investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 18 January 2018.  
     Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 31 January 2018.  
308 Investor Relations, German company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018.  
309 Investor Relations, German company, telephone interview, 31 January 2018. 
310 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018.  
311 Group General Counsel and Company Secretary, UK company, telephone interview, 12 June 2018.  
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Corporates in all three countries noted the potential for index funds to cast the deciding vote 
and therefore explained that they sought to maintain an active dialogue with them, “if we are 
in a fight [with an activist], if we need them, I want them to know me”.312 Another said,  
“passive guys have tilted the battle, decided who wins. So now there is a much greater incentive 
for corporates to engage them, but they [index funds] have not stepped up staff, so we need to 
reconsider our strategy. How to engage with them”.313 It is this voting power, combined with 
the lack of staff, and thus an overall deficit of engagement, that has created fear amongst 
corporate issuers that they may fail to get their point of view across, thereby increasing the 
potential that index funds may become instrumentalised. “If an activist were trying to drive a 
wedge between the company’s management and its shareholders, the best move would be to 
target index funds”.314 
 
Chapter 3 explained the new separation of ownership and control that has occurred within asset 
management firms. Since index funds typically do not have research analysts or fundamental 
portfolio managers, companies have no alternative means of engagement, should they fail to 
come to agreement on a policy issue with a member of an asset manager’s governance team 
(or indeed fail to make contact with the governance team). This is why the lack of engagement 
from index funds is stoking the fears of instrumentalization. “The mandate does matter. 
Passives don’t want to talk. […] it is hard to engage with them. They don’t care. I much prefer 
active firms”.315 Another said that “I don’t get the sense that the governance teams are staffed 
appropriately. Most don’t want to meet with you unless its way off season”.316 
 
312 Investor relations, UK company, Webex videoconference, 14 June 2018.  
313 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
314 Investor Relations, UK corporate, Webex video conference, 14 June 2018. 
315 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 16 January 2018. 
316 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
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Whereas large members of the S&P 500 index reported having a contact person at each of the 
Big Three asset managers, there was strong criticism from smaller capitalisation US 
companies. One company noted that their three largest shareholders were now all passive 
investors and that there was no engagement. “We never speak to them, never. To be honest 
with you I wouldn’t even know who to talk to at Vanguard”.317 Another said, “at Vanguard and 
State street, god help you if you’re trying to get a contact. Even at Blackrock who pride 
themselves on engagement, it is not easy to figure out who to reach out to. They have a separate 
section on their homepage, but there are no contact details”.318 Asked about the quality of 
engagement with the Big 3 asset managers, he replied “oh god no, not on any basis has there 
been engagement. […] They talk a big game, tell you to talk between the proxy seasons”. He 
went on to describe how he often gets just the voicemail and has to leave a message. “I usually 
don’t hear back from them. Even to emails I get no reply. […] It’s almost all for press, but it’s 
all bullshit”.319 
 
Amongst companies of all sizes, there was a concern that social and environmental activists 
will increasingly succeed in setting the engagement and voting agenda of the Big Three. A 
large US oil company explained that they had already reduced their carbon emissions by 25 
percent, but that there is a limit to how far their business model can be adjusted, and “consumers 
then ask BlackRock ‘what are you doing about this’”.320 A US airline similarly explained that 
they were concerned what would happen if, for example, “BlackRock turn to be an all-out 
environmental activist, [his company] will never be an environmental poster child”.321 
 
 
317 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 5 June 2018. 
318 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018.  
319 Ibid. 
320 Governance expert, US oil company, in-person interview, 26 June 2018. 
321 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 3 July 2018. 
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Finally, a number of corporates sought to link index investors with proxy advisors as follows, 
“if there is a concern its counter intuitive. Passives won’t be as engaging; they will not care. 
[…] Essentially there is a large block of owners that are disengaged. The risk is that they will 
defer to the proxy advisors. But we need to rein them in, not give them more power”.322 Another 
noted, “as regards the active fund managers these are separating themselves from the 
recommendations of the proxy advisors. However, passives have now also started voting and 
in the case of passives, there in the fewest cases a separation takes place”.323 
 
 
Corporates and Proxy Advisors 
Corporates in all three countries voiced the same concerns about proxy advisors, though as this 
chapter will go on to show, only in the US has this resulted in a concerted effort to restrain 
proxy advisors. Corporate criticism of proxy advisors can be divided into three buckets: (a) 
concern about how investors use them and the relational influence that results from this, (b) 
concern about how they operate and the quality of their services, and (c) that they may become 
instrumentalised. I will now discuss each of these in turn.  
 
At the heart of corporate concerns about proxy advisors lies the fear that investors blindly defer 
to them, thus giving proxy advisors outsized influence. One corporate estimated that half of all 
US investors follow ISS, “of those the majority will follow blindly. […] The rest will use them 
but have more ability to overrule them, especially if the analyst or PM gets involved”.324 
Companies suggested that even the stewardship teams of the Big Three were not sufficient to 
cover portfolios consisting of 15,000 individual companies and therefore necessitated the 
 
322 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018. 
323 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 22 February 2018. 
324 Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview, 20 June 2018. 
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support of proxy advisors.325 For many corporates, however, the issue was not with proxy 
advisors’ services directly, but with investors’ overreliance on them “investors give them the 
power, as investors just look and follow”.326 Another noted: “When it comes to AGM 
resolutions, investors very much follow proxy advisors. They often don’t engage with the 
company, it’s a tick the box exercise. They don’t reach out and try to understand. It feels like 
there is a lot of unfairness”.327  
 
Corporates suggested that this overreliance was at odds with the value proposition asset 
managers presented to their ultimate investors. “They [proxy advisors] have an incredible 
influence that is underappreciated by the ultimate investors that don’t vote but provide the 
funds. People might be surprised by the influence they have and by the rigid ways policies get 
applied”.328  
 
Chapter 5 reported that investors are more likely to rely on proxy advisors for foreign share 
holdings, and that proxy advisors may thus play a greater role at German and UK companies. 
This conclusion is supported by a German company who noted that they held regular 
discussions with domestic investors, but that when it came to the US, the response is “I vote 
with ISS” and therefore their conclusion is that there is no need for dialogue.329 This therefore 
supports the argument that foreign asset managers have less of an impact from an 
“internationalisation equates to Americanisation” perspective but raises the prospect that some 
of this influence has been transferred onto proxy advisors.  
 
 
325 Proxy solicitor, telephone interview, 26 February 2018.  
326 Investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 24 January 2018.  
327 Deputy Company Secretary, UK company, telephone interview, 11 June 2018.  
328 Corporate Secretary, US company, telephone interview, 22 January 2018.  
329 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 7 February 2018.  
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Corporates acknowledged such delegated authority, and suggested that rather than reflecting 
investors’ attitudes, proxy advisors were drafting their own policies. “There is a big problem: 
there are laws and regulations that are in force in Germany. Yes, proxy advisors think up new 
rules that one then has to follow. In predisposed obedience one then tries to follow these rules 
although the law does not require this”.330 This quote relates to proxy advisors’ support for 
annual say-on-pay votes in Germany, which at the time were only required to be held every 
five years according to German law.  
 
Yet a review of consultation responses filed with the German corporate governance Kodex in 
2016, suggests that the majority of investors advocated for a rule change towards annual 
elections in Germany.331 Proxy advisors’ backing for more frequent say on pay votes in 
Germany, thus did not represent them drawing up their own policy choices, but instead 
reflected the preferences of their clients. This illustrates how proxy advisors have become a 
pawn in a battle between investors and managers for control of the firm. 
 
This relational influence of proxy advisors has created the fear amongst corporates that proxy 
advisors, like the Big Three, may become instrumentalised by activists.332 As with the Big 
Three, this fear is being stoked by a lack of access. Importantly, it does not matter whether the 
power of proxy advisors is real, the mere perception of power suffices for it to influence 
corporate decision making. Corporates sought to engage with proxy advisors to “collect bonus 
points” as “it is easy to get a bloody nose” at the AGM.333 But often times it was difficult to 
 
330 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 7 February 2018.  
331 Source: https://www.dcgk.de/en/consultations/archive/consultation-2016.html (25 March 2020). 
332 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 11 January 2018. 
333 Ibid. 
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engage, as “once you are comfortably in the box that proxy advisors want you to be in, once 
they got you where they want you, there is little engagement”.334  
 
That final point again highlights the relevance of whether or not asset managers have 
fundamental research analysts or fund managers that can come to the company’s rescue by 
overruling the recommendation of the proxy advisors. In the case of active funds, corporates 
are able to call their established contacts and point out perceived faults in proxy advisors’ 
reasoning, “active investors still have a real telephone and like to talk”, in the case of index 
funds, as explained above, their governance departments may not have the resources to engage 
with corporates.335 
 
The fact that proxy advisors face greater resistance in the US than in the UK and Germany is 
therefore due to a combination of factors. Firstly, the greater market share of index investors 
in the US already reduces engagement, proxy advisors then further contribute to this separation 
of ownership and control. Secondly, the perception of influence is increased by the greater 
extent to which proxy advisors’ policies, particularly with regard to ESG issues, diverge from 
the domestic status quo in the US. As the previous chapters have shown, proxy advisors are far 
more likely to back such shareholder proposals and thus provide a challenge to the governance 





334 Investor Relations, US company, telephone interview, 4 June 2018. 
335 Investor relations, German company, telephone interview, 7 February 2018. 
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The role of US stock exchanges  
The lack of opportunity for direct engagement with both proxy advisors and many of the index 
funds, has led some corporates to seek alternative routes for engagement. Though UK and 
German corporates also participate in their respective domestic policy-setting discourses, the 
response of US corporates to harness the co-ordinating abilities of stock exchanges, to set up 
lobbying organisations, and to enlist the SEC to look at change to shareholder voting is of a 
different magnitude. This section as well as the next section will therefore document how the 
battle over shareholder rights is unfolding in the United States. 
 
The stock exchange Nasdaq Inc has taken a leading role in advocating for reform of the proxy 
voting process, including stricter regulation of proxy advisors and in support of restricting the 
ability of shareholders to resubmit unsuccessful shareholder proposals in subsequent years. 
They do this out of concern that the increasing governance demands by proxy advisors and 
institutional investors will lead to fewer companies choosing to list on US exchanges. This 
campaign has been waged under the banner of “revitalizing” and “reigniting America’s 
economic engine”.336  
 
Nasdaq’s campaign goes back several years. In 2012 Nasdaq conducted a study in cooperation 
with The Conference Board and the Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance to look 
into the influence of proxy advisors on executive compensation (Larcker et al., 2012). Nasdaq 
has also run annual proxy season surveys in which the stock exchange asks corporates about 
their experiences with proxy advisors. The 2017 survey, for example, noted that a substantial 
number of corporates that sought meetings with proxy advisors had these meetings declined 
 
336 See the campaign website for further details: https://business.nasdaq.com/revitalize (Accessed 20 October 
2019) 
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and that, even where engagement occurred, there was “little difference in outcomes” (Nasdaq, 
2017). 
 
Nasdaq (2019) followed up on the November 2018 SEC roundtable on the proxy process with 
a February 2019 letter to the SEC. The letter, signed by several hundred companies (including 
companies not listed on Nasdaq such as the oil major Chevron and the European budget airline 
Ryanair), made the case that the proxy system is “part of a poorly-calibrated regulatory 
ecosystem that is producing fewer IPOs and driving many companies out of the public markets” 
(Nasdaq, 2019: 1). Academic research, however, shows that the US “listing gap” is explained 
by a high rate of acquisitions of publicly listed firms and that changes in listing requirements 
can be ruled out (Doidge et al., 2015). Further contributing to the de-listing is the fact that US 
companies can find cheaper capital elsewhere due to the low interest rate environment, which 
is swelling the coffers of private equity funds (Henderson, 2019). There is therefore no proof 
that proxy advisors or more attentive shareholders are discouraging companies from listing.  
 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), while not as vocal as Nasdaq, has also sought to 
represent a “strong voice for its community of issuers”.337 Nasdaq and the NYSE are therefore 
helping companies overcome coordination problems in the same way that proxy advisors are 
doing for investors. However, since stock exchanges have both investors and corporates as 
their clients, one would expect them to take a more balanced position. 338 Neither the London 
Stock Exchange nor the Deutsche Börse have taken similarly partisan stances to that presented 
 
337 A US corporate interviewee sent me a scanned copy of the letter he had received from the NYSE. For further 
details on the NYSE campaign, see: https://www.nyse.com/article/bipartisan-bill-advances-reform-of-proxy-
advisory-firms (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
338 Besides charging firms to list on their exchanges, stock exchanges make money from selling trading data to 
asset managers and charging trading fees to banks and asset managers.  
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by the US stock exchanges.339 While beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to note an 
apparent change in the behaviour of stock exchanges. In the past stock exchanges have been 
promoters of better corporate governance in their listing standards but since the 
demutualization of many stock exchanges, some observers have raised the concern that a “race 
to the bottom” may be occurring as for-profit exchanges compete for company listings 
(Christiansen and Koldertsova, 2009).  
 
The announcement in October of 2020 that the German stock exchange operator Deutsche 
Börse has acquired an 80 percent stake in the proxy advisor ISS is a potentially significant 
development.340 Stock exchanges are to corporates what proxy advisors are to investors: data 
aggregators and coordinating agents that help overcome collective action problems. They 
therefore represent two different sides of the corporate governance discourse. 
 
A stock exchange taking over the largest proxy advisor therefore cannot be neutral, in the same 
way that indices and ratings are not neutral but always involve a degree of judgement.341 Each 
exchange is different and Deutsche Börse has not been as openly anti-investor and anti-ESG 
as Nasdaq, nevertheless caution is still warranted. 
 
This merger furthermore marks another milestone in the horizontal and vertical merger rush 
that has occurred amongst financial services firms in recent years. Stock exchanges and index 
providers have merged with ESG ratings agencies, proxy advisors have merged with ESG 
ratings agencies, as have credit ratings agencies, and now Deutsche Börse’s acquisition of ISS 
 
339 Though the LSE did consider changing its listing requirements to attract the Saudi state oil company to list in 
London. See: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/08/fca-rule-change-to-lure-saudi-aramco-
prompts-criticism (Accessed 19 October 2019). 
340 For further detail, see: https://www.ft.com/content/bcc89bd5-51da-4923-9cad-aa25292f5a9e (Accessed 21 
November 2020).  
341 For more on index providers see Petry et al. (2019) and Robertson (2018).  
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has created a firm that straddles the provision of stock exchanges, index construction, ESG 
analytics and proxy advice. It is doubtful that the creating of such of an oligopoly of giant 
private governance actors is in the interest of either asset managers or their ultimate investors.  
 
The one qualifying factor that will be interesting to follow, is how the fact that the largest proxy 
advisor is now controlled by a German firm will impact its perception by asset managers and 
corporates alike. Corporates could arguably regard it even less favourably, claiming it 
represents the Europeanisation of American corporate governance, whereas investors may be 
further alarmed by the potential for growing conflicts of interests, now that ISS does not only 




The Main Street Investors Coalition  
The second vehicle companies in the US have employed against proxy advisors and asset 
managers is the “Main Street Investors Coalition”.342 This coalition, dressed up to look like it 
is representing the every-day small investor from “Main Street” (as opposed to Wall Street 
banks and asset managers), was in fact a lobbying body of the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), the American Council on Capital Formation (ACCF) and the Small 
Business & Entrepreneurship Council as well as other business interests. The group demands 
 
342 For further details, see: https://mainstreetinvestors.org/ (Accessed 20 October 2019). In a November 2020 
article, the New York Times published a detail report on the consultancy that was behind the Main Street 
Investors Coalition explaining its links to big oil companies. See: https://www-nytimes-
com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/climate/fti-consulting.amp.html (Accessed 15 
November 2020). 
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“that fund managers focus on maximizing performance – not playing politics with other 
people’s money”.343  
 
In a coordinated move the American Securities Association (ASA), a trade association of 
regional financial service firms, has written opinion pieces and run an advertising campaign 
exclaiming that “workers don’t want fund managers playing politics with their retirement 
savings” (Iacovella, 2018).344 The ASA states its mission as promoting “investor trust and 
confidence and to help small businesses access the U.S. capital markets to grow and create 
jobs”. It further lists its beliefs on its website as follows “The long-term financial well-being 
of the investor supersedes all else; The best interests of the investor will be placed ahead of 
those of the firm and its employees”.345 It is thus both an advocate for US businesses and for 
shareholder primacy.  
 
This apparent paradox, an alliance between corporate interests and shareholder value 
principles, is a hallmark of the US corporate response to the rise of the asset management 
sector. By supporting shareholder value maximisation, a number of US corporates seek to 
prevent investors from micromanaging their businesses and to prevent ESG considerations 
from interfering with the maximisation of their profits. To this end, they seek to frame asset 
managers as illegitimate owners, and denigrate the proxy voting and engagements efforts of 
investors by coining terms such as ‘robo-voting’ (Doyle, 2018). As explained in the previous 
 
343 For more information see: https://web.archive.org/web/20190120202005/https://mainstreetinvestors.org/  
 (Accessed 15 November 2020). For A critical view of the work of the Main Street Investors Coalition see 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/14/the-main-street-investors-coalition-is-an-industry-funded-effort-to-
cut-off-shareholder-oversight/ (Accessed 25 November 2018) 
344 The ASA describes itself as “the only trade association that exclusively represents the wealth management and 
capital markets interests of regional financial services firms. ASA members are small and regional financial 
services companies who advise hardworking and retired Americans how to create and preserve wealth, provide 
Main Street businesses with access to capital and advisory services, raise capital for schools, hospitals, cities and 
states and work with institutional investors to increase investment returns”.  
Source: https://www.americansecurities.org/about (Accessed 17 February 2020). 
345 Ibid. 
 295 
chapter, the use of the term robo-voting seeks to imply that a large portion of the proxy voting 
decisions that institutional shareholders are making are made by robots and not by individuals. 
 
This corporate pressure leaves US-based asset managers in a situation where any initiatives 
aimed at considering sustainability concerns may be labelled as ‘political’ by corporate 
interests. US-listed companies for their part, however, resist any attempts to curtail their 
political activities whenever put to a shareholder vote. They are relatively free to engage in 
political spending, be it in the form of election spending or lobbying expenditure since the 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) ruling protects such behaviour under 
free speech. Investors’ response has been to call for increased disclosure of such spending, 
though to date with limited success. The result is that corporations are free to use company 
funds to finance campaigns such as the above examples of the Main Street Investors Coalition 
and the American Council for Capital Formation aimed at targeting shareholder rights.  
 
US corporates have been able to do so, due to the Big Three’s near universal rejection of 
shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure of political spending. Former Delaware Chief 
Justice Leo Strine refers to this behaviour by the Big Three as a “fiduciary blind spot” and 
criticises “the failure of institutional investors to prevent the illegitimate use of working 
Americans’ savings for corporate political spending” (2018: 1). Along similar lines, SEC 
Chairman Jackson (Democrat seat on the SEC) notes his surprise in discovering that the Big 
Three voted with corporate management against shareholder proposals on lobbying disclosure 
“I was surprised to find that—despite investors’ clear preference for transparency—these 
institutions have so unanimously voted against disclosing corporate political spending. Given 
the strongly held views on the subject, I wondered whether ordinary investors were aware of 
these facts” (Jackson, 2019: 5). 
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US corporates have also succeeded in lobbying the SEC to investigate the proxy voting 
activities of asset managers and their proxy advisors in a “Roundtable on the Proxy Voting 
Process” on the 15th of November 2018, while concurrently confronting them at the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) on the issue of “common ownership”.346 What these two 
investigations have in common is that they investigate the means by which large index 
managers may influence corporate governance. The implicit threat is that if institutional 
investors become too involved in the day-to-day business of corporations, or advocate too 
vociferously for environmental and social concerns, then corporates will step up their lobbying 
push for greater regulation of asset managers.  
 
Amongst the SEC commissioners, there are members that are clearly supportive of corporate 
interests, as illustrated in a speech by SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce before the American 
Enterprise Institute in which she likened the operations of proxy advisors and ESG consultants 
to a “cold-hearted”, “self-righteous” “morality police”.347 Questioned about these statements, 
a proxy advisor said “they [the SEC] are trying to interfere with a voluntary financial 
transaction between two highly sophisticated counterparts”348 while another suggested a degree 
of regulatory capture of the SEC.349 
 
In a major victory for US corporations, Reuters reports that the SEC will issue new guidance 
on proxy voting that will “clarify that investors do not have to submit votes for every share 
 
346 For details on the SEC roundtable, see: https://www.sec.gov/news/upcoming-events/roundtable-proxy-
process For details on the FTC hearing, see: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-8-
competition-consumer-protection-21st-century (Accessed 20 October 2019). For a background on the 
discussions surrounding the concept of common ownership, see Azar et al. (2018) and Schmalz (2018).  
347 For the full speech, see: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-061819 (Accessed 20 October 
2019) 
348 Former executive, US proxy advisor, telephone interview, 10 February 2020. 
349 Executive, European proxy advisor, emailed comment, 1 September 2019. 
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they own — a misconception that has allowed proxy firms to gain significant influence, say 
their critics”.350 At the time of the SEC roundtable on the proxy process, in November 2019, 
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton explained that “[s]ome of the letters that struck me the most came 
from long-term Main Street investors, including an Army veteran and a Marine veteran, a 
police officer, a retired teacher, a public servant, a single mom, a couple of retirees who saved 
for retirement — all of whom expressed concerns about the current proxy process”.351 
However, in a final twist, it was revealed that the SEC was duped by “fishy” letters purported 
to be written by private individuals but that these were instead part of a corporate lobbying 
effort, leading two US (Democrat) Senators to call out a “sham” process.352 
 
All of this corporate opposition has contributed to silencing the Big Three asset managers to 
the point where they have largely stayed out of the SEC fight. Although other US investors, 
such as Neuberger Berman (2020) and T. Rowe Price (2020), have made strong cases opposing 
the new regulations, Reuters reports that the “corporate lobby so far has faced little push-back 




An implicit assumption in much of the literature is that companies are continually reacting to 
institutional changes that have been put before them. They are portrayed as passive institution-
takers without any agency (Crouch, 2005). Instead this chapter has highlighted that corporates 
 
350 https://de.reuters.com/article/usa-sec-proxy-advisors-idUKL4N2594AM (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
351 Source: 
https://www.financialadvisoriq.com/c/2596973/299793/senators_call_clayton_were_duped_proxy_initiative 
(Accessed 17 February 2020).  
352 Ibid.  
353 Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-investors-proxy/top-u-s-fund-firms-split-over-
new-limits-on-shareholder-votes-idUSKBN1ZU1JW (Accessed 18 February 2020). 
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are actively seeking to influence the institutional framework within which they operate and 
appear to be having some success in the US. The fact that the level of resistance differs from 
country to country, furthermore, suggests that the varieties of capitalism may diverge as a result 
of this.  
 
With regards to the situation in Germany, the corporate interviewees noted that German 
investors in particular are becoming much more vocal. With regards to international investors 
Hermes Equity Ownership Services (EOS) was the exception to the rule that was repeatedly 
brought up as an example of good stewardship. Engagement from index investors for the most 
part was reported as limited. Unlike their US peers, German companies were less outraged by 
the state of asset manager stewardship, instead they appeared to be running rather emotionless 
through the new corporate governance motions, such as setting up calls between the 
supervisory board members and institutional investors. German corporates also made multiple 
references to German laws and the dual board structure, indicating that investors have also had 
to adapt their approaches to the German context. The overall impression I was therefore left 
with, is that the influence of greater investor stewardship on how German companies operate 
is likely to be piecemeal.  
 
Further contributing to tensions in Germany is that until recently German portfolio managers 
and analysts had never asserted themselves as “owners” in company meetings.354 Investors 
would ask questions about the operational performance of a firm, but they rarely ever sought 
to challenge executives seriously. Now that they have started to do this, it is causing the 
aforementioned strain in the relationships between German corporates and German investors. 
Voting at German AGMs had hitherto resembled “socialist” results that had tended to be in the 
 
354 Senior executive, German asset manager, in-person interview, 13 November 2018. 
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high-90s percentage approval.355 Up until approximately 2007 “everyone voted for everyone”, 
but “German corporates have now realised that they need to do more”.356 
 
In the UK the long history of engagement, starting with domestic insurance companies in the 
1980s and supported by regulations from 1992 onwards means that the UK has moved beyond 
the teething problems observed in Germany. Here rather than object to investor demands, 
corporates were mainly concerned with a lack of engagement from some investors. This 
concern differed from the US experience in that UK corporates expected UK investors to 
partner on corporate governance issues. 
 
For the US this chapter has documented both the effort with which US corporates have opposed 
increasing investor governance activities, as well as the success they have had in lobbying the 
SEC. The CEO of the US corporate accountability NGO “As You Sow” concluded that “the 
SEC has apparently inverted its mandate of protecting shareholders to that of protecting 
companies from shareholder input — even where company action creates increasing risk to 
shareholders, people, or the environment”.357 Rather than “merely” being stable, there is thus 
evidence to suggest that shareholder protection in the US is actually deteriorating. Hill (2018) 
thus refers to the engagement between US shareholders and US directors as “private ordering 
combat”. 
 
Chapter 4 showed that index funds have a larger market share in the US than in the UK or 
Germany, and that the majority of domestic index funds in the UK and Germany are operated 
 
355 Governance specialist, proxy advisor, telephone interview, 20 September 2018.  
356 Governance specialist, proxy solicitor, telephone interview, 26 February 2018.  
357 Source: https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/02/03/opposition-to-sec-proxy-proposals-
grows/?slreturn=20200117113720 (Accessed 18 February 2020). 
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by fund managers that have a large active asset base. Since fear of instrumentalization is of 
greater concern with regards to index funds (due to their lack of fundamental analysts and 
portfolio managers), this helps to explain why both UK and German corporates were overall 
less alarmed (due to the smaller market share of index funds compared to the US).  
A second reason for greater resistance by US corporates is their general objection to what they 
consider to be a politization of corporate governance. The two-pronged regulatory approach of 
the UK and German governments seeks to advance aspects of stakeholder capitalism to a 
greater extent than the US shareholder value focused approach. As such the increased 
integration of ESG consideration into investors’ policies, conflicts with the US status quo to a 
greater extent than with the UK or German model of governance.  
 
Overall, the extent to which we arrive by an institutional setup that is deserving of the 
nomenclature of “asset manager capitalism” will therefore depend not only on the size and 
ownership concentration of the asset management industry, and on how investors employ the 
services of proxy advisors, or even the size of their governance teams, it will also depend on 
the institutional context in which the conflict takes place. If regulators advocate for joint 
stewardship of the firm by shareholders and corporate managers, as is the case in the UK (and 
to a lesser extent in Germany), there is less scope for management to resist shareholder 








This thesis has documented how institutionalisation created the preconditions necessary for 
shareholders to play a greater role in corporate governance. In the initial phases of 
institutionalisation, asset managers’ ownership blocs for the most part were insufficiently large 
for shareholders to be able to meaningfully influence corporate governance. That changed with 
the arrival of index funds, who as the new blockholders provided the missing ingredient of 
greater ownership concentration amongst asset managers.  
 
The title of this thesis raises the question of whether the corporate governance models we have 
arrived at in the three countries concerned are deserving of the nomenclature of asset manager 
capitalism. Chapter 1 defined asset manager capitalism as a governance model in which asset 
managers are the primary supplier of equity funding and where they are able to demand changes 
to corporate policies, when they deem it necessary, against the preferences of corporate 
executives. 
 
Since asset managers today represent the primary suppliers of equity capital in all three 
countries studied, the first part of the above definition is fulfilled. In all three countries 
ownership concentration has also increased to the point that asset managers’ ownership blocs 
have on average reached sufficient size that, with the coordinating help of proxy advisors, they 
are able to remove company directors should they fail to carry out their demands. However, as 
the previous chapters have also illustrated, the possession of the means of control does not 
necessitate that asset managers have the intent of control and accept their new role as principals 
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of corporate governance. Thus, while we have arrived in the age of asset manager capitalism, 
its chief protagonists have yet to allow it to unfold its full potential.  
 
Many scholars have highlighted the challenge in identifying and characterising institutional 
change (Goyer, 2007; Streeck and Thelen, 2009; Vitols, 2001). Indeed, difficulty in accounting 
for change is one of the main criticisms levelled at the varieties of capitalism framework (Deeg 
and Jackson, 2007). Streeck and Thelen (2009) note a conservative bias in the literature and 
stress the challenge in differentiating between incremental and transformational institutional 
change, which results in a tendency in the literature to understate the extent of change.  
 
“Equating incremental with adaptive and reproductive minor change, and 
major change with, mostly exogenous, disruption of continuity, makes 
excessively high demands on ‘real’ change to be recognized as such and tends 
to reduce most or all observable changes to adjustment for the purpose of 
stability” (Streeck and Thelen, 2009: 103). 
 
This difficulty in accounting for change stems from the way the VoC literature conceives of 
the ideal-type models of capitalism as self-reinforcing equilibria (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
CME models are assumed to respond to challenges by doubling down on their coordinating 
aspects, whereas LME models will respond by increasing the role for markets, doubling down 
on their liberal characteristics (Hall and Soskice, 2001). A key role hereby is attributed to the 
“complementarities” between institutions. Complementarities exist when “the co-existence of 
two or more institutions enhances the functioning of each” (Deeg, 2007: 611). This 
interdependence between institutions suggests that they must shape the process of change as 
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“efforts to reform one part of the political economy may yield negative economic results if 
unaccompanied by parallel reforms in other spheres” (Hall and Gingerich, 2009: 451). 
 
Complementarities are thus said to result in path dependency as institutions reinforce a given 
path when countries double down on their respective institutional advantages. Since a break 
with complementary institutions results in a loss of efficiency, complementarities reduce the 
likelihood of change. What results is a U-shaped relationship between the varieties of 
capitalism, with efficiency at either pole and sub-optimal conditions in between, as borrowing 
from “best practice” institutions from different models of capitalism results in decreased 
efficiency (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Such understanding of the VoC does not allow for 
countries to operate successfully in the middle ground between the two ideal-type poles 
permanently. 
 
What further complicates the observation of change is that “major change in institutional 
practice may be observed together with strong continuity in institutional structure” (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2009: 114). For example, while Germany has had co-determination since the 
beginning of the last century, Jackson (2005) documents how the role that co-determination 
has played over time has changed substantially. Part of the success of the German export-led 
growth has been the absence of wage inflation, which was achieved in part because workers at 
companies such as Siemens agreed to longer working hours for the same pay during the 
recession of 2001-2003 (Dustmann et al., 2014).  
 
Goergen et al. (2008) therefore explain that there can be a convergence in function without a 
convergence in form. For asset manager capitalism, the opposite may also be true. There can 
be a convergence of form, with all three countries exhibiting asset manager capitalism, yet the 
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degree to which the arrival of asset manager capitalism changes the functioning of the national 
corporate governance context may differ substantially. To determine the extent of change in 
function, it therefore does not suffice to look at, for example, whether Germany still has a dual-
board structure or whether Germany has established a corporate governance code. Instead one 
needs to look at the details of how companies are managed. The result may be, for example, 
that German firms “engage in decoupling by espousing but not implementing a shareholder 
value orientation” (Fiss and Zajac, 2004: 1). Similarly, it is not sufficient to simply compare 
the levels of shareholder ownership concentration of UK companies with that of US companies 
to draw conclusions about the extent to which these two countries are converging.  
 
This is why this thesis has followed the approach of Sinclair (2005) and Braun (2014) in 
seeking to contribute to the macro understanding of the domestic and international political 
economy by studying the micro-level behaviour of specific actors (asset managers, proxy 
advisors and corporates). The previous chapters highlighted a number of such micro-level 
changes brought on by the rise of the asset management sector. These include the creation of 
new institutions such as corporate governance and stewardship codes, of new actors such as 
index funds and proxy advisors, and of changes in the levels of required cooperation between 




This final chapter will evaluate how the developments documented in the preceding chapters 
inform our understanding of the comparative political economy literature, specifically as it 
relates to the varieties of capitalism framework. It will explain why institutions should be 
considered resources as well as constraints on firms’ behaviour, why firms are not simply 
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passive “institution-takers” but seek to both influence the functioning of existing institutions 
and establish new ones when needed, why complementarities may influence institutions in both 
positive and negative ways and finally, why all this suggests that models of corporate 
governance operating between the two ideal-types are feasible. Asset manager capitalism will 
be shown to produce both endogenous and exogenous impulses for change, resulting in 
incremental change, which is best classified as representing a convergence in form but, for the 
most part, not in function.   
 
The chapter will be structured as follows. The first section will discuss the difficulties in 
measuring institutional change. This will be followed by a section explaining the role of 
governments in setting the ground rules for engagement between asset managers and their 
portfolio companies. The role of institutions within the models of capitalism will be discussed 
next, highlighting how they should be understood as more than restrictions on economic actors. 
Based off this understanding, a theory of institutional change in asset manager capitalism will 
be presented. The final two sections will assess what this entails for the overarching question 
of whether there is a convergence or a divergence of the varieties of capitalism and close with 
a deliberation of what the future of asset manager capitalism holds in store for the national 
models of corporate governance.  
 
 
Change in the shareholder identity  
The institutionalisation and indexation of investment management have resulted in changes at 
two levels of the shareholder persona. Firstly, private individuals have been replaced by 
institutional investors as the primary point of contact for corporates. These institutional 
investors are better resourced and face regulatory requirements of varying degrees to engage 
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with their portfolio companies. This development started in earnest in the post-World War Two 
era and has been documented by Useem (1996), Harmes (2001) and others. The second level 
at which changes have occurred is at the level of the investment style as a result of the rise of 
index investment.  This has resulted in both the identity of shareholders and their preferences 
having changed. This indexation of investment management and the corresponding rise of the 
Big Three, which began in earnest at the beginning of the twenty-first century and received a 
substantial boost following the GFC of 2007 and 2008, has been investigated by Fichtner et al. 
(2017), Bebchuk and Hirst (2018) and others.   
 
Hirschman (1970) posits that the use of voice will be a function of the likelihood of successful 
use of voice and the ability of exit. The institutionalisation and indexation of asset management 
has altered both. The growth in average assets under management, as well as their increased 
indexation, has made exit increasingly impractical. At the same time the growth in assets under 
management has reduced the cost of voice by allowing the cost of engagement to be spread 
across a larger asset base. This has also increased the likelihood of its successful use.   
 
As index funds are unable to sell, these new “permanent universal owners” (Fichtner and 
Heemskerk, 2019) provide a new source of patient capital. Deeg and Hardie explain that the 
assumption behind patient capital is that “banks and blockholders are patient because their 
insider position overcomes information asymmetries, enables them to monitor management 
and thus capture rents or secure strategic advantages” (2016: 628). Patient capital therefore 
shields executives from short-term market pressures and enables “complementarities” by, for 
example, enabling “investment strategies with delayed returns and long-term employment” 
(Hardie et al., 2013).    
 
 307 
Fichtner and Heemskerk (2019) question whether the Big Three should be considered as 
providers of patient capital and document that their voting practices support measures such as 
share buybacks and mergers and acquisitions, which they consider to be manifestations of 
corporate short-termism. However, these types of proposals are typically submitted by the 
board, and as the previous chapters have shown, the Big Three support the vast majority of all 
management proposals. While the Big Three therefore support such short-term proposals, they 
do so at the request of management.  
 
The motivation and quality of index funds’ patience may be questionable, but this does not 
invalidate the availability of their long-term capital and near blanket support of management. 
Deeg and Hardie (2016) also note an implicit normative assumption in some of the literature 
that patience must always be good and lead to better financial results. Index funds’ behaviour 
suggests this assumption is incorrect, since they are mostly providing for managerial autonomy. 
 
Index funds’ seemingly passive voting behaviour reflects an intentional choice, which is likely 
the result of the conflicts of interest presented in Chapter 3. Despite mostly reflecting a passive 
backing of corporate management teams, index funds’ voting behaviour still has an active 
influence on the voting outcome, since “one can't be truly passive while holding significant 
control rights” (Schmalz, 2020). This is the reason why the definition of asset manager 
capitalism employed in this thesis only requires that asset managers are able to demand changes 
instead of being both “willing and able” to do so. 
 
In summary, the institutionalisation and indexation of asset management has had the effect of 
making voice (engagement) more important than exit (selling stock). There is therefore a 
greater reliance on strategic forms of coordination relative to market forms than in the past in 
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LME markets. Index funds are also providing a new form of patient capital, the risk of which 
is partially controlled by increased stewardship, including calls for greater financial disclosure. 
Asset manager capitalism has thereby ostensibly adopted two major tenets of the CME model 
of capitalism.  
 
 
The Role of the Government in the Theory of Change 
Chapter 4 introduced five dimensions of stewardship. The first dimension concerned the role 
of governments in setting out the ground rules of corporate governance and investor 
stewardship. This was followed by four dimensions concerning the investor (their intent to 
bring about change, the nature of the change they are seeking to bring, their physical resources, 
and their voting power). Together with proxy advisors and corporates, introduced in the 
subsequent chapters, these seven dimensions determine how asset managers’ activities will 
shape the national models of capitalism. This analysis has further highlighted that there are five 
main actors that will determine the extent and nature of the change brought about by asset 
manager capitalism: government, the Big Three asset managers, all other asset managers, proxy 
advisors and corporates. 
 
How asset managers, proxy advisors and corporates engage is conditioned by government 
action. The role of governments and their regulators in corporate governance is complex. On 
the one hand, governments have been shown to demonstrate substantial agency and may serve 
as a control function for societal concerns. Should asset managers or corporates fail to show 
sufficient concern for societal interests, activists may pressure the government to enact new 
legislation to target the shortcomings of corporations, asset managers or proxy advisors. 
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Governmental agency has been particularly evident in the UK, where the government has set 
demanding rules for both companies (UK Corporate Governance Code) and asset managers 
(UK Stewardship Code). The UK government also demonstrated that it is prepared to back up 
its regulatory framework with parliamentary investigations, such as the one conducted by the 
UK Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committees, which put 
a series of questions to Carillion's major shareholders following its collapse.   
 
In quintessential CME manner, the German government has left the 2019/20 revision of the 
country’s corporate governance code to a commission consisting of representatives of civil 
society, corporations and shareholders. The government is still in charge, but the design of the 
rules has been outsourced to a committee nominated by the government.  
 
On the other hand, the previous chapter also presented evidence that governments’ policy 
catalogues can be subject to influence from other actors. Chapter 6 documented the increased 
lobbying spending by the Big Three in the US and Europe, and Chapter 7 detailed the extensive 
lobbying of the SEC by US corporates aimed at revising the existing proxy voting guidelines.  
 
The direct lobbying of the SEC is accompanied by indirect lobbying of politicians. A May 7, 
2020 letter signed by 36 Republican senators and members of congress to US President Trump 
shows how politicised corporate governance has become in the US. The signatories criticise 
what they consider to be BlackRock’s “hostility towards the American energy sector” branding 
it as “unacceptable” and calling for close scrutiny of BlackRock’s actions.358 Activists, as the 
previous chapters have documented, take the opposite view, complaining about BlackRock 
 
358 The letter can be found at: 
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/2020.05.07%20Letter%20to%20POTUS%20Re%20Energ
y%20Financial%20Institutions.pdf (Accessed 10 May 2020). 
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doing too little to change the way the energy sector operates.359 This highlights the political 
tightrope BlackRock is having to tread.  
 
With regards to the varieties of capitalism, governments’ efforts are therefore complex as the 
role of government may differ from country to country. The two-pronged approach pursued by 
the UK government and the European commission seeks to strengthen the voice of 
shareholders within corporate governance whilst simultaneously directing how it is to be used. 
Greater shareholder control, when considered by itself, would suggest a development in the 
direction of the LME model. However, expecting asset managers to take account of stakeholder 
concerns when exercising their increased influence, is more in-line with the CME model as it 
helps to amplify the voice of other stakeholder groups and requires a longer-term focus and 
greater coordination from company executives. In other countries, such as the US, the 
government and its formal institutions instead represent resources to be employed by 
corporates and asset managers to help ensure individual victory.  
 
This shows that even in a highly globalised world, governments continue to play an important 
role. The way in which they set out the rules will considerably influence the way in which asset 
manager capitalism impacts national varieties of capitalism. Since the US and UK models of 
governance are increasingly at odds with one another, as a result of the substantially different 
approaches pursued by the respective governments, it suggests that referring to an “Anglo-




359 See, for example, Financial Times, “BlackRock accused of climate change hypocrisy”, 7th of May 2020. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0e489444-2783-4f6e-a006-aa8126d2ff46 (Accessed 15 November 
2020). 
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The role of institutions in the corporate governance of asset manager capitalism 
The varieties of capitalism approach to comparative political analysis is an actor-centred 
approach that considers the firm as the central actor within the capitalist system and thus locates 
it at the centre of analysis (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This is why this thesis made extensive use 
of corporate interview data and dedicated one chapter to the corporate perspective. The centre 
of analysis of this thesis have been shareholders, which today are themselves mostly firms 
(asset managers). A central finding of this thesis is the extent to which firms, both corporate 
issuers and asset managers, are seeking to actively shape the institutional framework within 
which they operate. This suggests that actors are not just “institution-takers” (Crouch, 2005; 
Deeg, 2007) as suggested by Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
The behaviour documented in the previous chapter demonstrates that US corporates are 
lobbying the SEC to influence the design of the institutional framework by orchestrating 
investigations into the proxy voting system by the SEC. Firms in Germany and the UK have 
also employed their associations, including trade bodies, to seek to influence their respective 
domestic policy designs. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), for example, objected 
to the introduction of mandatory say-on-pay regulation in the UK, noting that it would lead to 
micromanagement by shareholders and warning that “[b]usinesses do not believe binding 
shareholder votes are the right way to ensure executive reward reflects performance”.360 
However, the approach of US corporates differs from that pursued by UK and German 




360 Source: https://www.irmagazine.com/esg/uk-sets-out-binding-vote-details (Accessed 13 April 2020).  
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Investors for their part have made use of both domestic and international institutions and 
associations to help overcome collective action problems. While governments have introduced 
domestic corporate governance and stewardship codes in an increasing number of countries, 
asset managers themselves have also created new associations. Examples include the European 
Fund Management Association (EFAMA) representing €15.2 trillion or the BVI German 
investment funds association, representing the interests of 114 fund companies and €3.4 
trillion in capital. Alongside these there are organisations, which were not set up by asset 
managers themselves but have been brought to life by them, such as the UN PRI.361 Asset 
managers use organisations such as the PRI, the BVI and EFAMA to further reduce collective 
action problems and ensure cost-effective stewardship.  
 
As noteworthy as the presence of institutions and organisations such as the PRI is the absence 
of others. In the case of the US, the Corporate Governance Principles of the Investor 
Stewardship Group (ISG) are a voluntary industry initiative that only went into effect on 
January 1, 2018. The US to date still lacks a government-enforced federal corporate 
governance code equivalent to those seen in the UK and Germany. This is indicative of the 
success that US corporates have had in stifling corporate governance reforms.  
 
Hall and Soskice define institutions as “a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally 
follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons” (2001: 9). This definition 
primarily conceptualises institutions as constraints on actors’ behaviour and corresponds to 
many of the institutions typically established by governments. However, alongside such 
limiting institutions, this thesis suggests that institutions should also be conceptualised as 
 
361 For further details on the PRI, see: https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri and for EFAMA, see: 
https://www.efama.org/about/SitePages/Home.aspx (Accessed 9 April 2020).  
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resources that actors may make use of in order to overcome coordination problems (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2005).  
 
The extent to which institutions constrain some actors, while acting as a resource for others, 
plays an important role in determining how asset management capitalism unfolds in each 
country. The concept of fiduciary duty is, for example, employed by US corporates as a 
constraint on US asset managers. The struggle for control over the firm will therefore be 
determined on two levels: (a) by the approach adopted by respective governments, and (b) by 
the respective resourcing of corporates versus asset managers (including index vs. active, 
domestic vs. foreign) and their proxy advisors (including the Big Three vs. proxy advisors).  
 
 
A closer look at the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) 
The PRI deserves a detailed consideration at this point, as its existence has had a substantial 
effect on the investment management ecosystem. Originally envisioned by the United Nations 
in early 2005 and launched in April 2006, the PRI is a network of institutional investors that 
today represents the “world’s leading proponent of sustainable investing”.362 Ahead of its 
launch the UN had “invited a group of the world’s largest institutional investors to join a 
process to develop the Principles for Responsible Investment. A 20-person investor group 
drawn from institutions in 12 countries was supported by a 70-person group of experts from 
the investment industry, intergovernmental organisations and civil society.”363 
 
 
362 Source: https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
363 Ibid.  
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A look at the founding signatories shows that they were made up of mainly of asset owners 
with a declared interest in sustainability. Of the 63 founders, just ten were from the US and 
none of the mainstream asset managers were signatories. Six were state of religious pension 
funds (California Public Employees' Retirement System, New York State Local Retirement 
System, New York City Employees Retirement System, Teachers’ Retirement System of the 
City of New York, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (CRPTF), Wespath 
Investment Management (General Board of Pension and Health Benefits United Methodist 
Church)), two were ESG fund managers (Domini Social Investments and Calvert Group), one 
was a trade-union owned social bank (Amalgamated Bank) and the final one was Generation 
Investment Management LLP the investment fund co-founded by former US vice-president Al 
Gore.  
 
The PRI has six Principles for Responsible Investment, which it describes as voluntary and 
aspirational. These principles seek to advance the integration of ESG principles into the 
investment chain.364 The PRI has further set out to achieve a “sustainable global financial 
system by encouraging adoption of the Principles and collaboration on their implementation; 
by fostering good governance, integrity and accountability; and by addressing obstacles to a 
sustainable financial system that lie within market practices, structures and regulation.” 
 
The sustainable investment roots of the founding members therefore continue to guide the 
direction of the PRI. As Figure X shows, the PRI has grown substantially from 63 signatories 
representing $6.5 trillion in AuM in 2006 to 3,038 signatories representing $103.4 trillion in 
AuM in 2020. Besides the growth in numbers, the shift in signatory type is telling: whereas 51 
percent of its founding signatories were asset owners, today asset owners represent just 17 
 
364 For a list of the 6 principles, see: https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
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percent of signatories. Therefore, while the original sustainability focus of the institution 
remains, the signatories have shifted considerably. Today 73 percent of signatories are asset 
managers and 11 percent are services providers (including ESG data providers, proxy advisors 
and index providers).365  
 
Figure 35: PRI Signatory growth 
 
Source: PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri, as of 21 November 2020 
 
Being a signatory of the PRI has become a qualifying requirement for many if not most 
“requests for quotes” with which asset owners procure the services of asset managers and many 
of the asset managers I interviewed prominently displayed their PRI signatory status in their 
email signatures. The PRI has therefore provided a means for sustainability conscious asset 
owners to project their preferences onto asset managers.  
 
There are a number of further factors worth considering in regard to the PRI. First of all, while 
its founding was supported by the United Nations, it is in fact an investment industry body that 
 
365 https://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatory-resources/signatory-directory (Accessed 21 November 2020). 
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is entirely independent of the United Nations. Its supervisory board consists of a chair, seven 
directors directly elected by asset owners (not asset managers!), three directors from non-asset 
owners, as well as two permanent UN advisors.366 It is also mostly self-funded from 
membership fees, which in the year 2019/2020 constituted 80 percent of its budget.367  
 
Besides staffing cost of £9.32 million, “bought-in services, consulting and research” at £2.25 
million represent by far the most significant expenditure item out of the total expenses of £15 
million in the 2019/20 budget.368 The PRI website lists the following as significant bought-in 
services, consulting and research: Energy Transition Advisors (Climate Transition Work 
Programme); London School of Economics (Investing in Just Transition); London School of 
Economics (TPI); Regnan (Environmental Issues); Vivid Economics (IPR Funding); Danyelle 
Guyatt (Implications for Strategic Asset Allocation); Freshfields (EU Sustainable Finance 
Action Plan); Clean Returns Pty Ltd (IPR Implementation Guidance).369 
 
The significance of this is that it demonstrates the extent of the policy and lobbying work the 
PRI engages in both at the European and global level. Together with the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative, the PRI has sought to break the global 
deadlock around the issue of fiduciary duty with notable agenda seeking publications 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; PRI, 2015; 2019). Whereas the 2005 report concluded 
that “integrating ESG considerations into an investment analysis so as to more reliably predict 
financial performance is clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions” 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005: 13), the 2015 report declared that “failure to consider 
 
366 https://www.unpri.org/annual-report-2019/how-we-work/more/board-report (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
367 https://www.unpri.org/annual-report-2019/how-we-work/more/financial-statements (Accessed 21 November 
2020).  
368 Ibid.  
369 Ibid.  
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all longterm investment value drivers, including ESG issues, is a failure of fiduciary duty” 
(PRI, 2015: 9). It appears that this statement was considered too deterministic and in 
contradiction to the global diversity in regulatory standards, so that in 2019 the PRI issued a 
revised “final report”, which instead noted that fiduciary duty requires investors to “incorporate 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes, consistent with their investment time horizons” (PRI, 2019: 8). The 
inclusion of the reference to consistency with investment time horizons, providing sufficient 
room for interpretation to, for example, US asset managers.  
 
Such policy work is one way the PRI seeks to influence corporate governance and set policy. 
The second one is via the standards and reporting commitments it requires from its 
signatories.370 In September 2017, the PRI conducted a consultation of its members that showed 
“strong signatory support for using reporting and assessment data to delist signatories whose 
progress in implementing the Principles is not sufficient”.371 In response to this the PRI 
proceeded to delist four asset managers and one asset owner in September of 2020. 
Furthermore, “23 out of 165 signatories identified as not meeting the requirements in 2018 
have since either voluntarily delisted or been delisted for failure to submit their annual PRI 
report”.372  
 
In a sign of further enforcement, the PRI announced that it plans to launch an additional 
consultation in October 2021. Membership requirements will likely be toughened further, with 
proposed changes “include requiring firms’ responsible investment policies to cover 90% of 
 
370 https://www.unpri.org/reporting-and-assessment/minimum-requirements-for-investor-
membership/315.article (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
371 Ibid.  
372 https://citywireselector.com/news/un-pri-delists-four-investment-firms-and-plans-to-boost-
requirements/a1406974 (Accessed 21 November 2020). 
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assets and making that policy public. Engagement and voting would also be made mandatory 
for those managing equities”.373 Such self-enforcement action is accompanied by annual PRI 
awards and “leadership showcases”. These seek to raise “standards of responsible investment 
amongst all our signatories”. 374 36 investors were included in the “2020 Leaders’ Group”, while 
awards were for prizes including for “ESG incorporation initiative of the year”, “Stewardship 
project of the year”, “ESG research report of the year” and further categories.375  
 
In this manner the PRI acts as a self-regulatory entity, seeking to set minimum standards with 
regards to ESG amongst its signatory asset owners, asset managers and service providers. The 
fact that with more than 3,000 members it is the largest investor network in the world, and that 
73 percent of its signatories today are asset managers, means that it also appears to be 
increasingly fulfilling the functions of an industry association, aiming to improve the 
investment management industry’s image and pre-empt further formal regulator oversight of 
the industry.    
 
Irrespective of such potential ulterior motives, the above policy work of the PRI has put it in a 
position to have considerable influence over the global corporate governance discourse. The 
board structure, with just three out of thirteen members from the asset management industry, 
mean that asset owners continue to hold the reins, irrespective of the fact that asset managers 
represent the majority amongst signatories. Amongst the current board of 13, there are just two 
representatives from US institutions, one from an asset owner (CalSTRS) and one from an 
 
373 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-global-investments-pri-exclusive/five-groups-ousted-from-u-n-backed-
responsible-investment-list-idUSKBN26J0T9 (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
374 https://www.unpri.org/signatories/showcasing-leadership (Accessed 21 November 2020).  
375 https://www.unpri.org/showcasing-leadership/leaders-group-2020/6524.article (Accessed 21 November 
2020).  
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asset manager (Wellington Management). The PRI board is thus representative of the diversity 
of its international signatories.  
 
The above paragraphs have explained that the PRI seeks to advance the integration of ESG and 
to extend investment horizons. This thesis considers both these aspects to be characteristics 
more common in CME than in LME varieties of capitalism. They are more aligned with a 
stakeholder value interpretation of the firm than with a focus on the maximisation of 
shareholder value. The biggest asset managers are today also members,376 but asset owners, 
many of them non-US, remain well represented, and the PRI’s policy initiatives suggest that it 
is asset owners’ longer-term preferences that are continuing to set the discourse.  
 
Further research into the role of the PRI within the institutional framework of asset manager 
capitalism is needed. But as outlined in this and the subsequent sections, the PRI should not be 
regarded as an institution seeking to advance the Americanisation of the asset management 
industry. To the contrary, the largely international membership, is reflected in policy 
preferences that represent an international consensus.  
 
To the extent that the PRI is contributing towards a convergence of international governance 
standards these standards are, therefore, reflective not of a convergence on the US model but 
on the international best-practice interpretation of fiduciary duty and ESG; one that is much 
closer to the CME than the ideal-type LME model of the varieties of capitalism. Furthermore, 
the PRI provides a framework for asset managers, asset owners and proxy advisors to overcome 
collective action problems and agree policies, which strengthens their position vis-à-vis stock 
market listed companies.  
 
376 BlackRock signed up early in 2008, whereas Vanguard only became a signatory in 2014. 
 320 
The Theory of Change in Asset Manager Capitalism 
The preceding chapters have established that individual shareholders have mostly been 
replaced by asset managers and that these asset managers face pressure from both their own 
clients and from society more generally. Firms and asset managers make use of associations 
such as the PRI, as well as institutions such as governance codes, as resources and create new 
ones when needed. Figure 36 below illustrates how some of the most important actors and 
institutions of corporate governance in the age of asset manager capitalism are arranged. 
 
Figure 36: Actors and institutions in the corporate governance of asset manager capitalism 
 
 
Marked in red are the primary actors in asset manager capitalism, consisting of the asset 
managers themselves, their customers (the ultimate owners), the portfolio firms, the proxy 
advisors, and society, often represented by NGOs. The fact that the Big Three are placed on 
the left side of Figure 36, the international side of the diagram (shaded), indicates that this is a 
diagram of the UK or German corporate governance model (for some of the big asset managers, 
that are the result of a number of mergers, and have governance and portfolio management 
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teams in several regions, assigning nationality can be challenging). Marked in yellow are the 
primary institution and organisation, the domestic corporate governance and stewardship codes 
and the PRI respectively. In the case of the US, instead of corporate governance and 
stewardship codes, the SEC is the primary domestic institution setting the formal ground rules 
and adjudicating over domestic corporate governance disputes. Not displayed on Figure 36 is 
the government, which can be considered to represent a red frame around the domestic part of 
the institutional landscape. 
 
Figure 36 furthermore illustrates that impulses for change may come from international asset 
managers and proxy advisors (exogenous impulses for change) or from domestic firms, asset 
managers or NGOs (endogenous impulses for change). Previous chapters have documented 
that the majority of engagement beyond proxy voting comes from domestic investors. This 
difference in pressure is represented in Figure 36 by the arrow between the domestic asset 
manager (Asset Manager A) and the firm being thicker than the arrow between the foreign 
asset manager (Asset Manager B) and the firm. 
 
The preceding chapters illustrated that proxy advisors, domestic US active asset managers, as 
well as asset managers from the UK and Germany often vote differently to the Big Three. 
Besides the policies adopted by the domestic government, the crucial factor determining how 
national models of corporate governance develop as a result of asset manager capitalism is 
therefore the relative strength of power relationships (the thickness of the arrows). Particularly 
the relative influence of the Big Three versus the proxy advisors, as well as the importance of 
other investors versus the Big Three. The thickness of the arrows between society and asset 
managers is representative of the extent to which the national context is critical or supportive 
of the financial sector. 
 322 
As a result of the internationalisation of asset management foreign asset managers as well as 
proxy advisors have the potential to bring exogenous change to any national model. At the 
same time domestic investors as well as domestic institutions such as corporate governance 
and stewardship codes have the potential to bring endogenous change or to resist it. Examples 
of endogenous impulses for change include asset managers participating in consultation 
processes to overhaul the domestic stewardship code, whereas the formation of global 
shareholder coalitions such as Climate Action 100+ is an example of exogenous impulses. 
Asset manager capitalism therefore provides a mixture of both endogenous and exogenous 
sources of change. 
 
The growth of the asset management industry, in conjunction with the regulations that oversee 
the industry, has created proxy advisors as new actors alongside those new institutions. The 
business model of proxy advisors matches Hall and Soskice’s (2001) explanation of the role 
that institutions fulfil in CMEs perfectly, suggesting that the role of proxy advisors may be to 
compensate for some of the losses of information and control caused by the dismantling of the 
interlocking directorships. Hall and Soskice (2001) explain that in the CME model, institutions 
fulfil three purposes: “(i) the exchange of information among the actors, (ii) the monitoring of 
behavior, and (iii) the sanctioning of defection from cooperative endeavour” (2001: 10). Proxy 
advisors similarly (i) aggregate investors’ preferences, (ii) monitor the behaviour of firms, and 
(iii) suggest sanctioning firms that fail to abide by common standards by voting against their 
management.  
 
When discussing the role of proxy advisors in this chapter, the intent is not to suggest that they 
represent a bloc of investors that blindly follows their recommendations. Instead, and in 
keeping with the findings of Chapter 5, the assumption is that proxy advisors fulfil a 
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coordinating role amongst the many smaller institutional investors, helping them to overcome 
collective action problems. Proxy advisors therefore represent a second voting bloc alongside 
the Big Three. One that regularly advocates for different voting outcomes on shareholder 
proposals to that pursued by the Big Three. 
 
The relationships within asset manager capitalism can be further boiled down to the following 
three central relationships: the relative influence of the Big Three compared to proxy advisors 
in the national context, the degree to which firms and asset managers are able to make use of 
domestic and international institutions to their advantage (the regulatory dimension), and the 
relative importance of domestic and foreign asset managers. In order to show why the 
convergence in form that asset manager capitalism represents has not been accompanied by a 
corresponding convergence in function, the following three sections will compare and contrast 




The dynamics of asset manager capitalism in Germany 
Because the German corporate governance Kodex commission, assembled by the government, 
is made up of representatives from civil society, corporate representatives and shareholder 
representatives, the German approach to regulation is one of consensus building, fitting for a 
CME economy. In line with the European Union’s Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) 
the Kodex is being amended to give further rights to shareholders. Importantly though, the 
SRD II pursues the same two-pronged approach set out by the UK government (which was of 
course part of the European Union while SRD II was being drafted). SRD II seeks to strengthen 
the position of shareholder while reducing the short-term focus and excessive risk-taking by 
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companies. It aims to make use of institutional shareholders as stewards, alongside 
conventional regulation. It seeks to “encourage long-term shareholder engagement and to 
enhance transparency between companies and investors” in order to create “a modern legal 
framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies” (European Union, 
2017: 1).  
 
In Germany the Big Three hold a combined average shareholding of 9.5 percent (Table 3, page 
122). Even adjusting for voter turnout of approximately 70 percent this indicates that with no 
more than 13.5 percent of the average votes cast the Big Three are not in a position to positively 
determine or block shareholder proposals against an otherwise united shareholder base. 
Second, interview data suggests that investors are likely to rely on the advice of proxy advisors 
to a greater extent when voting abroad.377  
 
With foreigners on average holding in excess of half of all shares outstanding, this implies that 
the influence of proxy advisors in Germany is likely to be at the upper end of the 13.6 to 29.7 
percent range given for the US by Bethel and Gillan (2002) and Cotter et al. (2010) 
respectively. Furthermore, proxy advisors’ recommendations have been shown to take greater 
account of the domestic context as well as generally adopting a more supportive approach to 
environmental and social shareholder proposals. Since these issues are of greater stakeholder 
relevance and thus closer to the CME model of governance, the influence of asset manager 
capitalism on the corporate governance of German firms to date has been more limited. 
 
 
377 ESG portfolio manager, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15 April 2015. 
     Governance expert, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 16 April 2015. 
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Further limiting the influence on the German model is the fact that German asset managers are 
seen to continue to lead the engagement initiatives at domestic companies, as documented by 
critical speeches delivered at domestic companies’ AGMs as well as interviews given to the 
national press. That domestic asset managers are able to lead engagement despite the four 
largest asset managers controlling a combined average stake of just 4.5 percent of a typical 
DAX-30 company, underlines the salience of domestic investors within asset manager 
capitalism. 378 The fact that German investors are able to fulfil this domestic leadership role 
despite their comparatively small shareholdings, also bears witness to the balance inherent in 
the German national corporate governance Kodex, which sets out a number of requirements 
for companies, without proving the possibility for them to challenge individual shareholder 
proposals the way that US companies are able to do with the SEC.  
 
The arrival of asset manager capitalism has been assisted by a number of changes to the 
German model of corporate governance since Hall and Soskice (2001) identified it as the ideal 
type CME country. Foremost of these has been the dismantling of the Deutschland AG network 
of cross-shareholdings (Höpner and Krempel, 2004) and the end of relational banking (Hardie 
et al., 2013), both of which also led to the dismantling of the networks of interlocking board of 
director networks. This has largely put an end to two of the defining characteristics of the ideal 
type CME: inside information and patient capital.  
 
Instead of the traditional patient capital provided by relational banks and equity blockholders, 
German firms have had to find new funding sources. Braun and Deeg (2019) highlight the role 
that strong corporate earnings have played in enabling firms to increasingly finance their 
 
378 Combined shareholdings of DWS, AGI, Union Investment and Deka Investment in the 10 largest DAX-30 
companies. Data as of 14 April 2020. Data source: Bloomberg.  
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investment needs out of retained earnings instead. The investment horizon of index fund 
managers, while a different quality than traditional bank lending relationships, also reflects a 
greater degree of patience than has commonly been demonstrated by investors focussed on 
shareholder value.  
 
In Germany, despite a select number of policy changes such as limits to director networks and 
the introduction of say-on-pay votes, advocated for by institutional investors and formalised 
by the Kodex commission set-up by the German government, there is limited evidence to 
suggest that the German model of corporate governance is converging on the US model. Many 
of the environmental and social issues addressed by shareholder proposals in the UK and the 
US already receive greater consideration within the German governance model. Large 
transformative transactions, such as the mega-mergers between Bayer and Monsanto as well 
as Linde and Praxair, both of which were completed without a prior shareholder vote seeking 
approval, underline the fact that shareholder influence within German corporate governance 
remains limited, even after the arrival of asset manager capitalism. 
 
With the exception of a limited number of firms where family insiders continue to represent 
blockholders, asset managers today represent the new blockholders of German companies. Yet 
the above illustration of the German governance context demonstrates that the new German 
institutional framework has not resulted in an Americanisation of the German governance 
model. Instead asset managers capitalism reflects a convergence in form but not in function for 





The dynamics of asset manager capitalism in the United States 
In the US, where asset managers hold an even more commanding share of the equity market 
and the structural preconditions for asset manager capitalism have similarly been met, the rise 
of the asset management industry has also had only a limited impact on the domestic model of 
corporate governance to date, but for very different reasons than in Germany. 
 
First, corporate governance in the US is covered by a mixture of state and federal legislation. 
As outlined above, the most important formal institution in the US is the SEC. In the absence 
of a formal corporate governance code, shareholders have to demand governance changes 
individually at each portfolio company. Issues such as the separation of CEO and chairman 
have to be put to a shareholder vote, and corporates have to agree to implement the result of 
the vote. Therefore, from the outset asset manager capitalism in the US has a more 
confrontational character. Instead of a two-pronged legislative push, the SEC has pursued an 
orthodox interpretation of fiduciary duty, which while not categorially ruling out issues of 
sustainability, has oftentimes led to them being excluded from corporate agendas. This 
provides corporates with substantially more lobbying potential than is the case in either the UK 
or Germany.  
 
From a breadth perspective this piecemeal approach of filing shareholder proposals at 
individual companies has not resulted in a comprehensive nationwide change to governance 
standards. Particularly at smaller companies that have not been the focus of engagement, 
considerable governance shortcomings remain. This is evidenced, for example, by 
considerably lower levels of gender diversity at the board level of Russell 2000 companies than 
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at S&P 500 companies.379 As a result of this, US corporates for the most part are still in control 
of the governance discourse.  
 
Second, the level of foreign ownership at approximately 14 percent of the shares outstanding, 
is considerably smaller than in either the UK or Germany (each above 50 percent). Besides the 
general bias for domestic investors to set the governance agenda, this further ensures that 
foreign asset managers play a smaller role in US corporate governance.  
 
Third, the Big Three are oftentimes splintering the unity of the asset management sector’s 
voice. Since they control approximately 24 percent of the domestic vote, therefore exceeding 
most estimates of proxy advisors’ influence, they have been able to insulate corporate managers 
by scuppering a large number of shareholder initiatives. As up to two-thirds of all US 
shareholder proposals have been decided by a margin of thirty percent or less, for asset manager 
capitalism to unfold its full potential in the US the Big Three will have to reconceptualise their 
governance role.  
 
The increasing rights that shareholders have been assembling have therefore yet to be put to 
work. The growing shareholder power has not been matched by a corresponding change in the 
attitude of the largest US shareholders to date. Shareholders may have new tools, but in large 
part because of the lack of support from the Big Three, they have not yet been employed to 
change the course of their portfolio companies’ strategies. The reason for this is to be found in 
a mixture of the political tightrope the Big Three are having to tread, in the potential for 
conflicts of interest, and in the absence of the two-pronged approach pursued by governments 
 
379 Ernst & Young (2016) finds that 36 percent of Russell 2000 company boards continue to be all male, 
compared with 3 percent at S&P 500 companies.  
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in the UK and Germany. Shareholders have greater power but are mostly falling short in 
employing it (other than for the protection of the status quo).  
 
Instead, in keeping with the ideal-type LME model of Hall and Soskice (2001), market forces 
are meant to play a much bigger role in the US system. Demand and supply results in the 
creation of price signals that substitute for much of the strategic coordination needed in the 
CME models. In theory, share prices therefore set the necessary incentives within the corporate 
governance sphere, creating a “market for corporate control” (Manne, 1965). Corporate 
executives have to implement policies that support their share prices or else risk their 
companies being taken over and them being fired.  
 
Yet, with the rise of index funds, the proportion of investors able to send such signals via 
pricing mechanisms from selling their stock, has decreased considerable. Instead engagement 
should be taking on a more important function. In the absence of government regulation to 
support it, this leaves the US system in a difficult position, one that has resulted in the current 
tension and inertia. Market institutions are no longer as effective as they have been in the past, 
yet the greater coordination that has come from asset manager capitalism in Germany and the 
UK has not been able to fully unfold in the US as the Big Three oftentimes vote differently to 
other institutional shareholders.  
 
Figure 37 provides a practical example showing the 2017 struggle between shareholders and 
asset managers at the US oil company ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil provides a good example of 
how the US model of corporate governance operates under asset manager capitalism as it has 
faced shareholder proposals over a number of years. Since the attitudes of asset managers and 
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formal institutions such as the SEC changed throughout these years, this example illustrates 
how asset manager capitalism functions in practice.  
 
Figure 37: 2017 Shareholder Proxy Voting at Exxon  
 
 
ExxonMobil has faced a long history of climate-related shareholder proposals, starting in 1990 
the year after the Exxon Valdez disaster.380 The 2016, 2017 and 2020 proxy voting seasons will 
be the focus of this section as they resulted in three very different outcomes. The 2016 proxy 
included a number of climate-related shareholder proposals, including a vote to elect a climate 
expert to the board as well as calling on the board to implement a policy to commit the company 
to support the goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C.381  
 
 
380 For a history of shareholder activism at ExxonMobil, see: https://insideclimatenews.org/content/exxons-25-
years-no-timeline-resolutions-climate-change (Accessed 13 April 2020).  
381 For the full proxy, see: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000119312516539460/d14941ddef14a.htm#toc14941_24 
(Accessed 13 April 2020).  
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As was the case in all the preceding years, the 2016 climate proposals all failed to gain the 
support of the majority of shareholders (reaching just 38% on the key proposal, “Item 12”).382 
This was in part because BlackRock and Vanguard voted with management (State Street 
supported the shareholder proposal).383 In 2017, shareholders including New York State 
Common Retirement Fund again submitted a similar proposal at ExxonMobil. In a rare 
exception to the rule, this time the Big Three unanimously decided to back the proposal and 
the proposal reached a majority of votes. ISS recommended a vote in support of the shareholder 
proposals on climate change in both 2016 and 2017.384 The fact, that it only passed in 2017, the 
year that the Big Three voted in favour, demonstrates the pivotal role that the Big Three play 
in the US corporate governance model. BlackRock (2017c) explained its decision to vote 
against management with the Exxon’s refusal to make their independent board members 
available for meetings.  
 
Finally, in 2020, the pension fund of the Church Commissioners for England and the US NGO 
“As You Sow” co-filed a further climate-related proposal at ExxonMobil. This time the 
company was successful in convincing the SEC that the proposal should be blocked as it 
interfered with “ordinary business”, and it was therefore not added to the proxy.385 This 
demonstrates how the corporates, the Big Three asset managers and the proxy advisors are the 
 
382 Source: http://exxonknew.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/10/10-16-KeyVotes-9-27.pdf (Accessed 13 
April 2020).  
383 For an explanation of BlackRock’s decision to vote with ExxonMobil management, see: 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-exxon-may-2017.pdf (Accessed 
13 April 2020).  
384 For ISS voting recommendations in 2016, see:  http://aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/AODP-
GCI-2016_EXXONMOBIL_VIEW.pdf and for 2017, see: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-mobil-
climate-investors/proxy-firm-iss-advises-vote-against-exxon-exec-pay-plan-idUSKCN18F0A3 (Accessed 13 
April 2020).  
385 Source: https://www.ipe.com/news/sec-blocks-church-climate-proposal-for-exxon-agm-
again/10044630.article For a copy of the Exxon filing to the SEC, see: 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2020/activehomeexxon011720-14a8-incoming.pdf   
(Accessed 24 May 2020).  
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dominant actors and the SEC is the pivotal formal institution in the US corporate governance 
model.  
 
The fact that US corporates are able to employ regulatory support in defence of asset managers’ 
attempts at stewardship, while oftentimes also being able to rely on the voting allegiance of the 
Big Three to overcome proxy advisors’ objections, means they are better resourced than 
corporates in either Germany or the UK. Despite a small number of high-profile proxy voting 
victories by shareholders, US corporates are therefore winning this battle to date.  
 
 
The dynamics of asset manager capitalism in United Kingdom 
The UK regulatory approach is substantially different from that seen in the US. An example of 
the UK government’s desire to transform the UK model is provided by the Kay Review (2012), 
which sought to reduce “the current role of trading and transactional cultures” to “[a]ddress the 
disincentives for engagement” and to “[r]educe the pressures for short-term decision making”. 
Because the regulator expects company executives and asset managers to jointly share the 
responsibility for the stewardship of firms, the relationship between asset managers and 
corporates is less acrimonious than seen in the US. This leaves UK corporates with less 
institutional means to push back against shareholders’ calls for reforms. The result is decreased 
CEO independence combined with a greater need by corporate executives to engage in 
consensus building than in the past. 
 
The level of foreign ownership in the UK, at more than 50 percent, is of similarly high levels 
as in Germany. Proxy advisors are therefore likely to play a larger role than in the US, therefore 
likely representing shareholders with combined ownership blocs towards the upper end of the 
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aforementioned 13.6 to 29.7 percent range. The Big Three, while bigger than in Germany, 
represent considerably smaller average holdings of 12.4 percent versus 18.2 percent in the US 
(Table 3, page 122). Proxy advisors are therefore of greater relevance for the outcome of 
shareholder votes than the Big Three in the UK.  
 
Since proxy advisors have been documented to be considerably more supportive of social and 
environmental shareholder proposals than the Big Three, this suggests that such proposals are 
more likely to pass at UK than at US companies (should such proposals indeed be needed in 
the UK, many issues may be decided differently due to the existence of the Corporate 
Governance Code and the Stewardship Code). Since such issues are oftentimes aligned with 
stakeholder concerns, asset manager capitalism in the UK is selectively introducing aspects of 
the CME model into its LME model.  
 
One of the chief assumptions made in the literature is that the ideal-type models of the varieties 
of capitalism represent self-reinforcing equilibria. The equilibria are the product of “centrifugal 
forces”, which result from institutional complementarities and lead to a bifurcation and 
hollowing out of a “dysfunctional middle ground” (Hay, 2019). Yet the behaviour of the UK 
model suggests that it is possible for countries to continually occupy positions in between the 
two poles, supporting the case made by, e.g., Amable (2003).  
 
 
Convergence or Divergence?  
With asset manager capitalism present in all three countries, the research question asks what 
consequences this will have for the corporate governance of stock market listed companies. 
Internationalisation, in principle provides the means for asset managers from different 
 334 
countries to project their influence abroad. With the largest asset managers being US domiciled 
firms, it has been suggested that this will lead to an Americanisation and thus a convergence 
of the varieties of capitalism (Harmes, 1998; Useem 1996).  
 
However, as the preceding sections have illustrated, the consequences of asset manager 
capitalism for the corporate governance of firms and thus the prospects of change are complex. 
Investors exhibit different intentions to bring about change, seek change in different directions, 
have different resource levels, including the size of their voting blocs. Their engagement will 
be conditioned by whether they are index funds or active funds, by the regulatory conditions 
they face as well as the corporate resistance they encounter.  
 
The Big Three have been shown to provide corporate executives with insulation against the 
majority of shareholder proposals brought by other investors in the US context. Proxy advisors, 
on the other hand provide a challenge to this governance vacuum. In Germany and the UK, the 
Big Three have comparatively smaller voting blocs, while the proportion of shareholder votes 
aligned with proxy advisors is comparatively larger than in the US. In short, within the rules 
of the game as set out by the respective governments, the direction and extent of change is 
determined by the relative resources of these respective actors vis- à-vis one another and the 
portfolio company. 
 
The evidence presented suggests that the UK model is diverging from the ideal-type LME pole. 
The institutional framework described above is further supported by the two-pronged 
regulatory approach of the UK government, which ensures that the greater shareholder power 
(an LME characteristic) is being employed at least in part with the aim of extending investment 
horizons and giving greater weights to sustainability considerations (CME characteristics). The 
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convergence in form that asset manager capitalism represent would therefore lead to 
expectations of a corresponding convergence in function, which would see the UK model 
doubling down on its LME attributes. Instead government policy helps to ensure a different 
outcome. While the shift in the UK model is modest, it does raise the question of whether it 
will in the future continue to be appropriate to refer to an Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. 
 
Both the UK model’s moderate convergence on the CME model, as well as Germany’s lack of 
convergence on the LME model, stand at odds with the expectation that CME countries will 
ultimately slide towards an ideal-type LME model (Goodin, 2003). Although the US and 
German varieties of capitalism both present a mostly stable picture, the underlying dynamics 
are very different. Whereas the German model shows few signs of institutional strain and thus 
largely continues to represent the stable self-enforcing equilibrium depicted by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), the US model’s apparent stability can best be understood as the result not of a 
stable equilibrium but of friction between actors resulting in policy inertia. It suggests that a 
socio-political compromise in the interpretation of fiduciary duty, one that reflects the new 
realities of asset manager capitalism has yet to be established in the US.  
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) present firms as “institution-takers” (Crouch, 2005; Deeg, 2007) yet 
the above examples of SASB and the PRI show that firms as well as asset managers (also firms) 
have agency. They are able to create or amend institutions and associations to assist them where 
needed. Institutions should therefore also be considered as resources and not simply as 
constraints (Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2005). With regards to associations, 
while neither SASB nor the PRI were created by shareholders (both resulted from civil society 
initiates), asset managers have been employing these formal institutions to their advantage, 
thereby bringing them to life. With regards to informal institutions, the discourse around 
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sustainability and fiduciary duty in the US, shows how corporates have been actively lobbying 
the SEC in order to ensure that an orthodox interpretation of fiduciary duty continues to be 
observed in the domestic context.  
 
To conclude, asset manager capitalism has been established in form in all three countries. 
However, there is no one ideal-type form of asset manager capitalism and its functioning 
therefore differs. In the US, the large index funds dominate the corporate governance 
landscape, leaving corporates to operate largely as they always have. In the UK and Germany, 
asset managers are advancing a limited number of stakeholder concerns and therefore 
increasingly challenging the conduct of domestic companies. Asset manager capitalism is 
present in all three countries but demonstrates differences in function analogous to differences 
seen in the varieties of capitalism.  
 
There has therefore been no meaningful convergence between the two ideal-type models of 
capitalism depicted by Germany and the US. The UK, on the other hand, shows what happens 
to an LME country when domestic investors and proxy advisors carry greater weight than the 
Big Three and when the regulatory institutions accommodate greater shareholder stewardship. 
While the UK system also experiences friction between shareholders and corporates, the 
regulatory framework bounds the extent to which this can unfold, leading interviewees to 
consider the UK model to be the best-in-class representation of corporate governance. 386 
Because the UK approach occupies a middle ground between a shareholder-centric and a 
 
386 ESG portfolio manager, UK asset manager, in-person interview, 15 April 2015. 
     Governance expert, European proxy advisor, in-person interview, 5 October 2018. 
     Governance expert, German asset manager, telephone interview, 9 April 2018. 
     Two governance expert, UK asset manager, telephone interview, 25 September 2018. 
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stakeholder-centric model, the UK no longer represents an ideal-type representation of the 
LME model in the sphere of corporate governance. 
 
 
Reflections on the future of asset management capitalism 
Globally the Big Three asset managers enjoy a commanding lead in assets under management, 
particularly within index investing, which has been the primary driver of their recent asset 
growth. Since index investing with its lower fee base is likely to continue to take market share 
from active managers, the market share of the Big Three is likely to continue to grow going 
forward. The significance of the Big Three in determining how asset manager capitalism 
impacts national governance models is therefore likely to increase even further.  
 
Two diametrically opposed scenarios appear most likely. In the first scenario index investing 
continues to grow, accelerating at a fast rate also in Europe. In the US this would cement the 
special role of the Big Three further strengthening their ability to insulate managers from the 
pressures of other shareholders. In Europe too, the Big Three will continue to grow to the point 
where they will be able to provide a similar level of insulation to European corporates as they 
are for US corporates. Although it is unlikely that any established governance reforms would 
be unwound in this scenario, further reform is likely to be limited.  
 
In the second scenario, index investing also continues to grow, but the approach of the Big 
Three changes. In this scenario, the Big Three reconceptualise their role as universal owners 
and stewards of the commons, likely because of one of the following two reasons. Either there 
is an explicit change to US governmental regulations that seek to adjust the way in which US 
asset managers steward their portfolio companies, akin to the one observable in the UK and 
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Germany, or the Big Three adjust their stewardship approach because they expect this to lead 
to a better financial outcome for themselves and/or their customers. 
 
Advances in the understanding of the financial materiality of sustainability concerns may result 
in changed stewardship priorities. Over the longer-term these changed priorities can lead to 
better portfolio returns for portfolios and thus for the customers of the asset management firms. 
Alternatively, the Big Three may consider greater incorporation of sustainability criteria to be 
in the interest of their own public perception and thus their social license to operate. Lately an 
increasing number of public challenges to their social license to operate have manifested 
themselves in a growing number of protests, similar in nature to the protests outside 
BlackRock’s offices in numerous countries around the world, including the occupation of the 
firm’s Paris office in 2020. A more responsible image may help to protect the reputation and 
also to attract new assets. In this scenario it may be that all of the Big Three alter their approach, 
or it may be that they take opposing stances on a growing number of issues.  
 
To date anecdotal evidence suggests that the second scenario is more likely. State Street has 
already begun to support a greater number of shareholder proposals than either BlackRock or 
Vanguard. Also, while Vanguard and BlackRock provide almost blanket support for US 
corporates, the tone of BlackRock’s public messaging is changing. Although we continue to 
await BlackRock’s proxy voting behaviour to align with these public statements, the absence 
of an equivalent change in the tone of Vanguard is conspicuous. It may therefore be that we 
witness a bifurcation of the index investing landscape with State Street and BlackRock 
adopting more sustainable policies, and Vanguard deliberately holding their line in order to 
capture the part of the customer base that does not recognise a greater role for sustainability. 
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With fees almost at zero, asset managers will be looking for other ways to differentiate their 
product offering.   
 
Motivated by a renewed sense of financial materiality and spurred on by protests, the most 
promising way by which the Big Three may pivot to address issues of sustainability appears to 
be through the Sustainable Accountancy Board (SASB).387 Doing so avoids the potential 
conflict of interest that may otherwise arise between asset managers’ social license to operate 
and the fiduciary duty they hold to their investors (Jahnke, 2019b). Rissman and Kearney 
(2019) explain that federal security laws are grounded in the principle of disclosure. Yet what 
is of “materiality” and should therefore be disclosed has been the focus of US Supreme Court 
deliberations in 1976 and 1988. Ultimately, the SEC “has gone beyond the Supreme Court in 
favoring a restricted version of disclosure based solely on financial, short-term considerations 
of materiality” (Rissman and Kearney, 2019: 10162). In the US the concept of materiality and 
thus of disclosure is therefore exposed to similar controversy as fiduciary duty. This is where 
SASB’s standards have the potential to be game-changing.  
 
“Disclosure may soon be vastly improved with finalization of the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board’s financially material social and 
environmental reporting standards. While the standards are voluntary, the fact 
that they have been endorsed as “material” by many of the world’s largest 
investment advisers will transform them into legally action-able standards” 
(Rissman and Kearney, 2019: 10155). 
 
387 SASB, founded in 2011, is a non-profit organisation whose primary aim is to construct a set of sustainability 
standards for use in official SEC filings.  SASB was founded by Jean Rogers and is the result of research she 
conducted with fellow academics at Harvard University’s Initiative for Responsible Investment. For further 
details, see: https://www.sasb.org/governance/ and https://rogersassociatesllc.com/index.php/about-me/ 




While SASB has not been founded by asset management firms, through the acceptance and 
support that asset managers are providing to its mission, asset managers have effectively 
created a new organisation outside of the domestic US governance landscape with the potential 
to shift the US domestic balance of power and break the policy deadlock. To ensure that such 
voluntary standards are nevertheless of consequence for corporate executives, requires a 
majority of asset managers to demand them. And here there are signs that the Big Three are 
ready to throw their weight behind it.  
 
In Larry Fink’s 2020 CEO letter, BlackRock’s CEO explains that SASB “provides a clear set 
of standards for reporting sustainability information across a wide range of issues” and that 
“[i]n the absence of robust disclosures, investors, including BlackRock, will increasingly 
conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk”.388 Continuing in bold formatting, 
the letter states that BlackRock “will be increasingly disposed to vote against management and 
board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related 
disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them”.389 
 
In the future SASB may therefore provide additional exogenous incentives to change, while 
simultaneously decreasing the level of insulation provided by the Big Three. With regards to 
the US corporate governance framework, depicted in Figure 38 below, this would have the 
effect of thinning the arrow between the Big Three and the US firm (vs. how it is depicted in 
Figure 37 above), as the level of insolation they would be able to provide would be bounded 
by the standards set out by SASB. If the Big Three were to become substantially more 
 




supportive of environmental, social and political shareholder proposals, the meaning of the 
arrow could indeed switch (from insulation to criticism). In this case we would be a big step 
closer towards asset manager capitalism representing a convergence in function across the three 
countries. 
 
Figure 38: Actors and institutions in the corporate governance of US asset manager capitalism 
 
 
As an interviewee explained, what makes SASB such a promising option is that it has set out 
a “materiality map”, which lists what is and what is not material from the perspective of its 
signatories and therefore leaves no room for interpretation.390 Shareholders will therefore be 
able to tell what companies are failing to meet the standards and vote against their directors. 
The fact that BlackRock’s endorsement of a standard such as SASB is effectively able to turn 
it into a universally accepted standard, underlines the central role it plays in the institutional 
architecture of asset manager capitalism.  
 
 
390 Governance expert, NGO, in-person interview, 27 June 2019.  
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There have also been technical proposals to completely eliminate the “agency cost of agency 
capitalism” (Gilson and Gordon, 2013), which results from two interlocking fiduciary 
relationships, the first being between the corporation and the asset manager and now a second 
between the asset manager and the ultimate beneficial owner (Rohr, 2018). The aim of such 
proposals is to create an “investor suffrage movement” (Holton, 2006) that passes the proxy 
voting decisions (“pass-through voting”) from the asset manager through to ultimate beneficial 
owner (Fisch, 2020; Griffin, 2020a; Taub, 2009). Yet it is likely that such solutions will not 
achieve their desired goals.  
 
Those seeking greater shareholder say in corporate governance are likely to be disappointed by 
the low voting participation of retail investors, which estimates put at between 12.6 percent 
(Broadridge, 2015) and 32 percent (Brav et al., 2019). This system would therefore merely lead 
to a renewed dispersion of stock ownership. Those hoping for a greater support of ESG 
proposals are similarly likely to be disappointed by the fact that data on retail investors’ voting 
behaviour suggests that they vote with management on almost 90 percent of the votes that they 
submit (Brav et al., 2019).  
 
Instead what appears more promising are initiatives to improve the transparency of mutual 
funds’ voting decisions to their beneficial owners. One suggestion is to have multiple funds 
tracking the same index but following different proxy voting guidelines (Rao, 2017). This 
would require mutual funds to stop voting all their shares as one “mutual fund family” (Lipton, 
2017), a feature that an interviewee noted they were considering introducing in the coming 
years.391 A simple way to ensure actionable transparency of mutual fund voting intentions, has 
been suggested by McRitchie (2019), who argues that mutual funds should publish their voting 
 
391 Corporate governance expert, German asset manager, in-person interview, 9 January 2020.  
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intentions in real time, enabling beneficial owners to move their investments if they note a 
discrepancy with how they want to have their fund holdings voted.  
 
Despite the promising work of SASB, and on a more general level, one nevertheless needs to 
keep in mind that the ability, and perhaps the willingness, of shareholders to provide extensive 
oversight of corporate conduct has limits. Despite the signs of change, conflicts of interest as 
well as marketing considerations will limit the extent to which asset managers will bring about 
change at corporates. There will always remain a strong role for government regulatory 
oversight. Lipton therefore argues for the necessity of more comprehensive reporting 
requirements as well as a need to make corporate reporting more easily understood so that it 
can be used by other stakeholders, besides shareholders, to “maintain social control over 
corporate behaviour” (2019: 1). 
 
 
Asset Manager Capitalism and the implications for workers 
The growth of the asset management sector has changed the relative strength of shareholders 
versus corporate management and other stakeholders from a game theory perspective. With 
executives giving greater consideration to stakeholder concerns, for workers this is on balance 
a negative development as corporate executives are likely to assume institutional investors have 
a preference for short-term value maximisation, unless otherwise stated. The fact that 
institutional investors in the UK and Germany have voiced comparatively greater support for 
sustainability considerations will moderate negative outcomes to some extent.  
 
The increased size of institutional investors, however, also makes them more vulnerable to 
public opinion. Figure 39 below shows the rapid rise in the media’s attention to BlackRock and 
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Vanguard. This rise has loosely tracked the increase in their assets. Academic research, in 
particular by Fichtner et al. (2017), has contributed to this increased attention.  
 
Figure 39: Newspaper Articles per year mentioning BlackRock or Vanguard Group 
 
Source: DiscoverEd, Edinburgh University online library search 
 
The result is that NGOs and governments are today aware of the latent power of asset managers. 
With the spotlight increasingly on their policy preferences, this thesis has made the case that 
asset managers will need to give greater consideration to their social license to operate. 
Whether or not this transfer is beneficial or detrimental to workers’ interests will depend on 
whether asset managers are themselves more easily influenced than corporate executives 
hitherto.  
 
The problem for workers seeking the support of asset managers is that the diversification that 
results from index investment has mostly removed the stock specific risk from asset managers’ 
portfolio, leaving only systematic risks. As discussed in Chapter 6, the large index fund 
companies are to date not recognising inequality as a systematic risk requiring their 
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intervention. Evidence of this is provided by the 2020 shareholder vote at Amazon.com Inc., 
which saw employees and shareholders including the state pension funds from New York, 
California and Illinois urging Amazon to release more data on employee safety.392  
 
SEC voting records, however, show that BlackRock and Vanguard voted all ballot items with 
management and against the shareholder proposals.393 Similar challenges remain outside of the 
US also, as social concerns remain largely neglected. Here too, however, regulation has taken 
up some of the slack left by investors. In the UK, for example, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
has introduced new reporting requirements mandating corporations to annually report on how 
they identify and mitigate modern slavery in their business and supply chain (Cousins et al., 
2020). 
 
Motivated by agency-theory, shareholder engagement initially targeted greater shareholder 
rights, focussing on the “G” in ESG.394 More recently, as a result of the climate breakdown, the 
“E” has taken over much of the limelight. Social considerations, the “S” in ESG, however, 
remains largely overlooked. Interviewees have explained that this is in part because social 
issues differ not only between countries but also from industry to industry, making standard 
setting more complicated than with governance or environmental issues, which can more easily 
be applied across the board.395  
 
 
392 For further information, see: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/25/amazon-shareholder-meeting-investors-
want-worker-safety-disclosures.html (Accessed 2 November 2020). 
393 For BlackRock voting results, see: https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-20-232474/, for Vanguard 
voting results, see: https://vds.issgovernance.com/vds/#/MjAxMA==/ (Accessed 2 November 2020). 
394 See also: https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/finding-the-s-in-esg-boardroom-and-40332/ (Accessed 2 
November 2020). 
395 Portfolio manager, German asset manager, in-person interview, 4 November 2019.  
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To date “[m]ost U.S. mainstream institutional asset managers/owners and pension funds have 
not acted on human trafficking and slavery due to a lack of knowledge about the issues, 
companies, and financial risks involved, as well as a lack of focus on human rights/labor rights 
more generally (in contrast to SRIs/faith-based investors)” (Responsible Sourcing Network, 
2018). In developed countries, workers will in the future need to apply pressure to both 
corporate executives as well as asset managers, in order to respond to the shift in the balance 
of power towards shareholders.  
 
The events at Amazon.com are just one example of this already happening today. Webber 
(2018) describes this approach as labour’s “last best weapon.” Without concerted efforts by 
labour representatives to engage with shareholders and to increase public pressure on them 
whenever engagement fails, the consequences of asset manager capitalism will likely be 
negative for the interests of workers. Labour’s ability to engage is, of course, a function of the 
resources they have available, which in turn are the result mostly of trade unions. Countries 
with lower trade union membership are thus likely to endure more adverse results from asset 
manager capitalism.  
 
 
Generalizability beyond the three case study countries 
Davis and Kim note that “[u]nlike franchise restaurants, financial markets do not come with a 
handbook that ensures uniformity” (2015: 30). Although there is no such handbook that sets 
out a uniform set of corporate governance rules for how national models should function, this 
thesis has shown that certain commonalities of form ensure that the asset management 




Central to any such analysis is the need to differentiate between different investor types. First 
consideration has to be given to the extent of shareholder ownership concentration, which is 
primarily determined by the relative shareholdings of individual investors, company insiders 
and institutional investors. This will determine the overall extent to which shareholders are 
able to influence corporate policies.  
 
Amongst institutional investors it is essential to differentiate between different investor groups. 
There are those investors that set out the policy agenda, these are typically either activist hedge 
funds or domestic investors that have a strong environmental and/or social agenda. Then there 
are the proxy advisors, whose influence increases with the percentage of the domestic market 
held by index funds and by foreigners. Finally, there are the big index fund companies, who 
for the most part vote with management, though also take account of the local context, so may 
side with domestic investors against corporate management. Besides these investors, central 
banks and sovereign wealth funds may play a role in certain markets. Their role was not 
discussed in this thesis, as neither the UK, the US nor Germany currently have sovereign wealth 
funds nor central banks that are buyers of equities.  
 
The way in which asset manager capitalism influences the national institutional framework of 
any individual country will be determined by the relative shareholdings between these different 
investor groups, as well as by the national regulatory environment, and the scope that this 
provides for corporates to push back against investors’ demands.  
 
Table 11 below provides an international context to ownership concentration, the holdings of 
the Big Three and domestic central banks, the state and sovereign wealth funds respectively. 
The table illustrates a strong inverse relationship between ownership concentration and the 
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ownership stakes of the Big Three. To some extent this is not surprising as there is a degree of 
endogeneity from the fact that that ownership sums to 100% and any part controlled by 
blockholders cannot be held by the Big Three asset managers. However, this does not explain 
the extent of the correlation (-0,80).  
 
Table 11: Share ownership of the 5 largest companies in each country by investor type 
 
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations, as of 30 October 2020.396  
 
Instead the reason for this is to be found in institutional investors’ preference for liquidity as 
well as good corporate governance. These investor preferences are in turn reflected in index 
providers’ index rules. Fichtner et al. (2019) explain that index providers typically determine 
the weight of a company’s stock by the ‘free float’ of the market capitalisation. That is rather 
than weighing the company by its total market capitalisation, only those shares that are in 
principal freely traded are included in the weighting.  
 
In other words, index providers discriminate against blockholders such as the shareholdings of 
founders or strategic holdings of other corporates or by the state. The result is that countries 
with large block holdings, such as Norway, Russia and China will receive smaller weightings 
in global equity indices as their companies have a smaller free float market capitalisation. Since 
 
396 Table shows the shareholdings in the five largest companies by market capitalisation in each of the respective 
countries. Data for government ownership in China is not provided as distinguishing between the many quasi-
governmental institutions proved too uncertain.   
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the holdings of the Big Three largely result from their index funds, the Big Three in turn have 
smaller holdings in countries with greater blockholdings.  
 
For companies seeking capital from index funds, this thus provides an incentive to reduce 
longer-term blockholders, with the potential for knock-on effects for their home countries 
(Fichtner et al., 2019). Furthermore, since market capitalisation is a function of the shares a 
company has issued and the price they trade at, valuation is a determining factor. Growth 
companies typically trade on higher multiples of their earnings than “old economy” companies, 
thus arguably further disadvantaging countries that have smaller technology and biotech 
sectors (which of course themselves are oftentimes the result of the availability of venture 
capital).  
 
However, whereas index inclusion may provide incentives for companies to change their 
governance structure to attract additional capital, the index rules that penalise blockholders also 
ensure that the extent to which US index funds invest in a highly concentrated company  or 
country is reduced from the outset, thus limiting the extent to which US asset managers can 
take direct influence over such companies. Norway therefore is an interesting case as its high 
domestic blockholdings (mainly government stakes) provide a degree of insulation from 
foreign index investors, while their own sovereign wealth fund invests globally, itself spreading 
the country’s individual flavour of sustainable investment.   
 
With regards to Brazil it is noteworthy that average ownership concentration is in-line with 
that seen in the UK and the US. Indeed, other large US Investors such as Capital Group are 
also large shareholders in the country and if one were to include them in Table 11, the 
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shareholder structure in the US and Brazil would be largely identical. In Japan, Norway, Russia 
and China on the other hand, large domestic government holdings continue to this date.397  
 
In terms of the generalizability of the results of this thesis, irrespective of country, the rule 
holds that the context matters. The presence of sovereign wealth funds or central banks in the 
domestic equity market will affect both the size of asset managers’ shareholdings as well as 
the national governance discourse and thus the issues that are put to a shareholder vote. 
Nevertheless, the same dynamics between local and international institutional investors and 
between the Big 3 and other mutual fund companies are likely to hold. These will result in 
substantial variation in outcomes from the US.  
 
The UK and Germany should not be considered as special cases but examples of how asset 
manager capitalism functions in countries that do not consider sustainability considerations to 
represent a conflict with fiduciary duty obligations and in which the Big 3 do not hold 
shareholdings sufficiently large to insulate corporate managers from the concerns of other 
shareholders.  
 
Since the trend towards index investing appears unstoppable for now, the potential influence 
of the largest asset managers is very likely to increase further in the years to come in all 
countries with active stock markets. Whether this development is beneficial or detrimental for 
the interests of workers and society more generally, will depend to a large extent on how the 
Big 3 conceive of their corporate governance role going forward. At its core, asset manager 
capitalism represents a transfer of influence to shareholders. This influence comes at the cost 
 
397 For information on the growing governance role of sovereign wealth funds, see Aguilera et al. (2016), Clark 
and Dixon (2017) and Gilson and Milhaupt (2008). For central banks, see Charoenwong et al. (2019) and van ‘t 
Klooster and Fontan (2019). 
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of corporate management but also indirectly at the cost of other stakeholders, particularly 
workers, as investors capture a greater share of executives’ attention.  
 
From the perspective of company management this shift in the balance of power is complex. 
On the one hand, if rising index fund market share results in less involved shareholders this 
reduces interference in the day-to-day decision making. On the other hand, the increased 
ownership concentration means that if executives slip up, shareholders will more easily find 
the needed majority to remove management teams or agree to takeovers etc. On balance this is 
likely to make them more attentive to shareholder interests. Whether shareholders actually 
express these interests or not is secondary. The common ownership literature shows that 




This thesis set out to investigate the influence of asset managers on corporate governance and 
the varieties of capitalism in the UK, the US and Germany. Specifically, it sought to determine 
the consequences of the changes in shareholder ownership structure for the corporate 
governance of stock market listed companies. The preceding sections have highlighted that the 
convergence in form, with asset managers dominating the shareholder ownership structure in 
all three countries, has as yet not been matched by a corresponding convergence in function. 
Instead the varieties of capitalism seen in Germany and the US have revealed considerable 
functional continuity. Indeed, the UK model suggests that rather than resulting in a further 
reinforcement of LME attributes, asset manager capitalism can have the effect of moderating 
LME models by raising the profile of other stakeholders. 
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Functional diversity remains because asset manager capitalism encounters different national 
institutional frameworks, which mediate its respective functioning. In short: asset managers 
behave differently in different countries. Corporate interviewees noted that European investors 
exhibited longer investment horizons than their US peers, thus indicating that patience 
continues to show national variations, even post the establishment of asset manager 
capitalism.398 European investors were also noted to be bigger supporters of environmental, 
social and political shareholder proposals, suggesting that they, and not the large US asset 
managers, are the primary agents of change to date.  
 
Instead of facilitating the Americanisation of the global investment management industry 
towards a model focused on shareholder value maximisation, the rise of the asset management 
industry creates the opportunity for a greater consideration of other stakeholders’ concerns. 
The extent to which this transformation has materialised differs from country to country and is 
dependent on the national institutional context.  
 
The intensity of the US corporate resistance suggests that the US model of governance is the 
one most at odds with the new asset manager capitalism, though it has yet to be successfully 
challenged by asset managers. The fact that the country whose governance model gave birth to 
the concept of shareholder value should be the one experiencing the greatest strain as a result 
of asset manager capitalism at first appears to represent a paradox. Yet, the finding that the 
 
398 Corporate secretary, head of investor relations, US company, telephone interview, 22nd of February 2018. 
Note also reports in the German press documenting how German asset managers came to the aid of the 
embattled, and ultimately fraudulent, Wirecard AG. Preferring to trust a German corporate executive over 




qPQp4a5dScSPkdpkWSpH-ap3 (Accessed 15 November 2020). 
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governance model that attributes the greatest significance to the interests of shareholders 
should also be the one most exposed to changes in the identity of shareholders is in fact logical. 
 
Critics have suggested that the conceptual framework provided by the varieties of capitalism 
is too coarse as a conceptual framework to account for such incremental change (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; 2009). Yet, as the previous chapters have shown the analytical toolbox it 
provides is effective when assessing the nature of the changes resulting from asset manager 
capitalism. Hall and Soskice (2001) expect economies to respond differently to international 
pressures. They foresee LME economies as likely to pressure governments for deregulation 
and predict that “government is likely to be sympathetic because the comparative advantage of 
the economy as a whole rests on the effectiveness of market mechanisms” (2001: 57).  
 
For CME economies, on the other hand, they predict that governments will be less supportive 
of deregulation as it threatens the country’s comparative institutional advantage. They thus 
anticipate a “bifurcated response marked by widespread deregulation in liberal market 
economies and limited movement in coordinated market economies” (2001: 58). Change will 
unfold in this way because “much of the adjustment process will be oriented to the institutional 
recreation of comparative advantage” (2001: 63).  
 
These predictions of Hall and Soskice (2001) that there is unlikely to be radical change and 
that countries will double down on their respective strengths in order to retain or recreate their 
comparative advantage, conform well to the developments documented in this thesis. 
Corporates in the US are indeed pushing the government for greater deregulation, although 
ironically they are also pushing the SEC for increased regulation of asset managers and proxy 
advisors. At the same time the German and European governments have adopted a corporate 
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governance framework that pursues a two-pronged approach that seeks to ensure that financial 
markets retain a focus on the longer term and also account for the concerns of other 
stakeholders besides shareholders.  
  
The changes to the UK corporate governance framework, however, appear to run contrary to 
the predictions of Hall and Soskice (2001). Rather than the UK responding to 
internationalisation with further deregulation of its corporate governance framework, it has 
adopted a joint stewardship approach that increases the regulatory burden on both corporate 
executives and shareholders alike.  
 
The divergent approaches of the UK and US governments are, however, not a new 
development. Instead, as Professor Kay explains, US corporate governance has been 
management-friendly from the start as a result of the fact that different states compete to attract 
company registrations (resulting in a race to the bottom with regards to corporate governance). 
In the UK, on the other hand, the Companies Act reflects a deliberate compromise between 
competing groups.399 Hall and Soskice (2001) thus saw greater commonality between the 
American and British models of capitalism than were present at the time. 
 
This distinction is often neglected in a literature that mostly overstates the role of shareholders 
within US and UK corporate governance. The implication of this is that the divergent 
approaches of the UK and US regulators, and thus of their respective national varieties of asset 
manager capitalism, are in part also the result of inherent differences in their political and legal 
systems. 
 
399 For conference details, see: https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/sustainable-finance/events/GRASFI-
Conference-Programme-2019.pdf (Accessed 20 October 2019) 
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Besides highlighting differences in the respective resources of asset managers and corporates 
in Germany, the UK and the US, the previous chapters have included a selection of the many 
pieces of policy analysis that NGOs such as Majority Action (2019) and ShareAction (2020) 
have produced in recent months. The scrutiny of such social activists, and the public pressure 
that results from it, will also play an important role in determining how the policies of the Big 
Three develop in the coming years and, therefore, also what direction the respective varieties 
of capitalism will develop in. 
 
 
“If today’s activism, which is visible but low, becomes a fundamental 
challenge to accepted ways of doing things, the fight will move from the 
economic to the political arena, where politics will settle it” (Roe, 1994: vii). 
 
The above quote from Roe (1994) predicts that tensions between rising shareholder activism 
and corporate interests will ultimately be resolved in the political arena. His book (Roe, 1994) 
further highlights the relevance of corporate governance to the national political system and at 
the same time demonstrates the centrality of the national political context for the evolution of 
the system of corporate governance. Separately, Amable (2016) reminds us that 
complementarities within the varieties of capitalism should be understood as socio-political 
compromises.  
 
The private ordering combat (Hill, 2018) that is evident in the present day US corporate 
governance context suggests the US has yet to reach a new compromise that reflect the many 
new realities of asset manager capitalism. The fact that the above quote by Roe (1994) is more 
than a quarter of a century old, suggests such political processes take a long time to come to 
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fruition. The direction in which future change occurs will therefore depend on both the 
approach of the national government as well as the institutional reality, that is the relative 
resources of the different actors (corporates, index funds, active funds, proxy advisors and 
governments). 
 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) highlight the “undersocialized view of corporate governance” that 
results from the fact that agency theory fails to account for differences between countries and 
for how corporate governance is shaped by its institutional embeddedness. Hence, they 
conclude that “the unmet theoretical challenge, in comparative studies, remains to 
conceptualize corporate governance in terms of its embeddedness in different social contexts” 
(2003: 449). I hope to have contributed to closing this research gap with this thesis. 
 
The rise of the asset management industry is of fundamental relevance for the varieties of 
capitalism as it suggests that shareholders may in the future set the agenda on an increasing 
number of key policy items. Contrary to the common narrative, asset manager capitalism 
represents the first time in over a century that shareholders have the potential to take over the 
reins of the economy from corporate executives. Understanding who these new shareholders 
are, what drives them, and how they interact with other actors in the new institutional 
framework is of relevance for all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and will help determine 
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